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Abstract 
 
This thesis lies in the broader topic of the impact of external intervention on the 
interstate crises and conflicts and each one's duration. The purpose of this study is to 
address the gaps and contradictions in the related literature. This study achieves this 
purpose by investigating the factors that drive the duration of intrastate conflicts, and 
understand why and how the duration of such conflicts may be affected by the role of 
regional third-party interveners. It focuses primarily on understanding the factors 
underlying the duration of the Darfur crisis in Sudan by analysing the Gaddafi regime’s 
role in that crisis during the 2003–11 period. This dissertation investigates the 
association between the long duration of the crisis and Libyan involvement as a major 
regional third party, as a form of crisis management and as an aspect of the international 
management of internal conflicts.  
In doing so a number of questions were asked regarding the causes of the Darfur Crisis 
and how they impacted on its duration: what were key Libyan national incentives and 
agenda behind the Gaddafi regime involvement in the Darfur Crisis; how did the scale of 
Libyan involvement effectiveness relate to the duration of the crisis in addition to Libyan 
mechanisms and techniques used; and how might the regime change in Libya affect the 
resolution of the crisis? In this respect, a new theoretical model was developed from the 
literature to show the theoretical relationship between external/regional third-party 
intervention in internal conflicts and the likelihood of ending these conflicts in shorter or 
longer time. Hypotheses were developed and tested based on the relationships identified 
in the model.  
It has been found that the causes of the rebellion in Darfur are multiple and complicated, 
internal and external, political and economic, social and environmental. All these factors 
have had a significant impact on the eruption of the Darfur Crisis and its continuation. 
Thus, any attempts to end this crisis without taking all these dimensions into 
consideration would be quite meaningless and ineffective. Each regional and extra-
regional actor significantly sought to guide the violence in the direction which would 
allow them to gain certain outcomes. The major research finding was that when an 
external state becomes (in)directly involved with military, economic or diplomatic 
manoeuvres with a separate agenda that is independent of the motivations of the 
domestic fighters, parties, in an intrastate conflict that involves ethnic and tribal societies, 
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and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, the 
likelihood of prolonging the duration of the conflict is greater. These developed 
hypotheses were tested and explained by utilising a qualitative case study of Libyan 
involvement in the Darfur Crisis. This thesis then shows how the Libyan intervention 
(under the Gaddafi regime), exactly in line with our developed model, has prolonged the 
duration of the Darfur Crisis in Sudan. This thesis demonstrates that the Gaddafi regime 
has its own agenda, interests, and ambitions in the Darfur region, and its involvement 
was a key factor in prolonging the duration of the crisis there. The key incentive behind 
the Libyan strategy of interference in the Darfur crisis over the past decade or so was 
founded on the basis of Gaddafi’s desire “to gain from the conflict, not to resolve the 
conflict.” It is found that Gaddafi appears to have played one of the most complex and 
ambiguous roles in the crisis as it was dual in nature, and at different times showed how 
the Libyan leadership influenced the parties to the crisis in Darfur in different ways and 
levels.  
The originality of this thesis lies in both what is studied and how it is studied. This study 
simultaneously combines and employs two different types of literature: material focusing 
on the Crisis’ historical roots, its domestic, regional, and international implications; and 
distinguished studies relating to the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis that 
address the impact of external intervention on the internal crises and conflicts and who 
long they last. This a comprehensive technique of looking at and analysing primary and 
secondary data is, to the best of our knowledge, new and has not been used in any other 
study in the literature. In short, this study contributes to our understanding the causes of 
the outbreak of the Darfur Crisis and factors underlying its continuation, as well as why 
the crisis has been prolonged for over ten years. Furthermore, the study analyses the 
strategies variability to advance knowledge in the field of crisis management. This study 
attempts to address a gap in the literature which, broadly speaking discusses the impact 
of outside third parties on the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. This study 
concludes that the adoption of this particular model would increase the probability of 
domestic and international dissension-makers and mediators of minimising the worst 
negative effects of external state intervention on the possibility of making internal crises 
and conflicts last longer. Both the limitations and the implications of this research as 
well as recommendations are given, along with possible directions for future research. 
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Introduction 
___________________________________________________ 
Historical analysis has shown that both domestic and international political crises 
have always been amongst the most fundamental factors in motivating change and 
development within and between states. States that have adopted effective strategies 
for crisis management tend to be more stable and capable in domestic and 
international relations. On the other hand, states that employ non-systematic 
management styles have suffered from instability (Fars 2005). Moreover, developing 
states that practise ineffective methods of crisis management are usually more 
severely affected when an emergency occurs. In the contemporary era, internal 
conflict has become more volatile, possessing greater potential to destabilise 
domestic politics, due to the uneven implementation of improvised crisis 
management methods. 
Today’s world is characterised by increasing levels of complex interdependence, in 
the political, economic and socio-cultural spheres (Keohane and Nye Jr 2000). As a 
result, there is greater potential for national friction to have an international effect 
and vice versa. This suggests that it is increasingly important to use rationalised 
approaches to crisis management at the domestic and international levels (Conteh-
Morgan 2001). Crisis suppression is a principal organisational function of both state 
and non-state legislators. Failure in this area can result in serious harm to 
stakeholders and losses for the parties involved – including individuals (Coombs 
2011). The civil war in Sudan (1955 – 1972 / 1983 – 2005), which took place mostly 
in the southern parts of Sudan, which is known today as State of Southern Sudan, is 
one of the longest wars in the modern era. At one level the conflict exemplifies the 
problem of national disunity, which is broadly characterised as a conflict between the 
Arab Muslim north and the non-Muslim south. 
 In early 2003, a time when the majority of analysts and scholars assumed that an end 
had come to the problem of southern Sudan – which had lasted for more than two 
decades and led to considerable losses on both sides, upset the political and social 
stability in neighbouring countries and complicated relations between Sudan and its 
neighbours – a new conflict commenced in Darfur in western Sudan (Niama 2005). 
The hostilities were associated with two main parties. Firstly, the Sudanese military 
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using the Janjaweed militia represented one side. The second main faction comprised 
two armed, non-Arab groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and 
Equality Movement. The crisis emerged as an internal Sudanese dispute, concerned 
with tribal land possession, between settled tribes/communities resident in the area 
(the Masalit, the Fur, and the Zaghawa) and nomadic tribes that rely on the grazing 
of livestock for their livelihood. Climate change and limited resources of fresh water, 
which the Darfur region has witnessed for some years, represent key contributing 
factors to the hostilities (Quach 2004).  
The government of Sudan (GoS) and its allied Janjaweed militia have been accused 
of perpetrating consistent and widespread violations of human rights, such as murder, 
rape, torture, unjust arrests, theft, the burning of villages, and the deliberate 
destruction of crops and livestock (Amnesty International 2010). In addition, the 
Janjaweed has been accused of attacking people who are not Arab to force them to 
relocate (IRIN 2003). The rebel groups have also been accused of committing serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to 
war crimes (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005, p. 4). This armed 
conflict has left more than 300,000 dead. An estimated 2.7 million civilians have 
been internally displaced and an estimated 300,000 have fled over the borders to 
neighbouring countries, such as Chad (Aljazeera net, 2014; Better World Campaign, 
2014).  
This situation led to a humanitarian catastrophe in the Darfur area which reflects the 
fragility of the GoS and the inability of the authorities to deal with the crisis. 
However, the intensity of the conflict and its development have dramatically 
escalated. The brutal conflict, atrocities, and ensuing humanitarian disaster have 
come to be seen by many observers as an ethnic conflict between Arab and African 
tribes, in which the Arabs seek to carry out ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab 
population in the region, with the support of the GoS. By mid-2004, the crisis had 
taken a central place in global media and political discourse. Following the failure of 
national conflict resolution methods, international efforts to end the crisis and to 
address the underlying causes of the dispute increased (Hassan 2010). 
It took a long time before the GoS and the rebel movements agreed that a peace 
process should go ahead. Urgent action was needed in order to reduce opposition to 
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humanitarian relief efforts and to stop the slaughter of innocent civilians (especially 
women and children), to prevent the destruction of property, and of course, to 
eventually end the crisis (Abiodun 2011). Over a decade has passed since this peace 
process began. Unfortunately, neither the international community represented by the 
United Nations (UN) nor regional actors, such as Chad, Libya, and Egypt, have been 
able to persuade the GoS and the rebel groups to engage in a process of dialogue and 
a peaceful settlement (Hassan 2010). One begins to be apprehensive as to whether 
there can be an end to the crisis in the near future. The continuous war in Sudan 
portends a gloomy future for the whole of the region. Therefore, analysis of this 
particular crisis offers an opportunity to explore an existing crisis situation and 
relevant armed conflict management literature, and to offer conclusions on the 
quality of different management approaches.  
Often in international relations, states can be categorised as either winners or losers 
in any given moment of an event or issue. In this respect, crises can be regarded as 
presenting an ideal opportunity for change, whether for better or worse. Therefore, 
states tend to have or seek to have well-organised crisis management strategies and 
systems, and are able to take advantage of such crises to maximise their benefits. 
From the crisis management perspective, scholars should not ignore the fact that the 
actors involved in crises may resort to creating a crisis atmosphere during their 
attempt to stop or interrupt key activities, or to destabilise normal activity in order to 
change the situation to preserve their interests (Mickler 2009, p. 3). These can be 
called pseudo-crises (Rosenthal 1997). The modern crises often do not recognise 
national borders, and can be more frequent and costly, both financially and socially 
in some regions (Del Rio 2007, p. 9). 
In this context, the Darfur Crisis can be regarded as a model case in the investigation 
of internal crisis management within an international context. The interest lies in the 
diversity of its dimensions and the discrepancies between domestic and international 
mechanisms and resolutions (Niama 2005). Recently, scholars have begun focusing 
on the influence of external third-party interventions on the duration of civil conflicts, 
instead of limiting their analyses solely to the diplomatic instruments and their 
effectiveness in ending the internal conflict efforts (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and 
Joyce 2008). The basic expectations of outside intervention, whether diplomatic, 
military or economic, are that it would shorten the conflict's expected time-span and 
 4 
 
the key motivation of this intervention is to manage the civil armed conflict 
effectively (Gates and Strand 2004).  
Given the wide variation in the duration of intrastate warfare, understanding why and 
how some end within days or months, while others last for years or decades, is a 
significant issue (Fearon 2004). The debate also includes the final formula employed 
to end the conflict, whether it is via negotiation or a decisive victory by one side. 
Civil war literature indicates that third-party interventions are a vital strategic action, 
regardless of whether the interveners are benevolent or malevolent (Cunningham 
2010).  
Several studies have referred to the variety of roles that can be played by external 
state participants during a civil war, from urging the parties to sit down at the 
negotiating table, offering incentives to groups to communicate, hosting mediation, 
deploying peacekeepers or peace enforcers, providing economic or military support 
to either side, to sending military forces to participate in the conflict (Gleditsch and 
Beardsley 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007; and Gleditsch 2007 
cited in Cunningham 2010). While some external protagonists might seek to end the 
Darfur crisis for humanitarian considerations, other third parties may have their own 
motives in prolonging the conflict, perhaps with a view to plundering the natural 
resources of the state, or draining the resources of a rival intervening participant 
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline 2000).  
This thesis has developed out of an attempt to understand the factors that drive the 
duration of intrastate warfare as well as analysing why and how the duration of such 
conflicts can be affected by the role of regional third-party interveners. In addition, it 
employs a particular understanding of the impact of external intervention on the 
termination of intrastate wars. To provide a better understanding of the factors 
underlying the continuation of the Darfur Crisis, and why the crisis has been 
prolonged for over ten years, this study explores the impact of regional third-party 
intervention. On this basis, the influence of Libyan involvement under the Gaddafi 
regime on the Darfur crisis and its historical development, its specific dynamics, and 
its duration are examined. This area of investigation is important since Libya has 
been one of the key external/regional third-party interveners that have played a very 
significant role over the course of the armed conflict in the Darfur region, from the 
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eruption of the crisis in 2003 until 2011 when the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli 
collapsed. Libyan intervention involved various methods, especially on the 
diplomatic level, in an attempt to find a shared strategy that could be accepted by all 
the parties to the dispute. However, the role of Gaddafi’s regime in the Darfur Crisis 
was also characterised as ambiguous and complex because it was dual in nature 
(Ronen 2011). 
 
Rationale, Aims and Research Questions 
 
The analysis that is offered is intended to help to broaden the approach which is 
currently taken by the international community. The underlying rationale is to build 
on work done previously on the principles regarding the effectiveness of third-party 
interventions on the termination of internal violent conflicts. It is hoped that this will 
assist the international community to pursue effective crisis management in cases of 
prolonged intrastate conflict. More specifically, the aim is to assess the underlying 
causes of the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. In particular, how improvements can 
be made to the governmental crisis management techniques used by groups within 
Sudan as well as the Libyan government as a third party player is looked at. 
Additionally, the internal and external factors affecting the paths and courses of 
governmental crisis management in Darfur are explored.  
In the course of this analysis, four research questions have been addressed. The first 
question considers the causes of the Darfur Crisis and how they impact on its 
duration. The second question asks what the real Libyan interests and motivations 
have been that led it to be one of the key external actors in the conflict. The third 
research question then asks whether the Libyan role/intervention influenced the 
duration of the crisis, and if so, how. Finally, considering the efforts of the GoS and 
external actors, how might the regime change in Libya affect the resolution of the 
crisis?  
The central hypothesis tested in this thesis is: Libya (under the Gaddafi regime) was 
both directly and indirectly involved in the Darfur crisis in pursuit of its own agenda 
that is separate from the agendas of the domestic combatants in Sudan. This 
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intervention prolonged the crisis and represented a key obstacle to its resolution. 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the underlying incentive behind the Libyan 
strategy of interference in the Darfur crisis was founded on the basis of Gaddafi’s 
desire to gain from the conflict, not resolve the conflict. Gaddafi’s Libya was 
deliberately keen to ensure any attempts at resolving the conflict in Darfur failed 
until his regime’s overall national goals had been achieved.  
 
Theoretical Approach and Framework 
 
Overall, this study is situated in crisis management and conflict studies, and employs 
an interpretive theory as a theoretical approach within the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). Analysing the underlying Libyan incentives and agenda in Darfur 
makes it easier to understand the relationship between the long duration of the crisis 
and the Libyan involvement as a key regional third party intervener, as a form of 
crisis management. For the purpose of addressing the research questions raised in 
this thesis, a new theoretical model has been developed to guide the theoretical 
analysis of this thesis. This model combines some of the theoretical assumptions 
found in the works of David E. Cunningham (2010) and Patrick M. Regan (2002).  
Cunningham argues that the duration of an armed civil conflict is longer when the 
key incentives of external interveners are driven by the pursuit of an independent 
agenda which differs from the agendas of the domestic combatants. Regan’s 
theoretical argument shows that outside intervention, whether military and/or 
political-economic, does not contribute to a prompt conclusion of the conflict and 
such interventions cannot be regarded as meaningful instruments of conflict 
management. Military, political and economic external interventions tend to reduce 
the likelihood that the intrastate conflict will be terminated in a short period. It is 
very noticeable that Regan’s work focuses on the type of intervention (military and 
economic) and the direct ways and strategies for intervening that either decrease or 
increase the likelihood that conflict will end in a short or long time. While 
Cunningham investigates what happens to conflict duration when an external third 
party state with an independent agenda becomes directly involved in internal armed 
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conflict. Therefore, I have observed that both Regan and Cunningham concentrated 
merely on direct third-party interventions and have ignored indirect interventions. 
Thus, this thesis explores mechanisms for indirect intervention alongside direct 
mechanisms. Moreover, this thesis does not generalise: it differentiates between the 
regional and the extra-regional state interveners which also was done by neither 
Regan nor Cunningham. The thesis argues that there is a broad difference between 
the two kinds of interveners. 
Since this thesis explores the major aspirations behind the Libyan involvement in 
managing the conflict in Darfur, as well as identifying how the techniques and 
mechanisms used by Gaddafi’s regime effected the attitudes of the internal parties in 
Sudan towards the peace process. It is found that combining both Cunningham and 
Regan’s theoretical assumptions is still an insufficient theoretical approach to cover 
all the aspects in order to answer the questions and test the hypothesis of this study. 
The further development of the theoretical model used here includes the use of 
Cunningham’s entire model, fused with some elements extracted from Regan’s 
approach, while adding theoretical assumptions about “diplomacy” and different 
forms of “indirect” intervention and the nature of regional external interveners. This 
theoretical matter is illustrated in more detail within the Theory and Methodology 
chapter. 
 
Methodology  
 
This thesis, given the nature of the issue under examination within this study and its 
diversity of dimensions, solely adopts the qualitative research strategy combined 
with an interpretive epistemological approach. This selection was driven by the fact 
that the study is an attempt to describe and understand social phenomena, rather than 
seeking to theorise from such phenomena, for an introduction to the differences 
between understanding and explaining international relations (see Hollis and Smith 
1991). Imad El-Anis (2008, pp. 88-89) asserts that methodological approaches that  
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are qualitative in nature, are fundamentally used to understand the dynamics of the 
relationships between the variables of the social phenomena. Bevir and Rhodes 
(2005) argue that an interpretive approach to political science provides accounts of 
actions and practices that are interpretations of interpretations. In addition to that 
they believe that interpretive techniques mainly focus on meanings, beliefs, and 
discourse, as opposed to laws and rules, ties between social classes, or deductive 
models (Ibid). 
Interpretive techniques, beside qualitative strategy research, were employed in this 
thesis because the underlying analytical aim is to understand why certain actors have 
formulated certain intervention policies in their responses to the Darfur Crisis. This 
thesis attempts to understand the normative context within which one actor in 
particular (Libya under the Gaddafi regime) was operating – how it shaped its 
understanding of the nature of the conflict, interests and motivations, and 
mechanisms and the behaviour of this regional actor. The types of phenomena with 
which this study is concerned – norms, motivations, actions, and interests – cannot 
easily be examined using positivist predictive theories or mathematical formulas 
because of the agency of the actor under investigation to construct its own meanings.     
The core of this thesis is centred on a case study, namely, Libyan intervention and 
the duration of the Darfur Crisis. It is expected that this case study of Libya, which 
has not been considered in the context of the impact of outside third-party 
intervention on the duration of intrastate conflicts in other academic investigations, 
will yield interesting insights into the process and practice of crisis management in 
internal conflict. The case study is particularly attractive and worth studying because 
it displays many of the classic elements of the impact of external intervention on the 
duration of internal conflicts, especially in Africa, as mapped out in chapters five and 
six. However, the major challenge to the decision to base a study of this nature on a 
single case is the tension (or apparent tension), between the general and the particular: 
to what extent can a single case study, which necessarily displays certain 
idiosyncrasies, form the basis for the formulation of a general theory?  
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The Originality of This Project  
 
The originality of this study emerges from early discoveries and from the literature 
relevant to the Darfur Crisis. It is realised that in addition to suspected external 
involvement, which might be the fundamental issue that have significantly prolonged 
the conflict, could be the role played by regional actors, such as Libya. The literature 
review of this thesis has been able to establish that the Gaddafi regime’s involvement 
in Darfur is not sufficiently covered in the existing literature relating to the Darfur 
Crisis. Previous studies, such as works by Flint and de Waal 2005; Young et al 2007; 
Behrends 2008; Mamdani 2009; De Maio 2010; Aral 2010; Abiodun 2011; Olsson 
and Valsecchi 2010; de Waal 2008; Boateng 2011; Ntsios 2012 – these sources are 
discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter – have significantly 
highlighted that the influential role played by Gaddafi’s Libya in the course of the 
events in the Darfur region is crucial to an understanding of the rebellion in Darfur 
and its longevity. However, this thesis investigates further the actual agenda, 
motivations, and mechanisms adopted by the Gaddafi regime in its interference in the 
Darfur conflict. It also assesses the Gaddafi’s influence on the parties of the conflict 
to pursue his agenda and ambitions in the region which have not been deeply 
discussed within the existing literature concerned with the Darfur Crisis. Instead, 
existing studies have addressed the problem by looking at one or perhaps two aspects 
in the Darfur region, whether it is political, economic, ethnic, environmental, or 
international interventions within the framework of civilian protection. Therefore, 
there is every reason to believe that this aspect of knowledge is still not fully covered 
and more investigation is still needed. Evaluating this study’s findings could provide 
a solid foundation from which to either improve many of the claims and assumptions 
made by previous studies or to refute them. This study presents an overview about 
how the direct and/or indirect external interventions and the regional interventions in 
particular, increase the tension between the internal combatants contributing to the 
continuation of intrastate conflicts, which could be a threat factor to the territorial 
integrity of the state where the conflict takes place. 
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The Structure of the Thesis  
 
To develop the argument of this study, the thesis is organised around six substantive 
chapters divided into three main parts. The first part of which is the introduction plus 
chapters one and two. This part establishes the context out of which the analysis in 
the other parts emerges. It establishes the disciplinary framework within which the 
study takes place presenting the subject and the primary focus of this thesis.  
Chapter one outlines and reviews the important range of existing literature related 
directly to the Darfur Crisis (causes, domestic, regional, and international 
implications). In short, the literature used for this study was divided - according to its 
nature, focus, dimension, and scientific foundation - into five categories: Studies 
with political dimensions, studies with economic dimensions, studies with ethnic and 
social dimensions, studies with international and humanitarian law dimensions, and 
studies concentrating on the Libyan involvement in Sudan. This chapter evaluates the 
relative literature on the internal and international factors (political, economic, ethnic, 
environmental and/or international involvement) are seen to have an important role 
in the emergence of the crisis in Darfur in 2003, plus the domestic, regional, and 
international implications of this crisis. The central argument of this chapter is that, 
despite a high range of research on the crisis in Darfur already conducted, an 
essential investigation into the impact of external third-party intervention 
(particularly Libya as a regional actor) on the duration of  the conflict is omitted, 
which means that an essential gap in knowledge is not considered. Chapter one 
concludes with the literature review framework, which shows the structure, themes, 
and components of this thesis.   
Chapter two serves as the theoretical and methodological chapter. This chapter 
develops the conclusion of chapter one and is presented in two sections. The first 
section provides the theoretical approach employed in this thesis. In order to test the 
hypothesis and to address the core questions of this study, a new theoretical model is 
used. Together the hypothesis and the questions focus more on Libyan involvement 
in the conflict in Darfur, thus this theoretical model allows the researcher to pursue 
this research project in a well-organised, coherent and valuable way. This theoretical 
approach is grounded on the theoretical arguments of David E. Cunningham (2010) 
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and Patrick M. Regan (2002). The model developed in this thesis argues that when 
an external state becomes (in)directly, militarily, economically, and/or diplomatically 
involved in an internal armed conflict to pursue an agenda, which is separate from 
the agenda of the domestic combatants, it substantially tends to prolong the duration 
of the conflict.  
The second section of this chapter establishes the methodological approach used in 
this study. This section outlines the research design for this study and defines the 
methodological techniques employed for collecting and analysing data. This research 
project relies primarily on qualitative research founded on the interpretation 
approach. The single case study technique was chosen to enhance generalisation and 
theory development. A developed discussion of the benefits and weaknesses of 
qualitative, quantitative and a combined method approach is presented in this chapter. 
The qualitative strategy adopted in this thesis is rationalised. 
Part two (chapters three and four) examines the important contributing factors in the 
eruption of the crisis in Darfur, as well as those factors that have an important impact 
on its continuation.  
Chapter three presents a discussion of the historical development of the rebel 
movement in Darfur. It provides an investigation into the key factors behind the 
eruption of the crisis and how they have influenced its development. It considers 
whether the conflict is an ethnic struggle, or a conflict over natural resources due to 
environmental factors. Furthermore, it explores regional and international factors that 
have played a significant role during the various phases of the conflict. The chapter 
argues that the Darfur Crisis is caused by a combination of different internal and 
external factors, such as political, economic, ethnic, and environmental issues. 
Additionally, the instability in the region caused by the armed conflict as well as the 
international involvement cannot be ignored. The Darfur Crisis cannot be resolved 
by addressing just one or two aspects, only by exploring all aspects together. This is 
because every factor has a different impact and implication at different stages of the 
crisis. 
Chapter four identifies the major Sudanese factions and the mechanisms they have 
adopted to end the conflict. It aims to understand the impact of intra-rebel deviation 
and the differences in their perceptions, attitudes, agendas, approaches towards the 
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conflict and the final form of settlement they are pursuing, on the duration of that 
conflict. This chapter also explores the impact that external interventions may have 
on the duration of intrastate conflicts. The discussion in this chapter is grounded in 
the theoretical assumption of Cunningham (2010). In this regard, a special theoretical 
model is developed to serve and achieve the goal of this chapter. This chapter 
therefore argues that when external states intervene with a separate agenda in an 
intrastate conflict that involves an ethnic and tribal society, and where there are 
multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, it decreases the 
potential of resolving the crisis sooner.     
The third part of the thesis (chapters five and six) focuses on the dimensions of 
internationalising the Darfur Crisis and how it has become an internationalised issue. 
This part exams the impact of outside involvement on direction and duration of the 
crisis. It explores the extent to which the termination and the peace building process 
of such conflicts can be influenced by external intervention, especially the 
involvement of a regional third party.  
Chapter five outlines the major internal and external factors that have significantly 
contributed to fuelling the internationalisation of the crisis. This chapter is largely an 
account of why and how Libya under the Gaddafi regime, as a regional third-party 
intervener, became gradually involved in the Darfur Crisis since 2003. This chapter 
explores the motivations and mechanisms used by the regime in Tripoli to handle the 
crisis, as well as the ways in which Tripoli intervened. 
Chapter six assesses the impact of Gaddafi’s Libya involvement as a key regional 
power, which is chosen as a case study to test the validity of the theoretical model 
used here, on the path of the crisis and its termination. It explores the truth about the 
hidden agenda that Gaddafi was seeking to attain through his involvement in the 
management of the Darfur Crisis. Also, the chapter examines the Gaddafi's ability to 
influence the domestic parties to the crisis. Analytical perception is given for the 
expected scenarios about the future of the Darfur Crisis beyond the collapse of the 
Gaddafi regime. This chapter argues that the Libyan involvement and the policy of 
the Gaddafi regime towards managing the crisis in Darfur were a key factor of 
instability and the long-duration of the crisis.  
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The concluding chapter draws together the themes, strands and analyses of the 
previous six chapters into a series of conclusions. It presents an overall set of 
answers to the core research questions that this thesis is based upon. A confirmation 
of whether the original hypothesis tested in this thesis was correct or not will be 
offered. In addition the conclusion reflects an assessment as to whether the 
theoretical and methodological approaches adopted worked or not and whether they 
could be applied to other studies. The potential for further study within the 
framework established in chapter two will also be offered. Overall, the conclusion 
summarises the findings of the thesis and discusses their boarder significance for 
scholarly knowledge in the field of IR in general and national and international crisis 
management in particular. 
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Chapter 1 
___________________________________________________ 
Literature Review 
___________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction   
 
Undertaking a review of a body of literature assists researchers in acquiring an 
understanding of the topic which is under study, what research has been conducted, 
and what the key issues are. Furthermore, this helps researchers to develop theories 
that have already been employed in investigating similar research topics (Hart 2006). 
Two different types of literature related to the Darfur crisis have been reviewed in 
this thesis: the first are articles directly relating to the crisis as a case study. A 
significant number of studies have been conducted on the crisis. By analytically 
concentrating on the crisis’ historical roots, as well as to ascertain its domestic, 
regional, and international implications, much of this body of research seeks to find a 
permanent solution rather than a temporary remedy. Secondly, a number of 
distinguished reports about the theoretical framework underpinning this case study 
have also been reviewed and will be discussed in the theory and methodology 
chapter. This includes investigations by Patrick Regan (2002), Ibrahim Elbdawi 
(2000), and David E. Cunningham (2010, 2006) on the overall success of crisis 
management. This literature encompasses analysis conducted on external third-party 
intervention and its influence on the duration of political crises, internal armed 
conflicts, and civil wars. 
Regarding the crisis itself, numerous scholars and specialised research centres have 
approached the Darfur Crisis by studying and analysing it in different ways, in an 
attempt to define the crisis scientifically and analytically. Their aim tends to be to 
uncover its historical background and the domestic, regional and international factors 
that have contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Darfur. Studies related to 
the Darfur Crisis have been reviewed to provide the reader with a more 
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comprehensive view. The existing texts that have been reviewed can be classified, 
according to their nature and scientific basis, into five categories as follows: those 
that analyse political dimensions, economic dimensions, ethnic and social 
dimensions, international and humanitarian law dimensions, and the dimensions of 
Libyan involvement. 
However, this study does not deal only with one specific field of literature or 
discipline such as IR, conflict resolution, or crisis management studies. The 
researcher has engaged with a range of different bodies of literature from different 
disciplines. Since this study looks at a certain type of relationship and specific case 
study that tells us about said relationship, the researcher does not restrict himself to 
one field of study or one body of literature. What it is dealing with is an eclectic 
body of literature. Therefore, this research project is an interdisciplinary project. 
 
Studies Focusing on Political Dimensions 
 
A large part of the existing literature relating to the Darfur Crisis has noticeably 
focused on the political dimensions of the problem. Most of this research has 
concluded that the essence of the crisis is existing power struggles and the 
government’s failure to achieve an equitable distribution of power. Many scholars 
believe that the crisis primarily erupted as a result of political conflict between 
Sudanese actors seeking power. This implies that the Darfur Crisis is a domestic 
political issue. In contrast, other scholars have gone beyond the domestic level, 
attributing the complicity of the crisis to the competitive nature of the key external 
actors in their relations and their hidden conflict for protecting their own self-
interests. Research conducted to examine the Darfur Crisis, including these concerns 
will be highlighted in this section of the thesis. 
Kelechi A. Kalu (2010) addressed the civil war in Darfur within the broad context of 
Sudan’s crisis of governance at the national level. The author contends that the major 
difficulty in ending endemic crises in African countries, like that taking place in 
Darfur, is an inability to generate sustainable solutions and institutionalised strategies 
for effective governance. In Kalu’s perspective, for example, the key cause that has 
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fundamentally contributed to the instability in Sudan (and Darfur in particular), is the 
neglect and marginalisation practiced by successive central governments in Sudan, 
following the independence of the country in 1956. The poor political, 
developmental, and social policies executed by central authorities and the lack of 
strategic vision for building a truly nationalistic Sudanese state, has led to the 
formation of different ethnically-based political groups, such as the Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), who endeavour to 
realise their demands by force. Kalu also argues that the GoS’s strategy in Darfur 
seeks to end the conflict on its own terms, represented in the homogenisation of all 
the ethnic groups consistent with the cultural, linguistic and ethnic consciousness of 
the ruling northern elite. Kalu states that the GoS’s violent reaction to the Darfur 
rebel groups might be a deliberate strategy to discourage other potentially 
marginalised and neglected groups from taking up arms against the GoS. The GoS’s 
reasoning for following this manner of handling the crisis is that it was already 
engaged in a peace negotiation process in 2003 with southerners, and it did not want 
to repeat the process with other marginalised groups and regions in the future (Kalu 
2010, p. 16).  
Similar to Kalu, Isiaka Badmus’ view (2009) posited that the major reason for the 
longevity of the crisis in Darfur can be attributed to weak and unaccountable 
governance in Khartoum and its lopsided politics towards various ethnicities, not 
only in Darfur, but across the entire country. He revealed that GoS politics is 
designed to promote Arabism and an Islamic state in order to export its radical 
ideology and revolution to other countries. He believes that for Sudan to surmount 
the current political problems, it must abandon its lopsided politics and deal with all 
people on the basis of equality, irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. 
Badmus argues that Khartoum’s reconsideration to its unequal policies, followed by 
ameliorating the socio-economic conditions, is essential. Sudanese authorities should 
be transparent and equitable in the distribution of national wealth and in the use of 
the revenues it exports to sectors such as education and health. Additionally, to 
accelerate Sudanese economic growth, sources of economic support to Sudan from 
African partners and the international community is very much needed (Badmus 
2009).  In this respect, Badmus’ view rather supports the argument of Abdel Monseif 
(2007), and this author strongly agrees with the argument that there should be 
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national and international support for the GoS to jettison its problems. The GoS 
should not be dealt with as a part of the problem only; it can also be a part of the 
solution. 
A study by Al-Said Omar (2008) concentrated on some defined actors and how they 
have dealt with the crisis in the Darfur region. He has categorised these actors into 
two different teams, according to the mechanisms and strategies each actor has used, 
or followed, to manage the crisis.  Omar has determined three actors which manage 
the crisis through manipulating crises. These are: rebels, Western civil society actors, 
and international mass media. Omar also found that the actors mentioned above have 
significantly contributed to the inflation of the Darfur Crisis. He points out that these 
actors have deliberately resorted to the use of power, diplomatic coercion, and have 
applied pressure on international public opinion with a view to shaping the 
orientation of international circles of decision-making. Second, a further four actors 
have been classified as those who have managed the crisis in accordance with their 
efforts to deal with the problem effectively, and are concerned with finding an 
appropriate end to the crisis. These parties are the GoS, the UN, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), and the African Union (AU). The author 
has also attempted to reveal the key actors whose actions have resulted in the 
escalation and growing complexity of the situation. Additionally, they have increased 
the gap between the main parties of the conflict, which has led to the transfer of the 
issue from the domestic to the global level. The author's argument can be agreed with 
to some extent, especially in terms of the contribution of implemented strategies and 
techniques employed by those actors to aggravate the crisis. In this context, it can 
also be argued that the author has only addressed non-state actors (if we exclude the 
state of Sudan). There are, however, limitations to Omar’s work. Perhaps the most 
significant is that he has referred to the causes of the internationalisation of the crisis, 
instead of investigating and analysing the impact of this process upon the crisis itself, 
as a crisis management mechanism. Hence, this academic effort does not give the 
most comprehensive picture of this very complicated problem.  
An article by De Maio (2010) has drawn attention to the trans-nationalisation process 
of conflict in Darfur through understanding if war is contagious or not. The author 
believes that the Khartoum regime manages the Darfur conflict by extending the 
violence across boundaries and destabilise neighbouring states. He argues that 
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threatened regimes deliberately resort to the shifting of the conflict from inside to 
outside of their jurisdiction, by pushing internal tensions across the borders to 
neighbouring countries, in order to undermine stability in those countries (De Maio 
2010, p. 25). The opinion of De Maio is that a civil war becomes a proxy war 
between states. Following such a strategy of political crisis management and 
conflicts, threatened regimes perceive that they can achieve several political benefits. 
For instance, they can be fortified against the charge of having committed atrocities 
or human rights abuses, as their proxies will be accusable. This tactic, in turn, is used 
to bolster the legitimacy of these regimes internally and externally as well as helping 
them to maintain power. From our perspective, De Maio rightly points out that the 
civil war can be contagious; yet, he did not reveal the key political, economic, and 
social conditions that assist in exporting the crisis across borders effectively. 
However, De Maio erroneously states that, due to its concern with regime survival 
and its belief that regional stability is vital for that survival, the GoS has transferred 
the conflict from Darfur to Chad. The Darfur conflict is not applicable in this case. 
The main point of argument here is that the regime in Khartoum was forced to be 
involved in this trans-nationalisation, particularly after the opposition’s attack on 
Omdurman.1 (Human Rights Watch, June 2008). Neither it is not wise to open a new 
front of conflict. The best proof of this is that once the interests of both regimes have 
been met, they raced to sign an agreement to end the rift in the relationship that 
resulted from the rapid developments in Darfur. De Maio’s point of view is contrary 
to Omar’s (2008). While the latter argued that the GoS was one of the actors 
managing the crisis, De Maio argues that the Sudanese regime manages the crisis in 
Darfur through promoting crisis.  
Regarding the peace process, Oluwadare Abiodun (2011) declares that peace 
initiatives have significantly prolonged the duration of the crisis, instead of bringing 
it to an end. The continuation of the impasse has led to the production of yet more 
dissident groups, with shifting positions, due to disagreements and discrepancies in 
their views towards the conditions of peace. Alex de Waal (2007a) reinforces this 
viewpoint when he refers to the differences and competition between the leaders of 
opposing groups, which has prevented the Darfur rebels from uniting to achieve their 
                                                          
1 On the 10th May 2008 the Darfur rebel group, the JEM, launched an armed assault on Omdurman 
area, one of the three towns that form the capital city of Khartoum. 
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political demands. Each faction has its own territorial ambitions. The diversity of the 
rebels’ agendas has resulted in a lack of coordination and acted as a significant 
impediment to achieving noticeable progress towards a real peace agreement in 
Darfur (de Waal 2007a, p. 1039). Given this evidence, one can argue that division 
inside the rebel movements in Darfur is one of the factors that has weakened these 
groups and their position against the Khartoum regime. Furthermore, this position 
has undermined the efforts of the international community to support the peace 
process in Darfur. On this basis, it may be inferred that if the opposition movements 
continued to be non-uniform, the crisis cannot expect to see the light at the end of the 
tunnel and Darfur might not see peace in the foreseeable future. 
Internationally, research by Berdal Aral (2010) examines how the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) has become an instrument at the hands of a handful of 
states seeking hegemony, inter alia, through this body. The Darfur Crisis has been 
taken as a case study to investigate to what extent the UNSC has been a motivating 
factor towards the politicisation of the crisis (Aral 2010, p. 163). Aral demonstrates 
that the Sudanese case is a model instance to illustrate how - since the end of the 
Cold War - the UNSC has been employed by powerful states, led by the US, in order 
to exercise their hegemony and to control energy resources in the non-Western world. 
These powerful states have pushed the international community to adopt many 
UNSC resolutions against Sudan (such as 1556, 1564, 1590, and 1706) to force it to 
adopt a certain political approach to the management of the Darfur Crisis. However, 
actions have been taken by these states to approach other crises in other parts of 
Africa (Rwanda in 1994, Burundi in the 1990s, and the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea in 1998, and Sierra Leone in 1998), which failed and so were ineffective 
despite high levels of violation and crimes against humanity (Aral 2010, pp. 164-
165). While it is strongly acknowledged that the transformation of the UNSC can be 
a means employed by the permanent members to achieve their strategic interests, due 
to the problematic structure of decision-making in the UNSC, and the policy of 
double standards adopted by them according to their perspectives of global peace, 
Aral did not draw attention to whether or not these policies contributed to the 
extension of the duration of the Darfur Crisis.  
Alex de Waal (2007a) examines the international response to the Darfur Crisis by 
highlighting how the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Darfur has been 
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adopted by the international community in order to manage the Darfur Crisis, and 
how this has influenced the crisis. He observes that the employment of this concept 
in Darfur has failed to accomplish the main objective, which focus on civilian 
protection. De Waal goes on to note that this failure owes much to incorrect 
calculations, and the exaggeration of expectations that civilian protection can be 
achieved by dispatching international forces with limited equipment to Darfur (de 
Waal 2007a, p. 1054). From de Waal’s perspective, bringing better-equipped 
international troops to Darfur may not achieve positive progress towards the end of 
the civilian struggle there. He claims that thinking that such actions can protect the 
people of Darfur is erroneous. The author has realistically mentioned several internal 
and external reasons and territorial points of view which are behind this failure. de 
Waal reports that “The responses of the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) consisted chiefly of ad hoc steps rather than a systematic or strategic 
plan” (de Waal 2007a, p. 1041). He expressed a similar view to Aral’s perspective, 
which argues that the UNSC has been affected by the US government’s decision that 
genocide had been committed in Darfur (Aral 2010). This decision was taken in 
response to advocacy organisations, and congressional pressure, which believes that 
describing the situation in Darfur as genocide would commit the USA to intervene. 
de Waal’s work asserts that the approach taken by the UNSC and the PSC to manage 
the Darfur Crisis and save civilians lacks a definitive and systematic strategy, but 
that these are steps taken in reaction to events and developments. De Waal went 
further and reported that the UNSC has failed even to monitor the implementation of 
issued resolutions as part of the crisis management process (de Waal 2007a, p. 1041).  
Regarding the importance of determining the priorities that effective management 
requires, de Waal notes that the multiplicity of the international community’s 
demands and goals to enhance the situation on the ground in Darfur has impeded 
effective and coherent mechanisms to containing the humanitarian crisis. It can be 
argued that focusing on political and diplomatic efforts, as well as increasing 
pressure from the international community to persuade all the parties of the conflict 
to provide more concessions, could result in a radical solution to the problem. In a 
disagreement with de Waal’s work (2007a), a study by David Lanz (2008) does not 
support the assumption that the international response to the Darfur Crisis has 
massively failed. Lanz argues that there has been a far-reaching and multifaceted 
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response to the Darfur crisis such as humanitarian aid, peace negotiations, enforcing 
peace, justice promotion, but it has not been effective. Lanz found that “those 
involved in the grand scheme of managing conﬂict Darfur must realise that they are 
in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, 
consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the 
Arab world”.(Lanz 2008, p. 7). Lanz believes that in order to improve our ability to 
manage conﬂicts in Darfur, moving from self-centred and self-righteous dogmatism 
to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences is essential.  
Yuri S. Fuchs (2011) argues that a mixture of domestic and political influences, 
geopolitical impact, and self-interests are the primary motives behind the escalation 
from humanitarian intervention to military intervention. Fuchs indicates that though 
the situation in Darfur merits intervention, due to its high levels of violence and that 
it may be in dire need of foreign military intervention for stabilisation, such 
intervention would not be forthcoming. Given the unclear scenarios in the Darfur 
Crisis and a lack of trusted partners on the ground who could assist a military 
intervention, it is unlikely to occur. Military intervention led by great powers in such 
circumstances would not give the interveners many chances of success in ending the 
crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 79). However, this argument is contrary to several scholars’ 
arguments, such as Fake and Funk (2009) who assert that that there has been a 
serious scramble for Africa between major world powers such the USA, China, 
France, and the UK, for access to valuable resources including oil and diamonds 
(Fake and Funk 2009, pp. 2-9). Fuchs’ argument is also contrary to the argument of 
Mahmood Mamdani (2010) who believes that “interest in oil is an important 
dimension of US involvement in the Darfur-Chad region and the US-China 
contention in Sudan” (Mamdani 2010, p. 20). Mamdani adds that economic interest 
are a key factor in understanding Powerful Western States’ handling of problems, 
particularly on the African continent (Kristof 2006). 
Understanding of the political dimension of the Darfur Crisis is essential in order to 
evaluate the course of the crisis and its duration. However, the limited focus on this 
approach alone is the work of a minor and weak. The Darfur conflict is compound 
and intertwined in it many local, regional and international factors with dimensions 
of political, economic, ethnic and foreign intervention. Addressing the political 
dimension can only illustrate the political polarisation and employment of the 
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conflict whether by local, regional, and international actors. Thus, besides looking 
further at the political dimension, this project will also engages with discussions and 
analysis the other factors symbiotically in order to establish a comprehensive 
outcome which has not been done by the above reviewed studies. 
 
Studies Focusing on Economic Dimensions  
 
Many sources indicate that the underlying causes of the disputes in Darfur are 
economically-driven. Some scholars believe that these sources have domestic or 
international dimensions. At the domestic level, many academics focus on, and 
maintain, that the Darfur Crisis is a reflection of agricultural and alimentary 
insufficiency, together with a deterioration of living conditions into further poverty, 
illiteracy and disease. Intellectuals also highlight the marginalisation suffered by the 
Darfur province, which has been badly treated by successive regimes, in terms of 
modern industrial and agricultural development, despite the major contribution of the 
province to the national income (Nixon 2005, p. 123). From an external perspective, 
however, several researchers have reported that a set of international factors led to 
the complexity of the Darfur catastrophe. The fierce competition between the major, 
powerful, states to access energy resources in Africa generally, and in Sudan in 
particular, has contributed significantly to the uprisings in the Darfur region.  
In light of the domestic context, a number of researchers have studied the problem by 
concentrating on the relationship between climate change and the conflict in Darfur. 
It is said that global warming is primarily to blame (Faris 2007). A study by Salah 
Hakim (2011) shows that, while political, socio-economic, and ethnic factors cannot 
be lessened during an investigation of the key factors behind the problem, climate 
change remains the root cause of the Darfur Crisis. He identifies that repeated bouts 
of drought, caused by a dramatic decline in rainfall, have resulted in a desertification 
phenomenon (Hakim 2011, p. 818). Furthermore, over the last ten decades, the 
deterioration of natural resources in the Darfur region has contributed considerably to 
tribal warfare in the area. This has led to tension/conflict between sedentary farming 
groups and nomadic, pastoral tribes. The resident tribes own the land, while other, 
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migratory, tribes have the right to use and benefit from the common rangeland. These 
issues will be discussed in more detail later in chapter three. For precisely this reason, 
numerous tribal conflicts have erupted due to strong competition for access to natural 
resources between the settled farmers and nomadic herders (Hakim 2011, p. 818). 
Hakim goes beyond this to assume that a political solution is not enough to solve the 
problem. It could terminate the hostilities and so avoid humanitarian catastrophe, but 
it cannot approach the fundamental cause of the Darfur Crisis, which is driven by 
climate change. 
 According to Hakim, the optimal solution for the crisis is seeking to develop the 
Darfur region through the adoption of strategies that fit with climate change. These 
kinds of strategies should provide the Darfurians with new, alternative, livelihoods 
that are more rewarding financially, such as encouraging them to do all economic 
activities, which tends to reduce the level of poverty and reduce the pressure on 
natural resources that have already been overused. In addition to the robust 
development of Darfur, Hakim suggests that there should be an awareness campaign 
which goes hand in hand with the implementation of the development plan to help 
people to understand how to rationalise their consumption of natural resources in 
preparing for drought and confronting the drastic implications of climate change. 
This can be done by adopting a new agriculture policy that must be mainstreamed by 
central and local governments. Adoption of the native administration is also called 
for in Darfur. Likewise, Mohamed Yonis (cited in Schlein 2011) the Deputy Joint 
Special Representative of the African United Nation Mission in Darfur, has stated 
that “Water is one of the main root causes of the Darfur crisis” (Schlein 2011). He 
believes that water can be the main means for peace. Well-managed and distributed 
water can contribute to building peace among the people of Darfur. He also argues 
that a political solution is needed, but that it remains elusive. Yonis concludes that 
there should be projects that aim to rebuild the water infrastructure with new 
technologies and systems that enable the people to adequately manage water and to 
face climate change.  
This view has been supported by Robin Bovey (cited in Schlein 2011). Bovey 
suggested that if we wanted to solve the Darfur Crisis we should effectively manage 
the freshwater resources. He believes that additional droughts will occur due to 
climate change, and he confirms that a prolonged and abnormal shortage of rainfall 
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occurs naturally in cyclical patterns. Nils Kastberg, the representative of the UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) for Sudan, moreover states that “getting access to water 
requires peace. And peace can best be achieved at the local level” (cited in Schlein 
2011). The access to freshwater issue could be used to establish a dialogue between 
the different groups in the region. Freshwater distribution discussions could assist the 
existing mechanisms to manage the freshwater supply and to unite the opposing 
interests of the conflicting parties. A number of influential figures, such as the United 
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former US Vice President Al Gore, staff at 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Jeffrey Sachs and Mahmood 
Mamdani, and the authors of the Stern Report on the economics of climate change, 
have emphasised that the hostilities in the Darfur area are a climate crisis, caused by 
long-term drought since 1997 (cited in Kevane and Gray 2008, p. 1).  Therefore, all 
these points of view support the perspective that argues that the solution to the 
Darfur crisis can only be achieved from inside, not outside.  
However, a related argument is made by Michael Kevane and Leslie Gray (2008). It 
reports that diminishing resources, or scarcity of freshwater, caused by declining 
rainfall due to climate change cannot be considered a root cause of the Darfur 
conflict. Data on rainfall has significantly not reflected a decline in rainfall patterns 
across the thirty years immediately prior to the eruption of the conflict in 2003. A 
challenge is that those who argue that climate change, resulting in an important 
decline in rainfall in Darfur, which led to a lack of freshwater resources, is a major 
reason for the Darfur conflict rarely provide accurate data on rainfall patterns to 
support their arguments. They tend to rely only on a general understanding that 
Darfur is part of the Sahel, an area where rainfall has been low, variable, and in 
decline. They do not necessarily present evidence to show that there was a significant 
change in rainfall that directly intensified the civil war in Darfur. Instead Kevane and 
Gray (2008) attribute the crisis to the regime in Khartoum’s willingness to eliminate 
the political opposition and perceived threats from the peripheral regions of the 
country, even by using large-scale violence against civilians. Whilst it might be 
feasible to agree with Kevane and Gray that many commentators have not presented 
accurate data to validate their claims, it cannot be fully concluded that the crisis is a 
political conflict resulting from the GoS’s willingness to crush political opposition 
 25 
 
(Kevane, Gray 2008). Nevertheless, Kevane and Gray also fail to present clear 
explanations to support their claims.  
Iana Brown (2010) expressed a similar view, Brown's investigation was conducted 
mainly in two regions, Western Darfur and Northern Darfur. She found that the 
worsening of eco-scarcity in both areas as the underlying cause of the conflict at the 
outset cannot be proved. On the contrary, she observed that in the years prior to the 
start of the conflict the growth in average vegetation was significantly better than in 
the previous twenty-five years (Brown 2010, p. 2513).  
A handful of scholars have focused on development in the Darfur state. A study 
conducted by Issam Mohamed (2011) assesses the economics of freshwater 
resources in the Southern Darfur region, and their role in developing the region 
which, in turn, is a positive reflection on the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. Hence, 
Mohamed’s study refutes the assumption that there was a shortage of freshwater 
sources in Darfur. Mohamed claims that there is sufficient freshwater in the region. 
The sources are of several different kinds due to topographical variations, rainfall, 
and drainage volume and underground water storage in the province. Furthermore, 
Mohamed notes that the freshwater resources in Darfur are not only abundant, but 
could also be a key factor in concluding the conflict and the humanitarian struggle 
there, together with the development of the region. In addition, Mohamed correctly 
argues that this can only be achieved if the GoS makes more efforts to effectively 
benefit from these resources. The writer makes it clear that development is possible, 
with the proper financing and honest efforts to exploit existing untapped freshwater 
resources, and that it would suffice for all economic projects. Thus, it is strongly 
agreed that focusing on development in Darfur would significantly, and positively 
influence stability and peace there. However, development should not only be limited 
to freshwater resources, but necessitates making significant efforts to developing all 
aspects of life as well as the elimination of financial and administrative corruption, 
which is a problem not only in Sudan but all over the African continent. 
Ola Olsson (2010b) developed a general model of relations between natural 
resources (land, in particular) and market integration in vulnerable environments, 
especially a community primarily inhabited by farmers and herders who can either 
equally share land in a market economy or in an autarky. Olsson argues that 
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decreasing resources can damage mutual trade between the two groups, which in turn 
makes each group’s welfare interdependent. According to Olsson, increasing 
resource scarcity is likely to cause more social tension between groups populated in 
the same location. He contends that in Darfur market integration has collapsed, partly 
due to the diminishing effectiveness of land resources in the region. The author also 
argues that ineffective land resources have declined drastically since the 1970s due to 
a 20% decline in rainfall. Such observations may allude to reasons for the 
disintegration of a market-like economy and the onset of appropriative conflicts since 
the 1980s in Darfur (Olsson 2010b, p. 2). In Darfur the relevant natural resource is 
land and the majority of the population are divided between either farmers or 
pastoralists, sharing communal land where there are no strong individual ownership 
rights to land. If we assume that Olsson’s model can be applicable to any context 
with a heavy reliance on natural resources, it is noteworthy to mention that 
decreasing resources can lead to a collapse in trade between groups that are heavily 
dependent on natural resources, but that this is not permanent or likely to create 
social conflict. There are several assisting factors that would have to be present for 
such an outcome. Groups in Darfur are from different ethnic backgrounds and each 
has different political agendas. In addition, regional actors might also play a key role 
and exploit resource-scarcity to trigger a social conflict. 
In light of the external context, work by Andrea Behrends (2008) addresses a case of 
fighting for oil when there is no oil yet. It concentrates on the role of major local 
actors directly involved in the conflict across the Darfur-Chad boarder (rebel groups 
and militias); national actors (Sudanese and Chadian governments) and international 
actors (multinational companies, the USA, China, and the UN). This study tries to 
illustrate how oil can have drastic consequences, even when reserves have not yet 
been proven, with regard to the future possibility of stability in the country. Behrends 
(2008) sought to answer two main posed questions. Firstly, how has oil, both as a 
local possibility and a national reality in Chad and Sudan, influenced the 
continuation of fighting on the border region between Darfur and Chad? Secondly, to 
what extent are the actors involved in this fighting motivated by the oil factor? He 
declares that while the insurgency in Chad is evidently linked with oil revenues, 
there is no evidence to confirm that the conflict in Darfur is directly associated with 
the presence of natural oil, but evidently has become part of the conflict’s 
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continuation. While, for the combatants in Darfur oil was not a reason to reach a 
negotiated settlement and agreement to end the fighting in the area, in Chad oil was 
the reason to continue fighting and acted as a motivation for securing power. In 
contrast, for the government on both sides of the border, oil has become the 
underlying reason to not let the rebels win. According to Behrends (2008), oil has 
influenced the continuation of the Darfur Crisis with different dynamics. In the 
course of the fighting, oil has gained significance as a narrative to justify the 
continuation of the rebellion (Behrends 2008, p. 52). Behrends concludes that 
although oil was not the main reason of the breakout of warfare in Darfur and Chad, 
fighting for oil has become part of the conflicts' continuation.  In this respect it may 
be inferred that the evidence suggests that oil has significantly influenced the 
duration of the Darfur crisis. But the question is how can the GoS and international 
actors use oil as a means to halt the fighting and end the crisis?  
Helen Young et al (2007) examined the influence of the recent Darfur Crisis on the 
patterns of Darfurian migrant workers to Libya and their remittance flows. How this 
civil conflict impacted the livelihoods of Darfurians in Libya was also investigated. 
The study focuses on the ways in which continued changes in Libyan political and 
economic policies affect migration for Sudanese workers from Darfur to Libya in the 
opposite direction. In general, the authors found that despite Libya relying heavily on 
foreign migrant workers, particularly Darfurian workers, work opportunities for 
Sudanese in Libya have been significantly influenced by upturns and downturns in 
the Libyan economy. This unstable economic situation was the result of Libya’s 
politically volatile relations, since the 1980s, with the international community as 
well as changes in world oil prices. More importantly, the study reveals that the 
closure of national boundaries between Libya and Sudan in May 2003, due to the 
eruption of armed conflict in Darfur, led to the prevention of thousands of Darfurian 
workers being able to return, and even created difficulties for them to communicate 
with their families and send back their remittances. The number of Darfurian migrant 
workers traveling from Darfur to Libya has also been restricted2. For geographic and 
economic reasons, Libya is an attractive place for Darfurian migrants, particularly 
during periods of drought and famine (especially the 1970s and 1980s). The 
                                                          
2 Ofcial estimates of Darfurian migrant workers in Libya were unavailable but were estimated to be 
between 150,000 and 250,000 (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 826). 
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economic and social marginalisation, practiced by the central GoS upon peripheral 
areas like Darfur, is another motivation. Remittance flows are a prime source of 
livelihood for Darfurian income (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 826).  
Helen Young et al (2007) posit that any international attempt to respond to the 
Darfur Crisis and its implications requires a deep understanding of the patterns and 
mechanisms of migration of the affected population and their remittance flows. In 
both the short and long terms, a number of policies that could lead to an 
improvement in conditions for the Darfurian migrant workforce in Libya, to facilitate 
their traffic, and to ease the flow of remittances, are recommended. Young, Osman 
and Dale concludes that, until a resolution to the crisis, and thus peace, is achieved, 
Libya will remain an attractive destination for Darfurians. Therefore, the Darfur 
Crisis’ implications are not only seen as domestic, and damaging merely to the 
economy of Darfur, as Olsson (2010) expresses. They extend beyond the national 
frontier to directly or indirectly affect the economies of neighbouring countries, such 
as Libya. From another angle, and given the evidence, a big question emerges here: 
has the continuation of the civil conflict in Darfur affected the Libyan economy and 
how have the Libyan authorities used this issue in their strategy to resolve the crisis? 
Research carried out by Tanner Young (2009, pp. 14-18) has offered an argument 
that economic incentives are driving current events in Darfur. He pointed out that the 
underlying causes and events that led to Darfur’s genocide are that the country’s 
government followed a repeated pattern of violence for the sake of economic 
interests, through the armament of ethnic militias who in turn used force to defend 
foreign petroleum operations violently, such as Chinese oil installations, in order to 
secure access for oil companies to begin exploiting oil (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 58).  
It is clear from the existing literature that has addressed the economic dimensions of 
the Darfur Crisis, which the conflict between different groups and tribes in the region 
is not primarily ethnic or religious (yet) it might be a result of the region’s struggle in 
relation to food and agricultural insufficiency, deterioration in living conditions, 
poverty, ignorance and disease. These are problems which the different regimes that 
have ruled Sudan have failed to solve. Imbalances in development among the regions 
over the entire territory of Sudan, especially Darfur, are regarded as among the key 
causes leading to the eruption of the crisis. Darfur has existed in a condition of 
economic backwardness, weakness in resources, execution of infrastructure, and high 
 29 
 
unemployment. The worsening of these conditions has dramatically increased with 
the increase in conditions of desertification that the region has witnessed since the 
1980s. This has led to a decline in agricultural production, which importantly 
contributes to feeding the conflicts between the groups and the tribes that mainly rely, 
for their living, upon natural resources, such as land and water. However, adopting 
the economic approach to investigate the crisis in Darfur is very useful as the most of 
the previous literature state that the absent of the development and effective 
economic policies by the Sudanese successive governments in Darfur has 
fundamentally led to the instability there. However, the economic approach is 
insufficient to look at, but may be able to give us only a part of the Darfur Crisis 
scene not the whole.  
 
Studies Focusing on Ethnic and Social Dimensions 
 
Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in the world. It is endearingly labelled as 
the small model of Africa. Darfur is characterised by ethnic and cultural diversity 
given its size, and diverse climate and vegetation. The environmental variety 
contributes to increased mobility between tribes and ethnic groups in the region. This 
integration has resulted in an extended variety of ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
groups. Darfur consists of two main components: African residents (mostly farmers), 
and Arab herders (mostly nomadic). Although there is homogeneity and 
intermarriage among Arabs and non-Arab African people, each side largely sticks to 
its ethnic origins and culture. However, they live in peace, with the exception of 
some frictions between pastoralists and farmers that are often addressed within the 
framework of the civil administration, tribal laws and customs. The Darfur Crisis has 
attracted wide attention in social science literature. This section will discuss 
contemporary literature that explores the Darfur Crisis and will focus on the ways in 
which the ethnic, cultural, and social factions have affected the eruption and 
continuation of the crisis. Many studies primarily focus on ethnic variety as the chief 
cause of violence in Darfur. While other research emphasises other, more harrowing, 
themes, such as the genocide and ethnic cleansing issue. The international 
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community, which has a responsibility to protect human rights, has responded 
ineffectively to these issues. 
A study by Mahgoub El-Tigani (2004) reveals that the ethnic component of the 
Darfur Crisis cannot be refuted. He believes that the Darfurian insurgency emanates 
from the Arab-oriented central government’s biased policies towards the non-Arab 
African groups in the region. El-Tigani has drawn his argument from the work of 
Sudanese writers. Many of these authors are related to the indigenous groups in 
Darfur. According to El-Tigani “the crisis is political and State-made. It results from 
the misadministration, abuse of authority, and economic greed of the governing elite, 
committed against the powerless Africans of Darfur” (El-Tigani 2004, p. 3). 
Furthermore, he posits that the crisis is a reflection of an Arab-dominated Khartoum 
government’s disrespect for human dignity and human rights. The author argues that 
the main responsibility for the bloodshed lies with the Khartoum government and 
that it should be blamed above all other participants, whether they be internal or 
external protagonists. El-Tigani, however, believes that the final resolution to ending 
the Darfur conflict is internal and lies predominantly with the Sudanese people (El-
Tigani 2004, p. 3). While it can be argued that the GoS has significantly contributed 
to an escalation in tensions in the region, as a result of its policies vis-à-vis the region, 
it is difficult to confirm that Sudanese authorities are primarily responsible for the 
crisis. 
Olsson and Siba (2009) declare that the conflict in Darfur is essentially a clash of 
ethnicities and should fundamentally be regarded as a deliberate ethnic cleansing 
campaign. They argue that the conflict in Darfur is driven by GoS attacks, in 
conjunction with the government's allies the Janjaweed, which have been primarily 
targeted at the three major African tribes of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa in the 
Darfur area, who proclaimed their opposition to the GoS in 2003. In contrast, Arab-
dominated villages are very rarely targeted. Although resource variables and a local 
struggle over dwindling natural resources have also played a certain role and have 
had some interpretive power in the conflict in Darfur, their importance is still limited. 
Additionally, the authors assert that the central aim of the GoS can only be 
considered as ethnic cleansing or an attempt to capture peripheral lands with good 
access to freshwater and fertile soils. Consequently, a vast number of Darfurians 
have been internally and externally displaced. Furthermore, the major reallocation of 
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land has been from the three rebel tribes to non-rebel Arab and African groups. It is 
in total disagreement with writers that argue that the underling motivation of GoS 
/Janjaweed attacks in Darfur is an ethnic cleansing campaign targeted against people 
who are non-Arabic. Much literature indicates that the Janjaweed militia consists of 
both Arab and African fighters. There have also been many Arab civilians that have 
also been displaced (Olsson and Siba 2009, p. 23). 
The work of Olsson and Valsecchi (2010) revealed that ethnic cleansing is 
essentially multi-dimensional. It is not just (and not necessarily) about mass murder, 
but also forced migration, as well as destruction of property and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, in the empirical application of their methodology to specifically sample 
530 villages in south-western Darfur, Olsson and Valsecchi found that ethnic 
cleansing has extensively and intensively occurred in Darfur. This, Olsson and 
Velsecchi argue, has largely affected the ethnic composition of the region, 
redistributing the population density in chosen villages. Olsson and Valsecchi argue 
that a segregation strategy may have been employed by the GoS to make it relatively 
easy for the government-supported Janjaweed militia to target rebel groups. 
Furthermore, such a strategy would assist in the survival of the rebellion, which is 
considered to be a very serious threat for the stability of the political regime in 
Khartoum. An additional increase in the regional ethnic diversity is illustrated by the 
data3 - which is already very high - after the eruption of the conflict. In contrast, the 
degree of ethnic diversity at the village-average, which was already low before the 
2003 crisis began, is very low even after, because of the high degree of segregation. 
Olsson and Valsecchi argue that there is a clear correlation between the extent of 
cleansing and the high level of segregation (Olsson and Valsecchi 2010, p. 18). 
John Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) focus on the mechanisms that are used 
by the GoS when targeting black African villages in Darfur. They suggest that the 
GoS deliberately instigated a collective framing process that dehumanised its victims 
from only three black African targeted groups: the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit. The 
GoS, according to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, motivated and encouraged local 
Arab Janjaweed militia toward ethnic cleansing. In their empirical analysis of 1,136 
interviews, they found 932 who reported hearing racial epithets, such as “you are 
                                                          
3 Given the current security situation in Darfur this data was not available during our study. However, 
a significant range of date have been provided by Olsson and Valsecchi (2010, p. 12).   
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slaves, kill the slaves”, and “this is the last day for blacks” (Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2008, p. 876).  Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s assumption is that the 
concentration and aggregation of racial epithets during attacks have played a 
fundamental role in creating a collective effect that intensified the severity of 
organised violence which led to genocide. Ideologically, Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond claim that Arab-Islamic supremacist ideology is the major contribution 
which has motivated both the GoS, and its local Arab allies, to reconfigure the 
political demography of the Darfur region by organised cleansing and an assault on 
non-Arab and non-Islamic traditional culture (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, 
p. 880). It can be agreed that racial epithets can transfer an individual’s motivation 
into collectively organised dehumanisation and violence.  
A similar study, conducted by Olsson (2010a) examines two major issues for post-
crisis; patterns of population growth and land redistribution that have emerged as a 
consequence of the crisis. The study is based on examining data from 542 villages in 
south-western Darfur (hosting a population of roughly 786,000 people), which has 
been collected by international organisations operating in the area. His analysis 
demonstrated that about 300,000 people, mainly from the three rebellious Zaghawa, 
Masalit, and Fur ethnic groups, have been displaced from their villages since the 
onset of hostilities in 2003. Meanwhile, these villages have been squatted by Arabs 
and other African non-rebel groups. The findings of Olsson’s investigation also 
reveal that the total population of the targeted area has declined by about 30 percent 
to approximately 525,000, while the percentage of the population belonging to the 
rebel tribes has dramatically dropped by roughly two thirds. Conversely, this 
considerable decrease has been followed by an increase in the population of Arab 
and non-rebel African groups in the same region (Olsson 2010a, p. 7). 
In addition to this, the analysis clearly suggests that this wide repopulation has 
mainly occurred in peripheral villages where soils are relatively high quality and 
with close access to freshwater. The analysis further indicates that squatting has 
taken place and thousands of rebel tribe households have fled. When displaced 
people return to their villages they find their lands have been taken. This enormous 
land redistribution, according to Olsson, can negatively affect the stability of the 
peace in the post-crisis period, if there are no affective mechanisms for cooperation 
between farmers and herders (Olsson 2010a, 16).  
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On the other hand, the findings of Olsson (2010a), Olsson and Siba (2009) and El-
Tigani (2004) are challenged by others. Jehron Muhammad (2010), for instance, 
criticised the argument posits that the GoS, with its allies from the Janjaweed militia, 
is involved in a civil war against insurgent groups in Darfur, which has developed 
into genocide against the ethnic African tribes that inhabit the Darfur area. 
Muhammad stresses that “focus[ing] solely on the Muslim and Arab north—when 
Darfur is nearly 100 present Muslim—being engaged in genocide against the Black 
population of Darfur is suspect” (Muhammad 2010). He argues that other assisting 
circumstances include rebels crossing the border from Chad, the distribution of 
weapons and the opening up of an illegal economy, should also be considered as 
factors that gave rise to the conflict.  
Farouk El-Baz (cited in Muhammad 2010), the director of the Centre for Remote 
Sensing at Boston University, confirmed that the conflict in Darfur cannot be 
considered a genocide because the populations in the Darfur region are of the same 
ilk. He believes that “Both populations are Africans. Both populations are Black. 
Both populations are Muslims, and both populations speak Arabic and some 
regional languages” (Muhammad 2010). Furthermore, El-Baz does not support 
Olsson and Siba’s (2009) argument. He proclaims that the origins of the problem lie 
in the diversity of the demographics of Darfur. The region is populated by two kinds 
of inhabitants. “The first category consists of sedentary farmers who grow food and 
raise cattle, therefore they congregate around water sources. The other community 
comprises nomadic tribes, who depend on access to available water sources as they 
travel” (Muhammad 2010). According to El-Baz, the nomadic population naturally 
depends on access to freshwater and markets, which has become increasingly 
difficult to obtain. Additionally, the profit margin gained from livestock cultivation 
has been critically undermined by the occupation of the farming faction (Muhammad 
2010). 
Zaki Beheiri (2010) does not support Olsson’s view. Beheiri deliberates that it is 
very difficult to distinguish between the Arab tribes and non-Arab tribes involved in 
the Darfur Crisis, as insurgents consist of both. Some rebels who attacked the 
southern areas were Arab. For example, rebels who attacked Bram city that was 
inhabited by an Arab tribe (Bno Halba), were also from an Arab tribe (Rezigat). He 
states that the disaster in Darfur is not due to the ethnic cleansing or genocide of non-
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Arab people, as westerners claim. Looting, killing, and murder have historic roots, 
and guerrilla activities in Darfur are documented in the courts, going back a long 
time. While Beheiri rejects the view that the conflict in Darfur is ethnic, he argues 
that it is due to poor economic and social conditions especially in recent years as the 
region has witnessed a series of droughts and intense desertification that has led to 
hunger and underdevelopment. This has contributed to the continuity of warring 
traditions in light of the absence of the central state’s control (Beheiri 2010, p. 48). 
Consequently, the conflict in Darfur is a conflict between shepherd tribes and farmer 
tribes, regardless of their origins. 
There is no doubt that a component of tribal and racial differences cannot be 
overlooked in the ongoing conflict in Darfur where these aspects still constitute a 
political and social reality in the region. The evidence from the reviewed literature on 
these ethnic and culture aspects seems to indicate that the GoS's failure to manage 
ethnic and cultural diversity decisively was a significant reason for the intensification 
of the crisis. The various political forces in Sudan were keen to employ this property 
in their political conflicts by attracting groups and tribes with different races and 
religions to support their political orientations and win votes in elections in return for 
some concessions, such as political positions and/or participation in the formation of 
the government. In light of the political polarisation of the tribes and civil 
administration’s endeavours to shift them to rival political entities for power locally 
and centrally, the conflict has transitioned from a professional and productive 
conflict to a political and ethnic conflict, whereby tribes have become a basic 
component in the process of rule, in Sudan generally and in Darfur in particular, and 
the distribution of the constitutional and executive positions. As a consequence, those 
who have political aspirations in all areas of underdevelopment have come to cling 
more to their tribes and ethnicities, in order to reach positions of influence or benefit 
through their tribal affiliations. Thus, the role of civil society organisations, which do 
not recognise the tribe and its restrictions, has been reduced and the logic of the tribe 
remains to govern Darfur. 
 Undoubtedly that we make a serious mistake if we exaggerate the tribe and ethnic 
differences as a major criterion for studying the conflict in Darfur as well as to find 
mechanisms and proposals to resolve the conflict as it means a case of isolationism 
and retreat to the self. Additionally, we will be in an even worse mistake if we ignore 
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the dimension of tribal and ethnic diversity of conflicts in Sudan, including Darfur, 
where the tribe continues to be a social and political reality cannot be ignored during 
studying of the Darfur Crisis in addition to other factors. 
 
Studies Focusing on International and Human Law 
Dimensions  
 
The conflict in Darfur has created a humanitarian catastrophe. The humanitarian 
conditions in the region have become a pivotal issue during the negotiations between 
the key parties of the crisis, supervised by external actors, such as the UN, the USA, 
and other governmental and non-governmental organisations. The GoS has been 
accused of committing human rights abuses against Africans in the region, using its 
Janjaweed militia as a means to quell the uprising, thus resolving the difficulties. 
These crimes have been mainly classified within four categories: killing, burning 
villages, sexual violence, and forced displacement. Moreover, the Bush 
Administration and a number of civil organisations working in the humanitarian field 
went further, and classified the situation in Darfur as ‘genocide’ (Daly, M.W. 2007, p. 
295), though this has been challenged by the UN and the European Union (EU). 
 In contrast, the GoS has refuted these charges and this description of the situation in 
Darfur. Simultaneously, it admitted a humanitarian catastrophe. In July 2008 the 
prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a petition charging 
Omar al-Bashir with 10 war crimes against humanity and responsibility for genocide 
in Darfur (Wall Street 2008). A crisis between the regime in Khartoum and the ICC 
has arisen. Sudan has refused to comply with the ICC because it has not ratified the 
Rome Statute which created the court. However, the ICC stuck to its jurisdiction on 
the grounds that the file was referred to the court by the UNSC. A number of studies 
have been carried out on the Darfur Crisis in terms of its internationalisation, 
importance for international law, and humanitarian dimensions.  
Babiker (2010) examined the Darfur Crisis in terms of its legal aspects and their 
impacts on both the peace and justice processes in Darfur. He addressed the 
capability of the Sudanese state to prosecute international crimes, such as human 
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rights abuses, war crimes, and genocide through assessing Sudan’s military and 
criminal laws from the substantive and procedural aspects. Additionally, he 
examined the key strengths and weaknesses of the recommendations in the report, 
issued by the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur (AUPD). Babiker affirms 
that Sudan cannot conduct this type of criminal prosecution, as its laws (whether 
criminal or military) do not meet international legal standards. Thus, the country 
cannot engage in such legal procedures. This position will ultimately lead to a supra-
national criminal prosecution, when the Darfur matter is referred to the ICC (Babiker 
2010, p. 82). Babiker importantly highlighted that shifting the Darfur issue to the 
ICC is not only an unfeasible step to peace, but that it may reduce the possibilities for 
achieving peace. Thus, it is argued by many that internationalising the Darfur matter 
and its referral by the UNSC to the ICC is purely driven by a political agenda, 
backed by superpower states, as an approach to put more pressure on the GoS and 
encourage it to accept a negotiated settlement that meets their national self-interests. 
It is Alex de Waal’s (2008) conviction that referring the Darfur issue to the ICC 
through the UNSC is a victory in itself. The GoS has not cooperated to permit 
investigations or prosecutions to be thoroughly conducted. De Waal argues that the 
major cause for this non-cooperation is the deterioration in the relationship between 
Sudan and the west, due to the position of a near-complete collapse in confidence 
amongst them. The author observes that the Darfur issue has become highly 
politicised globally through the UN and several other means, such as the ICC, with a 
view to spurring the GoS into providing more political concessions (de Waal 2008, p. 
34). De Waal arguably concludes that in light of the lack of trust between Sudan and 
western states, it is unlikely that the ICC would be able to proceed with 
investigations of war criminals (Waal 2008, p. 35).  
Indeed, it can be strongly agreed that the Darfur Crisis has become enormously 
politicised, which has created real obstacles to progress towards a solution. However, 
the inability of the ICC to conduct a successful prosecution does not result only from 
procedural inability but also from a lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ICC might 
be deliberately disrupted by its users, who are aware of its implications for global 
stability, whereby it cannot be used as a political instrument beyond that. Despite the 
need for harmonisation between political sensitivity and legal complexity relating to 
the Darfur issue, confusion between the constraints of legal and political interests 
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threatens international stability. As Al-sharif (2009) states, the inadequate approach 
which targets narrow self-interests without regard to the implications, will lead to 
chaos and threatens security and stability of global “law to be applied not to be 
employed” (Al-sharif 2009). Hamed  
In contrast, the work of Mary T. Reynolds (2010) rejects the calls for delaying the 
prosecution of President al-Bashir, with the justification that allowing the 
prosecution to go further would serve to undermine the peace process in Darfur. 
Instead, the international community should allow the prosecution, under the UN 
umbrella, to move forward which would then legitimise the ICC and strengthen 
international criminal justice. If prosecution did not go ahead, the ICC’s international 
reputation and credibility might be irreparably damaged. This can only occur through 
supporting the ICC in holding President al-Bashir accountable for his crimes, which 
will be a beneficial lesson for future leaders. Reynolds asserts that Omar al-Bashir is 
criminally responsible as a direct perpetrator and is involved in crimes against 
humanity in Darfur, and any delay in prosecution will send the wrong message to 
future leaders that there is a great possibility the ICC will hesitate in promoting 
future international criminal justice (Reynolds 2010, p. 179). Thus, it can be argued 
that the Reynolds’ contention contrasts with those who say that referring the Darfur 
issue to the ICC itself is essentially the wrong action.  
Kwame Boateng’s view (2011) does not support the arguments presented by de Waal 
(2008) or Reynolds (2010). Boateng believes that the ICC is currently a meaningless 
instrument to deter killing in Darfur. He has drawn attention to the fact that the 
international community miscalculated when they perceived that issuing the arrest 
warrants, for Omar al-Bashir and his associates, would be an effective factor in 
preventing the continuation of criminal violence. Boateng states that the most 
effective action to end the massacre in Darfur would be to follow a policy to compel 
constraint, which could halt such actions. This type of policy could be achieved by 
deploying humanitarian military intervention to Sudan, authorised by the UNSC. He 
adds that if consensus between UNSC permanent members has not been obtained, 
consequently, the USA must consider unilateral intervention to forcibly disarm the 
Janjaweed militias, protect civilians in Darfur, and arrest members of the GoS, such 
as President al-Bashir, who refuse to comply with the ICC. Due to non-possession of 
the court to the proper coercive power that is able to halt the genocide in Darfur and 
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its inability to enforce its jurisdictive authority, the USA has unique capability to end 
the conflict in Darfur (Boateng 2011, p. 38). The ICC will not be able to end the 
conflict in Darfur, particularly in light of the US statute towards the legitimacy of the 
ICC. There is disagreement with Boateng’s belief in humanitarian military 
intervention as a solution to end the crisis, whether collective, by the international 
community, or unilateral, led by the USA. However, it is clear that in light of the 
USA’s aversion towards legitimising the ICC for fear of political motivations against 
its citizens, the USA would never lead such a humanitarian military intervention and 
undertake a policy of compelling actions to solve the problem in Darfur.   
Zray Yihdego (2009) expressed a similar view. He concentrated on the criminal 
dimensions of the Darfur conflict through studying International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) related to the process of protecting civilians and their possessions in Darfur. 
The author investigated the nature of the conflict, the applicable rules, and to what 
extent those rules are compliant, and the weaknesses and strengths of the responses 
of the international community in providing physical protection to civilians. He 
found that despite the gains that might be achieved from putting a great responsibility 
on all parties of the crisis as well as relying upon the regional approach to prevent 
violence and humanitarian abuses against the civilian population in Darfur, further 
and timely global action must be taken by the international community. Yihdego 
declares that urgent global action is necessary from the international community. He 
maintains that besides Sudan’s failure to react appropriately, the international 
community has also not done enough to respond adequately to the crisis. The author 
claims that to prevent further atrocities in Darfur concentrated, adequate and timely 
international action is necessary (Yihdego 2009, p. 1). Thus, Yihdego, on a small 
scale, focuses on the IHL and its applicable rules in the Darfur case. While the IHL 
could be rightly applicable to Darfur, especially those related to crimes against 
humanity, Yihdego did not beneficially address the impacts and implications of 
referring the issue of Darfur to the ICC on the conflict’s duration.   
An article by M. Rafiqul Islam (2006) addresses another angle of the problem. He 
highlights the international legal position of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
within the framework of the humanitarian crisis taking place in Darfur. Through this 
study the author has attempted to examine the development of international legal and 
institutional frameworks for IDPs by addressing the problem through its legal 
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identity, rights, humanitarian assistance, and protection in international law. Islam 
upholds that the provision of basic needs and aid to victims, following enforced 
displacement, is meaningless and not an effective approach to overcoming the issue. 
He adds that responding to the needs of the displaced does not succeed in crisis 
management. The author states that the Darfur Crisis can be settled in a political or 
diplomatic manner, but that this can only offer a short-run solution to stopping an 
internal displacement crisis. Also, Islam attributed this to a lack of appropriate 
international processes of legal accountability for the artificial creation of a massive 
human tragedy in Darfur and the failure of Khartoum to contain and end the crisis. 
This failure will continue to challenge the wisdom inherent in the UN protection of 
human rights for all and solicit world attention to uphold the elementary 
consideration of humanity. Islam concludes with emphasising that the issue of 
internal displacement should be addressed as an integral part of the international 
protection of human rights and the enforcement of humanitarian law (Islam 2006, p. 
354).  
With regard to the complicity that has been made by referring the Darfur issue to the 
ICC through the UNSC, Mohamed Abou El-Fadl (2009) notes that many 
neighbouring countries are development obsessed, whether they have direct interests 
in Sudan or fear the repercussions of their neighbour’s inner turmoil. This is 
especially the case if development refers to a new pattern of international interactions 
in dealing with the internal and regional issues that would lead to more difficulties 
and obstacles that reduce the likelihood of a resolution. Abou El- Fadl highlights the 
fact that the GoS has committed a number of grievous errors which have impacted 
the ICC’s operation. These are not only related to the human rights abuses committed 
against the people in Darfur, but also to some political actions (see Abou El- Fadl 
2009, p. 236). The complexity of the crisis dramatically increased after the UNSC 
referred the issue of Darfur to the ICC in decision number 1593 issued on 31st March 
2005, to consider charges of war crimes against humanity committed by the Bashir 
regime in Darfur. The crisis worsened while Sudan refused to be subjected to, and to 
responds to, these resolutions. On 14th July 2008 an arrest warrant was issued by the 
ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Luis Ocampo for President al-Bashir – the first arrest warrant 
against a serving head of state. This development might significantly influence the 
expected duration of the crisis.  
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Given the existing body of literature concerning the international and humanitarian 
law dimensions of the Darfur Crisis, it is clear that there are differences among the 
scholars in their perspectives regarding the impact of the ICC on the path of ending 
the crisis. While some view referring the Darfur issue to the ICC itself as a victory, 
others believe that the Darfur and its resolution is an internal affair. In addition to 
that, they argue that referring it to the ICC through the UNSC is an attempt to 
politicalise and prolong the conflict. Seemly, the crisis between Sudan and the ICC is 
a clear reflection of the extent of the impact of external actors on the development of 
the Darfur Crisis. Furthermore, it reveals a lack of agreement among all involved 
parties on the priorities required to close the Darfur file. However, the approach of 
the international and human law dimensions has limited benefit in terms of having a 
comprehensive understanding. This approach is relatively useful for gaining a clear 
view about the international intervention and the different attitudes of some 
important international actors towards the crisis, as well as how the Darfur Crisis has 
become highly politicised internationally, with a wide range of instruments being 
deployed by the UN and other western states to put pressure on the GoS and to 
promote an array of policy objectives. However, it is unlikely that this approach will 
be able alone to provide a full perception to the impact of the dimension of the 
external intervention of the crisis.  
 
Studies Focusing on the Libyan Involvement in 
Sudan 
 
Few studies have profoundly addressed this side of the Darfur Crisis. William D. 
Brewer (1982) investigates the implication of Gaddafi's arrival to power in Libya as 
well as historic, regional, and religious factors that have a bearing on the Libyan-
Sudanese relationship – but long before the Darfur Crisis emerged. According to 
Brewer, the relationship between the two countries is characterised as unstable. 
While there has been good Libyan-Sudanese collaboration since the military coup, 
led by colonel Gaddafi in Libya in 1969, which led to Gaddafi’s support of Numayri 
against communist plotters in 1970, these relations deteriorated quickly later on. The 
Libyan regime in Tripoli has been accused of being behind several anti-Numayri 
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coup attempts. Brewer demonstrates that these events significantly contributed to 
increased tension in the relations between Tripoli and Khartoum, especially since 
they share an adjacent corner of the same desert. He believes that the fundamental 
threat to Sudanese stability originates from, or via, the sensitive Darfur region. 
Brewer argues that Darfur's strategic importance stems from its size and remoteness 
from Khartoum, as well as its independent past in addition to its conservative 
religious population, which would render the province an inviting target for Libyan 
ambitions and machinations.  
Within this context, a study by Yehudet Ronen (2011) assesses Libya-Sudan 
relations by tracing their chronology during the period of 1969–2010. It discusses 
Tripoli’s essential interests and involvement in its broader geo-strategic neighbouring 
region. Additionally, the work investigated Libya’s perceptions and alliances as far 
as they had affected Tripoli’s policy toward Khartoum during the post-Cold War era, 
concentrating on key issues relevant to understanding Libya’s involvement in Sudan. 
Yehudet Ronen also highlights the dramatic strategic change that occurred in 
Tripoli’s regional policies, abandoning the Arab world in favour of Africa. This 
study interestingly found that Sudan was a key factor in Libya’s perceptions of 
volatility in its foreign policy towards the region. Yehudet Ronen contends that 
Gaddafi has viewed Sudan exclusively through a pragmatic view, shaping his 
relations with Khartoum according to Libyan perceptions of national interest alone. 
The author argues that Sudan was perceived by Gaddafi as an important asset in 
promoting his strategy to limit threats upon the Libyan regime’s interests, in addition 
to his desire to implement his vision of the United States of Africa (Ronen 2011, p. 
13). 
This analysis is confirmed by Elvira Sanchez Mateos (2005) who has proved that the 
Gaddafi regime's policies are pragmatic and opportunistic, aimed at survival, and 
also with the aim of achieving maximum credit and changing its image abroad. The 
writer argues that Gaddafi has had an international agenda, using the regional arena 
as an approach to achieve his foreign (and even domestic) ambitions. Gaddafi’s 
regime defined itself as Arab, Islamic and, more recently, African. He also found that 
Libya's Gaddafi continuously attempted to demonstrate its capacity to act as an 
effective regional power.  Noteworthy, the author argued that within the context of 
Libya seeking regional power, especially after the relations between Libya and Egypt 
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worsened due to the Egyptian realignment with the USA; Gaddafi formed an axis 
with Ethiopia and South Yemen to counterbalance Egyptian influence in Sudan in 
the 1970s. Furthermore, the war with Chad, related to the dispute on the border area 
of Auzu, is another instance of the Libyan struggle to play a leadership and 
influential role in its neighbouring areas (Mateos 2005, p. 439). Similarly, Patrick 
Berg (2008, p. 79) argues that Libya and Egypt were trying to present themselves as 
hegemonic powers in the region through torpedoing one another’s peace efforts. In 
pursuit of this strategy they also undermined the joint efforts of the UN and the AU 
regarding bloody conflicts taking place in Chad and Sudan for instance. 
Asim Elhag (2013) contends that Libya, under the Gaddafi regime, has played a 
significant role in Sudan, contributing to the destabilisation of the country. The key 
approach used by Gaddafi throughout this period was a policy of intervention in the 
internal affairs of Sudan by supporting the political opposition as well as the rebel 
movement in different areas of Sudan. Elhag posits that Tripoli armed the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by the late Colonel John 
Garang, which later led to the secession of southern Sudan in July of 2011, forming 
the state of South Sudan. The Gaddafi regime supported rebel movements in the 
Darfur region, which also had greater ambitions in the western part of Sudan. Libyan 
intervention in Sudanese affairs has essentially influenced the course of Sudanese-
Libyan relations. Interestingly, Asim Elhag found that Khartoum was fully aware of 
the political approach of Gaddafi. Despite this the GoS was fully keen to crack the 
relationship with Tripoli, as Sudanese authorities were also fully aware of Gaddafi's 
ability to harm Khartoum. Nevertheless, the policy of intervention pursued by 
Gaddafi has created a gap in the relations between the two countries, rather than 
strengthening good neighbourly relations and collaboration. This argument is 
confirmed by a number of governmental and opposition sources who were 
interviewed 4 , including Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013), Hassan Trabi 
(14/01/2013), Sadiq Al Mahdi (10/01/2013), and Ahmed Derije (18/03/2013). 
On the other hand, Asim Elhag (2013) emphasises that the influential role was 
exchanged among the two regimes in Khartoum and in Tripoli. Due to the increased 
concerns and fears of the GoS towards Libya’s suspicious activities in Sudan, the 
                                                          
4 For more details about their job title, see Techniques of Analysis and Data Collection in Theory and 
Methodology chapter. 
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Inqad regime adopted a strategy of neutralising the impact of Gaddafi’s intervention 
in Sudanese internal affairs by pursuing a similar policy of trying to intervene in 
internal Libyan affairs by supporting Libyan opposition groups. The aim was to keep 
Gaddafi busy with internal troubles, until Khartoum could find a suitable opportunity 
to remove the threat of the Gaddafi regime. According to Asim Elhag the intelligence 
organs of the Libyan regime were working constantly in order to create instability in 
Sudan, as authorities in Tripoli were worried because of the Islamic orientation of the 
Inqad regime, which seized power in 1989. 
This development was considered by Gaddafi to be a significant threat to his regime. 
These fears increased after the coup attempt (Bab al-Azizia attempt) against 
Gaddafi’s rule in the early 1980s. Gaddafi accused Islamic groups governed by the 
Inqad regime for preparing and planning the coup. The author also stresses that all 
indications were clear that the Gaddafi regime had been involved in the war in 
Darfur since its eruption in 2003, by providing finance to the Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) and JEM, along with weapons and other military assistance, as 
well as providing the Darfur rebel movements with training bases inside Libyan 
territory. Nonetheless, Khartoum has constantly tried to avoid involvement in any 
confrontation with Gaddafi through a policy of restraint, based on Sudanese officials' 
understanding of Gaddafi’s volatile personality. Instead, Sudanese leaders did their 
best to persuade Gaddafi that he was a key factor for stability in Sudan. 
However, this diplomatic approach failed to deter Gaddafi from supporting the 
movements involved in the Darfur conflict, especially the JEM, and the active and 
influential Libyan role in the development of the Darfur Crisis continued up until the 
Revolution of 17 February 2011, which toppled Gaddafi from power. In this respect 
Andrew S. Natsios (2012, pp. 122 - 126), the US former Special Humanitarian 
Coordinator for Sudan in 2005, and Special Envoy to Sudan from October 2006 to 
December 2007, confirms Asim Elhag’s argument. Natsios reports that Gaddafi had 
a great and direct influence on the course of events in West Sudan. According to 
Natsios Libya was the original source of weaponry for rebel movements in Darfur, 
which were regularly sent across the Chadian territory into Darfur. Natsios believes 
that Gaddafi sought to create a Libyan empire, essentially to expand the sphere of his 
influence in North Africa. Natsios notes that the key approach to achieving his 
ambition was economic influence.  
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Historically, Darfur has had closer economic ties to Libya than Khartoum, and while 
authorities in Khartoum were ignoring the western part of the country, Gaddafi was 
bringing the region into his sphere of impact using Libyan oil revenues to build 
and/or modernise roads through the desert in order to expand his influence southward. 
For the same purpose, according to Natsios, Gaddafi had based seventy security 
agents in Darfur since the eruption of the crisis in 2003, using money, weapons, and 
logistical supplements to back insurgents against the regime in Khartoum and its 
allies. Natsios importantly highlighted three prime themes that formed Gaddafi’s 
foreign policy and served his vision and desire in the sub-Saharan arena in general, 
and Darfur in particular: first, Gaddafi’s attempt to expand the influence of the Arab 
race and culture; second, Gaddafi’s interpretation of Islam; and third, the creation of 
a Libyan state across Africa (Andrew S. Natsios 2012, pp. 123-124).  The approach 
of investigating the Libyan impact on the Darfur Crisis, in addition to the previous 
approaches together could offer a clear vision about the influence of regional third-
party intervention in intrastate conflicts, which may help in understanding the factors 
impacting the termination and solving of the crisis and maintain the peace in a short 
duration as this has direct relevance for decision-makers. This combined approach 
has not been used before which what differentiate our study from the others. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is the researchers’ desire to address the Darfur crisis with discerning analysis of the 
literature to fully comprehend the essence of the crisis and to identify the real causes, 
as well as the domestic, regional and international repercussions. Furthermore, to 
offer solutions that assist in overcoming the crisis in the short, intermediate, and 
long-term. The existing body of literature on the Darfur Crisis reviewed in this thesis 
has been divided into five main categories: firstly, political dimensions, which 
include studies that argue that the Darfur Crisis is mainly political, and focus 
fundamentally on the political causes and internal and external actors, as well as the 
domestic, regional, and international political repercussions of the interstate war in 
Sudan. Secondly, studies that have economic dimensions: many scholars have 
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primarily addressed the economic aspects of the crisis as they argue that the key 
factors that led to such a situation in Darfur are economic. This theme is divided into 
two components: 1) studies that have attributed the crisis to internal causes, such as 
the local impacts of climate change, unequal wealth distribution and development 
within Sudan, agricultural insufficiency, and deterioration in living conditions, 
poverty, illiteracy, and disease. 2) Research that considers international economic 
factors as the causes of the crisis. These shed light on the competition between the 
major powerful states, such as the USA and China, to access energy resources (in 
particular oil). These international actors have considerably contributed to the 
deterioration of the situation in Darfur. The third theme that has been identified is 
ethnic and cultural aspects. This body of literature includes studies conducted 
essentially on ethnic, cultural, and social factors that have contributed to the eruption 
of armed conflict in the region and formed its outcomes. These studies contain those 
that describe the conflict as an Arab-African conflict, genocide, and/or ethnic 
cleansing.  
The fourth theme covers those academic efforts that directly or indirectly relate to 
international and humanitarian law. A number of research endeavours have been 
carried out on the implications of internationalising the Darfur issue by referring it to 
the UNSC and the impact of this action on the paths of the process of resolving the 
problem. In addition to this, several other studies have focused on the resolutions of 
the UNSC issued against Sudan, the concept of the responsibility to protect, and how 
this has affected the peace process in Darfur.  The final theme concerns with the 
investigations related to issue of the impact of external intervention on the crisis, the 
Libyan intervention as centre focus. Analysis reveals that the Darfur Crisis is much 
more complicated than initially perceived. When considered carefully, each aspect, 
whether it be political, economic, ethnic, environmental, or international involvement, 
has an important impact at different times and in different ways. Each aspect has 
significant implications, whether internally or externally which often reinforce one 
other.  
Overall, the existing literature can be categorised into two fundamental themes. The 
first subject involves the causes of the crisis, plus their domestic, regional, and 
international implications. The second area of concern is the internal and external 
involvement in the intrastate wars. In addition to the topics that have already been 
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discussed in the existing literature, this study will also investigate the duration of the 
Darfur Crisis as a further theme (see figure No: 1).  
The examination of this protracted crisis raises important questions of why the crisis 
has not ended, and why there seems to be no clear path to its resolution. This 
research was selectively fine-tuned to focus more deeply on the management of the 
Darfur Crisis, through a thorough appraisal of how Libyan intervention (as a very 
important regional/external actor), has influenced the duration of the Darfur Crisis. 
Furthermore, a number of important studies on related topics, such as civil wars, the 
duration of civil conflicts, the impact of third-party intervention on the duration of 
civil unrest, and the overall success of crisis management have been also reviewed. 
This body of literature has been highly influential, generating a clearer overview to 
direct the research more effectively. These will be discussed in the following Theory 
and Methodology chapter. Despite the importance of exist literature on the Darfur 
Crisis as well as on the impact of external intervention on the intrastate conflicts, it 
was clear that this literature needs to be developed further. 
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Figure No: 1 the Literature Review Framework of the Study 
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Chapter 2 
___________________________________________________ 
Theory and Methodology  
___________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the existing literature related to the Darfur Crisis. 
This includes studies that have been conducted to explore the crisis through 
investigating its underlying causes and domestic, regional, and international 
implications, as well as internal and external involvements. As mentioned in the 
introduction of the literature review chapter, a good number of important pieces of 
literature on civil wars and the involvement of external third parties will be discussed 
in this part of the thesis. Partly because these studies are more concerned with the 
conceptual framework developed and employed in this research project.  These types 
of studies are very relative to the issue of the management of the Darfur conflict, 
which is necessary to be reviewed in order to coherently achieve the aims of this 
thesis.  
After intensively reviewing the existing literature and documents relevant to the 
Darfur Crisis, the main topic being investigated in this thesis, and after determining 
the main focus and tasks of this study, it is essential at this point to establish the 
conception of theory adopted here. Alan Bryman (2012) summarise the importance 
of theory as follows: “Theory is important to the social researcher because it 
provides a backcloth and rational for the research that is being conducted. It also 
provides a framework within which social phenomena can be understood and the 
research findings can be interpreted" (Bryman. A 2012, p. 20). 
The methodological strategy employed to collect, analyse and present information 
will be addressed in this chapter. It is contended that the major task of the research 
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methodology is to provide an appropriate technique for conducting, in advance, all 
the necessary steps of the research, from defining the problem to collecting and 
analysing data, to the writing-up of the research. Peter (1994) offers a useful 
overview on the research steps of methodology, which allows us to grasp the 
meaning of research methodology and how it is used. He argues that research 
methodology is an essential instrument not merely to constitute an overall research 
design, and to delineate clearly the purpose of the research, but also to precisely 
ascertain the appropriate type of research that should be conducted to serve its key 
purpose, and to select the methods and techniques best suited for that type of 
research.  
 
Existing Studies on External Third-party 
Involvement and the Duration of Conflicts 
 
The literature into civil wars indicates that civil wars last longer than international 
wars by more than six times (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004, p. 253). While 
some state that the upsurge of civil wars was strongly associated with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, others report that on-going civil conflicts had 
been steadily, almost linearly, rising from the end of World War II (Fearon 2004, p. 
275). The importance of sophisticated management in handling domestic armed 
conflicts has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War. It is assumed that 
external interventions are a form of crisis and conflict management (Regan 2002, P. 
55). Useful material, which allows the author to ‘test’ both the Cunningham (2010) 
and Regan (2002) models, is explored, providing a further justification for this 
research project in addition to exploring the Darfur Crisis. In this section, the 
literature on the role of third parties in internal armed conflicts, including factors that 
affect their expected duration, will be elaborated upon. 
After reviewing existing literature, it is noticed that studies conducted to investigate 
the duration of armed conflicts have been separated into two main categories. Firstly, 
studies concentrated on the key internal factors that lead to the eruption of any civil 
war, including the attributes of the societies where the armed conflict occurs, and the 
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economic, political, and geographic factors, as well as the internal conflict parties 
and their capabilities to wage war and achieve military victory or reach a negotiated 
end. In the second category studies focused on the impact of external involvement in 
internal wars. Types of interventions (whether political and diplomatic, economic, or 
military) and their effects on the duration of the civil conflict have been also 
addressed. Understanding the factors that control the duration of civil conflicts is 
crucially vital in examining how the duration of those conflicts can be affected by the 
role of external third-party intervention, the Darfur conflict in particular.  
Existing literature into the factors that impact the expected duration of civil wars 
examined this topic from a variety of angles. Wagner (2000, p. 449) and 
Cunningham (2010, p. 116) similarly argue that the duration of warfare is driven by 
factors that affect the ability of one side to achieve decisive military victory and/or 
affect the willingness of each side to reach a negotiated settlement. Those factors can 
be significantly affected by external actors within the existing approach of external 
interventions in civil wars. In other research Cunningham (2006, p. 876) indicates 
that there are three approaches to understanding factors that can affect war 
termination. Firstly, the economic dimension, which focuses on the costs of warfare. 
Secondly, the military dimension that examines how military position on the 
battlefield can be the key element of determining demands and form the final 
outcome of negotiations. There is also the diplomatic approach that addresses 
incentives that motivate parties to engage in a serious settlement process 
(Cunningham 2006). 
Recently, scholars have begun to focus on the influence of third parties on the 
duration of civil conflicts as a main approach instead of limiting their analysis solely 
to the diplomatic instruments and their effectiveness in ending the internal conflict 
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008). The basic expectations of outside 
interventions, be they diplomatic, military or economic, are that they would shorten a 
conflict's expected length, and the key motivation of these interventions is to manage 
the civil armed conflicts effectively (Gates and Strand 2004). Studies that have been 
conducted on the duration of internal wars have revealed that once a civil war starts, 
its duration depends critically on the balance of power and military capability 
between the rebels and the government (Elbadawi 2000).  
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While a few studies have directly shed light on the duration of civil war, a handful of 
scholars have examined how it can be affected by outside regional or international 
actors. Some external interveners might seek to end the Darfur Crisis for 
humanitarian reasons. Other third parties have their own incentives to prolong the 
duration of the war with a view of plundering the natural resources of the civil war 
state, or draining the resources of a rival intervening actor (Balch‐Lindsay and 
Enterline 2000).  Several studies have concluded that a variety of roles can be played 
by external state actors along the civil conflict's development, from urging the 
opposition to sit down at the negotiating table, offering incentives to groups to 
negotiate, hosting negotiations, deploying peacekeepers or peace enforcers, and 
providing economic or military support to either side (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004; 
Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007; Gleditsch 2007). 
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) developed a formal theoretical 
framework to explore the basic determinants that contribute to the expected duration 
of civil wars. They tested the duration of intrastate conflict by examining the role of 
two different variables, external interventions and the degree of ethnic fragmentation 
of society, to predict the length of internal wars. The results of Elbadawi and 
Sambanis’ research show that ethnic wars tended to last longer and were harder to 
resolve than other types of internal wars. Moreover, like Patrick Regan (2002) they 
revealed that long war duration is positively related to outside interventions. Other 
authors have found that external interventions that support rebel movements against 
extremely autocratic governments typically would lead to a growth in rebel forces 
over time; furthermore, rebel mobilisation would be easier, which would have a 
significant impact on the duration of civil wars. Additionally, Elbadawi and 
Sambanis argue that to reduce the expected duration of internal wars there should be 
appropriate initiatives or strategies that are compatible with each case separately 
(Elbadawi 2000). Arguably, if it is agreed that outside interventions in ethnically 
diverse societies would not shorten a conflict’s duration because of a high level of 
rebel mobilisation. Intervening in other types of civil conflicts when driven by 
ideology, concerns for poverty, and political marginalisation would, however, be 
shorter because the rate of rebel mobilisation in those conflicts will be lower. 
Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) investigated the factors that might account 
for the onset of civil conflict and its duration within the estimated hazard functions 
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model, using a large-scale dataset on wars over 40 years between 1960 and 2000. 
They empirically explored how the course of civil wars is systematically determined 
by two main different factors from their onset: structural circumstances prevailing 
prior to war and/or the conditions during conflict duration. They report that long civil 
war duration basically results from three major factors: low per capita income, high 
levels of inequality, and ethnic divisions. By contrast, a decline in the prices of 
exported primary commodities, and outside military intervention towards opponents 
are factors that have the most fundamental influence to end internal war in a short 
period. In general Collier and Hoeffler suggest that civil war is more likely to occur 
in countries where national income is largely dependent on the exportation of 
primary commodities (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004).  
The above review indicates that the authors attributed the key factors leading to the 
beginning of any civil war to economic determinants. The types of natural resources 
that countries have and the size of national revenues coming from those resources 
could make those countries more prone to civil war. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that the onset of civil wars depends on external considerations, precisely because the 
prices of primary commodities that countries export are directly associated with the 
international markets. In such a case, war duration would be related to the 
international economic circumstances during the internal conflict. Focusing mainly 
on the effect of natural resources and national revenue from exportation of primary 
commodities on the duration of internal wars results in the more reasonable argument 
that there is a great likelihood that the duration of civil war that breaks out in 
countries that have significant natural resources would be longer than in countries 
that do not. This is because those resources constitute easy sources of rebel finance. 
Thus, access to these resources by the opposition implies that the risk of rebellion 
will be increased. 
James D. Fearon (2004) investigates the expected duration of civil wars in terms of 
how long they last, and the possible obstacles that could undermine reaching a long-
lasting negotiated settlement using a game-theoretic model of credible commitments. 
He argues that a lack of military capability for either side to disarm the other is the 
key factor prolonging civil wars, leading to military stalemate. Conversely, they can 
be shortened when conditions favour a decisive victory. Fearon found that internal 
wars are shorter than those arising out of coups or popular revolutions. He reasons 
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that these types of approaches for change usually favour decisive victories. More 
specifically, he argues that taking state power requires a quick process to achieve 
objectives which basically rely on defections that occur within the security and 
military apparatus. Leaders of such change movements are very often not willing to 
negotiate deals with government, as this would threaten their ability to bargain and 
even their lives (Fearon 2004). Nevertheless, civil wars related to land or natural 
resource disputes between state-supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group 
and peripheral ethnic minority are usually long-lived. These types of wars are mainly 
seen as military competitions as each combatant attempts to render the other unable 
to continue fighting, or seeks to exact more losses that force the other side to accept a 
negotiated settlement. An imbalance of military capabilities is vital for a decisive 
victory. Fearon shows that the state has numerous influences on the likelihood of a 
long-running stable peace. Negotiated settlements are quite achievable when the 
military capacity of the state is stronger than that of the rebels.  
The state's military capacity and its ability to eliminate any rebellion tend to reduce 
the chances of a conflict lasting for a longer period of time. On the other hand, the 
military weakness of the state motivates rebels to continue fighting and increase their 
demands, undermining the efforts of a negotiated settlement and thus prolonging the 
duration of war. Furthermore, Fearon suggests that the expected duration of internal 
military conflict will be longer when the financial capability of insurgent groups is 
based primarily on contraband goods resources, such as diamonds and illegal drugs. 
Rather than examining the impact of outside intervention in the determination of the 
crisis as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) 
did, Fearon looks at different angles where he studies the duration of civil wars 
through particular internal factors.  
Cunningham (2006) offered a theoretical framework for understanding how the 
duration of internal wars, and the negotiation processes to end them, can be affected 
by the involvement of multiple parties in the conflict. He argues that the duration of 
internal wars with more actors is expected to be longer, and attributes this to the fact 
that actors can only accept a settlement that meets their own interests. The potential 
to end the conflict through the negotiated settlement is therefore less. Hence these 
'veto players' tend to be a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution. The 
author found that the termination of internal wars is significantly associated with the 
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number of actors who are veto players. He explains that whenever the number of 
conflict parties is more than two it is much more difficult to reach an end, because 
the differences in information, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold-out make 
a negotiated settlement more difficult. This brought him to emphasise that to have a 
good understanding about the duration of civil wars and their termination, it must be 
recognised that the hypothesis that civil war is a two-party phenomenon is no longer 
valid.  
Cunningham provides three suggestions for policymakers who are directly involved 
in responding to internal conflicts. Firstly, reducing the number of primary veto 
players (external actors in particular) involved in civil war is vital. This can be done 
through looking for ways to remove the actors who are the major barriers of a 
negotiated resolution. He perceives that multi-party conflicts are less likely to be 
resolved than those involving two actors. The other suggestion is that the external 
parties who are involved in contributing to halting internal wars must indicate a 
strong willingness to reach an agreement that includes all fighting parties. 
Furthermore, the main insurgents should be included in the peace process by 
encouraging them to participate in negotiations that ultimately lead to an end to civil 
war. Cunningham found this is a significant approach for achieving long-term 
stability. Finally, he revealed that if reaching a comprehensive agreement between 
veto players was not possible, international actors should attempt to make a domestic 
peace agreement among the government and the strongest internal opposition groups, 
and then seek to integrate the smaller groups. This tends to increase the chance of 
serious negotiations leading to a feasible and successful settlement (Cunningham 
2006). Thus, if the main international actors have not successfully reached an 
agreement regarding the mode of dealing with the situation in Darfur, or have not 
successfully removed and/or isolated the major barriers to taking a decisive decision 
to end the conflict, the expected duration of the conflict will be longer.  
According to Aysegul Aydin and Regan (2011) while researchers of peace-building 
in civil wars have paid a good deal of attention to the influence that collective 
intervention – in the framework of international and regional organisations – might 
have on the termination of civil war, some mechanisms within the conflict process 
that affect the expectations of civil war duration have not yet been fully explored. 
Investigators have paid less attention to the role that unilateralism plays in the 
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duration of internal wars through focusing on how this duration can be impacted 
upon by unilateral interventions undertaken by third party states, without prior 
coordination with these organisations. They contend that unilateral interventions by 
third-party states have a cumulative influence on conflict resolution depending on the 
interveners' interrelations. Aydin and Regan believe that regardless of the self-
interests of third-party interveners, unilateral interventions undertaken by state actors 
that have critical cooperative relations creates potential to facilitate the war's end in a 
short period.  
The writers’ network approach has highlighted the dependencies between third-party 
states’ unilateral efforts and modelled interveners’ roles through their interrelations. 
Aydin and Regan offer a new model of civil war intervention that regards the degree 
of interactions among the intervening states and their coalitions as essential as the 
interventions themselves in shaping combatants’ preferences. This is import because 
the disagreement between the interveners creates new conditions of bargaining and 
results in intense competition between interveners for influence over the competing 
factions. This in turn encourages the opposition to escalate their initial demands, 
because a decisive action to end the war is not expected to be undertaken by external 
interveners, which makes the period of civil war longer (Aydin and Regan 2011). It 
is agreed that whenever the intervening states have less capability to act collectively 
to force a certain course of ending civil wars, these wars last longer, and vice versa. 
An article by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) considered the influence of 
third-party interventions on civil wars during the period 1816-1997 within the 
historical framework of competing risks, relying upon the competing risks approach. 
They argue that third-party interventions must be regarded as central to the interstate 
war process, a process that is characterised by the duration of hostilities and the 
outcome. Their analysis reports that distinguishing between the lengths of time to 
different civil war outcomes is vital. They posit that two dimensions of civil war 
duration and outcomes are observable manifestations of the civil war process and are 
causally interdependent. Throughout this process, the probability of different types of 
outcomes is a function of various political, economic, and social factors.  
The research results suggest that third-party intervention can be the key factor that 
plays a decisive role in the development of internal wars, as it has different effects on 
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civil war duration to different civil war outcomes. The authors argue that while third-
party intervention increases the potential of the supported opposition groups 
achieving military victory, third-party interventions that are biased increase the 
likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Yet, third-party interventions on both sides 
reduce the probability of a negotiated settlement and make civil wars last longer 
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008).  
The authors’ work sheds light on the significant differences in the dynamics of civil 
wars, and emphasises that civil war is a dynamic process. Relatedly, Karl R. 
DeRouen Jr and David Sobek (2004) offer new contributions to the existing literature 
on civil wars. They find that state capacity has a great impact on the outcomes and 
the duration of civil wars. According to these authors, the involvement of state 
capacity can be observed in two different ways: the type of state, and governmental 
army size. While an effective state bureaucracy reduces the chances of rebel victory, 
regime type and the strength of the government's army do not appear to significantly 
increase the likelihood of governmental victory.  
On the other hand, other results outside the state’s influence are also generated. They 
show that UN involvement greatly underpins the probability of a truce or treaty. In 
terms of time, the involvement of the UN in civil wars tends to prolong the expected 
duration for both government and rebels to achieve victory, while shortening the 
period of time needed before reaching a negotiated settlement, whether in a truce or 
treaty form. In addition, the researchers’ analyses show that rebels have less 
capability to achieve a decisive victory in ethnic, identity, or religious wars, 
especially in those extremely heterogeneous countries (Karl and Sobek 2004).  
A study carried out by Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2005) probes the potential 
influence of geographical factors and the strategic ambitions of rebels on the duration 
of armed civil conflicts. Their central themes are determining the strategic 
motivations of the rebel groups to reveal their fundamental aims, including whether 
the conflict is being fought for territorial secession or conquest of the government. 
This is because the rebels’ goal type will impact the course of the civil conflict, 
where it is fought, and the possibility of one party achieving military victory. They 
found that drawing on a simple dummy variable for assessing whether the strategic 
 57 
 
ambitions of the rebels has a significant influence on the duration of civil conflicts 
does not provide sufficient information with regard to territory. 
In order to examine how the duration of conflicts can be affected by geographic 
factors, the writers argued that the location of the conflict is importantly associated 
with the period of time, especially in terms of location of natural resources that can 
be seized. Proximity of the conflict zone to international borders also sustains armed 
civil conflict. Furthermore, in their attempt to assess the capability of rebel groups to 
sustain civil conflict, the results report that if the rebel groups have access to 
resources, particularly to alluvial diamonds and gemstones, armed conflicts are not 
expected to end in the short term, as rebels would be able to exploit these resources 
for recruitment and retention of manpower, thereby prolonging the conflict (Buhaug, 
Gates and Lujala 2005). There are many reasons to agree with this statement, 
especially with the claim that proximity tends to be strongly associated with duration. 
The civil wars fought in south Sudan, Darfur, and Syria are clear examples of this.  
The work of Buhaug et al. (2009) underscores that identifying the dyadic interaction 
in relationships between the geographical characteristics of the conflict zone and 
rebel military capability itself would considerably help to improve our understanding 
of the dynamics of conflict, in turn, to simplify determining the length of civil wars. 
The study’s results indicate that the duration of a conflict directly relates to 
geography. The authors argue that the location of governmental and rebel forces 
plays a fundamental role in increasing, as well as decreasing, the duration of a civil 
war. Civil conflicts in areas located at a considerable distance from the centre of 
governmental influence, and along remote international borders, as well as being rich 
in diamonds, would lead to an increase in insurgents’ military capacity, which vastly 
reduces the likelihood of ending militarised conflict quickly (Buhaug, Gates and 
Lujala 2009). Thus, their contribution is to connect between rebel military capability 
and geographic factors, such as location of the conflict zones and the attributes of 
conflict areas (terrain and natural resources), and how these two major variables 
together play an important role in defining the duration of the civil conflict. This can 
easily be seen in the context of two very clear examples that can prove this: first, the 
long conflict in Darfur is located a considerable distance from the main government 
stronghold, as well as along the remote borders with three countries (Egypt, Libya, 
and Chad). Another case is a relatively long civil war that occurred in Libya in 2011 
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where the rebels' stronghold was located a considerable distance from the centre of 
government power and along international boundaries (Egypt in the east and Tunisia 
in the west), and also in regions with valuable natural resources. Undoubtedly, these 
factors have crucially influenced the combatants' military capacity and then 
prolonged the duration of both intrastate conflicts.        
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) assessed the impact of third-party interventions 
on civil wars from different angles. They believe that considering the interdependent 
relationships between the external parties is essential to understanding the influence 
of third-party involvement on the duration of civil wars, rather than concentrating 
solely on the impact of each individual third party upon the evolution of a particular 
civil war separately. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline indicate that each intervener has its 
own incentives, and these often differ. While some external interveners are 
encouraged to act by their desire to end internal conflicts for humanitarian reasons, 
other third parties have their own incentives to prolong the duration of internal wars, 
and these interests may be to plunder the natural resources of the civil war state, or 
drain the resources of a rival intervener. In addition, they argue that instead of 
concentrating only on analysing the characteristics of these internal wars, it is crucial 
to assess the geopolitical factors in which civil war occurs. Thus, in the case of 
Darfur the major reason behind the longevity of the crisis might not only be the 
external global powers' intervention but also the regional involvement by 
neighbouring countries, such as Libya.  
To test their hypotheses they relied on historical analysis and a sample of 152 
intrastate wars for the period of 1820-1992. The study’s results indicate that third-
party interventions are central to civil wars. Additionally, they found that the 
influence of third-party interventions on the duration of civil wars is a function of the 
interdependent nature of these interventions, as long civil war duration is associated 
with the equitable or inequitable distribution of third-party intervention across the set 
of interstate parties. An equitable distribution of third-party interventions by 
supporting both parties of the conflict would create a balanced intervention, thereby 
increasing the potential of ending the war later rather than sooner. The findings also 
show that separatist civil wars are strongly associated with longer conflict duration 
(Balch‐Lindsay and Enterline 2000). 
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According to the authors, civil warfare is significantly impacted by the strategic 
ambitions of each intervener, albeit to a lesser degree than third-party intervention. In 
other words, the degree of effectiveness of third-party interventions in the armed 
civil conflicts is partly linked to the actions of other interveners. Events and crises in 
various parts of the world differ according to their causes and the severity of their 
impacts. They also differ by degree of incidence that proves the need for strategic 
management of political crises – which is increasing continuously, especially after 
the events of 11 September 2001. Whilst certain features of crisis management used 
in the post-Cold War era have remained, others have changed (Youngson 2001).   
Although the influence of external intervention on the duration and termination of 
armed conflicts and crises has been addressed, investigation into the factors that 
drive the duration of intrastate conflicts is still sparse and needed. The focus of this 
study is on the impact of outside interventions specially those undertaken by regional 
state actors on the expected duration of internal armed conflicts as a form of conflict 
management. Examining properly the effectiveness of Libyan intervention (under 
Gaddafi regime), as a case study of a regional intervention form, on shortening or 
prolonging the Darfur Crisis duration will, therefore, provide a basic understanding 
of how different types and ways of external interventions can influence the expected 
duration of civil wars. Covering the gab of this aspect of knowledge will provide a 
new addition to the previous research on the broader topic of the duration of 
intrastate conflicts especially on the role of external/regional interventions in the 
duration of internal conflicts.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
The analytical approach used in this thesis to understand the relationship between the 
long-duration of the Darfur Crisis and Libyan involvement, as a major regional third 
party, will be adopted by interpreting the underlying motivations of why and how 
Libya has been involved in the conflict . Furthermore, this approach will be used to 
determine whether the strategy adopted by Libya to deal with the crisis has been 
passive or active, as well as to identify how this has adequately effected the phases of 
the crisis. In other words, to ascertain whether the real incentive behind the Libyan 
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strategy derives from the desire to resolve the conflict or to win the conflict? 
Interpretive theory will be discussed in the third section of this chapter. 
To address the main research questions, a new theoretical model has been developed. 
This model has been employed to guide the analysis throughout this project. Initially, 
a theoretical model by Cunningham (2010) was selected. Cunningham argues that 
the duration of an armed civil conflict could be extended when the key incentive of 
external state intervention is driven by pursuing an independent agenda that is 
different to the goals of the domestic combatants. The author spells out that third-
party state intervention in this form is likely to lead to long internal civil conflicts for 
two main reasons. First, foreign state intervention with a separate agenda means that 
involvement by a new actor must be part of any settled negotiation to end interstate 
war. Second, often external state interventions in civil conflicts are not enthusiastic 
about negotiating as they have less incentive to do so than the domestic actors as 
their costs of fighting are lower. Their expectations to gain significant benefits from 
negotiating are not higher than for the internal actors. These two primary 
implications can hinder conflict resolution by lowering the likelihood of ending the 
fighting quickly (Cunningham 2010).  
Cunningham proposed two necessary mechanisms that the international community 
should follow to overcome these barriers. Firstly, reassessing external state 
intervention is essential. If foreign states become involved and are associated with 
independent objectives, the international community must force these states to 
withdraw as an absence of this pressure decreases the potential that involved states 
will leave before achieving their full goals. Another technique is that if the 
international community fails to convince these states to withdraw, beginning 
negotiations with these states to resolve the separate dimensions of the conflict are 
essential. Cunningham, however, contends that conflicts where the international 
community fails to address this dimension can become substantially prolonged.  
This analysis also allows the researcher to interpret the transition of peace 
negotiations, between the GoS and the rebel leaders, from Tripoli to Doha in Qatar. 
This was a transition forced by the international community following the conviction 
that Libyan intervention was a major barrier to the resolution of the crisis, and finally 
to what extent this transition has influenced the development of the peace process 
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and the duration of the Darfur Crisis. In his empirical study, Cunningham utilised 
Version 3, 2005 of the Uppsala/ Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict 
Dataset Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO). This covers all conflicts that have 
taken place between 1945 and 2004 and classifies these conflicts into three 
categories: extra-systemic wars (such as anticolonial conflicts), interstate wars, and 
internationalised civil war. In his research, Cunningham included all conflicts from 
the last two categories.  
Cunningham found that there have been 12 cases where the external intervener had a 
separate agenda from those of the internal parties. These include, for instance, the 
cases of Libya in Chad and Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola in the DRC in addition to 
that of Tanzania in Uganda in 1979 and South Africa in Angola (Cunningham 2010). 
The assessment process is aimed at determining the extent to which Cunningham’s 
theoretical model suits this research. Cunningham’s approach has its limitations in 
that it only applies to cases of direct military intervention. Cunningham omits an 
important set of cases where external interveners are heavily involved in armed 
conflict, even if they are not direct military participants, of which the Darfur case is a 
very good example.  
Despite the fact that military action is the most evident form of intervention, other 
types of external state intervention also exists. Furthermore, there is another obvious 
weakness in Cunningham’s model. Cunningham’s model does not separately 
scrutinise the internal factions’ relationships with the external intervening state. 
Furthermore, this model does not explain what happens to the length of the conflict, 
when an internal party has an agenda which is different from another group of 
internal combatants. With these limitations in mind, it would be unwise to rely solely 
on Cunningham’s theoretical model, as it is not compatible with this project’s 
research goals. To avoid these obstacles, another theoretical model is needed, thus 
Regan’s theoretical framework was analysed (Regan 2002). 
Regan (2002) argues that foreign intervention whether military and/or economic does 
not contribute to a prompt conclusion of conflict and such interventions cannot be 
regarded as meaningful instruments of internal conflict management. Both military 
and economic foreign interventions are associated with longer conflict duration. 
Furthermore, Regan notes that biased external intervention towards one side of the 
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conflict, either the government or opposition, tends to increase the likelihood of 
shortening the hostilities. This can result in a shifting of the balance of power, which 
accelerates the cessation of internal war. In contrast, Regan believes that neutral 
external interventions, which manage both sides equally, are less likely to end civil 
conflicts or even diminish their expected termination date (Regan 2002). 
As such, Regan’s work primarily addresses whether outside involvement in internal 
civil conflicts, as a form of conflict management, contributes to a swift ceasefire. Or 
do the international protagonists extend that war? Regan also inspects which 
strategies effectively influence the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. It is clear 
that Regan focuses on a different perspective of the impact of external players, on the 
longevity of the conflict. While Cunningham’s investigation (2010) focuses on how 
the duration is influenced when external third-party states with an independent 
agenda become involved in internal armed conflict. Regan concentrates on diverse 
types of intervention and strategies for action that either decrease or increase the 
length of war, which Cunningham does not comment on.  
While Regan rightly points out that opposing intervention can reduce the expected 
period of conflict, it could be argued that it is not always necessarily that third-party 
intervention (of any type, or for any purpose) will increase conflict duration. Looking 
closely at the international multilateral intervention in Libya in 2011, for example, 
under resolution 1973 issued by the UNSC, we will find that it led to hastening the 
end of that conflict rather than prolonging it. This intervention was military and 
economic within the framework of protecting civilians by NATO. The stated goal of 
this intervention was to safeguard civilians in Libya, but facts on the ground suggest 
otherwise and it was intervention in favour of the rebels against the Gaddafi regime. 
It is clear from the literature that Regan concentrates on the type of intervention 
(military and economic) and the direct ways and strategies for intervening that either 
decrease or increase the expectation that conflict will end in a short or long time. 
Cunningham focused on the impact of direct external intervention on the duration of 
the conflict from another angle. The researcher has noticed that both works by Regan 
and Cunningham have not touched the indirect ways of intervening in intrastate 
conflicts. Instead, they have merely focused on the direct approaches of external 
interventions. This thesis, therefore, looks further at indirect alongside direct 
intervention.  
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This study not only looks at the impact of external state interveners on the duration 
of armed conflicts, but also determines the types of those interveners. It differentiates 
between regional and the extra-regional interveners which was not done by neither 
Regan (2002) nor Cunningham (2010). The thesis argues that there is a broad 
difference between the two kinds of interveners. Therefore, the differentiating 
between the types of external interveners is crucial to understanding the type of 
impact that external interventions may have on lengthening the expected duration of 
intrastate conflicts. Although both types of interveners fall within the framework of 
external intervention, neighbouring countries are more likely to be directly impacted 
by and involved in intrastate conflicts on different levels and in different ways 
compared with extra-regional states.  
This is due to several factors such as shared borders, tribal overlapping, and the 
interaction between people who live in the border areas and have historical, social, 
economic, and cultural relations. Additionally, the national security of regional states 
is very likely to be threatened by regional instability, for example in terms of a large 
influx of refugees. This, for instance, would result in significant security and 
economic burdens on the countries receiving these refugees which in the best 
circumstances will be obliged to provide humanitarian aid to these refugees, such as 
building camps and supplying food and water. The roles played by Jordan and 
Turkey in the civil war in Syria are examples here (see Phillips 2013, Ya Libnan 
2013, Al-Rashed 2012). These considerations can be key motivations for regional 
state actors to be the first external interveners in internal conflicts that take place in 
neighbouring countries.  
On the contrary, extra-regional interveners are not necessarily directly influenced and 
threatened to the same degree by the same warfare, precisely because they are 
relatively far away. To illustrate further, Libya as regional intervener in the Darfur 
Crisis perhaps has more incentives to intervene in the course of the conflict there 
than extra-regional countries such as Australia (Del Rio 2007), Germany, Italy, 
Ecuador, Bangladesh, and Thailand that participate as part of the African Union/UN 
hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (African Union – United Nations Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) 2014). For this reason, the methods and the mechanisms adopted 
by each type of intervener to end the crisis are very likely to be different which may 
form an essential factor that hinders and undermines efforts to achieve peace. This 
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thesis, however, focuses more directly on the character of the regional intervener 
rather than generalising by referring to the character of the extra-regional intervener. 
In conclusion, the combination and employment of both Cunningham and Regan’s 
theoretical models, is still not enough to cover all the aspects of this study. To give 
this model more explanatory power and to create further credence to this debate, a 
new academic model has been employed. This combines both models with new 
concepts. Cunningham’s entire model will be amalgamated with some elements 
extracted from Regan’s. The diplomatic external intervention (diplomacy approach) 
as a form of conflict management, and the “indirect” way of intervening, as well as 
the type of external intervener (regional) will be included as a new components (see 
Figure No: 2). This model assumes that: 
when external/regional third parties become (in)directly involved with military, 
economic and/or diplomatic manoeuvres in an internal armed conflict to pursue their 
own agenda, which is independent of the motivations and goals of the domestic 
combatants, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of conflict. 
 
Methodology 
 
Marsh and Furlong (2002, p. 17) highlight that political researchers’ orientations 
toward their subject is always formed by their ontological and epistemological 
positions. Those positions are usually implicit rather than explicit. They shape the 
approaches to theory and methods. Marsh and Furlong believe that students of 
political science must ascertain and clarify their own ontological and epistemological 
positions because they determine whether the researcher’s aim is to test or generate 
theory (Ibid). Therefore, they can be able to defend these positions against criticisms 
from other positions, which require an understanding of alternative positions on these 
major questions. While there are essential differences between ontology and 
epistemology, both positions are vital for any social or political researcher and 
cannot be ignored. 
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Figure No: 2 the Theoretical Framework of the Thesis 
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A considerable variety of methodological approaches are available for social 
scientists and political researchers in particular. Choosing methodological 
approaches to be employed in any type of research project is directly influenced by 
ontological and epistemological foundations. Historically, social research has mainly 
relied on either qualitative or quantitative approaches. These are considered as easy 
alternative methodological approaches to apply when conducting social research 
(Pierce 2008, p. 22).  Nonetheless, it is also possible to combine these two methods 
and employ them in one research project to gain more beneficial findings.  
Taking this route, however, is not easy and needs to be carefully used in order to 
conduct research leading to coherent findings. The main reason is that both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches are associated with different ontological and 
epistemological positions (El-Anis 2008, p. 85). According to Roger Pierce (2008) 
ontology is philosophy that considers the nature of being by adopting the base of 
thinking about existence, it concerns such questions as:  is there a real world? Does 
the mind exist? Epistemology is associated with theories of knowledge. They are 
regarded by some practitioners as general concepts that control the relationships 
between the underlying variables in the studied social phenomena (Ibid).  
Colin Hay (2006, p. 83) provides a distinction between ontology and epistemology: 
“ontology relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to 
what we can know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring 
that knowledge”. Marsh and Furlong (2002) argue that qualitative data are linked 
with a researcher from within the interpretivist tradition that tends to be concerned 
with understanding, not explaining, focuses on the meaning that actions have, and 
offers results as one interpretation of the unobserved relationship between the social 
phenomena studied. While quantitative analysis is primarily associated with research 
from within the positivist approaches, such as Realism, and positions that look for 
causal relationships. Quantitative methods can solely be used to analyse those 
relationships that are directly observable (Furlong and Marsh 2010, p. 186).* 
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* Figure No: 3 Connecting ontology, epistemology and methodology: 
 
 
 
Qualitative research strategy is typically concerned with addressing matters to 
comprehend or understand how and why a political institution, event, issue, or 
process has occurred. In contrast, if the issue in question centres on numbers, then 
quantitative or statistical methods that are mainly represented in the form of graphs, 
figures, and tables would be the preferred strategy (Kirk and Miller 1986, p. 9). 
Ariadne Vromen (2010, pp. 249–266) indicates that qualitative methods encompass a 
variety of techniques which can be employed to achieve the aims of the enquiry. 
These refer to a set of techniques, such as observation, participant observation, 
intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews. All of these qualitative 
procedures seek to decipher the experiences and practices of key informants and to 
locate them firmly in a context. It is very often the case that researchers utilise more 
than one of these methods - usually referred to as ethnographic research or 
ethnography (Devine 2002, pp. 197–230).  
It is clear from the methodological literature, however, that the divide between 
quantitative and qualitative research strategies remains highly pronounced (John 
2002, p. 216). They are keen to distinguish between quantitative and qualitative 
research, because each method has its own different strategy and approaches to 
collecting and analysing data. While quantitative research as a methodological 
strategy is concerned with emphasising quantification in the collection and analysis 
of data (Glesne and Peshkin 1992, pp. 6–7), qualitative strategy is seen as a research 
method that focuses on words rather than the quantification of data (Bryman 2012). 
Ontology                                        Foundationalism                                       Anti-foundationalism 
 
Epistemology                Positivism                                   Realism                               Interpretivism  
 
Methodology     Quantitative Privileged         Quantitative and qualitative     Qualitative Privileged  
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It is pointed out that “qualitative and quantitative methods are more than just 
differences between research strategies and data collection procedures. The 
approaches represent fundamentally different epistemological frameworks for 
conceptualising the nature of knowing, social reality, and procedures for 
comprehending those phenomena” (Pierce 2008, p. 41).  
  
The Collection and Analysis of Data  
 
 “When we seek to understand or explain how and why a political institution, event, 
issue, or process came about, we are necessarily asking questions that can be 
answered using qualitative methods” (Vromen 2010, p. 249). 
The choice of the most apt research procedure depends upon its validity and 
suitability to address the particular research question that a particular study attempts 
to solve (Bryman 1988).  
Since this research project is in the process of investigating the impact of Libyan 
intervention as a regional state actor on the continuity and longevity of the Darfur 
Crisis, the basic type of information wanted was explanatory information that deals 
more with experiences and interpretations those empirical facts. The type of 
information that the researcher looked for was often historical and contains personal 
experience constituted through participations in the political issues or events that are 
being researched. This research fundamentally focuses on interpreting and 
understanding the meaning that shapes actions and policies of Libya in its 
relationships with the key internal warring parties, the Sudanese regime and the rebel 
groups in Darfur, as well as the mode which they did so to respond to the crisis there. 
Therefore, the researcher preferred to largely rely on qualitative methods to collect 
and analyse those methods that enable the researcher to gain an in-depth 
understanding of a single or small number of events (Silverman 2011, p. 21). 
Thus, the main object of utilising the qualitative research methods is to explain the 
outcomes of individual cases (Libyan involvement in Darfur, for example), why and 
how that event happened in that specific time and that particular place. Answering 
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the core research questions, and meeting the objectives of the research project 
required the gathering of information on the three different actors: the Libyan 
government as the regional state intervener, the Sudanese government and rebel 
groups as the internal actors. The researcher looked at information about how each of 
these three sides view and interpret the role and behaviour of each other. For 
example, the researcher wanted to understand how the Sudanese government and the 
rebel groups as domestic players see the Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis, the 
role played by Gaddafi, how the regime in Tripoli has  influenced the complexity of 
the crisis, and what type of strategies and policies they have adopted to deal with this 
regional third party.  
In contrast, the researcher here wanted to gain information that allows us to interpret 
how Libya under the Gaddafi regime understood the conflict in Darfur and what 
Tripoli wanted and anticipated to achieve by its intervention there. This led the 
researcher to use lots of different types of existing literature that contains relevant 
data, and to find access to those actors searching on information, that might answer 
raised questions in this thesis which would cover the essential gap of relevant 
knowledge. This also led the researcher to target certain individuals who either 
participated in the process of discussion making in each side or largely qualified and 
acknowledgeable about the issue being investigated to be questioned. This will be 
discussed in more details later on in this section.    
Although, there are other types of information sources that show - as has been looked 
at and addressed in the literature review chapter - there are other variables, such as 
environmental issues, political and economic factors, ethnic and social issues, and 
domestic and external factors, that have impacted the duration of the Darfur Crisis. 
This project though has taken a different route and looked at just one aspect. This 
thesis sees the Libyan involvement as more important than other factors and other 
interveners. This research project focuses on third-party intervention and does not try 
to answer what is impacting the duration of the Darfur Crisis, but only tries to look at 
how third-party intervention impacts the duration of that crisis as a way of conflict 
management.  
Information collected for this research project is distinguished by its provenance 
(source), primary and secondary data. Primary data is original, unedited and ‘first-
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hand’ whilst secondary data is ‘second-hand’ edited and interpreted material. The 
main sources of primary data used in this thesis are: recorded interviews with key 
individuals and ‘actors’, and contemporary documentary (written) records including 
minutes, organizational research reports5 and diaries that reflect the position of an 
actor and do not have analysis in them. By implication, data that is not primary must 
be secondary - second-hand. Secondary information is data collected for other work 
includes data gathered from a number of separate primary sources and may contain 
authoritative commentary and analysis, like a scholarly journal article. In this 
research project the relationship between the primary evidence and secondary 
information is supplementary where the primary evidence confirms the secondary. 
Therefore, the gathered data for this thesis was collected in accordance to its validity, 
relevance and appropriateness to the research questions and the directness and 
strength of its association with the concepts and the theoretical framework under 
scrutiny. Given the nature of the issues being investigated here, the type of questions, 
and the data that answer these questions the study solely adopts the qualitative 
research strategy aligned with an interpretive epistemological approach (see Figure 
No: 3). 
Although the general research strategy adopted for this project is mostly a qualitative 
associated with interpretative approach, some quantitative methods have been used in 
little places throughout the research project, not necessarily in this thesis, to deal with 
and collect a certain type of empirical information, which was helpful for interpreting 
actions and events under investigation. Quantitative methods have been used only for 
collecting factual information, represented in the form of figures that deal with 
empirical data, but not for analysing information in the thesis. Therefore, this reflects, 
in somehow that a mixed-methods approach, in a dominant/less dominant mode 
where qualitative methods for collecting information were the dominating 
approaches used.  In a mixed-method approach design researchers can rely on one 
dominant method concerned with a particular paradigm in addition to a small 
component of the overall study associated with another paradigm, which is less 
dominant. The benefit of this approach is that it depends on a single consistent 
paradigm. Simultaneously, using this approach allowed me to collect other types of 
                                                          
5 Newspaper article and organizational research reports can be exceptional in qualitative use as they 
contain analysis but can also become the object of text analysis by studying the meaning they give to 
the political context they originated from, see Vromen 2010, p. 263. 
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data, which are drawn from an alternative paradigm according to which methodology 
is dominant (Bryman 2012, p. 627; Creswell 1994, p. 177). 
Methods are about three stages: collecting, analysing and presenting, not just one 
thing overall. Researchers can use a type of method, for example a qualitative 
method, to collect, analyse and present evidence. Or they might use a qualitative 
method to do one or two those phases, may be to only analyse information. 
Researchers might collect information in one way and analyse it in another way. For 
example, researchers may also use some kind of quantitative means of survey 
literature and find empirical information and collected it in that way. Then, that 
information can be analysed and presented by using qualitative approaches (Johnson 
et al. 2004; Teddlie 2009; Creswell 1994, 173).  
Fundamentally, in this thesis, qualitative methods were used for collecting and 
analysing information from primary and secondary literature sources. Qualitative 
methods are fundamentally used to describe and analyse detailed, text-based answers, 
not broad, numerical generalisations. Therefore, in qualitative research generalising 
these findings over other cases is rarely required (Vromen 2010; Schofield 2002). In 
this setting, Mahoney and Goertz (2006) demonstrate that major differences between 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches are evident in the model in which 
quantitative and qualitative researchers formulate their research questions. 
In this respect Beck (2006) provides a good example. While quantitative researchers 
would question ‘what is the effect of the economic development on democracy? 
Qualitative researchers might formulate questions such as ‘was economic crisis 
necessary for democratisation in the Southern Cone of Latin America from 1982 to 
1995? These two forms of questions illustrate the interests of the researcher, whether 
he/she seeks to find a general law-like statement or to explain a particular event 
(Ibid). Thus, according to the type of research question, researchers can determine 
the type of data needed and can answer that particular question. Vromen (2010) 
argues that the major trade-off among the quantitative and qualitative research 
strategy is mainly associated with the goal of conducting that research – whether it is 
for generalisation or particularity. Mahoney and Goertz (2006) noted that qualitative 
researchers choose individual/few cases because of the importance of investigating 
them in detail.  
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Several scholars have addressed the features and strengths of qualitative research 
strategy. Uwe Flick (2009), for instance, determines four main essential features of 
qualitative research: (1) appropriateness of methods and theories. This means that the 
researcher should emphasise the suitability of the themes or assumptions under study. 
In other words they should conduct research on merely ideas that can be investigated 
and avoid those that cannot, such as philosophical ideas (the meaning of life for 
example); (2) the perspectives of the participants and their diversity. In qualitative 
research strategy the potential of examining participants' knowledge and practices is 
great. The qualitative method can be used to study the interactions and ways of 
dealing with the issue under study. It does not ignore the difference between 
viewpoints and practices in the field that tend to derive from the difference in 
subjective perspectives and people’s social backgrounds; (3) the reflexivity of the 
researcher and the research project. Instead of playing down the importance of the 
researcher's communication with the field, as quantitative research does, the 
qualitative strategy regards it as an essential element of producing knowledge; (4) the 
variety approaches and methods in qualitative research. Qualitative research strategy 
is founded on a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches leads to a 
different kind of knowledge (Hoepfl 1997, p. 47). 
 This variety enables the qualitative researchers to design an appropriate framework 
of discussing and analysing effectively during the research (Flick 2009, p. 16).  
Pierce (2008) demonstrates that this strategy of research is considered as the most 
appropriate methodological model to understand and explain the complexities of the 
social world. Therefore, the main strength of this method emanates from its unique 
capability, through conducting in-depth interviewing and observation, which enable 
researchers to learn and understand the underlying values of individuals and groups. 
This allows building new theoretical knowledge related to the subject under study. 
The other strength is that qualitative methods enable researchers to shift their 
concentration from the individual(s) to the group(s) and make comparisons and 
distinctions between information collected from individuals in the privacy of a 
personal interview and in a group.  
Qualitative researchers tend to collect data through conducting field work where the 
participants experience the problem under study. The researcher is the main 
instrument for data collection and analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 7). He or 
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she does not bring individuals into a laboratory (Creswell 2009, p. 175). Data are 
mediated through this human instrument, instead of through inventories, 
questionnaires and/or machines (Creswell 1994, p. 145). A further advantage of 
adopting the qualitative research strategy is that it does not only provide researchers 
with a variety of opportunities for participant observation and access to the group, 
but it also enables them to investigate the minorities who tend to be missed by 
sample surveys due to their small number or their unwillingness to identify 
themselves. Lastly, qualitative methods also assist researchers in focusing on the 
linguistic side through analysing verbal conversations recorded by sophisticated 
devices, which allows researchers to share data (Pierce 2008, p. 5; Strauss 1987, p. 
45). However, the qualitative research strategy involves some criticisms and 
weaknesses. First, it has been argued that qualitative data not only vastly tends to be 
anecdotal or exaggerated, but also is not as accurate as data acquired through 
quantitative methods, which significantly harms the reliability of the data and 
findings (Pierce, 2008, p. 46). A second concern of using qualitative research is 
about the issue of representativeness and reliability. Qualitative researchers have 
been criticised in terms of their inability to focus as much on generating a sample of 
data as quantitative researchers, as representativeness is not often a concern to 
qualitative research (Devine 2002, p. 205; Miller 1986, p. 9). 
 Another weakness in qualitative research is that it lacks objectivity. This weakness 
is apparent when conducting interviews. The impact of the relatively close 
relationship between an interviewer and interviewee during the interview process is 
important, especially when the issue discussed and the data collected are of a 
personal and/or sensitive nature. Consequently, the effect of bias in the field cannot 
be ignored (Devine and Heath 1999, p. 13). Further concern is about the 
interpretation of qualitative data. Unlike in quantitative research (Golafshani 2003, p. 
597), the analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data frequently proceeds from 
the personal perception of the researcher (Silverman 2004). Michael Quinn Patton 
(1990, p. 372) highlights that although it is frequently argued that  there is no precise 
technique for ensuring that qualitative research is valid and reliable, there are  
guidelines. Scholars have developed extensive criteria for demonstrating the rigor, 
legitimacy, and trustworthiness of qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2011, 
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Lincoln 1989).  “Qualitative researchers are advised to adopt strategies of honesty, 
openness, and reflexivity” (Hagey 1997, pp. 1–4).  
Qualitative researchers should at least offer a reasonable interpretation to all 
empirical data and a context that enables the reader to assess the truth of their 
interpretation. The process of analysis in qualitative research entails continuous 
reflexivity and self-scrutiny (Pyett 2003, pp. 1177–1179). In addition, reflexivity has 
been described as encompassing continual evaluation of subjective responses, 
intersubjective dynamics, and the research process itself (Finlay 2002, p. 532). Lastly, 
the inability to generalise findings has been considered as one of the major reasons 
that qualitative research is often dismissed. The findings of qualitative research can 
merely provide a useful explanation and good understanding of other similar cases 
rather than being applicable to all cases. Qualitative researchers tend to ignore the 
function of generalisability in the qualitative research strategy as they believe that 
this is unimportant and unachievable. However, many give it a very low priority to 
see it as essentially irrelevant to their goal (Schofield 2002, p. 171).  
The findings of particular case studies in qualitative research can only be beneficial 
when compared with other research findings in order to determine the similarities 
and the differences among the two cases rather than providing broad general 
statements about social phenomena under study to facilitate the understanding of 
other cases. Flick (1999) says that the problem of generalisation in qualitative 
research is that its statements are often made to describe a particular context or 
specific cases through a specific expressiveness. Nevertheless, when attempts are 
made at generalising the findings, this context link has been given up in order to find 
out whether the findings are valid independently and outside of a specific context. 
Like other research strategies, qualitative research has its own weaknesses that 
should be taken into consideration.  In the past, quantitative and qualitative methods 
were employed as different methodological approaches to investigate different 
hypothesises and to answer different types of questions (Bryman 2004, p. 452). The 
use of this methodological strategy is motivated by the fact that this research project 
seeks to analyse and understand social phenomena (Hollis and Smith 1991). 
Understanding the principle of research design, in reference to a structure or 
framework within which data are collected, is very important as a research design 
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provides the structure that will enable the researcher to answer the research questions 
that the investigation started out with (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 186).  
De Vaus (cited in Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 186) highlights that “The function of 
a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the 
intimal questions as unambiguously as possible”.  
 The topic in hand primarily investigates the impact of external interventions on the 
duration of the Darfur Crisis through examining the involvement and policies of 
Gaddafi’s Libya towards managing this crisis. This research project entails collection 
of qualitative data within the framework of a case study. The case study design is the 
appropriate research structure that provides the framework for addressing the 
research questions behind this study. Case studies are often associated with in-depth 
qualitative study of human experiences by instruments such as fieldwork observation, 
interviews, and document analysis (Ibid). However, the case study approach is not 
confined to merely studying a single phenomenon because it tends to generate a 
multitude of qualitative/interpretive information, within-case observations reflecting, 
for example, patterns of interaction, organisational practices, social relations, 
routines, and actions (Ibid). 
The case study typically refers to the detailed and intensive examination for one or 
two small cases. A case could be an individual, event, community, organisation, 
geographical region and/or even decision and its impact on the implementation of a 
policy (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 194). Becker and Bryman (2004, p. 194) 
suggest that although the case study is mostly linked to the qualitative research 
strategy, it also can be involved in the collection of quantitative data either entirely or 
as part of a multi-strategy research design. Additionally, they suggest that a case 
study is contrasted with other types of research design, such as social surveys and the 
experiment, by using the case study design a large amount of data about one or two 
cases can be gathered  (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 254). However, this thesis does 
not claim that the chosen case is representative and, therefore, can be generalised to 
other cases. Rather, the theoretical arguments for this case study aim to reach 
findings that are capable of being tested and applied to other cases. The outcomes of 
this investigation can be used by other researchers either to extend the findings (for 
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example exploring further implications) or to study other cases to explore if the same 
outcomes hold there (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 195). 
After reviewing and analysing the relevant literature, this discourse proposes to 
present in an orderly fashion, gathered secondary data relying on the content analysis 
approach, as well as primary information on the existing narratives relying on semi-
structured interviews. The NTU library and e-journal facilities, as well as libraries 
and archives from other universities in the UK and the British Library are used here. 
Due to the nature and level of attention given to the literature on the impact of 
Libyan intervention on the duration of the Darfur Crisis as outlined in chapter one 
there are only limited sources of information and analysis which are relevant to this 
project that deal with Libyan involvement there. In order to collect information for 
this study which is both reliable and essential to the analysis presented here, primary 
research is essential as a means of gaining a deeper understanding and collecting 
information on the influence of third-party regional intervention which is represented 
in the Libyan case study on the continuation of the conflict there. 
Within this qualitative study, three techniques for collecting data are employed: 
semi-structured and unstructured interviewing; documents – both historical and 
contemporary; using the internet for collecting information. Interviewing is the main 
approach employed in this study to gather information. The key technique for 
political researchers whose work is concerned with the study of decision-makers is 
elite interviewing or the purposive sampling approach (for more details about the 
elite interviewing technique (see Burnham et al. 2004, p. 205). Elite interviewing can 
be employed whenever it is suitable to treat an interviewee as an expert about the 
topic under investigation (Leech 2002, in Burnham et al. 2004, p. 205). In this 
respect, the most effective data collecting technique for obtaining information about 
decision-makers and the decision-making process is semi-structured interviewing.  
Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are regarded as a superior mode for 
social science researchers to deal with non-factual phenomena, such as eliciting 
people’s views, opinions, attitudes and experiences (May 2011, p. 134). Such non-
factual phenomena are often complex and multidimensional due to the difficulty in 
conducting survey questionnaires or fully structured interviews (Becker and Bryman 
2004, p. 268). Semi-structured and unstructured interviews might be conducted on a 
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one-time basis, or repeated over time. Moreover, they can be done with one person or 
with a group (Seymour, Dix and Eardley 1995; Arksey 1996). Also, they can be 
conducted in face to face encounters, and/or over the telephone, for fuller 
information about telephone interviews, (see Chapple 1999), and this is what this 
study dose.  
Both techniques use open-ended questions but they mainly differ in the degree of 
standardisation and the amount of latitude accorded the interviewee. Employing both 
these types of interviews would help the researcher to generate rich in-depth material 
that allows the researcher to fully understand the informant’s perspective on the topic 
being investigated (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 268). Consequently, this project 
employs the semi-structured technique more than the unstructured style. I decided on 
a semi-structured interview in which the open-ended questions mainly relied on gave 
the respondents latitude to articulate fully their responses. This requires great 
attention from the interviewer since such an interview has a more conversational 
quality to it than the typical highly structured interview and questions may, therefore, 
be more easily breached in a manner that does not follow the exact order of the 
original interview instrument.  El-Anis (2008, p. 93) noted that simply selecting the 
questions to ask and the sources to address in search of answers risks neglecting 
other areas of questioning and other sources that have not yet been considered. 
Thus, four field research trips were carried out in Libya, Sudan, and the UK. In the 
case of the former, a one-month field research trip was conducted to Tripoli, Libya 
carried out in December 2011 while a second one-month trip was carried out in April 
2013. Prior to the second trip to Libya a two week-long trip to Sudan was completed. 
Finally, a number of interviews for this project were undertaken inside the UK at 
different times over 2012 and 2013. During the field research trips a number of 
intensive individual interviews were undertaken. In total some forty interviews were 
held. Some of these interviews were designed to contain guided and organised 
discussions with set questions (usually between twenty and fifty questions) 
pertaining to the key relevant areas and some were designed to be rolling discussions 
with open-ended questions to allow for the interviewees to talk in detail about the 
issue in question. Semi-unstructured interviewing with open-ended questions 
customarily allows interviewers to probe and/or prompt for more detailed responses, 
specific examples, and clarification. Employing this method, thus, gained further 
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important information on the questions that should be addressed. Furthermore, this 
gained information is not available in relevant literature. This is a method that has 
been suggested and employed by other scholars (Devine 2002, pp. 197–200; Becker, 
and Bryman 2004, pp. 268–273).  
The purpose of using the elite interviewing technique was to gain more information 
around the key areas being investigated that were to some extent not covered in 
previous research. The gathered data for this thesis was collected in accordance to 
the validity, relevance and appropriateness to the research questions and the 
directness and strength of its association with the concepts and the theoretical 
framework under scrutiny. During interviews the investigator was keen to ask 
questions that allowed for the collection of information and answers that cannot be 
found in any published sources, by encouraging interviewees to talk in–depth and to 
probe for information. Respondents were also given maximum flexibility in 
structuring their responses through utilising open-ended questions, and showing 
familiarity with the subject matter and asking well-informed and penetrating 
questions. Interviews were conducted in order to know what a set of relevant 
decision makers and knowledgeable individuals think, or how they interpret an event 
or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do. Beside existing 
literature, conducting elite interviews was necessary as in this study, respondents are 
selected on the basis of what they might know to help the researcher fill in the pieces 
of the puzzle or to confirm the proper alignment of the information found in 
literature already in place. Instead of providing generalities about the topic being 
investigated as answers, the respondents engaged in wide-ranging discussions in a 
fruitful dialogue with the investigator (Burnham et al. 2008, p. 238). 
The type and the sources of the information gathered during the field work trips are 
very high value as those that were interviewed are inherently significant. This 
importance derives from both, the level of the interviewees’ positions and the timing 
of conducting the interviews. In terms of the level, those interviewed are decision 
makers at the highest level, whether on the side of the Sudanese government, the 
Libyan government, or the rebel movements, who were either (in)directly involved in 
the process of managing the crisis and peace building in Darfur through participating 
in the events and making the decisions that significantly influenced the course of the 
conflict and its continuity, longevity and outcomes. 
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Those interviewed are more informed and aware with the minor details concerning 
the conflict and the dynamics of the Libyan involvement in the crisis in particular. 
This is because of either their participation or their high level of knowledge of the 
subject matter under discussion and their general intellectual and expressive abilities. 
This means that the resources of the information are the most informed which could 
be more accurate and reliable compared to the information sourced from published 
primary and secondary sources of information which is not necessarily reliable as it 
might have been changed and lost some of its coherency due to its transition through 
many different sources. Therefore, much information collected to answer the basic 
research questions of this project cannot be found in published material and/or with 
the ordinary people but often with decision-makers and small groups of highly 
qualified and knowledgeable individuals. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics 
of those respondents is that they count more than others in terms of their influence on 
the decision-making process. 
From the interview timing perspective, conducting these interviews in the time after 
the collapse of the Gaddafi regime provides another important value to the thesis as it 
encouraged the respondents to provide vast amounts of information related to 
Gaddafi’s policies and techniques in response to the crisis in Darfur which was 
highly unlikely to be provided in the era of Gaddafi. Interviewing those individuals 
in this time represented a golden opportunity and enabled the researcher to explore 
the true impact of the Libyan intervention in the Darfur Crisis and to eliciting those 
important peoples’ views and experiences in this context. My goal was to explore the 
respondents’ political attitudes, values, and beliefs. A major aim was to examine the 
important parameters that guide the elite's understanding of the Libyan role in the 
Darfur Crisis. This meant that we had to draw representative samples of members of 
these elites and use an interviewing technique that would enable us to gauge subtle 
aspects of elite views of the world.  
Elite interviewing was tailored to the purposes of this study and in order to bring the 
researcher as an academic and the world of the practitioner together in a fruitful 
mutual dialogue and discussion to offer a comprehensive understanding. In addition 
to utilising a combination of methodological approaches and other sources and 
techniques such as archival research, governmental and private sector material 
available on the internet, the elite interviewing approach was used to serve as a 
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supplementary technique and deepen the research findings. On the personal level, 
furthermore, interviewing those elite respondents was very crucial. I was in an 
advantageous position to research this topic due to my personal background, 
language skills and access to key decision makers at the highest levels.  Researching 
this topic at PhD level will help with my longer-term career ambitions. Elite 
interviewing is a technique whose exercise benefits from the accumulation of 
experience, but it is also accessible to students starting out on their research careers. 
Information was gained from a lot of different sources on all sides, whether from the 
conducted interviews or other types of sources. This information was analysed and 
then interpreted according to my theoretical framework and presented in the way in 
which the researcher thinks is the best conclusion. The framework acted as a guide 
for the researcher to collect and analyse data, and then to interpret the research 
findings. The information used in this study was collected to test all aspects and 
components of the theoretical framework. For example, when we look at the element 
of an independent agenda it was necessary to gather information about the real 
motives behind Gaddafi’s involvement in Darfur, the techniques and mechanisms 
adopted by Tripoli to manage the crisis, the extent and type of influence that Gaddafi 
practiced on the domestic parties to the conflict in Darfur, and finally how that 
impacted the continuation of the crisis there. In addition to that I have had to 
determine what form of Libyan intervention took. 
In terms of deciding and arranging interviews, initially, reading secondary sources 
and visiting websites gave the researcher some ideas about who is included and who 
is excluded (May 2011, p. 139). Drawing a sample of respondents who were at a 
level where they might have a say in policy making was quite straightforward. Lists 
of individuals are easily accessible and drawing them random, stratified into three 
groups representing different perspectives as follows: the Sudanese government, the 
Libyan government, and the rebel groups in Darfur (a requirement for the 
comparative aspect of the study), was a simple process. Further, I wanted to make 
sure that we covered all parties’ views.  
Approaching and gaining access to relevant individuals within government 
organisations, especially decision-makers, tends to be a great challenge. Because 
such individuals are usually very busy. This problem was to a certain extent 
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addressed by adopting the snow-balling approach (the practice of asking 
interviewees to nominate others for interview) on the field research trips in order to 
utilise networks of relevant individuals, especially with those are in high 
governmental position as well as with the rebel movements leaders. With snow-
balling or chain-referral sampling the researcher determines a small group of people 
relevant to the research questions of the existing study subject, and these sampled 
participants suggest and/or refer to other persons who have had the experience or 
characteristics relevant to the topic under investigation (May 2001, p. 132). Having 
identified my targets, I began contact by email or with a telephone call. Interviews 
sometimes obtained by using various personal contacts to intercede with the target. I 
did not find any difficulties and it did not take significant efforts and ingenuity to get 
access to the targeted factors. I provided a concise and honest account of what the 
research is about, what I am seeking to achieve, and why I wished to interview the 
particular person approached. I was flexible in my timetable as some interviews were 
arranged more than twice, and I was patient as some interviews were cancelled at the 
last minute.  In practice, the researcher started out with a few key informants whom 
had been identified from relevant literature and internet search, and determined by 
the objectives and purposes of my study. I then asked them to name other key 
individuals I should see who are relevant to my study. My snowball technique thus 
expanded as I gained access to a network of individuals, representing different 
parties in the area being addressed in this thesis. As a result of using this technique a 
number of additional interviews to those that had been planned were conducted and 
further information sourced.  
However, the source’s interpretations and bias are important – especially with 
evidence of how events were interpreted at the time and later on, and the moral 
relativism of value-judgement. There was a danger of becoming over-reliant on ‘key 
respondents’ who are offering their own particular interpretation of events, which 
may ‘capture’ the researcher. The source’s interpretations and bias are important – 
especially in regards to evidence of how events were interpreted at the time and later, 
and the moral relativism of value-judgement.  
From the perspective of the extent to which we could rely on the reliability of the 
source data and, therefore, the data itself is important. Reliable data is dependable, 
trustworthy, unfailing, sure, authentic, genuine, reputable. Indicators of reliability 
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include proximity to events, (whether the writer was a participant or observer), and 
likely impartiality. In this regard, politicians often, have their own agenda to justify 
their actions or to criticise others, while very few politicians admit to real failing. 
Consistency is the main measure of reliability. So in literary accounts, the reputation 
of the source is critical. Therefore we cannot take the interviewee’s responses as fact 
always even if the information was gathered from the president or the prime minister 
or the head of a rebel group because the information is not necessarily factual but 
instead is about them as individuals and their views, interpretations, experiences and 
the knowledge they have about this crisis or this conflict or relationship between the 
Libyan involvement and the conflict in Darfur. 
To avoid this challenge of bias, where snow-balling technique might lead to the same 
ideas, views and interpretations being expressed by connected interviewees, the 
researcher snowballed interviewees on each side: the Sudanese government, the 
Libyan government, and rebel groups to collect information valid to the research 
project.  Empirical and interpretive information was snowballed from respondents 
who represent all those parties. For example, this thesis argues that Libya as a 
regional actor is the most important external actor in the region. This hypothesis was 
demonstrated by respondents were interviewed and who reflect the perspectives of 
the Sudanese government and rebel groups and Libya. All said that Libya was the 
most important regional intervener and in particular that importance comes from the 
Sudanese government and the rebel groups (For more details about methods and the 
problems associated with snowballing see Burnham et al. 2008, p. 244 and May 2001, 
p. 132). 
The researcher was able to be realistic about the number of interviews that were 
undertaken in one day. I was able to manage to fit a maximum of two interviews into 
a day (this was during the Sudan field work trip in particular). The point of stopping 
interviewing was reached where each additional interview yields diminishing returns. 
The researcher stopped conducting interviews when it was recognized the saturation 
point was reached in a series of interviews where each interviews was adding 
relatively little to the stock of information or understanding. This must be taken into 
account and justification of one’s sampling strategies must be made to resolve this 
issue. The interviews conducted for this study can be categorised into three main 
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groups. Firstly, information was sourced from some key politicians representing the 
GoS including: 
- Mustafa Osman Ismail, the former Sudanese Foreign Minister and current 
Minister of Investments. 
- Hassan al-Turabi the head of the Public Congress Party.  
- Sadiq al-Mahdi, Prime Minister of Sudan from 1966 to 1967 and again from 
1986 to 1989, the head of the National Umma Party.  
- Ghazi Salahuddin, the Adviser to the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir of 
Peace Affairs, and responsible for the Darfur file and as well as the former 
head of the governmental negotiation team 2008 – 2010.  
- Abdullahi AlAzreg the Former Ambassador of Sudan to the UK, and 
currently the Undersecretary of the Sudanese Forging Ministry. 
Secondly, information was sourced from leaders and individuals representing rebel 
movements in Darfur including: 
- Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige the former governor of Darfur region and current 
head of the National Redemption Front alliance of rebel groups in the Darfur 
conflict. 
- Gabriel Belal the spokesman of JEM. 
- Hussein Minnawi the Director of Administration and Management in the 
SLM. 
- Osman Ibrahim Musa the Head of Sudanese Liberation Historical Leadership 
(SLMHL). 
Thirdly, a number of Libyan politicians and individuals were interviewed including: 
- Mahmoud Jibril, the former executive board of the National Transitional 
Council (NTC). 
- Ali Ashor, Libyan former Minister of Justice 2011-2012. 
- Ibrahim Dabashi, the Libyan Deputy Ambassador to the UN. 
- Abd Alhamid Nami, President of the Wasat Democrati Party (Democratic 
Centrist Party). 
- Mohamed Sola, Libyan Ambassador in Sudan. 
- Mahmoud Nacua, Libyan Ambassador in UK. 
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These interviews were designed to contain guided discussion with set open-ended 
questions (approximately 20) meant to start a conversation. This technique is fairly 
flexible, and guided the interview to a rolling discussion to allow the researcher to 
gather people’s views, opinions, attitudes, and experiences. Besides the fact that this 
method allows the respondents to talk in detail, it also allows the researcher to pursue 
interesting comments about the topic in question. The majority of questions were 
developed during the interviews, allowing both the researcher and the interviewees 
the flexibility to probe for details or discuss pertinent issues. This technique allowed 
interviewees to raise up issues that the researcher has not considered. The advantage 
of the technique is that it leaves the investigation open to new and unexpected 
information (Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 15). All interviews were conducted with a single 
respondent and were confidential in nature. All interviews lasted between 45 and 90 
minutes except five which lasted for around 120 minutes.  
All the interviews were tape-recorded (back-up notes were also taken) and 
subsequently transcribed in order to facilitate the use of a conversational style and to 
minimize information loss. Permission to do so was obtained at the beginning of the 
meeting. A tape recorder gives a complete record of any meeting. No respondent 
refused to be taped, and almost all quickly lost any inhibitions the recorder might 
have induced. In broad terms, questions or topics were classified as ‘essential’, 
‘necessary’ and ‘desirable’. Essential questions are those that, if they are not 
answered, would mean that the interview is a failure. Necessary questions are those 
that are important to the project and should be covered if at all possible. Desirable 
questions are those that can be inserted if time permits. Early questions dealt with 
matters that respondents certainly knew about and felt good discussing. For example, 
some questions start with 'What were the real causes of the Darfur Crisis?’ and ‘Why 
has the crisis been prolonged for over ten years and has not ended yet?’ Opening 
questions did not challenge the interviewees too much, but provided an opportunity 
to steer the interview by indicating what the interviewer knows about already and 
what the researcher wants to explore.  
As the interviews progressed, the researcher moved into the more central questions. 
For example, ‘Why and how has the crisis in Darfur been internationalised?’ and 
‘How do you assess the involvement of Gaddafi’s Libya in the conflict in Darfur and 
its longevity?’ As the interviews progressed further and rapport developed, the 
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interviewer moved to more difficult and sensitive questions. For example, the 
interviewees were asked ‘Was Gaddafi’s motivation to intervene to resolve the 
conflict or to gain from the conflict?’, ‘Did Gaddafi have a different agenda to those 
adopted by the internal parties of the crisis, and if so, what were they?’ and ‘What 
type of influence, support, and pressure did Gaddafi practice on the domestic warring 
parties?’ At the end of the interviews, respondents were given an opportunity to say 
whether there were any aspects of the topic being discussed which were not covered 
and which they think are important. 
Overall, all the interviews held were an extremely valuable part of the primary 
research as they provided new and unpublished information, and more insight into 
motivations, feelings, values, attitudes and perceptions towards the issue in question. 
It was very clear that those interviewees were not only willing to be participants, but 
also very enthusiastic to talk confidently in detail about the thesis topic which 
assisted us to have a better view and understanding about the national and 
international crisis management in Darfur. My judgment is that the interviewees 
were frank in their answers. 
Historically, qualitative methods are aligned with an interpretive epistemology that 
concentrates mainly on the dynamic of social phenomena (constricted and natural) to 
generate knowledge that cannot exist independently from the beliefs, values and 
principles created to grasp the world (Devine 2002, p. 201). An interpretive approach 
premises, first, on a philosophical analysis of the constitutive relation of meanings to 
actions which allows understanding actions properly through examining the beliefs 
embodied in them. This leads us to provide interpretations of interpretations. 
Additionally, an interpretive approach rests on a philosophical analysis of the holistic 
nature of meanings rather than tied individually to referents, so it allows us to 
understand beliefs properly only as part of the wider webs of which they are a part. 
Thus, it would assist us to spell out beliefs by reference to webs of belief and 
traditions (Bevir and Rhodes 2005; Bevir and Rhodes 2006). 
Since this thesis examines ideas, actions, institutions and other intersubjective 
aspects of the influence of external third-party states on the duration of civil armed 
conflicts in general, as a way of crisis management, and the impact of the Libyan 
involvement on the duration of the Darfur Crisis in particular, interpretive methods 
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are the most useful techniques of analysis. Interpretive approaches to political studies 
concentrate on understanding the meaning that shapes actions and institutions as well 
as the modes in which they do so. While epistemology addresses the question of 
‘how do we know what we know about political science? As discussed above, 
interpretive theories represent one set of answers to that question. In other words, 
interpretive approaches do not solely focus on norms, beliefs, and discourse, they 
also examine beliefs as they perform within, and even shape, actions, practices and 
institutions (Bevir and Rhodes 2003). The thesis attempts to understand the 
normative context within which Libya’s strategy is operating – what is the nature of 
beliefs and preferences that Libya has in regard to dealing with the Darfur Crisis? 
How have these beliefs and preferences shaped its policies and actions to respond to 
the Darfur Crisis? And how has this affected the paths, courses, and the duration of 
the crisis? This type of phenomenon, which is the main topic of this study that 
considers ideas, interests, and actions, cannot be easily examined utilising positivist 
predictive theories or mathematical formulas because of the inherently indeterminate 
nature of social life and because of the agency of actors under study to construct their 
own meanings (Groom 1994).  
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Figure No: 3 the Methodological Strategy of the Thesis 
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Chapter 3  
___________________________________________________ 
The Nature and Causes of the Darfur Crisis 
___________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction  
 
The Darfur Crisis is one of the most important crises that the modern state of Sudan 
has witnessed. Its main importance lies in the nature of its causes and the range of 
actors involved, not to mention its outcomes and the diversity of effects that it has 
had at the internal, Sudanese, level as well as at the regional and global levels. 
Exacerbation of this crisis and its continuation would threaten the structure of the 
Sudan and its political system. The widening of the conflict by increasing the number 
of players could lead to increased racist tendencies in a country composed of a 
multitude of ethnic minorities, diverse cultures, and multiple languages and religions 
(Cunningham 2006, p. 876). Furthermore, this would strengthen the separatist ideas 
that threaten the territorial unity of Sudan, especially after southerners obtained 
independence. It has become more complex as a result of the involvement (direct or 
indirect) of many regional and international players in the course of the crisis, which 
ultimately have internationalised that crisis with a variety of dimensions and 
implications. There are also other significant crises elsewhere on the verge of 
explosion in the east, far north, and other regions of Sudan that could lead to the 
fracturing of the state into smaller states/communities which may lack security and 
stability (Al Ddla 2007, p. 8).  
Africa as a whole suffers from the armed conflicts and disputes, with varying levels 
of intensity, actors, causes and phases of development, duration and outcomes. Sudan 
is a good example of a state that suffers from these problems (Niama 2005, p. 321). 
The phenomena of conflicts and disputes in Sudan in general, and Darfur in 
particular are not recent, rather they coincide with the historical development of the 
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communities that exist in this region (Tar 2006, p. 10), especially with the emergence 
of African countries, which led to the stability of some nomadic tribes in the region 
as well as a diversity of cultures, religions and ethnicities (Abdul Fattah 2009). It is 
often seen that violent conflicts exceed the scale and control of the state, especially in 
light of the fragile environment, as they do not erupt suddenly. It comes as a result of 
a set of accumulations that the state has failed to manage, treat/mitigate, or contain 
the repercussions, which generate at first dissatisfaction and then chaos (Braithwaite 
2010, p. 311). Given that the origins of the Darfur Crisis are old, and the factors that 
affect the course of political and security events, it has become one of the Sudan’s 
most important problems. The complexity of the causes and the number of parties, 
not to mention the complexity of its dimensions and the conflict’s implications, have 
contributed to the internationalisation of the crisis and so intervention by external 
parties (Natsios 2008, p. 77). This chapter analyses the key causes and the nature of 
the Darfur Crisis. It also explores the inflammatory side-effects of the conflict in the 
region. The chapter argues that despite the similarities in factors and circumstances 
that lead to domestic conflicts they differ in different areas throughout the world in 
general and in Africa in particular. Each conflict has its own unique nature, 
emanating from social and economic structures as well as the cultural development 
of each individual society. Likewise, each conflict has its different course of 
development and different dimensions; the Darfur Crisis is no exception.  
 
The Nature and Significance of Darfur  
 
Darfur acquires great importance due to the fact that it contains areas with both 
agricultural and pastoral potential that provide support for a range of livelihoods and 
ways of life. Geographically, its location controls trade routes between the north and 
south (Road 40 from Mosul to Egypt) on the one hand, and roads heading from west 
to east, including the route to the holy sites in Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj, on 
the other hand (Maqlad 1985). It is estimated that the area covers over half a million 
square kilometres (190,420 square miles), and represents approximately 20% of 
Sudanese territory, which is equivalent to the size of Spain (Olsson 2010a, p. 4) or 
France (O’Fahey 2006, p. 24). Darfur is bordered by three countries: Libya, Chad, and 
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the Central African Republic, and stretches from uninhabited desert areas in the north, 
to a Sahelian semi-arid area in the centre and more fertile savannah landscape in the 
south. Darfur is made up of a plateau, some 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea-level 
(International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005). 
 The importance of the region stems from several factors that feature in the area more 
than in other regions. For example, Darfur is regarded as the largest productive 
livestock province in Sudan. This is attributed to the diversity of the climate in the 
region and its appropriate nature, in addition to an abundance of pastures which 
enable Darfur to play an important role in Sudan's exports, including an estimated 60% 
of camels and sheep to Egypt and Libya. In addition, there is huge mineral wealth in 
the ground, distributed in different areas in the province (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).  
These include iron, gold, zinc, nickel, lead, copper, bauxite and the recent discovery 
of large quantities of oil. Darfur is also characterised by the availability of fertile soil 
and a favourable climate, which makes the region one of the largest agricultural 
production areas in the world for crops, such as gum Arabic and agricultural grains, 
including sesame and peanuts (Musa 2009, p. 77). 
 It is also mostly a plateau which includes the volcanic Marrah Mountain range, 
which has very fertile land. The Marrah Mountain range covers an area of 
approximately 9,000 square kilometres, and has a maximum height of about 10,000 
feet above sea level. Darfur is Sudan’s largest region in terms of landmass and 
population (Tar 2006, p. 412)6. Administratively, the province has been divided into 
three states since 1994: North Darfur and its capital at the city of El Fasher, South 
Darfur and its capital at the city of Nyala, and West Darfur, with its capital at the city 
of Al-Junaynah (see map No: 1). The Darfur province is inhabited by approximately 
6.5-7 million people, which is roughly 26% of the country's population (Al-
Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 47; Suleiman 2011, p. 4). 
 
 
                                                          
6 Also, for more descriptive information about Darfur see Suleiman 2011. 
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Map No 1:  the Darfur region 
 
The population of Darfur consists of two main different ethnicities: Africans and 
Arabs. African tribes rely on a stable life style – agricultural and pastoral – such as 
the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Dajo, Altama, and Tunjur tribes in addition to other 
groups of Arabic nomadic Arab tribes that move from place to place like the Abbala, 
Alzbidat, Mahamid, Mahariya, Bani Hussein, and Rizeigat. The majority of these 
tribes speak their own local languages in addition to Arabic. The second, the Arab 
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tribes, of which the most important are the Rizeigat, Bani-Halba, Habbaniya, and 
Ta’aisha, are pastoralist tribes who depend on the movement and grazing of camels 
and cows. They are from candid Arab roots and speak Arabic. Furthermore, most of 
Darfur’s population are Muslim (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 10). Acknowledging the 
causes that led to civil conflict is essential for conflict resolution, as well as to evade 
a future repetition of the conflict. Civil conflict is often grounded in an accumulation 
of complex factors, rather than a single grievance or factor (Flint 2010, p. 45).  
Determining and understanding these complexities facilitates recognition of the key 
issues that have contributed to the conflict. Like other African conflicts, the Darfur 
Crisis seems to be more complex than merely concentrating on one side of the crisis 
demonstrates. It is hard to attribute it merely to one or two factors, simply because of 
the overlapping factors and the combination of past with present.  As is mentioned 
above, the current crisis is not new. It has deep historical roots that extend decades 
into the past. Therefore, looking back to the mid-1980s, before the violence between 
Africans and Arabs began to simmer, helps us to truly understand the current crisis 
(Faris 2007).  This chapter does not aim to discuss the historical account of Darfur or 
its conflicts,7 rather it seeks to address a set of different and overlapping factors that 
significantly contributed to the creation of the environment which led to the 
deterioration in intra-Darfur relations, and which ultimately fuelled the conflict in the 
region. The instability and current emergency in Darfur can be attributed to several 
integrated factors. A number of internal and external factors that considerably affect 
one another have led to an argument that the conflict taking place in Darfur can be 
seen basically as a domestic conflict. These factors include political, economic, 
environmental, and social issues, which greatly contribute to insecurity across the 
whole region. 
 
 
                                                          
7 See Osman Suliman; the Darfur Conflict: Geography or Institutions? (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
Alex de Waal and Julie Flint, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (London: Zed Books, 2005); 
Alex de Waal, ‘Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External 
engagement,’ African Affairs 104, no. 415 (2005); Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: 
Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (London: Verso, 2009); Gérard Prunier, The Ambiguous 
Genocide (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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Domestic Factors of the Crisis  
 
 Environmental Degradation and Conflict over 
Resources 
 
As already mentioned, Darfur is a wide area bordered by three other countries, which 
has contributed to the existing diversity in the demographics of the region as a result 
of tribes spilling across borders. This demographic diversity has influenced the kinds 
of human relationships with nature which overlap throughout the region (settled 
agricultural, pastoral, and nomadic) (Al Malool 2005, p. 50). Likewise, one of the 
most important features of the region is that it has a diversity of vegetation. While in 
the north there are thorny plants that grow in dry climates, the south has tropical 
forests. There is also in region also diversity in terms of soil quality and plant height, 
as a result of the wide range of temperatures and rainfall (Al Ddla 2007, p. 10). 
The region has suffered for more than three decades from increasing cases of security, 
economic, and political instability. Like many parts of Africa, it has experienced 
successive periods of drought and desertification, which have led to three major 
famines in 1973, 1985, and 1992 (Raafat 2004). This deterioration in weather 
conditions has had a significant impact on the restructuring of demographic 
structures and on economic developments in the province, both having played a 
pivotal role in provoking the conflict between the pastoral and sedentary tribes. The 
north and central regions have turned to desert and semi-desert areas due to 
desertification, which has stretched from the north to the south at a rate of three 
kilometres a year (Cockett 2010). This has caused large losses in cattle, which has 
reflected negatively on the standard of living, especially among the pastoral tribes 
that depend on this style of farming and the grazing of cows and camels. Ultimately 
this has increased the rates of poverty and generated issues of security, such as armed 
robbery (de Waal 2005c, p. 8). 
Darfur is divided into four different climatic regions. First, the desert region which is 
characterised by a shortage of rainfall and higher temperatures, particularly in the 
summer. This area is virtually unoccupied and therefore it has no human activities 
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that use water or land for agriculture or grazing. The second area is the arid region 
that covers the middle of the northern parts of the province. The average rainfall in 
this zone is low with high variability and ranges from 100 to 300mm. The third zone 
is the poor savannah area which covers the middle of the Darfur region with an 
average annual rainfall of between 200 to 400mm, and a rainy season ranging from 
3–4 months a year. The fourth zone is located in the southern part of Darfur where 
the savannah is rich and rainfall average is approximately between 500 mm to 
800mm a year, with a rainy season that lasts for about 5 months per year (Fadul 2006, 
p. 33). 
 According to the ecological habits of the respective tribes, Darfur8 is divided into 
three main regions or Diar9: the first region contains Camel Nomads, while the 
second, middle, region comprises settled farmers, and the last region contains Cattle 
Nomads, see maps No 2 and 3 (cited in Suliman 2008, p. 9).  Deteriorating climatic 
conditions of drought and freshwater scarcity have pushed a lot of northerners 
towards the forested areas in the south of the province, where the most fertile areas 
of savannah and freshwater resources are found. For this precise reason, several 
tribal disputes have erupted, due to the competition for access to natural resources 
between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists (Hakim 2011, p. 815). In 
addition, there has been a shortage of food and fuel, resulting from climate change in 
the province and the deterioration this has brought to the environment in Darfur 
(Brown 2010, p. 2514). 
This has contributed to provoking collisions and a high frequency of conflicts 
between sedentary tribes and newcomers in southern Darfur. These conflicts have 
been violent, bloody and armed battles that have often led to many deaths and 
casualties (Kiernan 2007). Given the ecological and demographic transformation, 
overall, it can be observed that the lack of rain and desertification have negatively 
influenced the relationships between the tribes in Darfur in general and in particular 
in the middle and southern areas (Sunga 2011, p. 70).   
 
                                                          
8 Darfur, linguistically, in Arabic means the homeland of the Fur. The Fur is the main indigenous tribe 
of the region. Each Dar has own special political, social, and cultural identity and prestige. 
9 Diar is the plural of Dar. Dar is locally known as a sub-territorial tribal area or the homeland of each 
tribe. 
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Map No 2: The Ethnic Structure of Darfur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map No 3: population distribution by mode of living in Darfur 
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Darfur accounts for over 85% of the tribal conflicts that took place in Sudan, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Hassan and Ray 2009) (see Table No: 1). 
Table No 1: The key tribal conflicts 1957–2006: the parties, causes, and places10 
  
Conflicting  tribes 
 
Year(s) 
 
Key causes of 
the conflict 
 
Province 
 
1 
 
Meidob and Kababich 
 
1957 
 
Theft of camels 
 
North Darfur 
 
2 
 
Rizeigat and Almaalaa 
 
1968 
Pastures, theft 
of cattle 
 
South Darfur 
 
3 
 
Zaghawa and Rizeigat 
 
1969 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
North Darfur 
 
4 
 
Zaghawa and Birgid 
 
1974 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
South Darfur 
 
5 
 
Rizeigat and Bani-Halba 
 
1976 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
South Darfur 
 
6 
 
Rizeigat against Fur and Beja 
 
1980 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
South Darfur 
 
7 
 
Ta’aisha and Salamat 
 
1980 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
South Darfur 
 
8 
 
Kababich and Alquahlp 
against Meidob and Alberti 
and Ziadiah 
 
1982 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals, and 
land 
occupation 
 
North Darfur 
 
9 
 
Zaghawa and Misseriya 
 
1984 - 1987 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
South Darfur 
                                                          
10 For more details see Musa 2009, p. 93. 
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10 
 
Fallata and Al Comor 
 
1987 
Grazing and 
water, theft of 
animals 
 
South Darfur 
 
11 
 
Fur (Kbkabia) and Zaghawa 
 
1989 
Entry areas, 
theft of animals 
 
North Darfur 
 
12 
 
Fur against 27 Arab tribes 
 
1989 
The occupation 
of the territory, 
and political 
and racial 
motivations 
 
Whole Darfur 
region 
 
13 
 
Al Comor and Zaghawa 
 
1990 
Entry territory 
and theft of 
animals 
 
West Darfur 
 
14 
 
Rizeigat and Zaghawa 
 
2001 
Political and 
racial 
motivations 
 
South Darfur 
 
15 
 
Rizeigat and Almaalaa 
 
2004 
 
Grazing and 
water, and land 
 
South Darfur 
 
16 
 
Dajo and Misseriya 
 
2005 
 
Rebellion 
 
South Darfur 
 
17 
 
Rizeigat and Rizigat 
 
2006 
 
Rebellion and 
land 
 
South Darfur 
 
18 
 
Fallata and Habbaniya, 
Masalit 
 
2006 
 
Rebellion and 
land 
 
South Darfur 
 
 
In addition to this, the increasing migration of nomadic groups from Chad has placed 
greater pressure on Darfur’s natural resources and worsened living conditions overall 
(Sudan Watch 2006). The link between land degradation and desertification and the 
conflict in Darfur is very strong (Sunga 2011, p. 64). Waves of environmental 
degradation have resulted in deep imbalances in the local environment and Darfurian 
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society. Furthermore, these extreme environmental conditions have exacerbated 
other phenomena that have significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Darfur 
Crisis. In order to understand in more detail the role of environmental degradation, it 
is useful to discuss the most important of these accompanying phenomena. 
 
A - Conflict of Marahil11, Tracks and Pastures  
 
Amongst the most important and frequent conflicts in Darfur are those that arise 
between the pastoral tribes and sedentary tribes that practise agriculture. They are a 
result of competition for the resources of scarce fresh water and arable land due to 
drought and desertification since the late 1960s (Brown 2010, p. 2513). This, in turn, 
has led to a decline in the scope of pasture, freshwater resources and fertile soil. 
These disputes were traditionally addressed and resolved through tribal councils and 
customary laws agreed by all the tribes (Hakim 2011, p. 816; Sunga 2011, p. 4). In 
Darfur there have been 11 Marahil since the 1950s, stretching from the northern 
region to the south; their size varies between 250sq. kilometres and 600sq. 
kilometres, and the longest Merhal is Alokaim in North Darfur stretching to Um 
Davouk in South Darfur, with a size of 606sq. kilometres. The shortest Merhal is 
Kazan from the north of El Fasher to Dar Rizeigat in the south (Fadul 2006). The 
areal width of a Merhal ranges mostly between 6 and 10sq. kilometres in populated 
areas, expanding to become Merhal and pasture in the free areas of the population 
and farms (Regulation Act for pastures and Marahil, 1999. p 9). Some Marahil 
continent (the path of cows), others Abala (the camel path). However, due to 
environmental degradation and agricultural expansion that have prevailed on those 
Marahil – where there are freshwater wells – the Baggara’s Marahil faded, forcing 
most Baggara to flee to the south and south-west of the province (Alawad 2007, p. 
202). Darfurians have made a compromise formula for peaceful coexistence among 
                                                          
11 Marahil (the plural of Merhal) are animal tracks used by camel and livestock herders in Darfur. 
These are “areas between the farms plots designated for nomads to pass through during their 
movements from south to north during the rainy season and from north to south during the dry season” 
(Fadul 2006, p. 39). This helps herders to access places rich with grass and fresh water, without 
violating the rights and property of farmers and with respect for customs and traditions (El-Tigani 
2005, p. 67). Merhal is an administrative and social place well known to everyone and has certain 
limits in terms of latitude and longitude, named Merhal because it connects the two points at the 
departure of people from one place to another. 
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pastoral and agricultural tribes. One of the most important laws, for example, is not 
to arrive during the harvest seasons so giving farmers a chance to secure their food 
and livelihoods. Other than at that specific point for watering their livestock, herders 
do not enter these areas until they are authorised to do so. In addition to this, one of 
the main rules here is that nomadic herders should notify the heads of local 
administrations of the region through which they are to pass well in advance of their 
arrival in order to facilitate their passage (El-Tigani 2005, p. 67).  
Although the Marahil system has existed as a formula for coexistence, changes in 
climate conditions in Darfur, in recent decades, have led to the erosion of the 
effectiveness of this system. First, drought and desertification have changed the map 
of the old agreed tracks. Second, increasing numbers of camels and cattle, as well as 
newly emerging villages across these tracks, have significantly contributed to the 
inability of the nomadic communities to honour the commitments to move within the 
selected tracks. Third, agricultural expansion into the territory that the nomadic tribes 
walk through. Fourth, blocking roads that lead to the freshwater sources and the 
spread of the phenomenon of burning grass, under the pretext of land ownership, 
around villages and farms to keep nomads away from the region,. Fifth, neglect by 
the local authorities monitoring the seasonal movement of nomads and determining 
tracks before the arrival of nomadic tribes to agricultural areas in the south of the 
province, as well as non-compliance with the specific dates for the movement of 
pastoralists (Beheiri 2010, p. 94). 
It should be noted that the transmission of pastoral groups from north to south in 
agricultural areas, especially after the drought of 1971, has formed a high-pressure 
breach of the natural environment, due to the vast number of human and animal 
groups that came with new patterns of behaviour, leading to the reluctance of the 
people of the settled areas to expand to accommodate the new arrivals. Government 
authorities failed at nomadic administration in the required form, such as the 
establishment of semi-regular forces for nomadic insurance, where farmers accused 
them of being forces loyal to the shepherds to protect them and fight with them. This 
has challenged the credibility of the government's attempts to resolve the tracks 
problem. As a result, all the tribes resorted to the use of civil military systems, 
depending on them for protection, as well as in raids (Musa 2009, p. 88). All these 
factors have pushed pastoral tribes to commit numerous abuses as a result of moving 
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cattle into farmland and the destruction of crops, which was one of the most 
important factors leading to the collisions that inflamed the conflict between 
shepherds and farmers in the region. 
 
B - Conflict on Hawakeer12 and Land Ownership 
 
The system of land ownership of Hawakeer, or what is known as a system of tribal 
home lands, has significantly contributed to tensions and armed conflicts between the 
tribes inhabiting Darfur. This is due mainly to the nature and specificity of this 
system, which has been run since ancient times by inherited traditions. Under this 
system individuals and tribes could acquire large tracts of land for many years to 
engage in agriculture (Abu Salim 1975). With the passage of time these Hawakeer 
became acquired rights and an important part of the cultural heritage and economy 
for their owners, as in recent years and before the outbreak of the crisis in 2003, they 
acquired very significant social and political dimensions (Beheiri 2010, p. 90). 
In contrast, there have been other tribes who do not have Hawakeer for two reasons, 
either because they were small tribes or because they are nomadic tribes (mostly 
Arab) and their pattern of living depends entirely on movement, where they were 
merely claiming guaranteed access and the right of traffic through specific corridors 
and at specific times (Abdul-Jalil, Azzain and Yousuf, 2007, p. 41). However, the 
Hawakeer system has begun to break down. Deterioration in climatic conditions in 
the region has resulted in a decline in the pastures and fertile land suitable for 
cultivation in Darfur. In addition, the emergence of the modern state, as well as an 
increase in some economic freedoms, has pushed these tribes, driven from their 
homes, to settle in other tribes’ lands, changing their lifestyle and resorting to 
agricultural work and settlement.  
This, in turn, led to a change in the balance of populations and the old tribal system. 
For instance, of the most important tribes displaced due to the deterioration of 
                                                          
12 Hawakeer is the plural of the word Hakorh. Literally, Hakorh means monopoly, but idiomatically it 
refers to a patch of land granted by the Fur sultans to an individual or a tribe – they are mostly African 
and non-Arab – as owners to practise agricultural activity within the bounds of specific geographic 
features.  
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pastures and freshwater scarcity are the Zaghawa, Alberti, Almidoob and the 
Northern Rizeigat tribes and other Arab tribes of North Darfur (Al-Mashaqbah and 
Al-Taieb 2012, p. 88). These tribes entered into bloody tribal conflicts whenever they 
headed south, as tribal competition increased over agricultural and animal resources 
as well as scarce freshwater sources. For example, Dar Zaghawa, the geographic area 
of the Zaghawa tribe which is the largest of the pastoral tribes in the region, is known 
as Barbie. Its population before the drought in 1970 was about 255,000 people. But 
because of the droughts between 1970–1984, this number decreased to 40,000 
inhabitants (16% of pre-1970 population). Zaghawa have been a party in 11 out of 22 
conflicts in the period 1986–2001 (Haggar 2012, p. 102; Musa 2009, p. 91). 
Nomadic tribes believe that the Hawakeer system is unfair, as Hawakeer are not 
inclusive, and they demanded the abolishment of the system and equality among 
citizens in accordance with the principle of citizenship. On the other hand, these calls 
were met with strong opposition by the owner tribes of Hawakeer. They refused to be 
compromised as the Hawakeer represent inherited gains from their ancestors (Beheiri 
2010, p. 90). Furthermore, they are willing to go to war against any attempt to grab 
their land under the pretext of modernity (El-Tigani 2005, p. 65).  
The problem with the Hawakeer system is that it has contributed to the loss of state 
prestige and reduced the state’s ability to provide security for its citizens in Darfur. A 
clear example of this conflict is that which occurred between the Zaghawa and 
Rizeigat in 1996 in the Daein Province. The Rizeigat tribe replaced the banner of the 
Council in the Daein Province with the banner of the Council of the Dar Rizeigat 
Area. Furthermore, the Rizeigat (a non-Arab settled tribe) issued a decision, in 
writing, to the county government ordering the expulsion of five Zaghawa citizens 
from the province of Daein, including the judge, who had judicial immunity, under 
the pretext that they were undesirable because of their influence on the rest of the 
tribe and for inciting violence against the Rizeigat. The local authorities, therefore, 
decided to call the mentioned citizens and asked them to leave Hakorh (Haggar 2012, 
p. 94). In recent years, these differences have fuelled racism and ethnic tensions 
between the conflicting parties that strongly contributed to the deterioration of the 
situation in the region (Abdul-Jalil, Azzain and Yousuf, 2007, p. 56).    
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C - The Proliferation of Weapons and the Phenomenon of 
Armed Looting 
 
The proliferation of arms in Darfur is considered one of the main problems 
contributing to armed clashes between the tribes in the region. This is attributed to 
several reasons including the length of the boundaries that the region shares with 
three neighbouring countries (Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic). Also, 
a number of tribes in the region flow through both sides of the border in these 
countries, in addition to inadequate security reinforcements to monitor and secure the 
border. Another reason is that the harsh conditions of the Bedouin community in 
Darfur, and the region's history of wars and tribal conflicts, build the foundations of a 
culture of war and the inevitability of Darfurian men carrying weapons as an 
expression of their manhood and ability to defend themselves and their families 
(Sudanese Centre for Press Services 2004).  
Furthermore, the failure of the GoS to control this phenomenon and control the 
sources of arms has greatly contributed to the region instability and the use of 
weapons, as well as the emergence of armed gangs and organised robberies in the 
province (Nurain 2008, p. 194). Some sources confirm that the first extensive entry 
of the modern weapon in Darfur was in the mid-1970s, by the National Front led by 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, when stockpiling arms in Darfur in order to oust Jaafar Nimeiri. But 
after the reconciliation that took place between Nimeiri and Sadiq Al-Mahdi in 1977, 
the National Front ceded its arms to the GoS army. When the GoS wanted the 
captured arms, it found that large amounts had leaked to the people in Darfur 
(Beheiri 2010, p. 98).  
Likewise, the governmental authorities’ way of handling armed robbery, through 
immediate reactions to the incidents, represented in the response of the security, 
political, administrative and also media bodies, together with the lack of a deliberate 
plan to combat it, drastically led to its escalation. Just as governmental forces and 
official bodies moved to contain one incident, they would be surprised by another 
(Haggar 2012, p. 130). The border dispute between Libya and Chad during the 1970s 
and 1980s was of great significance because it led to the spread of weapons into 
Darfur. Libya armed Arab tribes in Darfur in their war against Chad over what  
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isknown as the region of Aouzo. The disintegration of the Central African Republic's 
army resulted in most of its personnel entering Darfur, where the majority belong to 
Sudanese tribes (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 139). 
The influence of the armed robbery phenomenon on raising hostility and reprisals 
between different tribes in Darfur has been emphasised by many Darfurians. For 
instance, when armed looting was committed against one tribe by a gang belonging 
to another, the victim tribe usually tried to trace the perpetrators to punish them (Flint 
2004). However, the perpetrator’s tribe often refused to hand over their people and 
insisted on protecting them, which led to the outbreak of further armed clashes and 
the increased frequency of incidents of armed robbery and mutual revenge (Al-
Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 140). Incidents of armed robbery have increased 
since 1984 as a result of climate change and desertification in Africa's Sahel region 
which has led to the elimination of more than 80% of livestock for some pastoral 
communities (Hassan 2003, p. 278). This has prompted these communities to flee to 
other areas less affected by the deterioration in climate. Some people initiated the 
practice of armed looting to make up for what was lost from camels and cattle due to 
the drought. Armed robbers move from one area to another in Darfur, and the 
practice of armed robbery in the region is not merely associated with a certain tribe.  
Furthermore, there have been some other factors that have increased the spread of 
this phenomenon in Darfur. These include: firstly, high rates of poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment and low levels of awareness as well as the absence of religious 
morality, especially among younger generations. Secondly, the state’s inability to 
adjust to the security issue, which has encouraged many people to adopt armed 
robbery as a livelihood (Hakim 2011, p. 815). Nora Hassan (2003, p. 279) also adds, 
the absence of developmental projects, alternatives for employment, and the 
weakness of the private sector. 
 
 Ethnic Diversity and Tribal Intolerance 
 
While Sudan has been acknowledged as one of the most diverse and versatile 
countries in the world, Darfur can also been seen as a small model of Sudan (Flint 
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2004). This diversity stems from the important geographical location of the province 
as it neighbours three countries, and links western and central Sudan. Mixing 
between Arab immigrant groups to Sudan13 and local tribes of African origin has 
importantly contributed to the culture in the province, which is characterised by a 
high degree of diversity and assimilation (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 10). Whereas 
intermarriage between the Arab and Negro tribes has changed certain tribal 
characteristics, habits, and traditions as well as leading to the emergence of new 
tribes which have stretched their assets as far as the Arabian Peninsula, there has 
been peaceful coexistence among these tribes for hundreds of years. Even 
distinguishing between the tribal or ethnic affiliations of Darfurians, according to the 
language or skin colour, has become a difficult task. Despite the existing 
classifications between Arabs, Fur, and others, historically, tribal leaders were keen 
to dissolve racial barriers between the different groups in the region (especially in 
areas of tribal contact) through mating, intermarriage, and by creating double 
affiliations between members of different tribes to achieve peaceful coexistence. It is 
often argued that Darfur is characterised by an extremely complex tribal combination, 
and is, at the same time, indeed marked by peaceful coexistence between individuals 
and groups, where there has been mixing and tolerance (Salih 2005, p. 2).  
A number of scholars refute the assumption that the Darfur Crisis is propelled by 
absolute competition between pastoralists and farmers over limited natural resources, 
such as fresh water, agricultural land and pasture, caused by climate change. It is 
claimed by many that the Darfur Crisis is essentially a conflict of ethnicity and 
should fundamentally be considered a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign. 
According to Olsson and Valsecchi (2010), ethnic cleansing has extensively and 
intensively occurred in Darfur, and has largely affected the ethnic composition of the 
state through the redistribution of the population in chosen villages. The GoS and its 
allies, the Janjaweed militia, argue that their attacks have mainly targeted the three 
major African tribes of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. Nevertheless, Arab-dominated 
villages are very rarely targeted (Olsson, Siba 2009, p. 23). Hagan and Kaiser say 
“The evidence presented . . . is of a pattern of racialised, state-led attacks on food, 
livestock, and water supplies, indicating the intent by the political leadership of the 
                                                          
13 The Arab migrations came to Sudan in general and to the Darfur region in particular through outlets 
and different routes such as: Bab el Mandeb, through the Red Sea, the Isthmus of Suez and Egypt, and 
North Africa. 
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Government of Sudan to eliminate the collective livelihoods of Black African groups 
in Darfur” (Hagan and Kaiser 2011, p. 20). 
Other studies – which have already been discussed in the literature review chapter –  
by Flint and de Waal 2008; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, p. 875-880; 
Mahgoub El-Tigani 2004; and Olsson 2010a, p. 16 argue that the ethnic component 
cannot be denied as a key factor in the Darfur crisis in 2003. They contend that 
cultural variation between tribes makes the social atmosphere ready for the outbreak 
of armed conflict between the people of the province. The GoS has utilised 
segregation strategies to make it relatively easy to subdue the rebellion stability in 
Khartoum, as well as to motivate both the government and its allies of local Arabs to 
reconfigure the political demography of the Darfur region by organised cleansing and 
an assault on their traditional culture.  
Nonetheless, as discussed also in the literature review chapter, some academics 
(Muhammad 2010; El-Affendi 2009; Shaw 2011) disagree with these points of view. 
They believe that the insurgency in Darfur cannot be considered genocide or ethnic, 
or even ideological. In the current Darfur crisis, it is difficult to differentiate between 
an Arab tribe and a non-Arab tribe in the conflict. It is said that the former US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his visit to Darfur in 2004, was talking about 
the distinction between Arabs and Africans in the region and trying to differentiate 
between them. He failed in his first six attempts. Whenever he pointed someone out 
as an Arab he or she turned out to be African, and vice versa, then he stopped 
(Beheiri 2010, p.152).  
Ammina Kothari (2010) found that the western media coverage of Darfur tends to be 
episodic, favours Western values and is not homogeneous. Additionally, some 
human rights organisations and movements like the Save Darfur Movement14  have 
exploited and taken advantage of the clash of events in Darfur (Hamilton and Farrow 
2011, p. 47).  Armed conflict, looting, and fighting between the tribes of the region is 
not new; they have historical roots (Shaw 2011), which have always been handled 
according to the traditional reconciliation system or what is locally called Traditional 
                                                          
14 It is considered as the brand for the Darfur anti-genocide movement. To understand how it has been 
founded see Mamdani, M. 2010, Saviors and survivors: Darfur, politics, and the war on terror, 
Doubleday Religion. 
 106 
 
Councils of Mediation the Judiyya15 (see El-Tom 2012, p. 108). The conflicts within 
the Darfur region, especially between 1975 and 1997, on the whole, account for 19 
conflicts, including five conflicts between Arab tribes, eight conflicts between 
African tribes and six conflicts between Arab and African tribes (Al Ddla 2007, p. 
32). This indicates that the conflict does not appears to be a purely racially and 
ethnically motivated crisis.  
 
 Economic Factors  
 
Darfur’s economy is mainly based on variations in productive patterns between 
pastoral and agricultural activities, which has led to tensions and clashes between 
Darfur's tribes, due to the growing number of economic disputes. The evolution of 
Sudan’s economic reality has led Darfurians to rely on livestock more than 
traditional agricultural crops, for reasons related to the global economy and 
international trade. This has forced them to focus more on the export of animal 
resources, rather than agricultural exports, which has contributed to the deepening of 
differences between farmers and pastoralists (Niama 2005, 323). This may indicate 
that the root causes of the conflict in Darfur are economically driven. Although 
Darfur is considered wealthy in Sudan (Cockett 2010), based on its major 
contribution to national income, the province has suffered a lot from marginalisation 
in terms of modern industrial and agricultural development, due to being badly 
treated by successive regimes. Traditionally, Darfur has been relatively ‘rich’ in 
terms of agriculture, particularly before the increased environmental degradation that 
the province has suffered since the 1970s. Darfur in general is characterised by 
multiple sources of natural minerals, surface and groundwater, livestock, and 
agricultural sources. The region essentially depends on rain agriculture, as opposed 
to cultivation, which is dependent on irrigation by water streams such as rivers and 
canals, as agriculture in the first instance is associated with the rainfall season (Abdel 
Monseif 2007, p. 52). 
                                                          
15 Abdullahi Osman El-Tom acknowledges the Judiyya as “It is a grassroots system of arbitration that 
focuses on reconciliation and resurrection of social relationships in the community. Unlike other 
judicial systems, such as government and Shartay courts, the Judiyya is distinguished by the 
impermanency of its membership, informality and accessibility to all in the community.” 
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Each state of its three mandates has its own economic characteristics which together 
constitute the economic value of the region as a whole. Arable land in northern 
Darfur is estimated at eight million acres. It also possesses a large amount of ground 
and surface fresh water, with annual rainfall ranging between 100-600mm. These 
two factors (land and water) essentially contribute to the provision of vast tracts of 
natural pasture, estimated at approximately seven million acres.  Forests in this state 
are estimated at one million acres, which has led to an enormous growth in animal 
wealth in the region, estimated at 12 million cattle: this is almost equal to 10% of the 
total animal wealth of Sudan. In western Darfur, agriculture is also the main 
economic activity. The estimated use of arable land is merely about three million 
acres out of eight million. The highlands of the Mura Mountain range are the most 
important of these agricultural areas. 
 Livestock in this state is significant and represents approximately 11% of the 
national economy.  Western Darfur has better freshwater resources, with an average 
annual rainfall ranging between 200-1200mm. There are many valleys extending 
from the heights of Jebel Mura, which represents a lifeline for fertile agricultural 
land, with the presence of groundwater basins rich in fresh water, such as the Wisa 
Basin. Freshwater resources are estimated at about three billion cubic metres per year. 
In western Darfur, forests cover about 75% of the total area. Finally, in southern 
Darfur, agriculture and fertile land are estimated at approximately 24 million acres, 
and represent 12% of the total arable land in Sudan. Livestock is also diverse and 
constitutes about 10% of Sudan’s total animal wealth. The total area of land used for 
grazing in this state is 22.7 million acres, and many forests cover large areas of the 
region. Southern Darfur is also rich in various freshwater sources. The average 
annual rainfall ranges between 200-1000mm. There is an abundance of rainfall and 
groundwater basins, such as Al-Bagara, that are not fully utilised (Al Ddla 2007, p. 
37), (see Table No: 2).   
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Table No 2: The economic resources of Darfur region 
 
Animal Wealth 
 
Pastures and Forests 
 
Water Resources 
 
Agricultural 
Resources 
Resources 
 
The State 
 
Livestock is estimated 
at 12 million head of 
ruminants including 
cows, camels, sheep 
and goats almost 
equalling 10% of the 
total wealth of animal 
Sudan 
 
The natural pasture 
estimated at about 7 
million acres 
 
 
Groundwater and 
surface water, at 
annual rates 
ranging between 
100-600 mm 
 
 
 
Arable land is 
estimated at 8 
million acres 
 
 
North 
Darfur 
State 
 
Forests are estimated 
at about one million 
acres 
 
 
Livestock represents 
about 11% of Sudan  
national economy 
 
Natural pastures and 
forests cover around 
22.7 million acres 
 
Water resources 
are estimated at 
about 3 billion 
cubic metres per 
year. Rainfall 
ranges between 
200-1200mm 
 
The estimated 
arable land is 8 
million; about 3 
million acres are 
used 
 
 
West 
Darfur 
State 
 
Million acre forests 
cover about 75% of 
its total area 
 
Livestock is also  
diverse and 
constitutes about 10% 
of the total animal 
wealth in Sudan 
 
The areas of grazing 
and forests  cover 
about 22.7 million 
acres 
 
The average 
annual rainfall 
ranges between 
200-1000mm 
 
Fertile land is 
estimated at 24 
million acres, 
representing 
12% of the total 
arable land in 
Sudan 
 
 
South 
Darfur 
State 
 
 
On the other hand, Darfur contains several important mineral resources which are 
used in various fields of industry. For instance, metals like iron and lead, marble, and 
chrome are located in northern Darfur, while the southern territory comprises metals 
such as copper, iron and phosphate, and limestone. Moreover, Darfur contains oil 
fields, located in Abugabrh and Scharf, in the eastern parts of the province. Darfur 
contributes about 45% of Sudan's exports – excluding oil exports – including 22% of 
exports of sesame, 15% of exports of livestock and meat, 5% of the exports of gum 
Arabic, and 9% of exports of hibiscus and watermelon (Dala 2007, p. 16). Despite 
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this, there are no real development projects in Darfur aimed at agricultural and 
industrial advancement, despite the fact that these two sectors represent the most 
important aspects of economic activity in Darfur in addition to the space of the 
region, which represents 20% of the total area of Sudan (Dala 2007, p. 16).  
Nonetheless, it is noticeable that despite the richness of Darfur and the availability of 
these natural resources, the Sudanese state has failed to effectively employ these 
economic potentials in the manner that best serves the region and its people on the 
one hand, and Sudan in general on the other. It is argued that the Darfur Crisis is a 
reflection of a deterioration of living conditions and greater poverty, illiteracy and 
disease (Nixon 2005, p. 324). Darfur exists in a state of default, economic weakness 
and underdevelopment. It has suffered from a significant decline in infrastructure due 
to the absence of developmental assistance and key services, such as potable fresh 
water, electricity, education, health, schools, hospitals, and roads linking the region 
to the rest of the state. Unemployment totals 1.5 million citizens. Many scholars have 
attributed these factors to the policies that have been adopted by successive 
governments (Omran 2005, p. 168).  
Undoubtedly this economic downturn has had a negative impact on the population 
and on the possibility of securing necessities, which has increased poverty and 
illiteracy rates and spread diseases. Unbalanced development between the regions of 
Sudan has also led to the deepening deterioration of the economic situation in Darfur, 
which is one of the largest states in Sudan (for more details see the Black Book16  in 
El-Tom 2011, p. 281). Since 1991 the Inqad government has worked on the 
establishment of some development projects to raise the quality of life in the region, 
including building some international airports, increasing the number of schools, 
developing the road network, and building some health facilities. Most of these 
projects have not been completed, however, due to the instability in the region, 
which has resulted in the re-direction of financial resources to meet security 
requirements. This has stunted development in Darfur. The GoS has failed to 
establish industrial projects that would encourage farmers to increase their 
production capacity, provide markets for their produce, and provide new job 
                                                          
16 The Black Book shows information illustrating the extremely narrow base from which Sudan's 
governing class has all long been drawn, starting with the first government in 1954; for more details 
see Mamdani, 2010, p. 199. 
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opportunities for the people of the region (El-Tigani 2005, p. 78). Researchers vary 
in their diagnoses of the main reasons that have led to the lack of development in 
Darfur, despite the availability of diverse natural resources and economic potential in 
the three Darfur provinces. The rapid growth and increase in the rate of population in 
the last five decades before the crisis erupted, alongside an acute shortage of basic 
requirements of life, was also a factor and cannot be ignored: see Table No 3 (cited 
in Fadul 2006, p. 35). This is likely to be a cause of more social tension between 
groups in the same location (Olsson 2010b, p. 15). 
 
Table No 3: The population density changes in Darfur (1956- 2002) 
Year Population Density (Person/Km2) 
1965 I,080,000 3 
1973 1,340,000 4 
1983 3,500,000 10 
1993 5,600,000 15 
2003 6,480,000 18 
(Source: population figures, Department of Statistics. Area 360,000Km2 below parallel 16:00 North) 
 
Also, it is argued that the failure of development in Darfur is basically a natural 
result of the political competition between Sudanese political parties. The major 
parties that formed governments in the past relied on votes of certain circuits over all 
past parliaments. However, often these governments tended to develop services for 
other regions that were far removed from those secured, in an attempt to secure the 
voters of those departments, so obtaining members in parliament. This has 
significantly restricted the development of areas like Darfur. Many of the rebels from 
different areas of Sudan emphasised that the conflicts in the country are the result of 
regional marginalisation, not of racial or religious tensions (El-Tom 2003, p. 25). 
In this respect, data in the Black Book of Sudan stressed this view by showing a 
pattern of political control (by the north) which has been unbroken since 
independence in 1956 (Cobham 2005, p. 463). Others believe that the Southern 
Sudan War, which lasted for more than two decades, also had a negative impact on 
the developmental process in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular. The GoS was 
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pre-occupied by the war, rather than trying to industrial and agricultural projects, not 
to mention the high costs that were incurred by the state during the war (Abo Fars 
2004). Under these difficult circumstances, caused by the neglect of agricultural, 
industrial, and human development, and high rates of unemployment, many 
Darfurians (particularly young people) have resorted to drifting and practising 
looting. They have also been joining different armed organisations fighting against 
the government and demanding improvements to living conditions after losing hope 
in the government's promises. 
 
 Political Factors 
 
In addition to the environmental and ethnic–tribal factors, issues of a political nature 
have been seen by many as the most important and decisive factors in the outbreak of 
the recent conflict in Darfur. Since its inception, the crisis was confined to 
developmental demands and the lack of services in the region that has existed since 
the National Union in Sudan. Then it turned into armed movements with a political 
agenda, because of the deterioration in economic and security conditions that were 
afflicting Sudan. Political factors played a significant role in the emergence of armed 
action against the GoS. These can be divided into three very influential key axes:  
 
A – The Abolition of the Native Administration System and the 
Absence of State Prestige 
 
Darfur has been ruled by a unique social-political-governance system since British 
colonial control in 1916. This was based predominantly on so-called Civil 
Administration, or Native Administration (Hamilton, 2011, p. 6). Sudan’s successive 
governments continued to adopt this system in the conduct of public affairs in Darfur 
even after independence in 1956, until it was repealed in 1971 during the Numeiri 
government, leaving a vacuum that resulted from the negativities that affected 
Sudanese political life. This political pattern was a factor for stability and a sponsor 
of moral values in a community consisting of more than 100 tribes, some of Arab 
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descent and others of African descent, which are spread across a wide area where 
economic interests intersect and overlap one another. Civil administration performed 
the sensitive and regulatory functions, which would adjust political, economic, and 
social stability in the region.  
For example, civil administration was a sponsor for contacts between different tribal 
leaders to coordinate the migration of tribes affected by climatic conditions under the 
legal authority vested in them by the central GoS and the social status among the 
tribes (Abdul-Jalil, Azzain and Yousuf 2007, p. 39). The Numeiri government 
abolished civil administration replacing it with a popular local system of government 
which is, theoretically, based on a system of elected local councils. In practice it 
supports the system of central governance of the ruling party, which is the Sudanese 
Socialist Union (As Usual 2012). Implementing this new system has been difficult to 
relate to tribal and ethnic diversity, which was one of the most important attributes of 
society in Darfur. The regional governance system failed to implement the same 
roles that had been carried out by the Native Administration System in the past and at 
the same level of efficiency and effectiveness (Abdul-Jalil Azzain and Yousuf 2007, 
p. 60). 
There have been repeated views that the decision to cancel civil administration has 
negatively affected the civil political and social scene in its entirety in Darfur. It is 
believed that the system has contributed to an increase in competition for leadership 
positions and regional parliamentary elections on a purely tribal basis. Politically, for 
instance, the local governance system has led to the perpetuation of the dominance of 
the ruling party in all aspects of life across the state. The other important issue is the 
abolition of the Hawakeer system of land tenure, which granted the leaders of the 
civil administration powers to act on the land (Mamdani 2010, p. 166).  The central 
government has restricted these privileges by issuing law devolution whereby all 
unregistered land in official property records automatically reverts to state ownership 
and state eligibility. This has created serious problems as most of the land was not 
registered (El-Affendi 2009, p. 54).  As a result, tribal conflicts have spread in light 
of the vacuum caused by the absence of the civil administration. However, despite 
attempts to restore conciliation conference systems as a mechanism to resolve 
disputes, it has not achieved any important successes (Al-Nahas 2005). Although 
there were attempts carried out by governments that followed the Numeiri 
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government to revive the civil administration system, they failed because of the 
developments in, and complexity of, real events (El-Affendi 2009, p. 54). 
 
B – Tribal Conflict over Power and the Political Polarisation of 
Some Tribes 
 
According to several political analysts and observers, the Darfur Crisis is a reflection 
of domestic political conflicts between internal Sudanese actors seeking power (Kalu 
2010, p. 12). A large segment of interested tribal and political anthropologists argue 
that the underlying causes of conflicts and tribal wars that frequently break out in 
Darfur are political conflicts based on an increased tendency toward tribalism. The 
desire to obtain constitutional positions and the keenness of some intellectuals in 
Darfur to achieve their personal political aspirations and ambitions have fed tribal 
conflicts, and politicians have failed to attract people on the basis of party loyalty. 
Instead, they rely on tribal affiliations to run the political race for gaining 
constitutional positions as the only available option (El-Tigani 2005, pp. 72-74).  
This has led to the fuelling of tribal conflicts and the shrinking of the role of the state 
and its institutions in extending its prestige and providing the necessary protection to 
its citizens. Thus, tribal affiliation has become the standard of political competition, 
rather than competence, programme or thought, which has contributed to the 
instability and the weaknesses of Darfur’s tribal structure (Idris 2006, p. 49). One of 
the most important movements of partisan polarisation that occurred in Sudan, in the 
period 1986 – 1989 during the Sadiq al-Mahdi's rule is the framework of competition 
between the Umma Party (UP), led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. This focuses its activities on 
attracting Arab tribes stationed in the western Sudanese region, and the Democratic 
Unionist Party (led by Mohammed Merghani) who sought to win the loyalty of 
African tribes in the region (Mans 2004, p. 291). This competition polarised the 
loyalties of the tribes and different social groups – especially in times of elections – 
in exchange for political positions in the government if successful. This has deepened 
the differences between the political and social components in the region. It has also 
contributed to the increase of tribal strife in the absence of opportunities for real 
development to address the economic problems afflicting the region (Al-Nahas 2005).   
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As a consequence, tribes and civil departments evolved from social entities to 
political entities competing for power. Therefore, the conflicts in Darfur have turned 
from professional and productivity conflicts into ethnic and political conflicts. The 
tribe has become a major focus in the process of distribution of constitutional and 
executive positions. This, in turn, has encouraged aspirants to conduct political work 
in Darfur to affiliate more solidly with their tribes and ethnicities in order to gain 
positions through tribal and ethnic affiliations. Thus, the role of civil society 
organisations has been reduced. Instead, the tribal factor that is inconsistent with the 
developed civil societies has been activated (Beheiri 2010, p. 51). The tribe is a 
social entity which supports its members in difficult times, as well as defending and 
recovering their rights, even if it leads to tribal hostilities. This led to the inability of 
the state and its institutions to provide the necessary protection for its citizens. The 
tribe has become a sanctuary, in place of the police or judiciary, and thus, an 
appropriate environment to worsen the bilateral problems between tribes which led to 
the deterioration of state control and the transformation of tensions into armed 
conflicts (Mans 2004, p. 292). 
 However, many specialists in GoS political affairs believe that the differences and 
internal divisions that occurred in the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ruling party 
in 1999,17  have had a significant impact on the course of the worsening political 
situation in Darfur, due to the influence of al-Turabi on rebel groups. Most of the 
leaders in the ruling party, as well as some tribal leaders, were already a part of the 
Islamic movement and its spiritual leader Hassan al-Turabi (al-Turabi 14/01/2013). 
The New Islamic party, named the Popular Congress, was formed and led by al-
Turabi (de Waal 2005c, p. 18). Al-Turabi has been accused by the authorities in 
Khartoum, and many observers, of fermenting the crisis and inciting groups to rebel 
against the GoS (Hoile 2006, p. 18).  
Furthermore, the split within the ranks of the NIF, which occurred in 1999, 
contributed to the deteriorating political situation and the outbreak of armed 
hostilities in Darfur against the GoS. Several political leaders of the NIF come from 
Darfur. Some leaders of the political opposition to the current regime are also from 
                                                          
17 The disputation over the issue of multiple references decision-making in the state led to the split of 
the ruling party into two parties: the National Congress Party headed by Omar al-Bashir, and the 
Popular Congress Party led by Hassan al-Turabi. 
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this region and their influence there is clear (Diraige 18/03/ 2013). Therefore, the 
political-military dimension is evident in the Darfur problem (Shnan 2005, p. 300). 
In support of this Mahmood Mamdani (2010, p. 198) argues that the split of Daoud 
Bolad (which occurred in 1990) was an important juncture in the region's conflicts. 
That split highlighted the division between settled and nomadic factions within 
Darfur that had important national and political implications. It was due to Bolad's 
awareness of the racial discrimination that the Sudanese elite made against him (Flint 
and de Waal 2008, p. 21). 
 Bolad believed that the Islamic National Salvation government was tilting too much 
in favour of nomadic Arab tribes. Likewise, El-Affendi (2009, p. 12) argues that the 
Daoud Bolad split was due to  disputes that erupted within the NIF within the Darfur 
sector where Yahya (Bolad’s former student leader) was chosen as president of that 
sector in the mid-1980s.  Nevertheless, Bolad was ruled out after the takeover of the 
military wing of the NIF, led by al-Turabi, on 30 June 1989 after financial, political 
and regulatory disputes which incited Bolad to rebel against the existing power at the 
time. This prompted a leading Fur member of the NIF, headed by Hassan al-Turabi, 
to defect from the movement with large numbers of the Fur and Zaghawa joining the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Sudan led by John Garang (al-Turabi 
14/01/2013). 
 This act can also be represented as one of the root causes of the crisis. They received 
logistical and military training to demand that Khartoum grant the Darfur region its 
share of power, wealth and development. However, negotiations in Naivasha to 
resolve the problem of the south may have also played an important role in fuelling 
the crisis in Darfur. Another factor that further exacerbated the western rebellion was 
the SLA/JEM exploitation of the Naivasha Peace Accord18, which occurred at the 
same time to end the war in South Sudan and which was brokered by the 
international community (Tar 2006, p. 408). It was the appropriate time for each 
party to put more pressure on the GoS. In this context, a report issued on 24 August 
2004 by the International Crisis Group demonstrates that:  
                                                          
18 This was the agreement that ended more than twenty years of war between the GoS and the 
SPLA/SPLM in the southern Sudan. 
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“The Darfur situation poses an ever greater threat to the nearly finalised peace 
agreement to end the larger and older civil war between the government and the 
insurgent Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)” (Deadline 2004, p. 23). 
“As long as Darfur festers, the chance remains for political forces in Khartoum 
opposed to the concessions that have been made in that negotiation to turn 
government policy back toward war” (Deadline 2004, p.23). 
On the other hand, some scholars argue that this transformation from an agenda of 
demands to a political agenda is not the result of a natural evolution but rather 
reflects a political issue with specific features worth struggling for. Furthermore, 
there are those who see the Darfur Crisis as being driven, or instigated, by actors 
outside the region, specifically the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which 
aims to weaken the position of the government negotiator in Naivasha.  
 
C – Political Marginalisation of the Region  
    
 “The crisis is political and State-made. It results from the misadministration, abuse 
of authority, and economic greed of the governing elite, committed against the 
powerless Africans of Darfur” (El-Tigani 2004, p. 3). 
A large part of the existing literature relating to the conflict in Darfur contends that 
what brought Darfur to humanitarian disaster in 2003 was mainly political 
marginalisation. According to this literature the key factors that created instability in 
Sudan, and particularly in Darfur, were the neglect and marginalisation practised by 
successive central governments since its independence in 1956. Scarcity of resources 
and uneven development policies and strategies have caused Darfur to become the 
most neglected region (Kalu 2010, p. 12).  A prevailing idea is that the northerners 
have dominated power in Sudan since its independence in 1956. All significant 
positions, such as presidential and sovereign ministries, have never been given to 
anybody from Darfur (Abdulkarim 2005). Many scholars believe that the GoS has 
failed to achieve justice in the distribution of power. Political exclusion towards large 
parts of Sudan’s political components has been practised, so that they cannot fully 
participate political processes (Miller 2007).  
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In the absence of real democracy and clear politics, through which the rebels could 
effectively express their grievances, the rebels concluded that continued resistance by 
force was their only viable option (Miller 2007). The Darfur region has suffered from 
poor political, developmental and social policies executed by successive 
governments. The key problem for Sudan is its failure to create a strategic vision for 
building a truly nationalistic Sudanese state based on principles of equal citizenship 
(Deadline 2004).  This failure has contributed to the spirit of sub-identities, based on 
ethnicity, religion or tribal affiliation, and their evolution to become political 
identities rather than remaining in the circle of cultural diversity within the 
community. As a consequence, different ethnic groups, such as the SLM and the 
JEM were formed. These rebel movements try to realise their demands by force 
(Mamdani 2010, p. 249).  
The founding statement of the JEM, the biggest armed movement in Darfur, states 
that the movement aims to end racial discrimination in the curriculum of governance 
in Sudan, and to divide the portfolios and management of governmental and non-
governmental institutions. It also commits to the distribution of all important 
functions in the state evenly between regions on the basis of population density, 
efficiency, and equal opportunities. Furthermore, it promises to choose the head of 
state and province governors through direct elections on the basis of the principle of 
one vote per person, taking into account the social balance in the states, including the 
state of Khartoum19. Importantly, details which contain some statistics that clarify 
how Sudan has been controlled by northern people and parties since independence 
are provided in the Black Book of Sudan (Yongo-Bure 2009). The authors state that, 
“This tiny population of the north contains several marginalised ethnic groups, such 
as the Manseer and the Mahas.  The former represent the marginalised – Sudanese – 
Arabs while the latter the marginalised Nubian tranche. These and others are 
dominated by just three ethnic groups within the northern region, i.e., the Shaygia, 
the Jaalieen and the Danagla” (El-Tom 2011, p. 291).  
The Black Book stresses unequal discrimination and how Sudan’s political and 
economic life, since independence, has been dominated by small ethnic groups from 
the three tribes Shaygia, Jaalieen, and Danagla, against the black African majority 
                                                          
19 See Founding Statement of the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan 
http://www.sudanjem.com/sudan-alt/arabic/jemintern/basic_explanation/beyen.htm  
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(de Waal 2007b). This shows the skewed power in political and economic 
imbalances between Sudan’s Arab population, which is largely based in the north of 
the country, and its African peoples. The long-term crisis in Darfur is caused by the 
weak and unaccountable governance in Khartoum and its lopsided politics towards 
various ethnicities, not only in Darfur, but across the entire country (Badmus 2009).  
Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) the spokesman of the JEM, states that the crisis erupted as 
a result of the existence of an imbalance of wealth and power prevalent since 
independence in 1956. He added that the main motivation for the outbreak of the 
crisis is to claim, and seek to restore, balance in the distribution of power and wealth 
not only for Darfur, but also for other regions. Bilal stresses that the JEM does not 
seek to make the Darfur province dominate the presidency, or the financial and 
personnel aspects of the state, or exclude other regions. Therefore they demand rights 
for Darfur as well as rights for others at the same time. Thus, all these factors led to 
the worsening of the situation in Darfur and the spread of violence and war. These 
factors have led to a transformation of the conflict from the level of the armed 
opposition to political movements against the central government to the level of civil 
war between the people of Darfur, both Arabs and Africans, where foreign hands 
play a subtle but important role. 
 
Foreign Factors of the Crisis 
 
The analysis of the various causes of the Darfur Crisis in the previous sections 
suggests that the Darfur Crisis is essentially a local crisis that has some external 
dimensions. The phases of the crisis have dramatically evolved and escalated, turning 
Darfur into a new flashpoint in Sudan. Continuation of the crisis and the inability to 
contain it in its early stages led to the transmission of the crisis from its local context 
to regional and international horizons. The involvement of regional and international 
powers, either directly or indirectly, has fuelled the crisis (O’Fahey 2006, p. 29). In 
this section, the external factors that have contributed to its escalation in western 
Sudan will be addressed, classified mainly as regional and international causes. 
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 Regional Causes of the Crisis 
 
Regional factors here specifically refer to those factors associated with geographic 
proximity to Darfur, embedded in countries with shared borders with the region, 
namely Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. These factors can be 
addressed in the following key points. 
 First, social interactions with neighbouring countries: Many analysts believe that 
among the important factors that increase the complexity of the conflict in the region 
is the interaction of Darfurian tribes with other tribes living in the areas adjacent to 
the territory's neighbouring states (Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic), as 
a result of the joint ethnic roots shared by these tribes (Giroux, Lanz and 
Sguaitamatti 2010, p. 7). One of the most significant tribes to have extensions into 
neighbouring countries is the Zaghawa tribe. It is spread across Darfur, Chad, and 
Libya. The Albargo tribe, which is one of the Negro tribes, is also spread across 
Sudan and Chad. This situation helped to ease the transition on both sides of the 
border from one country to another (Al Ddla 2007, p. 44). Due to instability in the 
political and economic circumstances in Chad, more than three million Chadians 
have settled in Sudan, half of them in Darfur, specifically in the south-western border 
areas and eastern part of South Darfur. On several occasions these tribes from the 
Chad border are accused of being behind a lot of cases of lawlessness and the 
deterioration of stability in the region (Carmody 2009). They do not comply with or 
respect the restrictions and tribal customs applicable in Darfurian society. They are 
also accused of not being subject to the authority of the local administrations 
especially relating to land and the Hawakeer system (Haggar 2007, p. 115).  
Moreover, they often resort to the power of arms. This hostile behaviour by the 
intruders has often dragged the Darfurian community into violence and counter-
violence. This then develops into conflicts which affect all the tribes of Darfur as a 
result of alliances and ethnic blocs, of which the most prominent are the Zurga and 
Arab alliances. These tribes are willing to provide all kinds of support to each other 
during their disputes against other tribes (El-Tigani 2005, p. 80). Thus, they are 
always affected by political interactions in neighbouring countries, especially in the 
cases of Libya and Chad, where Darfur was always a rear base for their conflicts. 
This, in turn, led to the presence of large quantities of weapons and military 
 120 
 
equipment which some tribes on both sides used to strengthen their political and 
military position (Suliman 2008).  
Second, political instability in neighbouring countries: Political instability in 
countries neighbouring Darfur has significantly contributed to the lack of security 
and instability in Sudan. It is argued that a mixture of domestic, political, and 
geopolitical issues are amongst the most important factors influencing the outbreak 
of the conflict and the continuing crises in Sudan, the Darfur Crisis being one of 
them. Additionally, at the same time, geopolitical factors can also be a factor to 
support efforts to find suitable adjustments to the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 9). Three 
important countries that may have had significant influence in the recent aggravation 
of the crisis in Darfur (Chad, Central African Republic and Eritrea) are investigated.  
 
a – The Conflict in Chad 
 
Internal conflicts between factions in countries that neighbour Darfur have fed the 
instability factors within it (Marchal and Bawtree 2006, p. 467). For instance, civil 
conflicts that Chad has witnessed, since the era of President Tmpelbaa, have left 
obvious marks in Darfur. The region became a scene of fighting and conflict among 
many regional and international powers (Libya, Egypt, France, and the USA) on the 
one hand, and internal factions on the other, that took shelter in Darfur (El-Affendi 
2009, p. 43). Khartoum and N’Djamena have been engaged in an on-off proxy 
conflict using one another’s rebel movements since the Darfur conflict began in 2003. 
Khartoum has attempted, on multiple occasions, to destabilise or even overthrow the 
Déby regime through support of Chadian rebel movements (Tubiana and Walmsley 
2008, p. 20). The conflict in Darfur is a reflection of the continuation of the civil war 
in Chad, not the opposite. The regional dimensions of these two crises, to some 
extent, are responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur (Marchal 2008, p. 
429).   
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b – The Political Relations of the Central African Republic 
(CAR) and Sudan  
 
Political instability in the CAR has negatively reflected on the stability of Darfur, 
especially with the presence of tribal stretches between the two sides (Giroux, Lanz 
and Sguaitamatti 2010, p. 2). The collapse of the African army, as a result of a recent 
coup that toppled President Ange Patassé, led to the escape of large numbers of his 
men, with their weapons, into Darfur – many of them were from Sudanese tribes 
(Debos 2008, p. 239). The CAR fears the impact of the events in Darfur and the 
GoS's support for the followers of Patassé existing on its territory to recover the 
former regime, which was toppled in 2003 by a military coup led by current 
President François Bouziri (African Strategic Report 2006-2007). The CAR's 
relations with France and its proximity to Chad and Darfur increase the likelihood of 
its involvement in international competition with Darfur as its theatre (Debos 2008, p. 
240).  
 
c – The Eritrean Factor 
 
Despite the lack of a shared border between Eritrea (which gained independence in 
1993) and Darfur, instability in Sudan-Eritrea relations has also importantly 
contributed to fuelling the conflict in Darfur. The regime in Asmara is accused by the 
Sudanese regime of supporting the armed movements and the escalation of the crisis 
(Morrison and de Waal 2005, p. 165). On the other hand, the GoS has been accused 
by Asmara of intervening in Eritrean affairs by supporting the opposition, 
represented by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. This support comes in the form of an 
attempt to export the Islamic revolution and overthrow the government in Asmara, 
which led to the severing of relations between the two countries in 1994 (Mahmoud 
2004, p. 9).  Despite the resumption of relations in 1999 they quickly soured again 
after an attack on the town of Hameshkureb (located on the eastern border) in 2002. 
Sudan accused Eritrea of financially and militarily supporting the Free Lions and the 
forces of Beja tribes stationed in the eastern region of Sudan, as well as supporting 
the rebels in Darfur against the GoS. There are those who believe that Eritrea tried to 
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exploit the government's preoccupation with the tense situation in Darfur. It sought 
to convert the eastern province into a buffer zone to avenge the Eritrean opposition 
backed by Khartoum (Habib 2004). Other observers believe that Asmara has hidden 
interests and ambitions, particularly relating to agricultural land in the Sudanese 
areas (Beja and Kassala), which appeared in the secret plan issued by the Eritrean 
government in 1996 (Abul Khair 2006, p. 121). For details of Eritrea’s involvement, 
see Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 84. 
Third, Libyan-Chadian war and the dilemma of weapons proliferation: Many 
academics argue that external actors have provided arms to tribes in Darfur to one or 
other of parties that are loyal (Libya and Chad). Libya has armed Arabic tribes in 
Darfur, while Chad and France have supported African tribes with money and arms 
(Behrends 2007, p. 99). Sudan under Jaafar Nimeiri, and Egypt during the era of 
Anwar Sadat, entered into an alliance against the alliance of Tripoli-Addis Ababa-
Aden, which was an extension of the conflict between the two superpowers, the USA 
and USSR, during the Cold War (Marchal 2007, p. 183).  In 1981 Libya supported 
the government of Gokony Oweidi against Hissene Habré who was forced to flee 
with his troops to Darfur and used it as a base for their military operations (Marchal 
and Bawtree 2006, p. 469). Habré also received support from Sudan and Egypt and 
their allies enabled him to reach power in Chad in 1981. Libya continued to support 
the oppositional Democratic Revolutionary Council in Chad, which used the border 
areas with Darfur as a launching point for military operations against the regime of 
President Habré (El-Affendi 2009, p. 43).  
On the other hand, differences between Gaddafi and Nimeiri pushed Gaddafi to 
attempt to destabilise Sudan. To do so he supplied some tribes in Darfur with large 
quantities of arms. Despite the collapse of Nimeiri’s government in Sudan in 1985, 
as well as the defeat inflicted on the Libyan army by Chadian troops with the 
assistance of French troops in 1987, Libya continued to support opposition against 
the Habré regime via Sudanese territory (Marchal and Bawtree 2006, p. 468). This 
was with the consent of the new government, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was 
closely aligned with Gaddafi.20 Following their withdrawal from Chadian territory 
                                                          
20 The alliance between Gaddafi and Sadiq Al-Mahdi is embodied in the establishment of the Islamic 
Legion in the eighties, which was considered the spearhead of Gaddafi's strategy to spread Arab 
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(Aouzou Strip), Libyan forces left huge amounts of additional weapons and military 
hardware in Chad, especially in areas bordering Darfur. Darfur has been a rear base 
in Chadian internal conflicts. Most of the political and military coups that succeeded 
in Chad were launched from Darfur with the help of the GoS (El-Affendi 2009, p. 
42). All these factors have helped in the spread of weapons and the increase of 
frictions between tribes, which developed political conflicts later evolving into clear 
ethnic conflicts (de Waal 2005).  
Both geographic and historical tribal and political linkages between Darfur and 
surrounding areas have led to the dominance of tribalism and weakened the sense of 
national identity for Darfurians. During their conflicts, both Arab and African tribes 
have been associated with third parties who provided money and weapons which 
were later used in rebellions against the GoS. For example, the conflict that broke out 
between Arabs and Masalit in West Darfur in 1998–2001. The main armed 
movements that declared rebellion against the central GoS were mainly from tribes 
that have extensions in Chad, Libya, and the CAR (Prunier and Ababa 2008, p. 9).  
Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti (2009) argue that “the conflicts in Darfur, eastern 
Chad, and north-eastern CAR have become so interwoven that they are scarcely 
separable from one another and actually form one regional conflict system rather 
than three distinct conflicts” (Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti 2009, p. 1). All these 
regional factors, along with the internal factors dealt with previously, contributed to 
the outbreak of the crisis in 2003. 
 
 International Causes of the Crisis 
 
Some see the presence of another contributing factor that has external dimensions 
and has led to the aggravation of the crisis. This factor is represented in the ambitions 
and foreign interests of influential states in the international community such as the 
USA, UK, China and France and their role in the Darfur Crisis, which has been 
interpreted as putting pressure on the GoS in an attempt to marginalise it in the 
region and involve themselves instead (Mamdani 2010, p. 22). However, it is  
                                                                                                                                                                    
nationalism and Islamic Africa. It explains Gadhafi's association with the establishing of Janjaweed in 
Darfur and supporting them with money and weapons. 
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difficult to say that the Darfur Crisis was caused by foreign parties, whether regional 
or international. It can be argued that external actors (such as the USA, Libya, and 
others) took advantage of the events and employed them as justifications for 
intervention and influence in the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 54). Deterioration in the 
humanitarian situation in the region was the main argument used to justify 
intervention and to put pressure on the parties of the conflict in line with the strategic 
interests of these external actors (Fawole 2004, p. 300).  
 Due to the development of events, and the deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation on the ground, more obstacles have emerged leading to an increase in 
difficulties to contain and resolve the problem (Kamel 2009, p. 21). This has had a 
significantly, negative impact on the stability of Sudan and neighbouring countries. 
Some international powers have become effective actors in the crisis. In general, 
external interference has aggravated the situation in Darfur and its continuity as well 
as its transition from the local level to the international level (Al Ddla 2007, p. 129). 
This is represented in the reactions of these parties towards the crisis and the policies 
that they pursue.  
These practices mostly flow into the scope of insisting on intervention and influence 
in events on the ground which would undermine the peace process and serious 
attempts to ending the crisis. Western powers have regarded the Darfur Crisis as the 
worst humanitarian catastrophe in the twenty-first century. This pushed the USA and 
some of western Human Rights organisations to describe the reality in Darfur as 
genocide and ethnic cleansing of the African race in the region by the GoS and its 
supporters from Arab tribes, or Janjaweed. Despite the main focus of this study is not 
on the role of the major powers such as the USA, UK and China in the Darfur Crisis, 
which has a significant impact on what is going on in Darfur and is very important to 
look at, this will be highlighted in more details in chapter five. 
 
 
 
 125 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Previous analysis has focused on the internal and external factors that have 
significantly contributed to the exacerbation of the Darfur Crisis. It seems that it is 
difficult to attribute the causes of the crisis to just one or two elements, since it has 
multiple and varied dimensions. Past and present political, social, and economic 
dimensions both domestic and international are all dimensions that have influenced 
this crisis. The Darfur Crisis has historic accumulations and the region has witnessed 
several such tensions since ancient times. Given the evolution of the economic reality 
of Sudan the importance of Darfurians’ focusing on pastoral activity has become 
more than focusing on agricultural activity and crops. This has led to many frictions 
and differences between the tribes, who often adopt a different lifestyle.  
The social aspect has also played an important role in raising the tensions that led to 
the crisis. The tribal environment that characterises the region in particular and 
Sudan in general, often generates feuds, loyalties, and biases to certain authorities 
and opposition to others. Likewise, ethnic divisions and different social identities 
have contributed to the complexity of the situation in the region, especially at times 
of tribal crisis. The central government in Khartoum also bears a great deal of 
responsibility in the deterioration of the social and political reality in Darfur. 
Successive governments have used their power to secure support for policies against 
their opponents, whether in Darfur or in other parts of the country, especially in 
facing challenges of the war in the south. Conflicts between political parties have 
played an important role in influencing the social groups from different races and 
affiliations, which has had a negative impact on the social fabric and unity in the 
province. Furthermore, the absence of developmental policies has decreased the 
opportunities available for overcoming the economic dilemmas as well as the 
deterioration of living conditions for the people of the province.  
The inability of the state in Sudan to extend its control and influence over all 
components of the society has often led to an increase in violence and resulted in the 
collapse of official institutions of the state. Instead, it promotes social institutions and 
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tribal formations, which tend to resort to the language of arms in addressing 
problems and disputes arising from that environment. This environment is 
exacerbated by the failure of the state to broadcast the feeling among its citizens that 
it is able to protect them, along with the central government’s adoption of particular 
social components in facing growing problems by arming them in the form of bodies 
such as the People's Defence and the national police (Appiah-Mensah 2005, p. 8). 
This has encouraged other social groups to seek various means to protect themselves, 
with arms being the main instrument. For warring groups access to weapons is not 
difficult, especially in Darfur. 
 Similarly, external factors have played an important role in escalating and 
developing the stages of the Darfur Crisis. Domestic conflicts have been 
characterised in Africa by resorting to the adoption of armed resolutions and leaving 
the peaceful political alternatives within constitutionally legitimate channels (Niama 
2005, p. 325). The inability of central governments to deal crucially with conflicts in 
the early stages gives the opportunity for these differences to move from their local 
circles to regional and international ones to achieve equilibrium in the balance of 
power. This is precisely what has happened in Darfur. Thus, any attempts to resolve 
the crisis without considering all these factors together would be both an ineffective 
and indecisive.  
The following chapters will also attempt to understand and foresee the key internal 
and external influential actors that have contributed to the prolongation of the war in 
the region. The political strategies of rebel leaders and Khartoum, as well as 
interventions by foreign powers such as Libya, will also be addressed, for a better 
understanding of the interplay of the most prominent actors’ interests, mechanisms 
and actions, and how they have impacted on the termination of the violence. The 
social and political dynamics which fuel the ongoing crisis will also be taken into 
account. 
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Chapter 4  
___________________________________________________ 
Intra-Rebel Divergence, Third-party 
Intervention and the Duration of the Darfur 
Crisis 
___________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter three showed how multiple internal and external factors have exacerbated 
the humanitarian situation and caused the eruption of the Darfur Crisis in 2003. It 
opened up new perspectives for determining the key domestic actors involved in the 
conflict in Darfur, as well as analysing different key mechanisms which have been 
adopted, and how they have impacted the course, duration, and opportunities for 
peace-making in the region by the relevant parties handling the crisis. This chapter 
examines the conflict in Darfur by analysing the impact of divergence in the 
domestic combatants’ views, attitudes, goals and interests upon conflict resolution. It 
also investigates the effect of external intervention on the duration of intrastate 
armed conflict as a form of crisis management. Cunningham (2010) argues that 
external state intervention in interstate armed conflict in the pursuit of a specific 
agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants inhibits conflict 
resolution. Furthermore, external states usually do not have the same incentives as 
the insurgents to negotiate. Their anticipation of gaining from such negotiation tends 
to be less than that of domestic insurgents. This chapter answers the question of what 
happens to the duration of warfare that involves ethnic and religious diversity and 
tribal societies, and when domestic combatants (whether rebel movements or the 
government) have agendas which are different from one another. In this regard, an 
additional theoretical model is developed.  
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This model shows that: when external states intervene with a separate agenda in 
internal armed conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are 
multiple armed opposition groups, the likelihood of prolonging the duration of the 
crisis is higher.  (see figure No: 4).    
 
Figure No: 4 the theoretical model of chapter four 
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The overall argument in this chapter is that when an armed conflict contains more 
than one armed group active against the government, there will be a plurality of 
agendas, leadership figures, insights and mechanisms among the rebel groups to end 
the conflict. These are very likely to be affected by the interests of their ethnic 
groups or tribes and, occasionally, by personal goals. Additionally, this type of 
intrastate war often causes intra-insurgent conflicts leading to an emergence of still 
further armed groups with new goals, insights, and mechanisms of resolution. This in 
turn allows external actors to intervene to achieve particular interests or ends which 
can substantially prolong the armed conflict. To verify the applicability of this 
theoretical model and to give it more explanatory power, it is applied to the internal 
combatants in Darfurian society. To achieve this task the key internal parties of the 
Darfur Crisis, their adopted strategic mechanisms, and the influence of divisions 
between them on the duration of the crisis are considered.   
 
The Key Domestic Actors to the Conflict in Darfur 
 
Given the worsening conditions in the region caused by the different factors 
mentioned in the previous chapter, particularly those linked to the political 
competitions between the political parties, the rebel movements in the region have 
clearly emerged. Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013), the private peace consultant of 
president al-Bashir and responsible for the Darfur file and the former head of the 
governmental negotiation team from 2008–2010, emphasises that there is no doubt 
that the high degree of awareness that occurred amongst the youth of Darfur – 
because of higher education, which has not been matched by the equivalent 
availability in jobs – has created a layer of educated and aggrieved Darfurians who 
aspire to certain rights. This brought about a suitable environment for the insurgency 
and revolution.  
The main theme that has prevailed among these elites in Darfur is that the dominance 
of small groups from northern Sudan, who have ruled Sudan since independence in 
1956, was the primary reason for the deteriorating situation in the region and the 
current crisis (El-Tom 2011, p. 231). They were dissatisfied with this dominance 
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especially with the absence of development in their region (Salih 2005, p. 7). The 
political competition between the two largest sectarian and traditional political 
parties in the late 1980s – The Umma Party (UP) and the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) – dominates the political scene and the executive branch. The focus on 
achieving their partisan interests to the neglect of the development of the region has 
led to their failure to rule the country democratically and equally. The UP and the 
DUP are accused of caring less about the marginalised tribes in provinces such as 
Darfur than focusing on winning votes in Darfur (El-Affendi 2009, p. 56).   
These reasons and others that led to the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur were 
discussed previously in Chapter three. The beginning of the military rebellion in 
Darfur 2003 was initiated by both the Darfur Liberation Movement (DLM) (changed 
later to Sudan Liberation Movement) and the JEM from the Jebel Marra (the highest 
plateau in Sudan). The rebels took the mountain as a base from which to launch their 
armed attacks on government forces and carried out attacks on police forces, 
positions, vehicles, and government institutions. Despite the multiple opposition 
movements and the tangle of internal parties in the conflict in Darfur, two categories 
of domestic parties, which are directly responsible for the aggravation of internal 
armed conflict and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, are 
identifiable. These are the GoS on one side and the rebel movements on the other. 
There are three key activist insurgencies in the territory. These are the SLM, led by 
Abdul Wahid Nour, the SLM/A (the armed wing of the SLM), led by Minni Arco 
Minnawi, and the JEM, led by Jibril Ibrahim, who assumed the leadership of the 
movement after the death of its leader and founder, his brother Khalil Ibrahim 
(Minnawi 10/11/2012).  
 
 The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 
 
This movement emerged in July 2002 in the area of Golo in Jebel Marra after a series 
of sporadic military operations carried out against the Sudanese army under the name 
of "the Darfur Liberation Army". It officially declared itself in February 2003 under 
the name of "the Sudan Liberation Movement” (Salem 2004). Different sources 
suggest that the adoption of the new name was on the recommendation of John 
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Garang, leader of the SPLM in the south, and suggests the shared relationship and 
nationalist visions that combine the two movements (de Waal 2005a). This 
movement is formed of individuals belonging to three major non-Arab tribes, the Fur, 
Zaghawa, and Masalit, in addition to some groups that belong to other tribes. In 
March 2003 the general conference of the SLM was held in the Jebel Marra area to 
form an agreement regarding the distribution of leadership positions within the 
movement. Under this agreement the post of head of the movement and political 
leadership was given to the Fur tribe, led by lawyer Abdul Wahid Nour. The military 
leadership was given to the Zaghawa tribe, led by Abdullah Abkar and then by Mini 
Arco Minnawi after the former's death in 2004. While the position of vice president 
was given to the Masalit tribe, represented by Mansour Arbab, he was later replaced 
by Khamis Abdullah. Most of the movement’s leaders were military officers in the 
Chadian and Sudanese armies (Ahmed 2007). 
The formation of the armed movement was a result of the policies of marginalisation 
and racial discrimination, exploitation and division, which have been practised by the 
successive Sudanese governments, both civil and military, towards the region. The 
SLM believes that governments have strengthened tribal ethnic factors when they 
recruited some Arab tribes to fight non-Arab tribes. This was worsened further, 
sometimes to the extent of ethnic cleansing, in some areas of Darfur in what was 
once a safe and stable region – according to the allegations of the leaders of the 
movement who emphasise that these policies culminated in the arrival of the Inqad 
government to power in 1989 (Minnawi 10/11/2012).  
The movement’s main demands are the prevention of the nomadic militias from 
carrying out armed attacks against settled tribes. The GoS's refusal to implement this 
requirement has led the movement towards armed action and raising the ceiling of its 
demands (Willemse 2005). Further calls for the removal of marginalisation of the 
region and its development, equitable political representation in the central 
government, and abolition of the division of Darfur into three states in favour of one 
province, have become the key demands of the movement. The SLM is regarded as 
one of the most active movements in Darfur, especially at the military level 
(Minnawi 10/11/2012). Most of the military actions which have been committed 
against the government army in Darfur are ascribed to the SLM, because of the 
power and effectiveness of its military wing (Brooks 2008). This efficiency was not 
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equalled by the same level of political effectiveness, which was the main factor that 
led to the movement’s later split into two factions (Minnawi 10/11/2012). The aim 
was to disavow any intention to separate Darfur from Sudan and, secondly, an 
assurance that the embryonic SLM would declare itself a political movement and not 
an anti-Arab militia (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 82) 
Flint and de Waal (2008, p. 86) have demonstrated that significant disputes between 
Abdul Wahid Nour and Minnawi appeared when the government surrounded Abdul 
Wahid’s forces in the south of Jebel Marra early in 2004. Minnawi refused to send 
reinforcements to aid the Fur leader who had to resort to the SPLA, which airlifted 
them to Nairobi. This event negatively affected trust and caused deterioration in 
relations between the two leaders and their tribes, leading to fierce fighting between 
the former allies, as happened on 15 January 2009. A general congress of the 
movement, held 29–31 October 2005, resulted in the split into two factions: the 
political led by Abdul Wahid Nour (Flint and de Waal 2008), and the military led by 
Minnawi (Ahmed 2007, p. 18). On 5 May 2006 the SLA signed the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) with the GoS in Abuja. Whereby, Minnawi became the senior 
aide to the Sudanese president as well as president of the transitional authority for 
Darfur (Jooma 2011, p. 1). While Abdul Wahid Nour refused to sign (Flint 2006). 
This refusal was also a result of the same differences in perspectives among the 
leaders during the negotiations (discussed in more detail below). 
 
 The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
 
The JEM is classified as an Islamist movement whose Islamic orientation has strong 
local support among the Zaghawa tribe (de Waal 2005a, p. 128). It is reported that 
the founder, former regional health minister in Darfur during the 1990s Khalil 
Ibrahim, is an Islamist which indicates that religious diversity in Darfur is not an 
issue (Suleiman 2011, pp. 6-8). However, Khalil Ibrahim’s theological orientation 
has been regarded as one reason for defections within the JEM (Bechtold 2009, p. 
151). The origins of the JEM are controversial. The GoS and others believe that the 
JEM has been a “stalking horse” for Hassan Al-Turabi, the godfather of the NIF, 
since the split in 1999 (Suleiman 2011, p. 34). Khalil Ibrahim, now chairman of the 
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movement, insists that it is an entirely independent movement, deeply rooted in all 
regions (de Waal 2005a, p. 88). Many of the movement's leaders still believe that 
Islamic values can be the model solution to many of Sudan’s problems. Thus, the 
JEM has attracted members from across the political spectrum (de Waal 2005b, p. 
89).  
The JEM was established after the split occurred in the Islamist-reference ruling 
National Congress Party (NCP) in 1999 (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). It is believed that 
this armed opposition group is comprised largely of non-Arab, black African 
members from Western Sudan, mostly from the ethnic Zaghawa tribe. It also has 
some others from non-Arab tribes like the Masalit who believe that the regime in 
Khartoum backs the Arab tribes in the province. Unlike the SLM, the JEM has a 
powerful political agenda. It provides its own perceptions about the possibility of 
how the political regime should be. Its vision is founded on a united Sudan within a 
federal formula. According to JEM leaders, Sudan should be divided into seven 
federal states: Khartoum, Darfur, the South, East, North, Kordofan and the Centre. 
The post of the president of the country should be rotated between the seven states 
(Salih 2008, p. 8). 
On the other hand, Gérard Prunier (2008, p. 5) states that several splits have emerged 
within the JEM, forming new movements: The Darfur Independence Front/Army 
(DIF/A); The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD); The 
National Redemption Front (NRF); JEM-Wing for Peace (JEM-WFP); and JEM-
Collective Leadership (JEM-CL). These splits have been caused by varying political 
visions among the leaders of the rebel movements in Darfur towards a 
comprehensive solution that should be adopted to end the catastrophic situation. This 
has importantly influenced the paths and courses of the peace process. The impact of 
this phenomenon on the mechanisms adopted by domestic parties to end the crisis, as 
well as on the duration of the crisis, will be discussed in more detail below. 
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The Mechanisms of the Sudanese Government to 
Solve the Crisis 
 
Internal crises management policies of African countries, especially in those with a 
high incidence of disputes and conflicts, are often characterised as resorting to 
military options before peaceful and legitimate ones to deal with such conflicts (Kalu 
2010, p. 10). Thus, the rebel parties in light of the inability of the central government 
to deal effectively and peacefully with the crisis, and their inability to achieve 
military success, results in the potential for the development of complex crises. 
Therefore, expectations to end the crisis within a peaceful framework seem weak 
(Niama 2005, p. 327). Because of various countries' failures to reach a 
comprehensive settlement with rebel movements, this often leads them to resort to 
the military option. Moreover, rebels usually start searching for external parties to 
support this trend and maintain its continuity to obtain the objectives of the 
insurgency (Niama 2005, p. 325). In its quest to eliminate the rebel movements and 
end the Darfur Crisis, and in an attempt to contain the local, regional, and 
international fallout of the crisis, the Sudanese government has adopted – since its 
acknowledgement of the crisis and the existence of political opposition – various 
mechanisms which are marked with some overlap and complexity. This part of the 
study focuses on the mechanisms and methods that have been adopted by the regime 
in Khartoum. It attempts to answer two main questions: does the GoS manage the 
crisis or manage the crisis by developing counter-crises? Then, how has that 
contributed to the duration of the crisis? In order to understand this it would be useful 
to identify the key mechanisms adopted by the GoS to maintain the developments 
and changes that have accompanied the crisis since its early stages. 
It is difficult to differentiate between the parties who manage the crisis for ending the 
crisis and those who manage the continuation of the Darfur Crisis, because of the 
overlap between the two behaviours of all local parties in particular (Omar 2008, p. 
185). However, despite the difficulty in distinguishing this, it is possible to approach 
the asymptotic description and to determine the attributes of the style of management 
of each party through the mechanisms adopted for managing the crisis. Each party 
tries to influence the crisis in accordance with its own agenda and its strategic 
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objectives that essentially are aimed at winning the conflict. The regime in Khartoum 
has described the crisis as part of an international conspiracy which seeks to break up 
Sudan, accusing opposition movements as in-house tools to implement this and 
provide political cover for it (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). On the other hand, the major 
rebel armed movements in the province have described the crisis as a turning point 
towards ending the marginalisation suffered by the province, and the equitable 
sharing of power and wealth, taking advantage of the human dimension of the crisis 
to use pressure through the concepts of ethnic cleansing and genocide, as well as 
deliberate abuses of human rights (Omar 2008, p. 185). 
It is noteworthy that this radical difference in describing and understanding the 
causes and dimensions of the crisis significantly contributed to determining a 
different method of crisis management by each party of the conflict, which has 
essentially affected the continuation of the civil war. Furthermore, it has resulted in 
the adoption of various mechanisms which have had a great impact on the inability 
of the warring sides to clearly control the crisis and reshape reality in Darfur, in ways 
that serve the goals and interests of each party. Additionally, it can be contended that 
relying on the dominant features of the standard behaviour of each internal party to 
the crisis works to put the GoS on the side that runs the crisis. To address the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms and their impact on the long duration of the crisis 
– despite the strong overlap between the mechanisms that the GoS has resorted to in 
the management of the Darfur Crisis in all its dimensions – this analytical part will 
focus on the key adopted governmental mechanisms, which have been classified into 
three main categories: militarising the solution; Sudanisation of the solution; and 
then Khartoum’s insistence on addressing the crisis in the African context. 
 
 Militarising the Solution    
 
The rebellion in Darfur has been considered an expression of the struggle of the 
Darfurian people against the inequality in the distribution of power and wealth in the 
hands of a small group – from tribes that do not have the weight of a large 
demographic base – in controlling the country. The GoS's first reaction was negative. 
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The Khartoum government initially played down the importance of the rebellion in 
Darfur, considering it an attempt to undermine the peace process that was going on in 
Naivasha in Kenya to end the civil war in the south, supported by the USA and the 
EU. It had ignored the rebel movement’s demands, refusing to recognise them as an 
opposition movement, and refused to negotiate with these groups (Tar 2005, pp. 107-
108). This contributed to an increase in the congestion of rebel groups which led to 
an escalation in their attacks. These assaults became more dangerous to Sudanese 
national security and territorial integrity – especially after the SLM and the JEM 
united their military operations and initiated a series of successful attacks on 
governmental institutions and forces in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, in 
April 2003 (Ismail 13/01/2013). This resulted in significant damage to state property, 
police stations and military infrastructure, as well as significant military losses for 
the government (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 827).  
In this context of a series of mistakes made by the GoS that contributed to fuelling 
the crisis in the region, is the dealing with the insurgency as a concern of security 
breakdown. The central government's refusal to open up dialogue with the rebels and 
to recognise them as an opposing movement but rather to consider these rebel groups 
as bandits, led it to adopt the military solution to resolving the crisis (Kamel 2009, p. 
16). It seems that the Khartoum regime wanted to eliminate the rebellion quickly 
with minimal losses through a military solution.  
This view is confirmed by Sadiq Al-Mahdi (10/01/2013) who claims that one of the 
reasons that led to the continuation of the crisis is that the GoS had not committed to 
peace and made significant concessions to the rebels, fearing that could accelerate a 
change of the composition of the regime in Khartoum. President al-Bashir has been 
told that the government will crush the rebels and the rebellion by using all military 
measures. This reaction has reduced the possibility of access to peaceful solutions to 
address the issue and opened the door to all armed options (Kamel 2009, p. 17). 
Another blunder committed by the government in its management of the crisis is its 
mobilisation of different tribes. The GoS has armed the Janjaweed militia, using it as 
a counterweight in putting down the insurgency (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 
827). 
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According to Abdel Aziz Mahmoud (16/01/2013), a Sudanese journalist and 
academic at Alzaiem Alazhari University in Khartoum, the government has merged 
these militias into so-called People's Defence Forces, which are treated as regular 
forces and provided with arms and money. Furthermore, it is reported that the GoS 
has employed some elements of the Chadian armed opposition on Sudanese territory 
(Al Ddla 2007, p. 93). The Janjaweed has become the military arm of the 
government, with advanced weapons, in Darfur. As a consequence, the Janjaweed 
transformed from small groups – previously relying on looting, armed robbery and 
fighting in Jebel Marra to acquire local influence – into an organised and trained 
militia, under the control of the official Sudanese army (Tar 2005a, p. 109).   
Additionally, the government’s response is considered an expression of ethnic 
strategy and the central government's hidden agendas instead of working to ease 
ethnic tension, when the Khartoum government armed the Janjaweed at the expense 
of stable agricultural groups from non-Arab tribes (Tar 2005a, p. 106). Although 
Sudan has repeatedly insisted that there are no systematic and deliberate assaults 
against civilians by its regular and other armed groups operating under its control 
(Olsson and Siba 2009, p. 3), it is widely argued that the measures taken to counter 
the insurgency in Darfur have been in blatant violation of international law, and 
Sudan has failed to protect the rights of its own people (Yihdego 2009, p. 12). 
 So it seems, in light of the above, the GoS has chosen a military solution to crush the 
rebellion in order to pave the way for a peaceful settlement in the framework of a 
national conference. Despite military success, Khartoum failed politically, which 
significantly increased the gap with the rebel groups. With the deterioration of the 
humanitarian and security situations in the province, the Khartoum government 
realised the ineffectiveness of its military strategy in ending the insurgency. This has 
redirected the government and pushed Khartoum to soften its line and adopt greater 
political and diplomatic options as mechanisms to manage the crisis, as well as 
opening a dialogue on Darfur with most of the rebel parties, whilst keeping the 
military option available whenever necessary. The recognition of the existence of 
political opposition was the first feature, which forms a significant shift in the GoS's 
attitude towards the crisis and its mechanisms for resolving it. 
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 Sudanising the Crisis 
 
After the Darfur issue became highlighted in western media, the main technique of 
the GoS became its keenness to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis. The 
GoS has always been assiduous in its attempts to keep the crisis within the domestic 
Sudanese framework, in order to maintain its ability to control the course of the crisis 
and the possibility of imposing its vision for a political solution on the rebel parties 
to address the problem. In this context, the government took a number of measures to 
bring together the views of both sides to contain the crisis. The GoS initiated a series 
of talks with rebels in the border town of Abeche in Chad on 3 September 2003. At 
the end of these talks, a cease-fire agreement between the government and the SLA 
aiming to settle down the situation in Darfur was signed (Al Ddla 2007, p. 180). This 
was the first time that the GoS had dealt politically with the armed rebel movements 
under the auspices of the Chadian government (Musa 2009, p. 131). Neither side 
abided by the cease-fire agreement, which encouraged the rebels to seek international 
observers. This was the first indicator of armed movements seeking to 
internationalise the crisis (Raafat 2004, p. 93).  
In an attempt to confirm the GoS's principle of good faith and to maintain the 
peaceful and political option, President al-Bashir launched an initiative for self-
containment of the crisis (Abul Khair 2006, p. 72). Although many domestic and 
international parties welcomed the initiative, it was rejected by the rebels. They 
insisted on entering into serious negotiations with the government under international 
auspices outside Sudan, which is a key party in the conflict (Al-Hayat 10 February 
2004). However, the government justified its refusal by emphasising its desire to 
solve the problem within the framework of the National Conference of the Whole, 
called the Bashir Initiative (Omar 2008, p. 189).  
On 18 February 2004 President al-Bashir issued a presidential decree for the 
formation of a national committee to prepare for the National Conference for 
Development and Peace, formed of 80 people and chaired by Izzedine Al-Said. The 
Preparatory Committee was exposed to many criticisms from the political forces 
involved. For instance, the UP, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, announced its withdrawal 
from the Preparatory Committee and challenged the nationalism and neutrality of the 
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committee; he described it as an advisory committee to the ruling regime (Al-Mahdi 
10/01/2013). Furthermore, al-Bashir allowed the commission direct contact and 
dialogue with the rebels (Raslan 2004, p. 158). However, the JEM announced its 
boycott of the conference and insisted that their demands be negotiated on neutral 
territory and under international auspices (Habibullah 2004, pp. 204-205). Despite 
the GoS’s attempts to address the crisis at home emphasising that it is a domestic 
issue, it has failed to do so.  
In contrast, rebel groups have succeeded in exporting the crisis beyond the borders of 
Sudan (Raafat 2004, p. 93). This is addressed in more detail in the mechanisms of 
rebel parties to manage the conflict. The GoS has continued to take several peace 
measures and formed a number of committees that reflect the government's desire to 
end the crisis. First was the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry formed by the 
Sudanese National Council on 1 December 2003, which was tasked with the 
promotion of peace, security, and development in Darfur. Secondly, the Sudan 
National Investigation Commission was formed as a result of a decision by al-Bashir 
on 8 May 2004. Its mission is to collect information on cases of violations committed 
by armed groups against human rights in Darfur, and to determine the causes and the 
effects of such violations if proved. Thirdly, the Committee Against Rape was 
formed by the Minister of Justice on 28 July 2004, to verify the claims of rape and 
sexual assaults (Omar 2008, pp. 190 – 194). Fourth, the Sudan People's Initiative for 
a peaceful settlement to end the conflict in Darfur was announced by President al-
Bashir on 22 January 2009 (Al Ddla 2009-2010, p. 295). Finally, in August 2010 the 
Sudanese President called for another initiative: the New Strategy for Darfur Peace. 
This strategy centred on tribal reconciliation to push forward the development and 
peace processes in Darfur (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).  
Despite numerous attempts made by the GoS to demonstrate flexibility and 
responsiveness through several mechanisms and by the launching of initiatives to 
resolve the Darfur Crisis, the effectiveness of these efforts has been limited. These 
initiatives have not exceeded the phase of political slogans and conference rhetoric. 
Moreover, they did not turn into effective programmes capable of changing the 
reality, which shows the extent of the government's inability to contain the crisis 
locally (Al-Ddla 2009-2010, p. 280). There is no doubt that the GoS is primarily 
responsible for this national crisis, but the responsibility does not fall on the GoS 
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alone. Rather, it is shared by non-united factions in Darfur. The loss of trust between 
the two sides has had an important impact on all negotiations and agreements that are 
reached between Khartoum and the rebels, and this was clear from the changing 
demands of the armed movements. The intransigence of negotiation teams led to 
delay in finding a solution. In contrast, rebels demanded that Darfur should be 
considered as one province and that they should be given one vice president and a 
percentage of the ministries according to the proportion of the population of the 
region. These demands were not approved by Khartoum. This clearly shows that 
there are radical differences between the agendas of every party to the conflict 
behind handling the crisis.  
 
 Africanising the Solution 
 
Besides coordination between the GoS and the Arab League on many occasions to 
find a way out of the Darfur dilemma and to prevent its internationalisation, the GoS 
has sought vigorously to limit the scope of Darfur Crisis management in the African 
context. Khartoum has adopted mechanisms of coordination with neighbouring 
African countries (Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya). Another important mechanism 
is to accept African mediation under the umbrella of the AU. Mustafa Osman Ismail 
(13/01/2013) has said that Sudan is still convinced that it is a crisis which can be 
dealt with locally. But the inability to keep away foreign hands has forced Khartoum 
to accept the regional role of the international peacekeepers already deployed in 
Darfur, UNAID and African leadership. Africans are more familiar with the conflict 
and can prevent Western intervention in the conflict. The AU has played a pivotal 
role in dealing directly with the Darfur Crisis as a regional organisation dealing with 
issues of peace and stability in Africa. This crisis has featured at several AU 
Summits (Haddad 5 December 2012).  
A trend of the AU on the Darfur Crisis has centred on prioritising an African solution 
with a call to the international community to assist in the effort to end the 
humanitarian tragedy in the region and to reach a political settlement. During the 
three years from 2004 to 2006 the AU was heavily involved in the Darfur Crisis, 
either by adopting the peace negotiations in Abuja and Addis Ababa, or by holding 
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mini-summits, or the composition of and sending in of military force to Darfur. The 
most prominent result of the AU effort and mediation was the establishment of an 
international commission to monitor the ceasefire in 2004 (Bergholm 2009, p. 114).  
However, it seems that the parties to the conflict were not enthusiastic enough about 
the AU mediation. The GoS was keen to tackle the crisis domestically, or at least 
within the framework of the AU, as Khartoum believes that Africans have enough 
experience in dealing with such conflicts. The GoS also want to avoid any Western 
intervention that would threaten the security and unity of Sudan. Armed movements 
questioned the integrity of the African mediator and his ability to act impartially. 
Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012), the official spokesman of the JEM, confirmed that the GoS 
and its military intelligence were able to influence the African mediator.  
This has prompted the AU to address each successive international resolution issued 
by the UNSC and international peace in Darfur by condemnation and rejection or 
lack of recognition, especially regarding decisions trying to address the Darfur file 
under Chapter VII resolutions of the ICC. Because the AU did not have a clear 
alternative resolution, its efforts have faced a lot of difficulties in achieving its 
mission (Kalu 2010, pp. 20 – 21). The absence of strong international support and the 
lack of AU logistics, capabilities, and modern communication tools has also 
contributed to the continuation of atrocities in the region, as well as to the refugee 
camps (Raslan 2006b, p. 184). 
 
 Managing the Dimensions of Internationalising the 
Crisis 
 
After the GoS had been exposed to considerable international pressure – especially 
after the issuance of UNSC Resolution 1564, adopted on 18 September 2004 – to 
send a mission from the UN to Darfur to investigate human rights abuses, the 
government realised that the internationalisation of the crisis could not now be 
prevented. Thus, the GoS resorted to the adoption of a number of political tactics to 
handle the international dimensions of the crisis as follows: 
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1) The Prevarication and Diplomatic Manoeuvre Method 
 
While it is clear that the GoS showed an important flexibility in the approval and 
acceptance of some of the decisions of the UN, at the same time it did not commit to 
the application of those resolutions (International Crisis Group 8 Mar 2005). For 
example, the GoS did not fulfil its obligation under UNSC Resolution 1556 to disarm 
the Janjaweed (De Waal 2007a, p. 1050). Although the GoS agreed to this resolution 
it highlighted the need for more time, financial aid and technical support in order to 
disarm the Janjaweed militia. However, Khartoum did not act immediately to disarm 
and disband the militias and bring those responsible for their crimes to justice 
(Gberie 2011, pp. 2–8). Also, Sudan complained that resolution 1706 gives the 
international forces powers and functions for using all forms of military force. It also 
gives them the right to monitor and evaluate the performance of government 
agencies, which means complete disregard for the GoS as a genuine party to the 
solution. Khartoum saw this as the occupation of Darfur and as a step on the road 
towards the division of Sudan. This reflects the government's desire to gain more 
time to end the conflict and enter into negotiations and arrangements with the UN 
and the international community (Bellamy and Williams 2006, p. 152). 
 
2) Questioning the Intentions of Some Members of the 
International Community 
 
The government adopted a method of waiving risks that threatened the Naivasha 
agreement and the peace process in the south, in response to increased international 
pressure. The central GoS often maintained that the exertion of pressure on it over 
Darfur and Naivasha concurrently increases the possibility of deposing President al-
Bashir and unravelling the security structures in Sudan, thus jeopardising the 
Naivasha negotiations (Ramuhala 2011, p. 45). Sudan's government sought to 
promote of the idea that some international powers wanted to repeat the Western 
intervention in Iraq under the pretext of human rights violations in Darfur, in order to 
overthrow the ruling regime in Khartoum. This was clear from the reaction of the 
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GoS to UNSC Resolution 1556, which outlined economic and diplomatic sanctions 
without resorting to the use of armed force. The GoS viewed the decision as a 
declaration of war on Sudan and a move to pave the way for US-British aggression. 
Furthermore, Khartoum considered resolutions 1564 and 1706, which dealt with the 
crisis in the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as steps towards escalation, 
and as being against the GoS's efforts to resolve the crisis (African Strategic Report 
2006-2007, p. 152). 
 
3) Mobilising Internal and External Public Opinion 
 
The GoS adopted a method of mobilising Sudanese and Islamic public opinion into 
the belief that Sudan is the victim of an international conspiracy which seeks to 
fragment Sudanese unity. The ruling party organised demonstrations which 
denounced the international resolutions. Military presentations have also been 
organised to demonstrate the ability of Sudan to address any military intervention 
which violates the sovereignty of the state (SudanTribune 2012b). The GoS 
succeeded in mobilising Islamic support around the world to defend the adopted 
Islamic political project (Al Ddla 2007, p. 175). 
 
4) Showing Flexibility towards International Positions 
 
The GoS has been accused of complicity to liquidate African tribes using the 
Janjaweed and also of being unable to protect ethnic minorities in Darfur and extend 
state authority (African Strategic Report 2006-2007, p. 183). Khartoum authorities 
announced trials for the elements involved in the violence in Darfur (Al-Ddla 2007, p. 
146). Moreover, the central GoS showed a positive attitude towards the deployment 
of French troops on the border between Chad and Sudan in August 2004 (Renaux 
2012). The GoS recognised – under international pressure, especially from the USA 
– the scale of the problem and asked the international community for relief support 
for refugees and displaced people. However, Khartoum refused to recognise the 
causes which had led to their displacement (Al Ddla 2007, p.115). 
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5) Rejecting the Resolutions of the International Criminal Court 
 
The GoS has refrained from responding to the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 31 
March 31 2005, to arrest some governmental officials, such as Ahmed Haroun, State 
Minister for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan and Ali Abdel Rahman Kushayb, field 
commander of the Janjaweed (Reynolds 2010). It has also refused to comply with the 
arrest warrant issued against President al-Bashir for the accusations against him of 
committing crimes against humanity (Sharif, p. 240). Khartoum has denied 
committing those crimes in Darfur and has stated that the responsibility is shared 
between the government and rebels alike (Abou El- Fadl 2009). The GoS considered 
these resolutions as blackmail by some international powers and an attempt to 
politicise the issue in order to pressure the government to achieve political and 
economic interests and security (Boateng 2011, pp. 24-29). It justified its position by 
suggesting that the credibility of the majority of the reports which the ICC’s views 
were based upon was questionable. The humanitarian organisations that prepared 
these resolutions are believed to have a hidden agenda supported by world powers 
seeking to target Sudan (Abou El- Fadl 2009, p. 236). 
 
6) Negotiating Approaches 
 
One of the methods used by the GoS to contain the international dimensions of the 
crisis in Darfur is to negotiate with all domestic and international parties, such as the 
rebels and the UN, the AU and the specialised agencies of the civil society and other 
parties involved (Omar 2008, p. 202). This has led to a number of negotiated 
agreements signed with different parties to the conflict, such as the mid-October 
2006 Darfur Peace Abuja Agreement and March 2010 Doha peace agreement 
(Anonymous 2011). According to Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) the 
mechanisms of government are still within the local treatment through 
reconciliations and through the people of Darfur themselves, with African and 
Arabic support via Doha to stop the predominance of Western organisations. This is 
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because they want to address the problem within the framework and to settle scores 
with the regime in Khartoum. Sudanese authorities accuse Israel of supporting the 
rebellion in Darfur as Israel believes that the Islamic government in Khartoum 
threatens it existence (Rashid 2009). Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) accuses 
Israel of intervening in the Darfur issue by training many tribal leaders in Darfur, and 
Khartoum has documents that appear to emphasise Israel’s involvement in the 
instability in Sudan (Musa 2009, p. 290). In fact, Sudanese affairs have not been 
exempt from the strategy of the Israeli policy-makers since the 1950s (Shlaim 1999, 
p. 188). This was clearly expressed by Gen – Amos Yadlin, the outgoing president of 
Israeli military intelligence (Aman), during a ceremony held at the time he handed 
over his duties to his successor General Aviv Kokhvy (Nafaa 2010). 
In reviewing the most important achievements of the intelligence apparatus during 
the four and a half years he spent as its head, Yadlin listed a long list of 
achievements including activities that had been practised in Sudan. According to 
Yadlin, Israel supplied the rebellion in the South and the East of Sudan with weapons 
and logistical aid. This became evident during the first visit of the foreign head of 
state Salva Kiir of South Sudan after independence in 2011. He revealed that the 
Aman had trained many rebels to help them, and it developed networks in the south 
and in Darfur which are still at work. The Israeli minister added that for the first time 
Israeli institutions at home and its arms abroad could agree on a single policy 
towards the crisis in Darfur (Nafaa 2010). 
In the same context, in 2007 Israel announced that it was donating about five million 
dollars for the homeless in Darfur. Then it followed this, in the same year, by 
announcing its willingness to grant Israeli citizenship to about 600 refugees from 
Darfur, and allowed them to settle within its borders (Rashid 2009). At the same time 
the Khartoum government announced that the number of Sudanese refugees reached 
3,000 who had infiltrated into Israel via Egyptian territory, 40% from South Sudan, 
35% from Darfur, and 25% from the Nuba Mountains (Musa 2009, p. 291). More 
than that, Israel's Haaretz newspaper published a report on the visit of Abdul Wahid 
Nour, the leader of the SLM, to Israel in early February 2009 to discuss the situation 
in Sudan with a senior official in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). 
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 Abdul Wahid Nour declared however that his movement was then working on 
opening an office in Tel Aviv (Rashid 2009). According to this statement, Israel's 
policy towards Sudan is based on the need for Sudan to live in a permanent state of 
crisis, because if it achieves a long-term state of stability and development its wealth 
and power will become similar to those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Nafaa 2010). 
This would support the interests of Arab national security which are counter to the 
interests of Israel. During the interview, Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) stressed 
that Israel was behind the Darfur Crisis and continues to support the rebellion in 
Darfur. He stated that it had also highlighted the Darfur issue as an ethnic issue 
between Arabs and Africans through its presence in the USA, such as the “Save 
Darfur” institution.  
 
 
The Mechanisms of Rebel Movements to Solve the 
Crisis 
 
Through the key features of the mechanisms being used by rebel groups to deal with 
the developments of the crisis and the techniques to address them, armed movements 
can be classified as the parties that handle the crisis by creating new crises, either 
intentionally or unintentionally. The key features of those mechanisms are the 
resorting to the use of force, and depending on coercive diplomacy represented in the 
adoption by those movements of conditions which are impossible for the government 
to adopt. Also, another feature is adopting strategies to pressure and influence the 
international powers concerned, by influencing international public opinion and 
decision-makers. The mechanisms of the armed movements in general can be 
classified as the follows: 
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 Keenness on the Unity of Sudan  
  
The SLM and JEM have adopted a unionist discourse as a key mechanism in their 
dealings with the government and the other Sudanese forces. The SLM changed its 
name from the DLM, which launched itself in the middle of February 2003 in 
reference to the movement's unitary approach and non-separatism. The founding 
statement of the movement focuses on the idea of unity, democracy and secularism, 
and equality of all citizens regardless of their origin, religion or culture, to build a 
united democratic Sudan based on decentralisation and political pluralism 
(International Crisis Group 6 October 2005). The story is similar for the JEM. In an 
interview conducted with Jibril Adam Bilal, the spokesman for the group, he assured 
us that the orientation of the JEM is the nationalist defence of the rights of all 
Sudanese in all territories of the state, not only confined merely to Darfur. According 
to Bilal, the movement does not seek to attain power and wealth at the expense of 
other regions. However, the movement does seek the dissemination of justice and 
equality in the political and economic rights of all Sudanese wherever they are 
without discrimination, not to the hegemony of one group (Bilal 22/10/2012).  
 
 Coercive Diplomacy and the Push in the Direction of 
the Internationalisation of the Crisis 
 
Despite efforts made by the GoS to contain the crisis through traditional mechanisms, 
tribal conferences and social mediation, all these attempts have failed to achieve any 
peaceful settlement. This is because of the positions of the militant movements and 
their insistence on the continuity of armed conflict as a means of achieving their 
goals. The armed movements in Darfur have been keen to militarise the crisis since 
2003, in attempts to involve external parties in the peace talks with the government 
in order to achieve internationalisation of the crisis. Although the rebel movements 
frequently announced the adoption of the option of a peaceful negotiating mechanism, 
a policy of boycotting settlement conferences and talks inside Sudan was clearly 
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adopted by them particularly in the first phase of the crisis. For instance, they refused 
to attend the Chadian efforts in the Abeche talks in September 2003. They also 
boycotted the combined conference of the people of Darfur in December 2005 called 
by President al-Bashir, arguing that the GoS is a key party in the crisis and thus 
cannot negotiate with it inside Sudan. The Sirte summit in 2007 and the first round of 
negotiations in Abuja in August 2004 are also good examples (African Strategic 
Report 2004–2005, pp. 108–194).  
The rebels' justification is often that the mediators have failed to submit serious and 
practical proposals which could be the basis of a draft for a comprehensive and just 
peace. Instead those proposals expressed the bias of mediators in favour of the GoS 
(Bilal 22/10/2012). The GoS, on its side, has objected to the involvement of 
international observers in the negotiations or in forces ensuring the ceasefire 
agreements and peacekeepers in the region, in order to prevent the 
internationalisation of the crisis. Rebel groups have escalated their demands for 
international involvement especially by the USA and UK (Raslan 2004, p. 198).  The 
opposition believes that the internationalisation of the crisis and the involvement of 
international actors is vital to urging the GoS to enter into serious talks and to offer 
more concessions (Bilal 22/10/2012). Perhaps one of the most prominent indications 
of rebel desires to internationalise the crisis is a request sent by Minni Minnawi, the 
commander of the SLA, on 11 August 2004 to the US President and British Prime 
Minister asking them to lead an international intervention in Darfur to protect the 
millions of displaced persons (Awad 2005, p. 52). To achieve this, the rebel 
movements in Darfur have used several tactics: 
 
1- Escalating Military Operations against Government Forces  
 
Hassan Bashir (25/09/2012), one of the leaders of the JEM, states that the 
rebel movements believe armed action is the only effective way to achieve a 
just solution to the crisis, and to push the GoS to meet the demands of the 
rebels. For example, armed movements have escalated their military 
operations during the negotiations that took place in October and November 
2004 regarding the problem in Darfur, to demonstrate the lack of credibility 
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of President al-Bashir's announcement that GoS troops managed to quell the 
rebellion there, in an attempt to put pressure on the GoS. On 8 March 2005 in 
Asmara the capital of Eritrea, along with the Free Lions and Beja movements 
in eastern Sudan, the JEM signed an agreement intended to unify political, 
media, and military actions (Al Ddla 2010, p. 303). The report of the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General documented that the violence in 
the region peaked with the attack of the rebel SLA on large areas in North 
Darfur. This report accused the rebels of violating the ceasefire and military 
escalation (Ahram 26th October 2004). Moreover, the coup attempt that 
occurred on 10 May 2008 (Omdurman attack) by the JEM to control Sudan 
and establish an Islamic state (according to governmental sources), can be 
included in the context of the military dealings of the opposition groups in the 
crisis (Al Ddla 2010, p. 303). A wide range of political-national opposition 
parties and other external actors have expressed their condemnation and 
rejection of the principle of violence and military coups. The JEM was 
considered a “terrorist movement” by the Arab League (African Strategic 
Report 2007-2008, pp. 81-82). 
 
2- Exploitation of Humanitarian Aid for Political Purposes 
 
The mechanisms used by the rebels to push forward the direction and 
complexity of the crisis and its internationalisation include preventing 
humanitarian access to Darfur and war-affected areas which are, or pass 
through, areas controlled by rebels. The armed movements have also 
prevented the arrival of the international community to areas they control 
(International Crisis Group 23 May 2004). It is reported that the SLA has 
attacked humanitarian aid convoys and killed some of their employees 
including Abdulrahman Mohamedain, one of the traditional leaders of the 
Zaghawa tribe, in April 2004. The SLA rejected the charge, instead accusing 
the Janjaweed (Al Ddla 2007, p. 100). It seems that the rebels attempted to 
employ the issue of relief to urge the international community to put pressure 
on the GoS. Undoubtedly, this has undermined humanitarian aid access to 
remote areas in Darfur, which means the continuation of the humanitarian 
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crisis in those areas as well as maintaining pressure on the GoS (International 
Crisis Group 23 May 2004). 
 
3- Stimulating International Concern by Circulating the Claim 
that Genocide Has Taken Place in Darfur 
 
Leaders of the rebellion in Darfur have exploited the humanitarian situation 
resulting from the military operations carried out by governmental forces to 
quell the revolt. They issued several statements describing the types and sizes 
of crimes committed against civilians in the region, accusing the government 
of planning genocide against non-Arab tribes in an effort to mobilise inner 
and outer public opinion against the Khartoum government (Bashir 2012). In 
this regard, the rebel movements have adopted several mechanisms including 
firstly, employing Sudanese living abroad, who have foreign links. These 
have directly intervened to defend their people through the media, the ICC, 
fact-finding, and documenting the crisis. They aimed to alert the international 
community that war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have been 
committed in Darfur. This in turn has led to regional and international 
interference (Bilal 22/10/2012). Secondly, rebellious groups are accused of 
exaggerating the losses in Darfur to expand the scope of their issue, maximise 
their gains, and put the regime in Khartoum under constant pressure to force 
it to recognise their demands (Abou El- Fadl 2009, p. 236). Thirdly, although 
the attitudes and reports of several parties of the international community, 
like the UN, the Arab League, AU, EU, and humanitarian NGOs operating in 
Darfur (such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or Doctors Without Borders 
(DWB) and others), have emphasised that there had been massive violations 
of human rights, yet it does not rise to the level of genocide. Armed 
movements have sought to exploit the description of former US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, in September 2004, of the events in Darfur as comprising 
genocide (Hoile 2006, pp. 73-79). They have circulated reports issued by 
Western non-governmental organisations (especially American) that accuse 
governmental forces and Janjaweed militias of ethnic cleansing and mass 
rape in Darfur (Mamdani 2010, pp. 22-23). 
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Omar Al-Saied (2008) has noted that the rebel movements were eager to undermine 
almost all peaceful settlements taking place during the negotiations in Sudan to 
resolve the crisis, aiming to escalate and internationalise the crisis. Nearly all 
interviewees from the rebel side, such as Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012), Hessen Minnawi 
(10/11/2012), and others confirm that they are convinced that the intervention of the 
international community (particularly the USA and the EU) is the only way to force 
the government to make important concessions, as happened with the PMLS in the 
south. According to the opposition, the USA and Europe are able to provide large 
financial and logistical aid to push development in the region (Raafat 2005, p. 96). 
 
Splits in Rebel Movements and Their Effect on the 
Duration of the Crisis 
 
The most important challenge that has been faced and still faces completion of the 
peace process in Darfur is the phenomenon of splits within the rebel movements into 
numerous factions. Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) the leader of the Sudanese 
Liberation Historical Leadership (SLMHL), 21  reveals that while opposition 
movements were initially confined to the SLM and JEM, the number of factions has 
increased to more than 100. He adds that divisions among the rebel groups have 
squandered international efforts to find a common framework for both the GoS and 
the opposition to conduct serious negotiations until a peaceful solution, that satisfies 
all parties of the conflict, is achieved. Instead, the efforts of the UN and the AU have 
been doubled to focus on reaching a unified negotiating position and agenda which 
carries the demands of rebel factions in its confrontation with the GoS (Shafie 2006, 
p. 183). 
Defections and disputes inside the insurgent groups have weakened their negotiating 
position against the government. This in turn has resulted in the absence of a real 
local partner who can ensure the implementation of any agreement (Musa 
16/01/2013). Furthermore, this has frequently led to the postponement of the right 
                                                          
21 The SLMHL is a rebel faction which split from the SLM in Darfur. 
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moment for the settlement of the dispute (African Strategic Report 2004-2005, p. 
183). It is also believed that successive splits within the ranks of the opposition 
movements are attributed to the indulgence of the key countries involved, including 
the major states, with those armed movements and factions, by providing financial, 
political, and military support. In contrast, these major countries have exercised more 
pressure on the GoS on the basis of responsibility for the events in Darfur without 
putting similar pressure on those movements (Kamel 2009, p. 23).  
While this argument is convincing, it can also be contended that it remains a 
supportive and secondary factor. In my estimation, the absence of a united leadership, 
the tribal structure of the armed movements in Darfur, and the different agendas 
which emanate from the objectives and interests of the leaders of these movements 
and factions – which often are non-convergent and sometimes rise to the level of 
narrow personal interests – could be the main reasons for the proliferation of the 
Darfurian insurgencies. This was evident in the escalating conflict within the SLM 
and the JEM whenever they were close to reaching a political settlement. 
 
 The Absence of the United Leadership 
 
Unlike the rebellion in South Sudan, led mainly by one leader in John Garang, the 
leadership of rebel groups in Darfur are distinct and not united. The absence of a 
united leadership is not only between the SLM and JEM but also within every other 
rebel group, and clearly reflects the desires of these groups to individually achieve 
the greatest possible gains. The most prominent of the leadership conflicts is that  
which erupted between the Chairman of the SLM, Abdul Wahid, and its Secretary-
General, Minni Arco Minnawi, during the Tripoli Conference 2004 (Musa 2009, p. 
102). Given the early military successes achieved by the movement at the beginning 
of the crisis, especially after the internationalisation of the Darfur issue and its 
description by the USA as genocide, internal differences started to grow and emerge 
among the political leadership in the SLM (Raslan 2006a, p. 209). Arco Minnawi 
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intentionally disabled and postponed negotiations by calling for a general conference 
of the liberation movement (Haskanita Conference).22  
According to Raslan (2006a, p. 208), the apparent aim of this invitation was the 
restructuring of the movement and its institutions and resolution of internal 
differences to unify their positions before entering into any negotiations. This would 
enable the movement to be committed to reaching outputs. However, the hidden 
objective of the conference, it seems, was to try to exclude Abdul Wahid from the 
presidency of the movement and to replace him with Minnawi. The Haskanita 
Conference embodied tensions of internal disputes regarding the leadership of the 
SLM. This clearly emerged before the seventh round of negotiations in Abuja in 
August 2005, which was under the auspices of the AU and other regional and 
international mediators. During this conference for the first time a proposal to isolate 
Abdul Wahid Nour, head of the movement, was discussed (Musa 2009, p. 102). 
 This has led some field commanders to object to, and withdraw from, the conference 
as it did not fully represent the movement. It was regarded as an attempt to 
circumvent the leadership of the movement: 270 of the 800 members withdrew from 
the conference after the opening session (Tijani 2007). The commanders expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the organisational structure within the movement and its 
Chairman, Abdul Wahid. They showed clear concern over the lack of 
institutionalisation and the emergence of the tendency of the dictatorship to make 
unilateral decisions, which has significantly delayed an insurgency victory. Delegates 
decided to isolate Abdul Wahid from the presidency of the movement due to his lack 
of institutional commitment and his decision-making. Furthermore, he was also 
involved (according to the final statement of the conference) in both financial 
corruption and raising money for his own benefit. Abdul Wahid is accused of stirring 
racism within his military leadership. Attendees also agreed to appoint Arco 
Minnawi as Chairman of the movement over Abdul Wahid, Mustafa Teerab as 
Secretary-General, and Juma Haggar as the Forces Commander of the movement. On 
the following day of the conference, Abdul Wahid issued a statement emphasising 
that the final statement of the Haskanita conference represents a utilitarian and racial 
group which has its own agenda in seeking personal gain (Musa 2009, p. 385).  
                                                          
22 A general congress of the movement, held 29–31 October 2005 in the area of Haskanita in north 
Darfur (Brooks 2008, p. 421, Ahmed 2007, p. 18). 
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On the other hand, Juma Haggar, the new military leader of the movement, 
responded with a statement showing the involvement of Abdul Wahid in racist 
crimes within the Zalingi area (hijacking students and killing them), as well as the 
issuance of orders for the robbery of relief vehicles in different parts of Darfur. 
Furthermore, Haggar’s statement stated that Abdul Wahid had issued orders for 
military operations against civilians around the Jebel Marra (Musa 2009, p. 386). 
Since then, both leaders have proceeded to work with Haggar's group of followers, 
which makes decision-making within the movement more difficult (Hoile 2006, p. 
72). Haskanita has resulted in the separation of the military wing led by Minni Arco 
Minnawi, composing the SLA, demonstrating the emergence of a third party in the 
negotiation process.  
 
 The Tribal Differences 
 
The tribal factor and its impact on unity between rebel movements is vital. The 
effects of this tribal factor are indicated in the mechanisms adopted by rebel groups 
to manage the crisis against the GoS. Alex de Waal (2005a) stresses that "internal 
differences in each group are perhaps most serious of all; the mechanisms for 
debating political issues and establishing a consensus are very weak. This is one 
reason for their reluctance to set up technical committees; every senior member 
needs to be consulted on every issue" (de Waal 2005a, p. 131). Escalating tribal tone 
was one of the main reasons behind the escalation of the dispute between Abdul 
Wahid Nour and Minni Arko Minnawi. The intensity of the conflict between the two 
men can be recognised through the mechanism of tribal affiliation used to rally 
supporters. 
It is argued that Minnawi’s invitation to the general conference for the SLM was a 
reflection of the differences in tribal ambitions in Darfur. Nour's acceptance to 
participate in the sixth round of negotiations in Abuja as the legitimate representative 
of the movement was a result of his concerns regarding the Zaghawa tribe, led by 
Minnawi, and its ambitions to control the movement. Nevertheless, Minnawi 
announced that the negotiating team in Abuja did not represent the movement. He 
and his group would not abide by any agreements which would be reached (Raslan 
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2006a, pp. 209-210). The Zaghawa tribe has unlimited ambitions and is a well-
organised and coherent tribe at the political, economic, and security levels. Zaghawa 
rebels led by Minnawi have seen themselves as the main cause behind the victories 
achieved against the GoS. They feel that Minnawi works a great deal in the field 
among the soldiers, unlike the movement's leader Abdul Wahid Nour, who lives in 
Europe, and snatches the limelight, ascribing it to himself (Abdul Sattar 2010, p. 46). 
Minnawi was very successful in attracting support for the movement at the local and 
regional levels, especially in the Zaghawa tribe which has extensions in Chad. In 
contrast, Abdul Wahid Nour has failed in this task, which has caused retreat in his 
leadership position as a result of his removal from the battlefield and his stay abroad, 
as well as to other reasons connected with his relationship with external parties such 
as Israel (Minnawi 10/11/2012). Minnawi signed a peace agreement with the 
government on 5 May 2006, which approved the basic formula to stop the fighting in 
the region while Abdul Wahid Nour refused to do so. Several gains to the signatory 
movements have been achieved, which is considered to be a major shift in the 
evolution of the crisis (Arabic Strategic Report 2005 - 2006, p. 353). The main point 
of contention, according to Hussein Minnawi, which led to the signing of the Abuja 
Agreement with the Minnawi faction, is related to power-sharing. While Abdul 
Wahid Nour was stuck on the post of the First Deputy President of the Republic, 
Minnawi and his team accepted the Assistant to the President position which was 
approved by the government negotiator. They were convinced that there was no 
difference between the titles as the references are almost identical. The only 
difference is in the label. 
 
 The Ideological Differences 
 
Ideologically, there are obvious dogmatic and ideological disputes between the two 
key armed movements of the SLA and JEM and their leaders. The difference in the 
political culture and the ideological aims is one of the most important factors that 
prolonged the duration of the Darfur Crisis. Simply because this ideological 
difference had necessarily led to an important difference in the agendas of, and the 
solutions offered, by these movements to end the conflict. This would allow foreign 
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parties to intervene using this difference in line with those of their own interests 
which had pushed them to intervene, which will be discussed in detail in chapters 
five and six. External state intervention in such a fashion must lead to the 
exacerbation of differences between rebel movements and even within the 
movements themselves in terms of their strategies – this in all probability results in 
more obstacles to any solution. 
Disputes over the identity and religion of the state are significant issues, and are the 
key axis for rebel movement agendas. The backgrounds of both leaderships are 
entirely different. Khalil Ibrahim, the founder of the JEM, adopts an Islamist 
approach and vision for the state and resolving the crisis. In contrast, Abdul Wahid 
Nour adopts liberal and secular ideas (Abdul Sattar 2010, p. 38). Ibrahim Khalil was 
a senior leader in the Islamist movement between 1989 and 1999. He was also a 
commander in the Popular Defence Forces set up by the Inqad Revolution which are 
militias popularly used by the government to suppress the southern rebellion. 
Ibrahim Khalil was titled at that time "the Prince of Mujahedeen in the South" (Al-
Turabi 14/01/2013). After the split that occurred in the Islamic movement at the end 
of 1999, between Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, Khalil joined al-Turabi. 
Many observers believe that the JEM is the only military wing of the Popular 
Congress Party headed by Hassan al-Turabi, although this has always been denied by 
Hassan al-Turabi (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). 
In contrast, Abdul Wahid Nour is both secular and a liberal. He does not believe in 
islamising the state and he opposes the ideological orientation of the JEM. His 
position and image among the Sudanese, the Arab, and Islamic nations are 
destabilised however by his declared openness to the West and Israel, as well as his 
preference for residence in European capitals (Paris in particular) away from the 
battlefield (AlAzreg 16/10/2012). This argument is supported by Ghazi Salahuddin 
(15/01/2013). He contends that Abdul Wahid Nour is keen for a relationship with the 
West and Israel without limitations, with evidence that he is the only politician since 
the independence of Sudan to not only opens an office in Israel, but to also be proud 
of it. There might be other movements that have established such relations with 
Israel, but they recognise the political price that will be paid, so they have not 
advertised it; this perspective is also confirmed by Abdul Wahid Nour himself 
(Asharq Al Awsat 2009). The opening of the office for the movement of Abdul 
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Wahid Nour in Israel hs caused great shock in political and media circles, both inside 
Sudan and across the rest of the Arab and Islamic worlds.  
Specialists such as Professor Hassan Saori (14/01/2013) believe that this act violates 
the orientations of the people of Darfur who embrace the Islamic religion and are 
historically biased towards the issues of the Arab and the Islamic nations. The 
orientations and ideas of Abdul Wahid Nour that are biased in favour of the Western 
countries' agendas have significantly contributed to the loss of the SLM’s important 
and influential sanction of its mass base in the region. It was also a major reason for 
the defection of many factions which either formed new ones of their own or joined 
the JEM (Musa 16/01/2013). In this same regard, Hani Raslan says that opening a 
new office for the Abdul Wahid Nour movement in Israel is a very dangerous 
development on the path of the Darfur issue. It embodies a strong shift for some 
Darfurian movements to become tools manipulated from abroad. He adds that some 
leaders of these movements lack the minimum awareness needed to manage their 
cases in the most appropriate direction to achieve the objectives covering their basic 
issues, such as political marginalisation or equality in development (Raslan 2006a, p. 
42). This ideological difference has clearly affected the management of the crisis and 
the mechanisms used by the rebel movements. It has also had a considerable impact 
on external actors trying to determine appropriate mechanisms for handling the 
Darfur conflict in ways which best serve their own interests and visions regarding its 
resolution (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). This will be discussed in greater detail in next 
chapters where the mechanisms and the Libyan intervention method to manage the 
crisis and how it influenced its duration are investigated. 
 
 Personal Interests of Leaders and Their Conflict over 
Power (Positions or Financial Gains) 
 
Besides the power and wealth struggle between the centre and Darfur, it is clear that 
there is a third type of conflict which is no less significant. This conflict is between 
the Darfurians themselves over political positions and financial gains. Instead of 
resorting to the popular mandate and democracy as a method of governance and 
accepting the principles of the peaceful exchange of power in Darfur, political action 
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is still controlled by tribalism and regionalism (Azzain 2009, p. 156). Thus, the 
conflict over the narrow political gains of the tribe represented by the armed 
movements and their leaders is an essential factor in prolonging the conflict. Adam 
Azzain (2009) adds that the defects of the Darfur Peace Agreement include the 
reality that it has approved the principle of appointing those in charge of the 
implementation of the terms of the agreement instead of a popular mandate. This has 
significantly contributed to the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the armed 
movements, and repulsion between the leadership incumbents on behalf of the 
province, where these divisions have come to be formed on ethnic and tribal lines. 
 Consequently, these rifts have intensified disputes between various movements, as 
well as causing fragility within them. In this situation, the central government is 
forced to negotiate with multiple parties, none of which has the ability and influence 
to be the legitimate representative of the people of Darfur (Abdullah 2009, pp. 9–11). 
Abdul Wahid represents only the Fur tribe. Although it is the largest tribe in Darfur, 
it does not represent all Darfurians. Additionally, Abdul Wahid's relations with Israel 
and the West are strongly rejected by the GoS, as well as by the rest of the people of 
Darfur. 
The JEM is a part of the Zaghawa tribe which is the second or third largest tribe in 
terms of population in the province. Thus, the people of Darfur will not agree to be 
led by such a faction in their negotiations with the government. Other movements 
that adopt a secular orientation will also not accept it (Ismail 13/01/2013).  The JEM 
is accused of being the military arm of Hassan al-Turabi, which was rejected by the 
ruling party, as it is their political opponent. Minnawi has failed experiments in 
Abuja and political partnership. He is no longer convincing for either the people of 
Darfur or the GoS. Politically, Minnawi is weak and does not have the ability to 
convince anyone to adopt an agreement (Musa 16/01/2013). It seems that most rebel 
leaders are keen on continuing the crisis and that it is not in their interests to stop the 
war. This is because they are beneficiaries in terms of spoils and funding. This 
argument is put forward by many scholars and different rebel leaders, such as Sadiq 
Al-Mahdi (10/01/2013), Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013), and Bushra Omar 
(Musa 2009, pp. 385–389). They believe that the reason behind the splits is the sense 
of individual opportunism of some rebel leaders driven by personal ambitions and 
desired positions. 
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Abdul Wahid is accused of not being serious and of having become a businessman 
rather than the owner of a political project. According to some rebel leaders, Abdul 
Wahid collects money from the international community, supportive countries, 
various international organisations, and others on behalf of the revolution in Darfur. 
However, this money goes to his investments. As a result the international 
community has become largely unconvinced by him. A number of other rebel leaders 
have also become businessmen (Musa 2009, p. 102). Osman Ibrahim Musa 
(16/01/2013) reveals that when Minnawi signed the Abuja peace agreement he took 
millions of dollars on behalf of the Transitional Authority in Darfur to set up 
development projects in the region. During his time in power, Minnawi did not build 
a single school or start any development projects. Rather, it was found that the 
money went to investments managed by his companies abroad.  
In this regard Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013), the Peace Adviser of President al-
Bashir and Chairman of the governmental panel for the negotiations during the 
period between 2008 and 2010, underscores that what unites the armed movements 
in the Darfur conflict is simply self-interest. The controlled political, moral, and 
humanitarian discourse is used perfectly by the rebels. For example, statements and 
documents of the armed movements are written very carefully and are fully 
compatible with the standards of the contemporary discourse in talking about rights; 
however, this is not the intended purpose. Ghazi Salahuddin said that “when I went to 
negotiate, I found people who are only interested in positions and personal gains, 
and this is fad of the era means you can embrace the issue of trafficking in children 
and give it a moral dimension” (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). He added that due to the 
availability of these privacies, the GoS had great success in the strategic dispersal of 
the armed movements and their leaders. Taking advantage of ethnic contradictions in 
Darfur, financial destitution, and the authoritarian aspirations of members of the 
armed movements has necessarily resulted in the defection of most of those 
movements.  
Many observers, such as Salah Eldoma (09/01/2013), Professor of Political Science 
at the Omdurman Islamic University and a member of the Supreme Committee for 
the implementation of items relating to higher education in the Abuja and Doha 
agreements, have noted that the reason for these defections is the temptation of 
money and positions and racial rising amid those movements. Adam Abdullah 
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(18/01/2013) the head of the International Centre for Sudanese Studies in Khartoum, 
states that on several occasions during the Abuja negotiations and beyond, the GoS 
resorted to the creation of fake leaders inside these movements which have achieved 
nothing on the battlefield. These rebel leaders aim to extort money from the 
government, driving luxury cars and residing in luxury hotel accommodation at the 
expense of the state and the funds of the Sudanese people.  
With the passage of time and the continuation of the crisis, clear major differences 
between the main interests either of the armed movements in Darfur or the Sudanese 
state have emerged. This has been confirmed by analysis of the internal behaviour of 
the parties to the crisis, particularly the armed movements. Conflict over privileges, 
and searching for the political and financial gains between the leaders of the rebellion 
have significantly contributed to the series of divisions within the armed factions and 
the outbreak of some conflicts between those groups themselves. As a result, the 
legitimate claims and demands of those factions that claim legitimate representation 
of Darfur have been lost. Furthermore, the rebels' previous objectives of securing a 
resolution to the conflict no longer exist and have been replaced by simply finding a 
way to unify the movements and their visions in the face of the GoS. 
 
Conclusions  
 
This chapter examined the conflict in Darfur by looking at the key internal actors, the 
GoS from one side, and the two main anti-government armed movements, the 
SLM/A, and JEM on the other. Moreover, the key mechanisms and techniques that 
have been adopted by each domestic party of the conflict, and how those strategies 
have influenced the continuation of the Darfur Crisis are investigated. On top of that 
it highlights and analyses the impact of divergence in the domestic combatants’ 
views, attitudes, goals and interests, and how these have impacted the conflict's 
duration and resolution. The evidence indicates that the Darfur Crisis is a reflection 
of a trust crisis among the political class in Sudan. Among the outcomes is that the 
visions of the internal parties to resolve the crisis are completely different. On this 
basis it may be inferred that the GoS is seeking to employ all efforts to resolve the 
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crisis within a national framework. Rebel movements on the other hand believe that 
armed action and addressing the crisis within an international framework are the best 
ways to manage the crisis and to achieve their goals. It is found that the political 
positions, ideology, and leadership of rebels are non-uniform.  
Given this evidence, it can be seen that the negotiating positions of the two main 
factions suffer from significant weakness due to the lack of uniformity in their 
visions and their political and military agendas. While the SLM aims to establish a 
confederation (autonomy), the JEM is designed to maintain a united Sudan and the 
establishment of a genuine democratic system. The SLM stems from a secular 
reference and is often touted as a regional movement which seeks to achieve gains 
for the western Sudanese region. The JEM on the contrary has declared itself as a 
nationalist movement aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state in Sudan. 
It is also clear that unequal political and diplomatic experiences between local parties 
to the conflict have contributed to the delay in achieving a peace agreement to 
resolve the Darfur Crisis. At the same time, the NCP controls the governmental 
delegation negotiating on all occasions, and negotiating with a clear strategy. The 
delay in reaching a comprehensive and permanent solution to the crisis since the 
beginning of the armed conflict has importantly led to widespread splits inside the 
rebel groups. Thus, it could be concluded that the increasing divisions and the 
continual shifting alliances of rebel groups have not helped them to make any 
progress at the negotiating table in their confrontations with the governmental 
professional delegation to end the civil war in Darfur. Difference in the compositions 
and the doctrines of the armed movements has allowed for external third parties to 
intervene in an attempt to achieve the greatest possible strategic interests, whether 
inside or outside Sudan, by funding local arms to achieve their different agendas. 
It is indicated that the internal conflicting agendas have significantly led to 
international efforts being an important factor that has contributed to the continuation 
of the Darfur Crisis. This is due to interests of the regional and international parties 
involved in the crisis in addition to those of the disputing domestic parties. This 
inconsistency in each domestic party's agenda has led almost all effective external 
actors to adopt different strategies and mechanisms to each other. Some of them have 
sided with the government while others have chosen to side with one of the armed 
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movements as a technique for achieving their agendas. This has increased the 
complexity of the crisis and assisted in internationalising the Darfur issue, especially 
in light of the nature of the conflict in Darfur and the ideological differences 
involved, as well as the tribal compositions of the armed movements.  
The absence of a unified leadership across the Darfur rebel movements has also 
significantly contributed to distracting the international community's efforts to 
contain the crisis in a short time. As a consequence, the attitudes of external 
interveners, such as Libya, have been hesitant because of the lack of sufficient 
guarantees to enable them to rely on a certain movement or specific person to 
promote the implementation of any agreement or settlement which can be agreed 
with the GoS. Khalil Ibrahim was not a trusted person for a lot of external actors due 
to his Islamic orientation. Abdul Wahid Nour is also mixed up in his positions and 
does not have a clear political vision. He is accused of non-seriousness and of turning 
into a businessman not only by the international community but also within the SLM 
itself. Abdul Wahid's relationships with the West and Israel have massively 
contributed to undermining the confidence of many effective foreign parties in his 
intentions. This argument will be analysed in more detail during the next two 
chapters.  
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Chapter 5 
___________________________________________________ 
The Internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis 
and the Libyan Involvement 
___________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction  
 
The main task of this chapter is to investigate why and how the Darfur Crisis was 
internationalised, as well as testing the applicability of the theoretical model 
developed for this thesis. It will be undertaken by investigating the case of Libyan 
involvement in the Darfur Crisis in detail. Internationalising communal conflicts has 
become one of the most important features of crisis management in the post-Cold 
War period. Analysts and observers believe that the crises of third world countries, 
especially those that have erupted in Africa, are the most vulnerable to 
internationalisation (Niama 2005, p. 336). This is attributed to the reality of third 
world countries’ internal policies on the one hand, and the reality of changes in the 
international environment on the other. Many scholars argue that the new world after 
the collapse of bipolarity at the end of the Cold War has led to the emergence of one 
superpower, represented by US dominance of the structures of the distribution of 
power globally. In other words, “a unipolar system” (Fuchs 2011).  The USA is keen 
to prevent any other power (or group of powers, or even the international community) 
to disable its options to use force in order to maintain its strategic national interests. 
Internationalising intrastate conflicts, as happened with the USA involvement in the 
former Yugoslavia and Libya 2011 (within the NATO framework), Somalia and 
Darfur (Ghali 2008), is also among its options (Fuchs 2011, p. 15).  
Internationalisation can be produced by one party as long as it does not have to rely 
on others for the purposes of international legitimisation of its interventions (Niama 
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2005, p. 335). Despite the optimism that pervaded the world that the UN would play 
an active role in the formulation of international policy and determine its course, it 
turned out that international organisations are subject to the influence of whatever 
power has managed to recruit them to serve their policies or interventions. Berdal 
Aral (2010, p. 163) argues that the main problem lies in the problematic structure of, 
and decision-making in, the UNSC and in its instrumentalisation at the hands of 
states seeking hegemony, inter alia, through this body. 
 The occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the Darfur and East Timor cases taken up by the 
UNSC after the Cold War through a series of resolutions, under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, are taken as test cases indicating the extent of politicisation in this organ. 
It seems that it is not legitimacy that is important (although it is good to have it), 
agency (power capabilities and policy interests) is more important – and in a unipolar 
system hegemony tends to rely on military and economic power more than anything 
else. For example, the USA did not have the luxury of international legitimacy when 
it invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003. Indeed, it committed the most significant crime 
under international law when it did so – but it did not matter: it is the world’s only 
superpower after all. However, when internationalisation is supported by the 
international community under the umbrella of the UN, it will gain international 
legitimacy and then will be authorised to resort to several alternatives, beginning 
with mobilisation of pressure to impose sanctions and military action (Aral 2010, pp. 
68-69; Cockett 2010, p. 226). This was clear in the case of NATO intervention in 
Libya 2011. 
The post-Cold War mobilising world opinion in favour of certain international 
policies through local and international media and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations has become much easier. These organisations and 
institutions have come to play an important role in showing what is happening on the 
ground and often in a manner which serves their interests and the interests of their 
financers (Kotharia 2010, pp. 209-222; Cockett 2010, p. 227). They often call for 
international action and push in the direction of internationalisation through 
influence on the political decision-making centres and public opinion to clarify the 
serious dimensions of the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 13). Furthermore, these means have 
become involved in determining priorities and resolutions. Some of these authorities 
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deliberately intimidate and misinform in order to create a climate of opinion to 
intervene within local and international public sympathy (Mamdani 2010, pp. 19–21).  
Internationalisation provides legitimacy to the advocates of external interference 
either from local, regional or international parties to settle the dispute through 
international administration, which serves the strategic interests of the intervening 
parties. However, in the post-Cold War era the possibility of determining the 
dividing line between legal legitimacy and the legitimacy of power has become 
extremely difficult. International legitimacy in many cases does not comply with the 
rules of international law and/or the UN Charter. The major powers have become 
capable of overcoming the obstacle of legal legitimacy, as happened in the 
occupation of Iraq with the recognition of the UN Secretary-General. For instance, 
on 13 July 2004 the US Congress issued a resolution urging the US administration to 
take all available options for intervention, whether collectively or even intervention 
of one party, to prevent genocide in Darfur, in the case of a failure of the UN to stop 
such violations (Straus 2005, pp. 123-124). 
On the other hand, attempts to internationalise the crisis may come from regional 
parties, particularly those adjacent to the state in crisis. Perhaps African crises and 
conflicts are the most common in the shift from internal to external, and of their 
implications reaching neighbouring countries and the region. This is mainly due to 
the overlap of ethnicities, cultures, and tribes between African countries across their 
borders, as addressed in the third chapter of this dissertation. This in turn reduces the 
possibility of resolving internal crisis and conflict within the borders of one state: 
Sudan is arguably the best model to support this (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti 
2010, p. 2; Niama 2005, p. 341; Apsel 2009, p. 241).  
Regional parties, especially those that have a common border with the home state of 
the crisis, have many varied motives for involvement in the crisis. Regional actors 
may interfere to support the armed movements and the rebels against the government 
for reasons of ethnic, tribal or economic gain, or to prevent the transmission of the 
dispute into the state, or to avoid effects that may accompany a mass exodus due to 
the outbreak of hostilities, or to improve its negotiating position for political gains 
that can be realised in normal times. Thus, rebel armed movements receive financial, 
political and logistical support from neighbouring countries. This is how African 
 166 
 
national crises quickly take on regional dimensions and become more complex due 
to the multiplicity of agendas and conflicts of interest (Apsel 2009, p. 241; Boggero 
2008, p. 15).  
 
The Internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis  
 
Since the early stages of the Darfur Crisis, the USA administration has promoted the 
view that what is happening in Darfur can only be described as ethnic cleansing and 
genocide (Goldstone 2007). These allegations have found supportive attitudes from 
the UN. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, has warned the international 
community of the frightening situation in Darfur. He described it as a prelude to a 
humanitarian disaster (Almustaqbal 2004). In addition to that he called – in his 
recommendation to the UNSC – for the need for international intervention to end the 
crisis, citing the failure of the GoS to achieve a peaceful settlement, and for a lack of 
commitment by the parties to their commitments given to the international 
community (Hansen and Wolfhagen 2012). 
The tragic humanitarian situation in Darfur has raised international interest. The fact 
this has pushed it into the international arena less than a year since the outbreak of 
the conflict in the region has been noteworthy (El-Affendi 2009, p. 59). Especially if 
it is compared to the international silence regarding the civil war in South Sudan, 
which lasted for more than two decades, and resulted in two million people killed, 
and four million displaced. These are much larger numbers than those in the Darfur 
Crisis (Alsaaouri 2010, p. 45).  
Likewise, international actors (countries, governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, media, and others) have not presented the same attention and 
enthusiasm when dealing with similar conflicts and civil wars which have broken out 
elsewhere, such as in Rwanda. This leads to the argument that, beside humanitarian 
motivations, there are other motives which underpin calls for the internationalisation 
of the Darfur Crisis, as there are mechanisms that have been used to dramatise the 
conflict in Darfur and to impose it on the international agenda with such enthusiasm. 
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Factors that have significantly contributed to fuelling the internationalisation of the 
Darfur crisis can be distinguished asnfollows: 
 
 Internal Drivers for the Internationalisation of the 
Crisis 
 
- Civil war between north and south Sudan was one of the key factors 
contributing to the intensification of the conflict in Darfur and thrusting it 
into the international arena (El-Affendi 2009, p. 54). The SPLM has provided 
technical and military support to the rebel movement in Darfur since the 
beginning of the 1990s (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012, p. 53). For example, a 
safe haven and military support were provided for the military campaign led 
by Yahya Bolad, although Khartoum succeeded in defeating Bolad’s forces 
and killing him (Natsios 2012, p. 129). Nevertheless, Garang wanted to invest 
in the rebellion and lawlessness in the region to gain more concessions from 
the GoS during negotiations which led to the Nifasha peace agreement 
between the GoS and the SPLM (Berg 2008, p. 31; Hassan 2010, p. 24). John 
Garang has been engaged in providing international platforms for the Darfur 
rebels to deliver their cause to the world. He has made several trips to 
Western and African countries to highlight the Darfur Crisis, which has 
significantly contributed to the creation of the position of the GoS with regard 
to these countries (Dagne 2005). The impact of the SPLM model and strategy 
on rebel movements was clear in Darfur. This has been shown by the way in 
which it sought to deal with the crisis; choosing a revolutionary approach and 
adopting almost the same demands and tactics. So the insurgents relied on 
arms and a military escalation policy against Khartoum instead of politics to 
achieve their demands, similar to the approach adopted by the southerners 
(Mamdani 2010, p. 250). The SPLM did not view the issues between the 
North and the South as a geographic problem but as being between Arab and 
non-Arab elements. In this sense it is seen as an ethnic problem and for this 
reason it supports the SLM in Darfur (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). 
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- Armed movements in Darfur have adopted mechanisms that seek to 
internationalise the crisis. After they obtained internal recognition from 
Khartoum, they then sought to gain external recognition so as to use 
international forces as a second weapon with which to deal with the GoS. In 
addition to the adoption of the movements on the military option and the 
blockading of all negotiating efforts to end the crisis in a peaceful manner due 
to their demands, the leaders of the rebellion sought to sensationalise 
international concern about human rights abuses, raising them to the level of 
genocide (El-Doma 09/01/2013). Leaders of the rebellion promoted reports 
issued by international human rights organisations (particularly in the USA) 
that describe what is happening in the region as genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, committed by the GoS and the Janjaweed militia against ethnic 
non-Arabs (Idris 2006, p. 65). One of these, for instance, is an Amnesty 
International report issued in July 2004 entitled "Rape as a Weapon of War 
by the Janjaweed and some Government Soldiers". Also, the US-based non-
governmental organisation, Human Rights Watch (HRW), reported concerns 
with human rights in May 2004 in a document entitled "Darfur destroyed, 
ethnic cleansing by government and militia forces in western Sudan" (Human 
Rights Watch: May 2004). Furthermore, the rebel movements in the region 
have opened offices in European capitals which have participated in 
encouraging hostile groups in Sudan as well as international pressure groups 
to urge the UN to intervene in the Darfur Crisis. This was aided by 
participation in media campaigns funded and supervised by groups such as 
the USA Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM)23 (Omar 2008, p. 129). On 
the other hand, leaders of the rebellion in Darfur believe that there has been 
collusion of some countries and international institutions with the regime in 
Khartoum. Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012) argues that the USA and the EU could 
impose solutions as happened with Libya on 19 March 2011 in accordance 
with UNSC resolution 1973, when there were indicators for committing a real 
                                                          
23  The USHMM is the United States' official memorial to the Holocaust. It provides for the 
documentation, study, and interpretation of Holocaust history. It is dedicated to helping leaders and 
citizens of the world to confront hatred, prevent genocide, promote human dignity, and strengthen 
democracy. 
 169 
 
massacre in Benghazi by pro-Gaddafi militias. The international community 
made the decision in less than a month and stopped this crime. 
 
- People from Darfur who live in Diasporas have led a marketing 
campaign for the Darfur issue at the UN and UNSC in particular. They 
package what is happening in Darfur as an ethnic conflict, genocide and 
ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab African element. Moreover, diaspora 
Darfurians were able to coordinate with the leaders of the armed movements 
in Darfur to employ international media campaigns through the establishment 
of symposia, seminars and demonstrations in front of embassies to gain 
international and regional sympathy (Bilal 22/10/2012; Ismail 13/01/2013; 
Musa 16/01/2013; Minnawi 10/11/2012). This marketing campaign has found 
significant support from some European organisations and pressure groups in 
the USA and the pro-Israel lobby by providing opinion and thought, and 
holding seminars. Abdullahi AlAzreg (2012, p. 3) says that the USHMM 
created an alleged section about "genocide" in Darfur to distract attention 
from its occupation of Palestine and from the massacres in Gaza, and to state 
that Arabs and Muslims are murderers. These activities have contributed to 
the integration of the role between the rebel movements and their leaders 
abroad on the one side, and between international organisations and countries 
abroad on the other (Diraige 18/03/2013). 
 
- Political parties in Sudan are another local factor that has significantly 
contributed to the developing stages of the crisis and its internationalisation 
(such as the People's Congress led by Hassan al-Turabi, the UP led by Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, and the National Democratic Alliance led by Merghani). Some 
rebel leaders in Darfur are prominent leaders in these parties and political 
movements. Khalil Ibrahim, before founding the JEM, was the most 
prominent leader in the Popular Congress Party, as well as Tijani Sisi – a 
leader in the UP – and both are from Darfur (Al-Turabi 2013). However, the 
extent of their contribution in fuelling the conflict and its internationalisation 
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is dependent on the impact of the political party on events in Darfur, and the 
extent to which they are in line with the GoS. Perhaps political maliciousness 
was the general characteristic for some of these parties towards addressing 
the crisis. It is considered that internationalisation will contribute to a 
weakening of the government and so may lead to a change in the Inqad rule 
in Sudan. The political discourse of these parties has contributed to the 
promotion of descriptions of the events in Darfur as humanitarian disasters 
that require international intervention (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). The UP and 
the JEM drew surprise by announcing the signing of an agreement in Cairo 
regarding the parties' support for the decision to refer the case of Darfur to the 
ICC. The ruling National Congress Party in Sudan criticised the agreement, 
viewing it as a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime (Al Arabiya 2009). 
 
 External Drivers for the Internationalisation of the 
Crisis 
 
Besides internal factors that have contributed to the internationalising of the Darfur 
Crisis, there are also external factors that have played an important role in this regard. 
The crisis in western Sudan is considered by some international actors, including the 
USA, France, and China, to be an opportunity that can be exploited to exert pressure 
on Sudan for future gains, whether political or economic (Fuchs 2011, p. 67). Others 
see it as an opportunity to break up Sudan because internationalisation means 
opening the door to foreign interference in its internal affairs (Al Ddla 2007, p. 62). 
Given the economic and strategic importance of Sudan, the key external drivers for 
the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis are economic 24 . However, political 
dimensions cannot be neglected (Kalu 2010, p. 28). In light of a unipolar 
international system dominated by the USA, Washington has led the efforts of 
international actors of the crisis (states and organisations) towards 
internationalisation. From this point of view, US motives will be addressed in the 
next step, and can be classified into three major groups: 
                                                          
24 See a report issued by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington in 
January 2004 entitled “To Guarantee the Peace: An Action Strategy for a post-conflict Sudan” 
(Esposito and Crocker 2004). 
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Political Motives   
 
Some believe that key US political motives for the internationalisation of the Darfur 
issue are to seek to liquidate the Inqad regime in Khartoum, due to its Islamic 
orientation and support for international terrorism (Hoile 2006, pp. 17-20). 
Washington and other Western think tanks consider the regime in Khartoum to be 
radically Islamist, and it is the only African regime within the sub-Saharan area to 
provide support and a safe haven for terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, since 
1991 (Cockett 2010, p. 143). They see Sudan as a rogue state that should be punished 
because it undermines the USA agenda in the region (Massoud 2013). However, 
Hassan al-Turabi considers this view invalid and confirms that the Inqad government 
has completely retreated from its Islamic and religious slogans (Al-Turabi 
14/01/2013). Furthermore, electoral pressure and the outbreak of the crisis coinciding 
with the USA presidential election in 2004 between Republican President George W. 
Bush and Democratic Senator John Kerry have played an important role. Due to 
electoral rivalry both have engaged with internationalisation of the crisis in order to 
gain the votes of citizens of black African descent (Heinze 2007, p. 377). They have 
labelled the Darfur conflict as a clash between Arab and African tribes and exploited 
the humanitarian consequences resulting from fighting in the region (Haggag 2008, p. 
195). 
 Interestingly, the former USA representative to the UN, John Danforth, has revealed 
that the use of the term "genocide" to describe Darfur was intended for "internal 
consumption", mainly by the Christian right (The lndependent 2 July 2005). El-
Affendi (2009, p. 62) stated that among the main outside motivations that contributed 
to raising international public opinion awareness is the synchronisation of the 
explosion of the Darfur Crisis with the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan massacres, 
where the international community is accused of failing to respond to the crisis. For 
this reason, there was a feeling among world public opinion of the need to double 
efforts to avoid a repeat of what tragedy. Moreover, the USA also wants to divert the 
attention of the USA public from what is going on in Iraq, and the opacity to USA 
casualties and the USA failure to establish a democratic regime there (Hoile 2006, p. 
98). 
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Economic Motives 
 
Besides political motives, economic motives behind the internationalisation of the 
Darfur Crisis are essential (Abramovici July 2004). Fake and Funk (2009, p. 9) argue 
that the main reason behind the war in Darfur is oil. They contend that the 
continuation of the GoS in prospecting for oil, while the Darfur conflict was at its 
height, was a real spark for the internationalisation of the crisis. This has increased 
the ambitions of the rebels, raising the pace of war between the government and the 
rebels, and also contributed by attracting the attention of the major powers competing 
for control of the region. Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013) contends that the main 
motivation for the great powers for interfering in the problems of Sudan and Darfur 
is precisely the discovery of a large inventory of oil, specifically in the area 
stretching across the province of Bahr el Ghazal between Chad and Cameroon. These 
sources are characterised as much closer to America and safer to access.  
For instance, the USA pushed for the internationalisation of the conflict in the region 
in an attempt to deprive the rest of the other major international powers and oil 
companies, such as the Chinese  (Large 2007), of the opportunity to access these 
resources (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 55; Musa 2009, p. 271). Some official American 
quarters believe that access to the new sources of oil, especially in Africa, provides 
additional power for the USA regarding its oil strategy, as Gulf States begin to fail to 
do so either because of the high prices, or the instability of the region (Engdahl 2007, 
p. 5; Al Ddla 2007, p. 64).  
The expiration of the US Aramco monopoly in the exploitation of Saudi oil over the 
past fifty years has represented a pressure factor which has urged the USA to seek a 
foothold in West Africa, and create new paths, safer in the long run, away from the 
waterways of the Arabian Gulf and the Suez Canal and Mediterranean threatened by 
Islamist groups and Iran (Musa 2009, p. 268). Furthermore, US-Chinese competition 
for oil concessions in Africa, Sudan, and Darfur in particular, works to increase that 
interest (Ahmed 2008; Engdahl 2007). The USA will never forget that Sudan's oil, 
and the South Darfur privileges enjoyed by Chinese companies, were discovered by 
the USA Chevron company in 1974, which spent more than a billion dollars before 
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leaving in 1992 on the instructions of the USA government as a result of their 
exposure to attacks from insurgents (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 30). This could result in 
USA intervention, whether on the basis of international legitimacy or unilateral 
ambition, as was the case with regard to Iraq, conducted under the pretext of 
humanitarian intervention (Mahmoud 2007, p. 101).  
 
Strategic Motives 
 
Seemingly, the USA also sought to internationalise the crisis in Darfur to achieve 
long-term strategic goals. Sudan, for example, enters into the framework of the so-
called new Middle East project, as well as the Horn of Africa project (as part of the 
Bush Doctrine) 25 , which aims to disassemble and re-install regional politics in 
accordance with USA interests and priorities in the region. This project does not 
allow the existence of large influential entities that could pose a threat to Israel or 
that are outside USA domination and subordination. It is clear that the USA policy 
towards Sudan is based on two overlapping factors: the USA strategy towards Africa 
in general and the USA approach towards the Middle East to confront the arc of 
crises stretching from Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan to Libya. This strategy includes 
mechanisms of containment and economic sanctions, and/or the direct presence of 
USA forces in the region (Heinze 2007, p. 370). 
Moreover, the USA interest in the Darfur Crisis stems from factors related to the 
strategic matters of the USA in the African continent, such as terrorism and energy 
resources (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 55). Sudan has a significant geographical location 
that can act as a base to access the heart of the African continent to achieve USA 
military and economic objectives in the new world order (Shurkin 2005; Fuchs 2011, 
p. 63). The other strategic dimension is to circumvent Chinese interests not only in 
Sudan, but also in various other African countries, especially in light of China's 
candidacy to be the first contemporary strategic rival to America, as a result of its 
                                                          
25 The Bush Doctrine declared that the United States could launch first strikes to defend itself from 
terrorists and countries that support terrorists in order to prevent possible attacks before they occurred. 
The gist of this defence strategy is centred upon the US security strategy to promote democratic 
regimes – by force if necessary in order to prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world (see Heisbourg  2003, 
p. 75).    
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high rates of economic growth (Goodman 2004). China's policies towards African 
countries are characterised by investments and non-interference in internal affairs 
(Chan, Lee and Chan 2012, p. 423). This is at odds with the USA approach in 
dealing with these states (Engdahl 2007). Furthermore, grabbing the Darfur region 
from Sudan's sovereignty helps to increase penetration in Africa and rob France of 
post-colonial influence on the continent, in the same way as was done through 
intervention in Rwanda and Burundi after massacres took place there (Berg 2008, p. 
36).  
However, it seems that the USA is seeking to intervene in Darfur to evangelise and 
control the region given the historical and religious importance of the Darfur region 
in the spread of Islam into Africa (de Waal 2005b, p. 10). It is also believed that the 
West wants to separate the Muslim African world from the rest of the African 
continent due to fears of expansion of the Islamic religion to the entire African 
continent (Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 6). Hassan Alsaaouri (14/01/2013) states 
that children who were born in the refugee camps, which are fully subjected to the 
supervision of Western relief organisations, have been influenced by the vacuum of 
ideas and the religions of the workers of those missions. There is doubt that this has 
had an impact on their religious and intellectual learning, which will have a 
significant effect on the Islamic society in Darfur. 
Besides the different motivations of key internal and external actors to 
internationalise the conflict in Darfur, a number of mechanisms have been adopted 
by those actors to take the Darfur issue from the domestic to the global level. 
Western media (such as The Washington Post, The London Sunday Times magazine, 
CNN, the New York Times, BBC World) have played an important role in agitating 
events in Darfur, describing it as a humanitarian crisis, and portraying the issue as a 
conflict which is based on Arab tribes’ attempts to enslave the African people of 
Darfur 26 . The international press coverage focusing on the war in Darfur has 
succeeded in representing the Darfur Crisis as a global crisis and one of the most 
often-repeated cases in the news, given the huge number of affected civilians in 
Darfur (Kothari 2010, p. 221; Sidahmed et al. 2010, p. 52; Amman Community Net 
2009, p. 45). In addition to international media, Western Research Centres (Think 
                                                          
26 For more details about the role of Western media see Hoile 2006, pp. 128-151; El-Affendi 2009, p. 
59; Sidahmed et al. 2010, pp. 69–70; Mamdani 2010; de Waal 2005).  
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Thank) and International Human Rights Organisations27 (such the HRW), Amnesty 
International and Save Darfur Movement) were other external mechanisms that have 
largely contributed to internationalising the Darfur Crisis (see Lefkow 2004; de Waal 
2004; Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 47).  
 
Libyan Intervention in the Darfur Crisis  
 
Studies of civil wars emphasise an insurgency’s external support as a key factor that 
influences duration and determines the outcome of the civil warfare. External 
assistance, such as safe havens in neighbouring states and the provision of military or 
economic aid have been deemed especially crucial for the duration of 
counterinsurgency wars as well as insurgent success (Lyall and Wilson 2009, p. 82). 
During counterinsurgency wars rebels often seek sanctuary in neighbouring states to 
hide behind the shield of sovereignty that prevents local authorities from crossing 
national borders to pursue them. In addition, longer counterinsurgency wars may 
increase the incentives for neighbours or patron states to fight proxy wars through the 
provision of cheap arms to insurgents in the hopes of destabilising an enemy from 
within (Regan 2002; Salehyan 2007). Undoubtedly, the interactions and reactions of 
neighbouring countries to the Darfur Crisis in attempting with influence the 
development of the crisis are configured and formed in accordance to furthering their 
own interests. Gaddafi’s Libya has played a pivotal role in attempts to settle the 
conflict (El-Affendi 24/02/2012; Al-Turabi 14/01/2013; Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Al 
Mahdi 10/01/2013). Almost all Sudanese scholars and politicians who have been 
interviewed during the field work for this study, from both the government and the 
opposition, state that Libyan interference in Sudanese internal affairs was the key 
feature in the relations between the two countries since Gaddafi rose to power in 
September 1969. They believe that to play down this fact or to try and neutralise the 
Darfur Crisis is a kind of illusion. The Gaddafi regime has played one of the most 
complex and ambiguous roles in the crisis. The role of Libyan diplomacy in the  
                                                          
27 Generally these centres or so-called "repositories of ideas" play an influential role in decision-
making, and perhaps even greater than those played by lobbyists themselves. They seek to influence 
the elites, policy-makers, academics, the media, and interest groups which form public opinion, 
especially in the USA (Abul-Enein 2007, p. 145). 
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Darfur Crisis has grown and, at different times, shown the Libyan leadership’s ability 
to influence the parties to the crisis, especially armed groups, urging them to 
participate in many negotiating events. Simultaneously, it provided diplomatic cover 
for the GoS, allowing it to resist international pressures and efforts aimed at the 
internationalisation of the crisis (Al kbashi 2010). Nevertheless, the Libyan 
leadership's attitude towards Darfur and its crisis was characterised by vagueness and 
inconsistency (Ismail 13/01/2013; Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 15). This is caused 
by the influential association of Libya with all parties to the crisis, despite the 
significant differences which divide those parties (Giorgis 2007).  
Libya has also appealed, more than once, to adversaries not to internationalise the 
crisis and so turn it into an international political conflict. Gaddafi was keen, from 
the onset of the conflict, to classify it as an African problem requiring an African 
solution (Hassan 2010, p. 24). It is widely believed that the Libyan proposal to 
resolve the Darfur issue does not deal with the root of the problem, and that the 
Libyan leadership had its own agenda, interests and ambitions (Rockro 2011). This 
belief was also confirmed by several leaders and political officials from both the GoS 
and the rebel movements in Darfur, such as Sadiq Al Mahdi (10/01/2013), Mustafa 
Osman Ismail (13/01/2013), and Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013).  
As we mentioned earlier, this chapter tests the viability of the theoretical model 
developed for this thesis. This model shows that when outside actors become 
(in)directly involved with military, economic or diplomatic manoeuvres in an 
internal armed conflict to pursue their own agendas, which are independent of the 
motivations of the domestic parties, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of 
the conflict. This section principally addresses questions of why and how did 
Gaddafi’s Libya become involved? And to what extent has the Libyan involvement 
influenced the duration of the crisis? Two key issues relating to the Gaddafi regime’s 
interference in Darfur will be investigated: first, the motives behind Libyan 
intervention; and second, the mechanisms adopted by the Libyan leadership in the 
management of the Darfur Crisis. 
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 Gaddafi's Motives for Intervening 
 
There is no doubt that Libya is one of the neighbouring countries most directly 
affected by the repercussions of the armed conflict between the government and 
rebels in Darfur, because of many overlapping historical, geographic, political, and 
economic factors. As a result, Libya was one of the first actors to influence the 
course of the Darfur Crisis, since the Libyan leadership was concerned about the 
seriousness of this crisis, not just with regard to Libya and the region, but also in 
relation to the entire African continent. The Libyan leadership in Tripoli was eager to 
be a major player in its management.. Libyan moves towards the Darfur crisis are 
embodied on more than one level: locally, regionally, and internationally, and this is 
attributed to several motives. They are addressed as follows. 
 
The Neighbourhood Factor  
 
Libya shares a border with Darfur. Therefore, in the understanding of the political 
leadership in Libya, Darfur represents an important strategic interest. This is 
especially important since Darfur is close to the areas of south Libya which contain 
energy resources ranging from oil and gas fields to freshwater aquifers. In addition, 
the tribal and historical ties between the two countries were vital factors in the 
Gaddafi regime's assessment of the Darfur Crisis and its repercussions. Ibrahim Al-
Sanusi (14/01/2013), the deputy of Hassan al-Turabi, the Secretary-General of the 
Sudan People's Congress, has confirmed this. Sanusi confirms that the relationship 
between Libya and Darfur is concerned with the ancient area of Fezzan since the Fur 
Sultanate in the fifteenth century and the Kingdom of Dai in the sixteenth century, 
where the populations were engaged in various activities, most importantly trade.  
Libya was a conduit for Darfur towards the Mediterranean. In addition to the overlap 
produced by the border between the two countries, there also exists a tribal and social 
overlap. A number of Sudanese tribes extend into Libyan territory and vice versa, 
such as the Zaghawa, Mahamid, Fazzan and Al Zwai tribes. Pressure was exerted by 
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some Libyan tribes from southern Libya on Gaddafi to intervene in the problems in 
Darfur and so to protect their relatives from the civil war and displacement there. Al-
Sanusi (14/01/2013) emphasises that this pressure was led by Libyan citizens who 
are related to some of the Darfur tribes and have old alliances, such as Abu-Bakr 
Yunis Jabr, the Libyan Minister of Defence under the regime of Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi. Also, the Libyan intervention might have been due to the pressures 
exercised by Osman Al Bushra and other members of the Revolutionary Committees 
including members belonging to the alliance of the Tabu, Bideyat, and Zaghawa as 
tribal cousins (Ahmed 2013, p. 44). Consequently, Gaddafi became involved in the 
conflict (Al Ameen 2011). Gaddafi perceived the rebellion as an opportunity to 
extend Libyan influence into Darfur (Natsios 2012, p. 145; Marchal 2007, p. 181). 
From another point of view, the Libyan authorities feared the exodus of these tribes 
into Libya, and the turning of their territory into refugee camps which might lead to 
the conflict leaking into Libya, and therefor threatening the stability and the security 
on its southern border, which would act as an indirect threat to the effectiveness of 
the Gaddafi regime in the region. 
 
Security  
 
As mentioned earlier, Darfur represents strategic depth for Libyan national security, 
and the continuation of the armed conflict there poses a direct threat to the political 
regime in Tripoli. Therefore, Gaddafi developed a security obsession with Darfur, 
especially with the presence of tribal extensions for a number of tribes in the south of 
Libya. Importantly, a second fear for Gaddafi’s Libya was that the escalation of the 
conflict in Darfur would create an excuse for foreign intervention, which would 
restrict the movements of Libya in the Sahel and Sahara regions, which include 
Sudan, Chad and the CAR (Mamdani 2010, p. 213). In order to maintain influence 
over the development of the crisis and its implications for Libya, Tripoli made great 
efforts to prevent the entry of international forces into Darfur, despite the urgent need 
for these forces to protect civilians there (Rockro 2011). This Libyan attitude was 
evident when Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam stated that any defect in the 
geo-politics and humanitarianism in Sudan would be reflected on the countries of the 
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region as a whole. He pointed out that sending foreign troops into Darfur would be 
an insoluble disaster which would encourage radical Islamists to come from all over 
the world for Jihad with the people of Darfur, and that Darfur would become another 
Afghanistan or Iraq. So it had to be a solution provided by the AU and the Arab 
states so as not to give extra-regional actors an excuse to intervene (Ahram 12 
Augustus 2004). 
Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) confirmed that the Libyan regime had considered the 
Darfur Crisis from one angle only, which was that if the crisis was internationalised 
and international intervention occurred, then the existence of regional and 
international forces was likely to be seen as a siege on the Libyan regime. 
Furthermore, during the same interview, Bilal also revealed that the Gaddafi regime 
were rejecting any USA or European intervention, whether in the form of direct 
military intervention or the presence of international forces to keep the peace. This 
rejection was not motivated by a desire to protect the people of Darfur, but through 
fear of turning this troubled region’s border with Libya into an international security 
threat to the Libyan regime. Libya has always been concerned about the potential 
presence of the USA in its backyard. Therefore, Libya was an active actor in the 
whole of Africa to protect its national security in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, 
Gaddafi supported liberation movements in many places in Africa, where several 
regimes have changed, such as Chad in December 1989 (Ismail 13/01/2013). 
 
Economic Motives 
 
Darfur is an important market for Libya. Each border tribe in southern Libya is 
heavily dependent on Darfur for trade, as Libya exports a wide variety of goods to 
this market. Darfur also exports all kinds of livestock, such as camels and sheep, to 
Libyan markets. Therefore, we find along the road from El Fasher (the capital of 
Darfur) to Khartoum, there are so-called Libyan markets which deal in a variety of 
Libyan goods, from petrochemical crafts to food commodities and petroleum 
products. Most of the goods that exist in the domestic market in Sudan come from 
Libya via Darfur. Goods that come from Europe across the Mediterranean also enter 
Darfur through Libya. The open-air markets of Darfur today feature more goods 
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from Tripoli and the Libyan coastal plain than from Khartoum and Port Sudan 
(Natsios 2012, p. 123; Ibrahim 2011, p. 9). 
From another angle, the characteristics of the geographical and tribal border areas 
between Libya and Darfur, in addition to the economic and social marginalisation 
practised by successive GoS’s on peripheral areas, such as Darfur, have made Libya 
an important market to absorb the people of Darfur as part of the Libyan economy in 
the form of workers (for more details see Young, Osman and Dale 2007). Azhari 
Tahir Ahmad (10/01/2013), the Commissioner for Voluntary Repatriation and 
Resettlement in the Darfur Regional Authority, spells out that more than 80 per cent 
of Sudanese workers in the Libyan market are from the different tribes of Darfur, and 
depend on Libya for improving their living conditions. They represent a significant 
percentage of the labour force in Libya. Thus, Darfur is important for economic 
growth in Libya and vice versa (for useful details see Young, Osman and Dale 2007). 
Studies conducted by Helen Young, Abdalmonium Osman and Rebecca Dale (2007), 
and Ola Olsson (2010) summarise that Libya will remain an attractive destination for 
the people of Darfur as long as peace is not made and the Darfur Crisis is not 
resolved. They argue that the effects of the situation in Darfur cannot be seen as only 
economic in relation to the local context. The continuation of the crisis directly 
affects the Libyan local economy, allowing Libyan authorities to use the issue in its 
dealings and strategy to solve the problem. 
 
Searching for the Peacemaker Role 
 
After Libya's re-alignment towards Africa rather than the Arab world during the 
1990s, Libya began to play an active role in resolving African conflicts. Tripoli has 
tried to mediate in a number of African conflicts, such as the Ethiopian-Eritrea 
boundary conflict 1998, Eritrea and Sudan 1994, Sudan and Chad 2006 (Huliaras and 
Magliveras 2011, p. 172) – through peaceful means within the framework of the AU 
and the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States, drawing on two basic 
mechanisms: personal diplomacy and financial capacity (Ronen 2011, p. 9).  
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Furthermore, Libya sent envoys to the peace talks on Sierra Leone that took place in 
Togo in 1999, and in the same year brokered a peace accord between Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as sending peacekeepers to Uganda 
(Solomon and Swart 2005, p. 476). In 2001 Libyan military forces were deployed in 
the CAR to support President Ane-Felik Pattase after a failed coup. It has been 
widely recognised that Libya most significant role as peacemaker was in its former 
enemy state Chad (International Crisis Group 2010).  
Gaddafi's Libya sought to secure African political support as a means of resisting the 
domination of imperialism and USA hegemony in the international system. This was 
also utilised to create an appropriate environment in Africa to help Libyan foreign 
policy-makers to achieve their goals in the post-Cold War era, including the 
strengthening of African unity and African integration (Solomon and Swart 2005, p. 
479). It is worth noting that Gaddafi wanted to exploit the Darfur Crisis to enhance 
his peace-seeking image. Gaddafi wanted to prove that the new Libyan policies 
towards the continent were compatible with the desires of the UN and African 
regional organisations to create peace, as well as to bring stability and renounce 
violence and armed conflicts in Africa, as he was the main financier to them (Al-
Turabi 14/01/2013).  
From this standpoint Gaddafi’s regime was keen to be a crucial actor from the 
beginning of the conflict in Darfur. The motive behind Libyan efforts was partly 
related to Gaddafi’s desire to be a strong regional intermediary for conflict resolution 
and crisis management in Africa. However, the proximity to Libya of the conflicts in 
Chad and Darfur, and their local and regional dimensions, ensured a more committed 
Libyan involvement than in other African conflicts (Giorgis 2007). However, this 
role was always characterised by double standards (Huliaras and Magliveras 2011, p. 
167). While Libya has shown, at different times, its relative ability to influence rebel 
groups in Darfur and has urged them to participate in broader political processes, 
Tripoli provided the Khartoum regime with a political margin within which that 
regime was able to resist all local and international efforts aimed at strengthening the 
peacekeeping operation through international mechanisms. 
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 The Gaddafi Regime’s Mechanisms for Managing the 
Crisis 
 
As mentioned above, the Gaddafi regime was forced to intervene, both directly and 
indirectly, at all levels to monitor the development of events on its southern borders 
in an attempt to contain the fallout and effects of the crisis. Although the most 
important motives and reasons behind the Libyan rush to intervene in the course of 
the Darfur Crisis have already been highlighted. This section considers what type of 
intervention Libya pursued and what types of mechanisms were adopted by the 
Gaddafi regime in order to serve its main goals. Those mechanisms can be 
categorised as two key types: ‘declared mechanisms’ and ‘hidden mechanisms’. The 
apparent, or declared, mechanisms primarily represented political and diplomatic 
approaches, including Presidential Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy, while the 
hidden mechanisms related to military and financial support, changing alliances, and 
revolutionary committees or “Alligan Althawria”. 
 
 The Apparent Mechanisms 
 
Diplomatically, Gaddafi's Libya played an active role as a third party in attempts to 
reconcile the fighting Sudanese parties in most stages of the Darfur Crisis. It tried to 
find an acceptable compromise to the conflict, investing in Gaddafi's political 
position, gained after his success in founding the AU, and its efforts in solving some 
African conflicts, where he became label himself as the patron of peace in the 
Community of the Sahel and Saharan States (Niama 2005, p. 333). In addition, 
Tripoli has tried to unify the positions of the armed insurgencies that stand behind 
and fuel the continuity of the crisis, persuading them to uphold peace and halt 
military operations. For a while, Tripoli represented a link between the GoS and the 
rebel movements, exploiting the historic tribal links between the Libyan tribes and 
the tribes of Darfur (Beheiri 2010, p. 215).  
Initially it seemed to Khartoum that Gaddafi was a person who could play the role of 
mediator in resolving the crisis and bringing peace to Darfur, especially in light of 
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the deterioration of Sudanese relations with Chadian President Idriss Déby who was 
in a close relationship with Gaddafi. The poor relationship between Khartoum and 
N'Djamena is a key factor in the continuation of the armed conflict in the region, 
particularly as a result of mutual accusations between the two capitals that each 
provides support for opponents of the government in the other country (Al-Nour 
2011). Politically, Libya has invested in the crisis through its attempts to converge 
the views of Sudan and Chad in an attempt at reconciliation between the presidents 
of the two countries as an important step to containing the armed conflict, as 
happened in the Sirte Summit in October/November 2004 and Tripoli in May 2006, 
and the second Sirte Summit in April 2007, in addition to countless meetings and 
conferences. Libya has wanted to achieve, from this diplomatic activity, some 
political successes either in resolving this issue or at least giving it tighter control 
over the potential outcomes of any negotiation processes (Al Kbashi 2010). Thus, 
Libya has moved diplomatically at all levels, using multiple tools, to intervene in the 
Darfur Crisis. 
 
Summit Diplomacy (Presidential Diplomacy) 
 
In an effort to find a way out of the Darfur Crisis, Libya used small and larger 
presidential summits alongside other suitable mechanisms. Tripoli has hosted a series 
of presidential summits, such as the Quintet Summit, which was held in Sirte on 17 
October 2004 and which brought together the heads of five countries: Libya, Chad, 
Egypt, Nigeria, and Sudan, as well as the presence of Alpha Oumar Konare, 
chairman of the AU Commission (Al-Hayat 18 October 2004). Tripoli also called on 
the Darfur rebels to meet with Gaddafi, but they did not participate in the summit. 
Moreover, the summit dealt with the humanitarian, political, economic, and security 
situations in Darfur. It also succeeded in confirming the regional African and Arab 
framework to address the crisis, rejecting any foreign interference in this ‘African 
matter’ (Al-Taweel 2006, p. 215).  
The main importance of the summit was to show the willingness of regional powers 
to intervene in the crisis (Al Ddla 2007, p. 190). The summit also called for the rebel 
movements in Darfur to sign a humanitarian protocol to secure the arrival of food 
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and medical aid for the displaced. The five presidents also agreed to a follow-up to 
the conflict in the region, and the development of connections among them, as well 
as a commitment to regular meetings under the auspices of the AU. They agreed to 
delegate Gaddafi as the official contact for all relevant parties to the conflict to 
narrow the gaps between them in order to reach a final and permanent solution to the 
crisis. In addition, the meeting also encouraged the GoS to comply with the 
implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1556 and 1564 (Asharq Al Awsat 18 October 
2004; Ahram 19 October 2004). 
On 16 May 2005, Libya hosted a summit with the participation of the heads of states 
of Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Chad, Eritrea and Gabon to stop the humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur, in the presence of Amr Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab 
League. However, the most important results of this summit were an agreement on 
the resumption of Abuja peace talks between the government and the rebels, and to 
the commitment to exert more effort to resolve the crisis (SudanTribune 2005). 
Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, stated that the decision to 
resume peace talks was the most important decision in the leaders' meeting. He 
added, "We have prepared a roadmap more clearly to resolve the problem in Darfur 
to reach a comprehensive peace" (Al Ddla 2007, p. 195). Likewise an attempt to 
confirm the support of Africans for Sudan's refusal to deploy international forces in 
Darfur was embraced by Tripoli at the 21 November 2006 summit with the 
participation of six presidents: then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir, Chad's Idriss Déby, Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki, and the 
Central African Republic President François Bozizé, in addition to Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi (Al Ddla 2007, p. 2008).  
During the meeting the Libyan leader stressed the need not to allow foreign 
intervention in Sudan because this involved risk to Sudan and its neighbouring 
countries, noting that if NATO deployed its troops on the borders, this would be a 
disaster for Sudan and neighbouring countries (Al-akhbar 22 November 2006). After 
the failed attempts to unify the armed movements, the JEM and the SLM refused to 
sign the Abuja agreement on 5 May 2006. The Libyan regime continued its 
diplomatic efforts through summits mostly held in Libya. The recent important 
attempt to reviving the political process to resolve the conflict was on 27 October 
2007 when several movements agreed to negotiate with the government. This was 
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conducted under a joint UN and AU committee to unify opposition factions on a 
common negotiating position in preparation for the final negotiations for a peace 
agreement (El-Affendi 24/02/2012). This summit failed to unify the position of the 
armed movements, to persuade the two main factions, the JEM and the SLM, to 
attend the summit. The summit was also considered a failure of Libyan diplomacy 
which was trying to show impartiality in dealing with the parties to the conflict in 
Darfur, especially after the description by Gaddafi in his meeting with the leaders of 
the rebels that the Darfur Crisis was a brawl over a "camel" (Bilal 22/10/2012). 
Furthermore, the strained relationship between the two partners, the NCP and the 
SPLM, at the time was another of the factors that encouraged the rebel movements in 
Darfur to be absent from the meeting (El-Affendi 2009, p. 83). 
 
Public Diplomacy 
 
Libya focused on the process of internal reconciliation to create the atmosphere 
required for the completion of important progress at the political and humanitarian 
levels. It held a number of tribal conferences, as well as regional and international 
meetings, on the Darfur issue, including many tribes and  public delegations from 
inside Darfur region and from the border areas between Chad and Sudan (Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) 2007). The most important of these forums was the third 
meeting for the people of Darfur, which was held in Tripoli in October 2004, and 
attended by representatives of the JEM, the SLM, and representatives of the civil 
administration in the region, as well as the presence of deputies from the Sudanese 
parliament, civil society, and political and partisan leaders from inside and outside 
Sudan to discuss ways to resolve the crisis (Raslan 2005, p. 32-33).  
In May 2005, Tripoli hosted a further meeting with the civil administration in Darfur, 
in the presence of tribal leaders and civil society groups in Darfur, which set a 
precedent for Darfurians: providing an independent forum gave them an opportunity 
to meet and discuss the conflict away from excessive pressure. The civil 
administration demanded transferring negotiations between the GoS and the 
opposition from Abuja to Tripoli and to play a prominent role in addressing the issue 
of Darfur under the personal supervision of Gaddafi (Ahram 18 May 2005). In 
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December 2005 Tripoli hosted another meeting, attended by hundreds of participants 
from Darfur including politicians and tribal members, which concluded it was 
necessary to reunite Darfur into one region within the boundaries of 1956 (Giorgis 
2007).  
The Libyan political leadership also sponsored the signing of the protocol for 
implementation of the Abuja Agreement between the GoS and the SLA in Tripoli on 
18 November 2006. In the same vein, another forum was held for the people of 
Darfur, which included more than 65 leading figures and partisan and political 
activists from the region. This conference was organised in order to develop a 
standardised view for the Conference of Sirte, ahead of a peace conference on Darfur 
between the GoS and rebel movements, held under the auspices of the UN and the 
AU on 27 October 2007.  The goal of this event was to bring together the demands of 
the people of Darfur in a single document for submission to the conference. The most 
important item in this document is the formation of the Office for the Coordination 
of the Mass of People of Darfur in order to achieve the purposes for which the war 
initially broke out (Daily Al Bayan 21 October 2007). 
These efforts by the Libyan political leadership culminated in the convening of an 
international conference on the situation in Darfur in Tripoli on 29 April 2007.  In 
addition to Libya, several actors attended this conference: Sudan, Chad, Egypt, 
Eritrea, China, France, Russia, Britain, the USA, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, 
the AU, the EU, the League of Arab States, and the UN. The conference reaffirmed 
the support of the findings of the consultations at Addis Ababa in November 2006, 
which were adopted later by the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the 
UNSC. The conference also stressed upon participants the importance of the need to 
speed up the formulation of comprehensive solutions to the Darfur Crisis (Al Ddla 
2007, p. 208). 
Despite the large number of presidential and public summits hosted by Gaddafi since 
2004, in order to normalise relations between Khartoum and N'Djamena, and then to 
reach a peaceful settlement to the Darfur Crisis, none of these diplomatic efforts have 
led to positive results. These efforts achieved no significant change in the hostility 
between the two sides or a definitive end to the crisis. The value of these diplomatic 
efforts has been limited due to the ambiguity of the Libyan attitude towards the crisis. 
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Many in the GoS and rebel factions, as well as the international community, have 
been suspicious of the seriousness of Libyan efforts, as well as its claims to being a 
neutral mediator (Giorgis 2007). As has been the case in other parts of Africa, the 
motive behind these Libyan efforts of mediation was partly due to Gaddafi's desire to 
be a player and a strong regional mediator. But the conflicts in Chad and Darfur and 
their effects were sustained in Libya more than anywhere else (International Crisis 
Group 26 November 2007).  
 
 Unexpressed Mechanisms 
 
Many observers of the role played by Gaddafi to resolve the Darfur Crisis emphasise 
the duality of that role, suggesting that the way in which it attempts to tackle the 
crisis reflects the existence of a wide gap between the ambition of Gaddafi's agendas 
and the agendas that internal feuding between parties seek to achieve. This is 
confirmed by both the government and the rebels. Opposition leaders confirm that 
the Libyan diplomatic moves were not serious attempts to resolve the crisis and did 
not provide any clear map accepted by all parties to stop the bloodshed. Gaddafi used 
to meet with rebel leaders in Tripoli and present them with  hours-long lectures 
describing what was happening in Darfur as fighting over "camels", without offering 
a scientifically conceptualised, thoughtful resolution to the crisis (Al-Turabi 
14/01/2013; Bilal 22/10/2012; Minnawi 10/11/2012). 
Similarly, a number of senior governmental officials, such as Mustafa Osman Ismail, 
Ghazi Salahuddin and Abdullahi AlAzreg, the Sudanese Ambassador in London, 
suggested that the government was always uncomfortable and did not trust Libyan 
moves towards the crisis. This was an important concern which led to Khartoum's 
agreement on the transmission of the negotiation platform to Doha (Salahuddin 
15/01/2013; Ismail 13/01/2013; AlAzreg 16/10/2012). In spite of the convergence 
witnessed by the relationship between Tripoli and Khartoum since the arrival in 
power of al-Bashir, the situation quickly changed and became volatile. Support for 
Sudan fluctuated, particularly following the outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur in 
2003. The armed movements in Darfur have played a major role both in deteriorating 
and improving the relationship between the two countries. These rebel movements 
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have become a key element that controls the improving and the worsening of the 
relationship through accusations of Libyan support for these movements along the 
lines of support given to the SPML in the 1980s (Ezerg 2010). 
 
Military, Logistical and Financial Support for Insurgents 
(Carrot and Stick Policy) 
 
Many observers believe that the Gaddafi regime was closer to the rebels in Darfur 
than the government. This belief is, in part, influenced by the fact that a number of 
the leaders of the rebellion were mainly members of the Revolutionary Committees 
Movements, the political establishment and operation that adopt the promotion of the 
ideas of Gaddafi published in the Green Book28, and were also residing in luxurious 
hotels in Tripoli. The ambiguity of the Libyan role often caused discomfort for the 
GoS, which was dealing with Gaddafi with a great deal of caution because of the 
active role he played in the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States and as an 
important member of the AU (Musa 2009, p. 117).  
The Libyan role in Darfur is complicated and difficult to understand, with roots 
stretching back to the early 1980s. Some analysts believe that Libya played a big role 
in what happened in Darfur. The Darfur Crisis – in addition to the wrong internal 
governmental policies – was a victim of the vagaries of Libyan politics, and the 
disparate orientations of the Libyan leadership from Arabism to Africanism. Gaddafi 
played an important role in supporting the movements of armed opposition groups in 
Darfur, which has been confirmed by a number of sources, whether governmental or 
rebel, who believe that all logistical support and sometimes military aid comes to the 
rebels via Libya, whether in favour of the SLA, led by Minni Arco Minnawi, or as a 
last resort for the JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 
282; Ismail 13/01/2013; Musa 16/01/2013). 
The policy of supporting the Sudanese opposition is not new for the regime in Tripoli, 
it is a continuation of the Libyan intervention in Sudan's internal affairs since 
Gaddafi came to power in 1969 (Marchal 2007, p. 178). After a short period of 
                                                          
28 The Green Book is a short book setting out the political philosophy of the former Libyan leader, 
Muammar Gaddafi. The book was first published in 1975. 
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cooperation and normalisation of relations between Gaddafi and Numayri their 
relationship deteriorated. The key reason for this was Numayri’s signing of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement in 1972 with Southern Sudanese rebels (Ibrahim 2011, p. 5). This 
convention obliged Sudan not to interfere in the neighbouring affairs of African 
countries and granted southern Sudanese autonomy (Collins 2006, p. 35). In response, 
Numayri prevented Libyan military aircraft crossing Sudanese airspace on their way 
to Uganda, which was on the verge of war with Tanzania29 (Ibrahim and Amira 2011, 
p. 4). Numayri ordered these aircraft to return to Libya, and Gaddafi considered that 
action as a betrayal of the revolutionary and unitary principles held by the 
revolutionary regimes in Libya and Sudan, which were also consistent with the 
revolutionary ideas of Nasser in Egypt (Natsios 2012, p. 54).  
This incident made Gaddafi embrace the leaders of the opposition to Numayri, such 
as the forces of the National Front consisting of the UP and the DUP, led by Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, as well as the Islamic Legion, to overthrow Numayri's rule. Gaddafi 
supplied these groups with weapons and funding, which helped them to invade 
Khartoum in 1976, known as the Battle of Mercenary Forces (Marchal 2007, p. 180). 
Numayri's reaction was to adopt the National Front for the Salvation of Libya 
(NFSL)30, the opposition to the Gaddafi regime, led by Mohammed Yusuf Maqrif, 
and to assist the group in what was to be a failed attempt to topple Gaddafi in the 
attack on the Bab al-Aziziya in 1984 (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). When the Sudanese 
regime adopted Islamic slogans at the end of the 1980s and invited the leaders of 
global and regional Islamic movements to Khartoum on various occasions, Gaddafi 
was apprehensive of a coalition of Islamic leaders’ intent on toppling his regime 
(Alintibaha 2011). 
With the outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur, Libya exercised clear influence on the 
direction of the crisis in order to keep the events on its southern border under control. 
                                                          
29 In September 1972, during Idi Amin’s first confrontation with Tanzania, Libya intervened with 
equipment to airlift Ugandan troops, justifying this action as a support for the Ugandan struggle 
against colonialism and Zionism. 
30 The NFSL was a political opposition group formed in 1981. It was active during the rule of the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya. NFSL called for major liberalising reforms such as democratic elections, 
practising the general freedoms, and the separation of powers. However, during the 1980s, the group 
made several coup attempts against the Gaddafi regime; the most notable was the 1984 armed assault 
on Gaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli. In 2005 and after the failure of several coup 
attempts the group abandoned the armed methods, and instead used peaceful tactics to promote 
reform in Libya. This continued until the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 when the NFSL 
participated in forming the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition in 2012. 
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This was because of the security concerns of the Libyan regime, and its desire to 
appear as a strong and effective regional actor. In order to achieve this, the Libyan 
regime kept its relations open with all parties of the crisis at the same time. It 
supported the armed movements in Darfur, regardless of their ideological 
orientations, and dealt with the regime in Khartoum in an attempt to convince them 
that Tripoli was an unbiased mediator (Haggar 2012, p. 132). The main mechanism 
that Gaddafi used in dealing with the main parties to the crisis in Darfur was the 
‘carrot and stick’ approach. Gaddafi used the carrot less than the stick with the Inqad 
regime. Politically, this was obvious when Gaddafi gave some positive statements 
(that Khartoum wanted to hear) describing the war in Darfur as a conflict over 
"camels" (International Crisis Group 2007), stating that it was going to be the cause 
of the advent of global imperialism in the region.  
Economically, Gaddafi in a few cases gave Sudan some grants and loans (Salahuddin 
15/01/2013). Observers who follow Libyan movements in Sudan generally, and 
Darfur in particular, will see that there are many contradictions in the economic 
behaviour of the Libyan leadership towards Khartoum. For instance, at the beginning 
of the rule of Numayri, Libya awarded Sudan about $8 million. Nonetheless, after 
tension grew in relations between the two countries, Libya demanded Khartoum 
return this sum (Ezerg 2010). The Gaddafi regime went even further, supporting the 
SPLM in southern Sudan for years during the rule of Numayri. In the first years of 
the Bashir regime, Libya donated generously to Darfur, for example for the 
establishment of a land route between El Fasher and Kufra. Nevertheless, this road 
was cancelled because of differences between the two regimes. Furthermore, Tripoli 
donated to the establishment of a university in Darfur in February 1991 under the 
name of "The University of Al-Fateh September". It was officially opened in El 
Fasher, the capital of the Greater Darfur, and lasted for four years, funded directly by 
the Libyan regime. But when Sudanese authorities changed the name of the 
university to Al Fashir University, Tripoli withdrew its funding (Rockro 2011). 
Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) stated that in the recent period, after the success 
of Saudi mediation between Sudan and Chad, Gaddafi repeatedly demanded the 
withdrawal of the amounts contributed to the financing of AU forces in Darfur.  
Furthermore, Sadiq Al-Mahdi (10/01/2013) has said that the current regime in Sudan 
had tried to appease the Gaddafi regime in order to prevent Libyan interventions in 
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Sudan, especially in the affairs of Darfur. The cooperative relationship between the 
two regimes reached the point where the regime in Khartoum came to rely on Libyan 
oil for a period of time, at preferential prices, and on credit. Moreover, the regime in 
Khartoum also adopted Gaddafi’s ideas, when the Sudanese political regime became 
a “Jamahiriya” similar to that in Tripoli. Al-Mahdi added that al-Bashir called 
Gaddafi to Khartoum and that, together, they demolished the walls of the political 
Kober prison, as Gaddafi did with the central prison in Tripoli on 3rd March 1988. It 
is clear that Gaddafi was embracing the regime in Khartoum as long as it 
corresponded to his anti-US position. It turns out that when the USA bombed the Al-
Shifa factory and the Sudanese leadership in 1998, Gaddafi led a demonstration in 
Tripoli to support the Sudanese position (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013).  
Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013) confirms that there are no significant Libyan 
investments in Sudan: Gaddafi sometimes adopted small projects,31 but not large-
scale signature projects. Tripoli did not have a financial impact on the Sudanese 
economy and government. Economic relations between the two countries witnessed 
considerable tension in the first year of the Inqad government, where Gaddafi 
frequently claimed that Sudan took Libyan money and did not give it back. The 
practical result was that Gaddafi had no important influence on the GoS in terms of 
financial support. As for the use of the stick, Gaddafi was betting on the knowledge 
of the government that he could be harmful, because the leadership in Khartoum was 
well aware that Gaddafi was a 'mad' and dangerous man, and had the potential to 
threaten the stability of the regime in Khartoum. Gaddafi was able to aggressively 
seek revenge on his victims. He hinted to the GoS that if the regime was not with 
him on the same line he would open his weapons stores, supporting Sudanese 
opposition movements with arms, money and fuel (Eldoma 09/01/2013). 
Ghazi Salahuddin, the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel negotiations, 
confirms this view by saying that “I, as an administrator on the Darfur file, have 
dealt realistically with Gaddafi, because I realised that he could do bad things in 
Darfur that are difficult to face and stop” (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). The GoS was 
largely trying to secure what could be useful from Gaddafi and at the same time 
trying to address what could be harmful. Khartoum has only had diplomatic means at 
                                                          
31 Such as The Burj Libya hotel (former The Burj Al-Fateh) in Khartoum (Cockett 2010, pp. 8-9). 
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its disposal; it does not have the strength or the financial and moral potential to fight 
a war with Libya. Sudan has had enough problems in Darfur, as well as the south and 
east of the country. In contrast, Gaddafi has used the carrot more than the stick with 
the rebel movements. Gaddafi had provided a safe haven for insurgents and combat 
training centres for them, in addition to financial aid and logistical and intelligence 
support. Tripoli also provided them with a large area which enabled the armed 
movements to access secure treatment of persons wounded in battles against the 
government’s army (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013; Minnawi 10/11/2012). It is worth 
mentioning that although this claim has been confirmed by interviewees from both 
the governmental and rebel sides, there are no accurate figures and/or statistical data 
available to corroborate these statements. 
 
The Policy of Changing Alliances 
 
Gaddafi's Libya was biased to certain movements who were given larger amounts of 
money and weapons, although they differed ideologically from the Gaddafi regime. 
For example, in the first years of the crisis Gaddafi supported the SLA. Gaddafi was 
generous with the SLA, supplying the necessary fuel and spare parts for vehicles. 
Tripoli also provided many SUV vehicles and large amounts of nutrients that the 
SLA needed in the fight against governmental forces (Musa 2009, p. 116). After 
Minnawi's signing of the Convention of Abuja in 2006, Gaddafi switched alliances 
and became a supporter of the Islamic-oriented JEM (Al-Mashaqbah 2012, p. 182). 
But at the same time he did not lose contact with Minnawi, and the delegations of the 
SLM's Minnawi wing visited Tripoli asking for financial aid. Other movements were 
provided with money and political support but did not receive arms support (Eldoma 
09/01/2013). Azhari Tahir Ahmad (10/01/2013), one of those who regularly visited 
Tripoli within the delegations of the Darfur opposition movements, confirms that 
there is not a faction in Darfur that went to Libya that had not received financial 
support according to its size and effectiveness. Even Abdul Wahid, who disagreed 
with the Libyan government, was supported and given large amounts of money, very 
specifically through Abdullah Senussi who was the intelligence chief in Libya. Some 
say that Abdul Wahid was given more than €5 million. Gaddafi adopted the tactic of 
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changing alliances with the armed movements in Darfur according to their strength 
and effectiveness on the ground. 
Gaddafi had a clear standard in his support for movements and in identifying 
movements that could be relied upon, which would subsequently receive more 
attention than others. The criterion was the extent of the movement's ability to 
continue in the struggle and resistance to the government's army and its ability to 
implement whatever was asked of it to destabilise, if not topple, the regime in 
Khartoum. The SLA and the JEM movements sometimes had more power and 
influence in the field, and therefore received Gaddafi's support in spite of the 
ideological differences between the movement's Islamist ideology and the secular 
Gaddafi regime. Gaddafi suspected that these movements might be the most likely to 
gain power and thus they would subsequently be indebted to the regime in Tripoli 
should Gaddafi sponsor them. Gaddafi thereby sought to ensure that this new 
leadership would not work against his interests (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). Thus, 
Libyan intelligence worked to determine the strongest movements and supported 
them in order to serve Gaddafi’s agenda. 
Osman Ibrahim Moussa, the head of the SLMHL, dissident Abdul Wahid Nour says, 
was always meeting with Gaddafi to crystallise and unify the visions of the people of 
Darfur. Moussa added that “Gaddafi enthusiastically supported us morally, 
logistically and with arms. Gaddafi’s position was good at the beginning of the crisis, 
but he recently responded coolly as a result of the dispersion of our positions as 
armed movements” (Moussa 16/01/2013). It seems that the main reason for the 
disagreement that occurred between Nour and the Libyans was that the former 
wanted to be independent in his decisions, which was inconsistent with the desire of 
the Gaddafi regime (Azzain 11/01/2013). Gaddafi offered a peace initiative to 
contain the dispute between Minni Minnawi and Abdul Wahid based on the principle 
that rivalry between the leadership weakens the opposition.  
On this matter, Abdul Wahid considered the intervention as interference from 
Gaddafi. He refused any external pressure for reconciliation as well as rejecting the 
principle of Gaddafi as an intermediary. As a result, the Libyans considered Abdul 
Wahid Nour to be outside their influence and so incapable of being a partner in the 
future. So they put their trust in Minnawi because he was more closely aligned with 
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the regime's thinking (Tahir 10/01/2013). Besides, Abdul Wahid had refuted 
Gaddafi's description of the Darfur problem as a "camel problem". He considered 
this to be an abuse of the people of Darfur, and therefore refused to go to Tripoli. 
Since then, Gaddafi’s support turned to strengthen the JEM, supporting it politically 
and militarily, a situation which continued until the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 
2011 (Musa 16/01/2013). 
On the other hand, Gaddafi succeeded in using these movements as a card to achieve 
tactical objectives during his handling of the crisis. This was clearly visible after an 
attack by the JEM on 10 May 2008 in Khartoum, which occurred after the transfer to 
the Doha negotiations. Governmental reports accused the Libyan authorities of being 
involved and supporting the attack, which was aimed at toppling the Bashir regime. 
These reports stated that the extensive military force used by the JEM, estimated to 
be more than 400 armed cars, had to have been supported by neighbouring countries 
(Al kbashi 2010). Mustafa Osman Ismail stressed that Khalil Ibrahim arrived in 
Khartoum using Libyan weapons, and that the GoS verified this with the Libyan 
authorities. He revealed that Sudanese authorities required Tripoli to provide 
explanations about the Libyan weapons found with the JEM elements that attacked 
Khartoum. The Libyan authorities denied this, stating that they gave the arms to 
Chad, and that Chad gave them to Khalil (Ismail 13/01/2013).  
This was also confirmed by Andrew Natsios, the former USA Envoy to Sudan, when 
he mentioned that most of the rebels' arms came from Chad and Libya, with most of 
these weapons entering Sudan across the Chadian border, but that their origin was 
Libya (Natsios 2012, p. 145). It seems that Gaddafi used these actions to realise his 
desire to move the negotiations from Doha to Tripoli again, which would enable him 
to affect the outcome of any possible settlement, and this was contrary to Khartoum's 
wishes. The Gaddafi regime thought that strengthening the JEM movement would 
mean more pressure would be put on Khartoum on the ground which might force 
Khartoum to go into peace negotiations, regardless of the location, be it in Doha or 
Tripoli. 
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Tribal Polarisation 
 
By tracking the performance of the Gaddafi regime in the Darfur issue, it transpires 
that the initiatives of the Libyan authorities, presented to resolve the Darfur issue, 
contain a kind of discrimination between the Darfur tribes and clearly demonstrate a 
policy of divide and rule. Gaddafi was keen to polarise certain influential tribes 
within the armed movements at the expense of other tribes in Darfur. He also sought 
to revive old relations with some branches of Darfurian tribes using Libyan assets 
such as some Zaghawa branches (Al kbashi 2010). Added to this, Gaddafi relied on 
some of those tribes which had become a shield and protection for the Gaddafi 
regime after it had been weakened as a result of the international embargo imposed 
on Libya for more than a decade 1992 – 2003. Given Gaddafi’s doubts concerning 
the loyalty of the tribes of eastern Libya and other parts of the country, he resorted to 
the southern shared tribes between Libya, Sudan and Chad, such as the Tabu, 
Bideyat and Zaghawa, to strengthen his regime and impose his vision on his era and 
the era of his sons after him. So Gaddafi resorted to encouraging the migration of 
Africans to Libya, which was against the desire of the Libyan people themselves 
(Migration News 1996). 
This arguably resulted in deadly assaults (known as Zawya events) in 1996 by 
Libyan citizens on these immigrants (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 833). These 
killings32 were a strong indicator of the rejection by the Libyans of Africans being 
increasingly present in large numbers in their land who intended to protect the 
Gaddafi regime from a coup. His idea was to lure these Africans (mostly from Darfur, 
Chad, Mali and Niger), with funds, to fight on his side against the Libyan people (Al 
Ameen 2011). This is what happened in the revolution of 17 February 2011 which 
toppled Gaddafi. 
Additional evidence that the Libyan regime sought to break up the tribes in Darfur 
appears when it confirmed the split in Darfur movements by initially pulling 
Minnawi from the SLM and the establishment of the SLA across the Haskanita 
                                                          
32 In 1996, an estimated 300 to 400 of Sudanese migrants were shot and killed; for more details and 
figures see Young, Osman and Dale 2007. 
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Conference, which was funded by Libya (Flint 2007, p. 158). It seems this strategy 
had been planned by the Libyan regime to weaken the Fur tribe, which is the only 
tribe that has the ability to influence developments in Darfur. In addition to the 
rejection of Libyan intervention by Abdul Wahid, especially with regard to the issue 
of the settlement of nomads in the area of Wadi Saleh in West Darfur, the Libyan 
people refused to accept international forces in Darfur (Rockro 2011). 
The Fur tribe and its allies tended to resist the Arab presence, particularly Chadian 
Arab tribes that had been in opposition to the regime in N'Djamena since the 
founding of the Islamic Legion in 1988 under the leadership of Sheikh Ibn Umar, and 
were supported by the Libyan authorities to topple the regimes in Chad, Sudan, Niger 
and Mali. These regimes were targeted because they represented the main obstacles 
to Gaddafi’s scheme for an Arab belt created in North Africa and extending to 
Central Africa (Haggar 2007, p. 122). Gaddafi found, in the rebellion in Darfur, an 
opportunity to support the Zaghawa tribe and so extend Libyan influence within 
Darfur (Natsios 2012, p. 145). 
 
Revolutionary Committees (Allegan Al Thawria)  
 
Many Darfurians belonged to the Libyan Revolutionary Committees who have had 
offices that promote the Jamahiriya system – the ideas of Gaddafi's Green Book – 
and had strong links with the regime in Tripoli. When they returned to Darfur they 
joined the rebel movements and thereby came to have a double political membership, 
which served the interests of the Gaddafi regime in targeting the loyalty of the ruling 
regime in Khartoum or influencing its internal and external policies (Alsaaouri 2010, 
p. 92). Gaddafi embraced the rebel movements in Darfur, especially after it appeared 
that many elements of the revolutionary committees were affected by the Green 
Book, such as Abdullah Zakaria Mahmoud Abdeen, Adam Shogar, and Osman 
Bushra. These are some of the most important political leaders in the rebel 
movement in Darfur, particularly within the SLM.  
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Gaddafi hoped that these movements, and their allies, would be able to attain power. 
Thus, he supported these movements and provided safe corridors to deliver aid and 
supplies. According to some reports, the Society of the International Gaddafi 
Foundation charity – run by Colonel Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam – Gaddafi was 
active throughout the world in humanitarian crises and represented the Libyan 
regime as an instrument of its foreign policy. This continued throughout the period of 
2003–2004, with assistance provided to areas controlled by the rebels and often 
without the knowledge of the GoS (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). 
The role of members of the Revolutionary Committees Movement in Sudan was 
evident in the Haskanita Conference incident which separated Minnawi from Abdul 
Wahid Nour. Many observers confirm that this conference was fully funded by the 
Libyan government (money and supplies) through the Gaddafi Foundation which has 
now been closed down now. 
The most crucial result of this was that this conference was set for prominent leaders 
among the members of the new leadership of the SLA wing, essentially belonging to 
the Libyan Revolutionary Committees who fought with Gaddafi in his war against 
Chad. Amongst these was Osman Bushra, who was appointed Secretary of the Office 
of Movement, (Wing Unity) in Libya, in addition to Mustafa Tirab who spent more 
than 20 years in the service of the Revolutionary Committees in Libya. It seems that 
the Libyan regime brought him in as Secretary-General of the Movement to control it 
(Musa 2009, p. 116). After the peace agreement for Darfur in Abuja, Tirab also was 
appointed as Minister of State at the Ministry of the Federal Government from 2006 
to 2010, followed by Minister of State at the Ministry of Culture 2011-2012, and 
then Minister of State at the Ministry of Culture and Information.  
Nonetheless, after signing the Abuja Agreement, all these men have turned their 
backs on Gaddafi and have indulged in their conflicts and struggles over their own 
interests. After that, the Revolutionary Committees proceeded to adopt other 
movements, such as the SLM/the Collective Leadership, led by Abdullah Yahia 
(Mahmoud 16/01/2013). Thus, the regime in Tripoli was always looking for leaders 
belonging to the revolutionary committees to manage the crisis, but it seems that 
tribal associations have always been more powerful than political associations. 
 
 198 
 
Conclusion  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that internationalising the Darfur Crisis was due 
to a lack of confidence between the GoS from one side and the Darfur rebels, the 
neighbouring countries and the international community from the other side. 
Significant local factors have increased the possibility of intervention in and the 
internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis. At the level of the rebel groups, Khartoum 
failed to contain these factions because of the rebels’ distrust about reaching a 
solution without external intervention. Additionally, the internal environment in 
Sudan and the political nature of interactions have colluded to set the stage for 
foreign intervention and created a climate that allows others to use excuses to further 
their own interests. Sectarianism and the adoption of narrow agendas revolve around 
the power conflict and political maliciousness by most Sudanese political actors, 
which does not give priority to supreme national interests. This is also an essential 
cause for external interventions. 
Regionally, the exchange distrust between the regional countries, such as Libya, has 
led Sudan to engage in internal conflicts in these countries, and therefore the 
response of these countries was to support rebels in Darfur and to facilitate the 
smuggling of weapons and logistical support to them. Furthermore, lack of 
confidence by the international community, both in either a Sudanese or African 
solution, helped to increase in the push towards the international solution, which the 
GoS does not trust.  
Foreign intervention has now become one of the most important factors impacting 
attempts towards a solution. Black and Williams (2009, p. 9) argue that in diplomatic 
negotiations concerning Darfur, and other regions in Africa, it consistently “punches 
below its financial weight”. Most influential major powers may effectively serve as a 
‘humanitarian cloak’, obscuring the deep, neo-colonial continuities in relations 
between them and their regional allies. Certainly, many local actors will be suspected, 
and accused, of playing such a role by complicating their collective efforts to 
influence events in Darfur and elsewhere. This seems evident from the confusion 
caused by the multiplicity of influential actors on the trends and tracks of the Darfur 
Crisis, and then the multiplicity of agendas for each of these key actors. This justifies 
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the chaos and confusion that increases whenever the relevant parties get closer to the 
start of a serious political negotiation process, geared towards a solution. Regional 
and international actors are significantly keen to guide the conflict along a specific 
path in order to attain specific interests. Gaddafi's Libya was certainly at the forefront 
of these parties. 
This chapter demonstrates that the Gaddafi regime has adopted a dual policy of 
cooperating at the same time with the ruling regime in Sudan and the opposition to 
avoid disturbing its balance of interests in Sudan. Therefore, Gaddafi wanted to 
ensure the balance for Libya's continued presence and influence on Sudanese politics 
with any rebel group. It is also obvious that the overall strategy of the Libyan regime 
wanted the stability of Sudan because this promoted Libyan security, and at the same 
time, Libya was uncomfortable with the Islamic regime in Khartoum and would 
support any attempt to change it. Therefore, Gaddafi supported the Sudanese 
opposition, providing it with arms and money and tracts of land to move through. 
Although he used various mechanisms in achieving his ambitions, the main 
instruments adopted by Gaddafi were predominantly money and arms. Thus, the 
duration of the Darfur Crisis would be prolonged as long as it found weapons, 
financial and political support from Libya, this in total largely support the 
assumption of the theoretical model designed for this study. How Gaddafi’s Libya as 
a key regional actor had an influence on the duration of the Darfur Crisis will be 
assessed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
___________________________________________________ 
Assessing the Influence of Libyan Involvement 
on the Duration of the Darfur Crisis 
___________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction  
 
To assess the applicability and validity of the theoretical model developed in the 
literature review chapter with the Libyan case, understanding the truth about the 
Libyan role in the Darfur conflict is essential. Therefore, this chapter principally 
addresses the extent of Gaddafi’s impact on the expansion of the conflict, and on its 
duration. It explores the hidden role of Gaddafi and the agendas that he was seeking 
to achieve through his involvement in the management of the Darfur Crisis. Whether 
those agendas were different from those of the rest of the domestic conflicting parties 
is also discussed. Could this lead to a clearer understanding of whether Gaddafi 
really was willing to end the crisis? Was he able to influence the combatants and 
impose a fast and lasting solution to the conflict? And how did this affect, lengthen, 
and widen the circle of conflict or war containment for the benefit of all parties? 
Additionally, the impact of the regime change in Libya on the future of the Darfur 
Crisis will be investigated. It is difficult to accuse the Gaddafi regime of being 
behind the outbreak of the crisis, as certainly there were local factors and historical 
accumulations, which all led to the explosion and the shifting of the crisis from the 
local scope to a global one, as has been explained in the literature review section and 
chapter three. It was to be expected that the Gaddafi regime found itself to be 
strongly present and a major player since the beginning of the crisis until the regime's 
fall in 2011, since Darfur represents an important strategic space in Libyan security 
accounts (Al-Nour 2011, p. 6). 
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Gaddafi’s Hidden Agendas in Darfur 
 
The diplomatic performance of the Gaddafi regime, as well as the Libyan solutions 
and proposals to resolve the Darfur Crisis, were too far from the roots of the problem 
and its implications in general. Likewise, it clearly reflected the interests and 
ambitions of the Libyan leadership, especially in Darfur.  
 
 Ensuring Regime Survival  
 
Gaddafi and his security aides feared that trouble in Darfur could turn into an 
international threat to the Libyan regime (Bilal 22/10/2012). Any American or 
European intervention whether in the form of direct military intervention or the 
presence of international peacekeeping forces cpuld have placed limitations on the 
active movement of Gaddafi's policies in Africa (Tahir 10/01/2013). Gaddafi 
believed that if these forces entered Darfur they would not leave quickly and that 
Western countries might also request cooperation from Libya, using its territory to 
monitor the security situation in Darfur and eastern Chad (in fact this had already 
been requested by Britain in September 2006). The Libyan regime had reservations 
about UN forces in Darfur. It knew that international forces, if allowed to enter into 
Darfur, would have a significant impact in the region surrounding Darfur, which 
could lead to the imposition of democracy on the region. Libya was one of the 
dictatorial countries in the region which might become obliged to meet with its 
people (Rockro 2011).  
The other issue relates to the hidden and undeclared ideological conflict between the 
secular Gaddafi regime and the Inqad Islamic regime. This had been dormant for a 
long time, but each party was aware of it. The Inqad regime sought to establish an 
Islamic state and sharia law, which Gaddafi saw as a risk which could be transmitted 
to Libya (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Thus, he wanted to ensure the non-transmission of 
the ideology adopted by the Islamic regime in Khartoum to Libya. Gaddafi had not 
forgotten the coup attempt in the 1990s, led by leaders from Islamic backgrounds 
who received their training in Sudan and set off from Sudanese territory with the 
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support of the Numayri regime (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). In addition, it can be said 
that the desire of the Gaddafi regime to play a negative role in the Darfur Crisis was 
clear after the Americans and Europeans approached the issue of Southern Sudan in 
Machakos 2002 with the proposed partition of Sudan. The regime in Tripoli realised 
that the stability of northern Sudan, with its ability to extract oil and other natural 
wealth, as well as to the return of Sudanese emigrants, would mean that major 
developments would occur under the Islamic government. This would threaten the 
existence of the Gaddafi regime; particularly as in Libya most people adopt 
conservative Islamic orientations (Al Ameen 2011, p. 6). 
Libya was present at every negotiation platform, as a member of the observer team 
for the peace process, in attempts to influence the outcomes. Gaddafi was 
deliberately keen on several occasions, to exit from the general framework of the 
case. This was a result of his own understanding of the nature of the conflict in 
Darfur as a tribal dispute with its roots in, and parties to, the "camel problem". 
Therefore, others should understand Gaddafi’s methods of handling the crisis. Thus, 
the Libyan leadership was keen not to give the Darfur Crisis a political nature and 
would not admit that it was a struggle for power and rule of the country. The issue of 
Libya as a third party playing the role of mediator to resolve the crisis and its 
unwillingness to change this understanding significantly increased the complexity of 
the problem (Bashir 2009, p. 170). 
This tactic of the Libyan leadership in the management of the crisis had a negative 
impact on its credibility and commitment to neutrality for some parties to the conflict, 
particularly the armed movements in Darfur who accused Gaddafi of playing down 
the importance of the Darfur issue. In fact, maintaining the conflict in its tribal 
framework, in addition to its consequences, tended to be of interest to Khartoum. 
Gaddafi's remarks in this context supported the position of the GoS in the crisis, not 
the insurgency. The leaders of the rebellion in Darfur were political bodies with 
material and moral interests, so they insisted on making the conflict political. This 
was important because without politics the conflict would have remained confined to 
a narrow, geographic constituency, so strengthening the negotiating position of the 
GoS, while the politicisation of the issue would help the rebels to expand it 
regionally and internationally (Bashir 2009, p. 170). Furthermore, among the tactics 
adopted by the Gaddafi regime in its handling of the crisis to serve its security 
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agenda was creating a state of distrust between the armed movements. The Libyan 
mediator did not succeed in maintaining its position as a neutral intermediary 
standing at an equal distance from all sides. This has negatively affected the 
possibility of the presence of the leaders of the main armed movements, the JEM and 
the SLM, at the negotiations in Libya. Gabriel Bilal (19/10/2013) stresses that the 
Libyan mediator failed to appreciate the views of the conflicting parties as well as 
not providing a suitable negotiating environment without any bias to either party. 
This failure does not seem accidental, but deliberate, and it appears that the Libyan 
leadership was not seeking to accelerate the end of the issue according to the 
interests of the Sudanese warring parties, but according to the vision and agenda of 
the regime in Tripoli, which contributed to the extension of the crisis. 
 
 The Pursuit of Leadership 
 
A strong tendency toward leadership and the temptations of power entrenched 
Gaddafi since he came to power in 1969. He saw himself as an inspiring or unusual 
leader, and looked to expand his influence and leadership. He always introduced 
himself as a political leader, internationalist thinker, philosopher and the leader of the 
Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa, and the Imam of Muslims who can provide 
solutions to the problems of the whole of humanity. Libyan oil revenues enabled him 
to buy influence through supporting rebel and separatist movements and oppositions 
in different places in the world (Natsios 2012, p. 123), especially in Africa, including 
Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Ibrahim 2011, p. 4; El-Kikhia 1997, p. 116). 
Gaddafi sought leadership of the Arab world by adopting Arabism and nationalist 
orientations, trying to replace Jamal Abdel Nasser in the leadership role of the Arab 
world, which required that he had an influence in different Arab countries. However, 
in light of the conditions that followed the setback in 1967, the refraction of the 
Nationalist Project,33 and the emergence of a new political class in the Arab world 
                                                          
33 The Nationalist Project of Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser held the central premise of 
radical Arab nationalism that the peoples of the Arab World, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian 
Sea, constitute one nation bound together by common linguistic, cultural, religious, and historical 
heritage. One of the primary goals of Arab nationalism is the end of Western influence in the Arab 
World, seen as a "nemesis" of Arab strength, and the removal of those Arab governments considered 
to be dependent upon Western power. 
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against the Arab national project, Gaddafi found himself unable to achieve this goal, 
forcing him to move towards Africa to search for new fields in which to follow his 
obsession with leadership. This is what lay behind Gaddafi's idea of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). For this, Gaddafi paid huge 
amounts of money to buy the loyalties of heads of states and governments, tribal 
leaders and communities to become one of the largest economic supporters of many 
African countries (Ismail 13/01/2013). Much of this was done through the Libyan 
Arab African Investment Company (LAAICO) and the Libyan Arab Foreign 
Investment Company (LAFICO) (Ibrahim 2011, pp. 9–10). Gaddafi's efforts resulted 
in the establishment of the Community of the Sahel and Sahara in February 1995, 
which paved the way for the establishment of the African Union (instead of the OAU) 
in March 2001 (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). Ghazi Salah al-Din 
(15/01/2013) says that "there is no doubt that Gaddafi was behind the creation of the 
African Union and, proposed it in order to lead it. He wanted Sirte to be the capital 
of the African Union. Thus, he had to find allies and supporters in African countries, 
especially in Chad and Sudan." 
Gaddafi's obsession with leadership directly affected Libya's biosphere and 
involvement with neighbouring states, where he remained present throughout the 
years of his rule, interfering in the internal affairs of Chad and Sudan in order to 
make them affiliated countries, and subject to his influence. In 1981 Gaddafi 
announced the formation of an empire to implement the idea of a desert Arab belt in 
North Africa, which would extend to Central Africa. To carry out this scheme, the 
Libyan regime trained mercenaries from different countries, forming the so-called 
Islamic Legion (Haggar 2007, p. 121), which was used to support the Arab 
nationalist orientation of the Libyan leadership before his repudiation of Arab 
nationalism and embracing of Africanism.  
These militias were from pastoral tribes, including the tribes of Mahamed in Sudan 
and Mauritania, the Touareg in Mali and Niger, and the Bideyat in Chad. Gaddafi 
armed them with modern weapons, which later formed the largest security issue to 
hit Darfur (Haggar 2007, pp. 121-130). These militias were considered a natural 
extension of the Janjaweed forces that had committed atrocities in the region. 
According to Gaddafi's revolutionary spirit and his ambition to expand militarily, and 
build on the illusions of exporting the revolution, Libya invaded Chad in 1987 to join 
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the Aouzo Strip in Libya, using Darfur as a rear base where he built camps for 
Libyan forces in the Jebel Moon region of Sudan. Nonetheless, the Libyan army 
suffered a major defeat in the Aouzo Strip and the Dome Valley by Chadian troops, 
with the help of French forces (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). As a result, Gaddafi sought to 
secure Libya's southern borders by creating a certain presence in Darfur. This 
presence was provided by the citizens from Darfur through their emigration to Libya 
via the open land borders with Sudan. Darfur was, for Gaddafi, a field of experiments 
for his dreams in the context of his diligent quest for leadership. Darfur was also a 
theatre through which to extend his influence in Sudan and for fabricating and 
fuelling the conflicts in Darfur and the south and other areas in Africa (AlAzreg 
16/10/2012). 
The juxtaposition and overlap between the communities of Darfur and Libya, and 
intensive migrations towards the latter, especially after the discovery of oil, 
encouraged large numbers of Darfurians to adopt Gaddafi's ideas and beliefs and to 
join the so-called Revolutionary Committees in Libya. Later, many elements of the 
revolutionary committees appeared in the leadership of the rebel movements in 
Darfur, allowing Gaddafi to hope that these movements, and their allies, would be 
able to attain power. Despite the weakness of indicators and evidence, Gaddafi 
preferred to support these movements and provide safe corridors to deliver aid and 
supplies at the expense of good relations with the GoS (Ministry of Defence of 
Republic of Sudan 2013). His role and motives in becoming involved in the Darfur 
Crisis are closely linked to the main problem related to the mental image of himself. 
Gaddafi believed that he was greater than Libya's leadership alone, and that the limits 
of his powers should be beyond the limits of the powers of the head of state. He was 
acting as a prophet who carries an important message that exceeds the task of the 
head of state. On several occasions he rejected the ceremonies and protocols that are 
practised for and by the heads of states, where he refused to be treated as a head of 
state, saying “I am the commander.” Gaddafi believed that he had a natural right to 
interfere in the internal problems of Africa, and in particular in neighbouring 
countries’ problems, such as in Chad and Darfur, and this could be explanation of the 
story of the 'king of kings of Africa' (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).  
In this context, Gaddafi was able to gather all the traditional symbols in Africa 
(Ashanti, Albaguenda, and Zulu) to support himself and his position among African 
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peoples. But the irony here is that Gaddafi turned against the Sanusi monarchical 
regime in Libya, and at the same time sought to be the king of kings of Africa. It 
seems that this was also part of the mobilisation of the position of the Libyan and 
African people for the benefit of Gaddafi's African leadership, constituting a kind of 
pressure on the leadership of the AU to be the best candidate for the title of the father 
of the AU (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). Although some believe that Gaddafi was behind 
the establishment of the AU, which he first initiated during the thirty-fifth summit of 
the OAU held in Algiers in July 1999, others remain both sceptical and cynical.  
They believe that Gaddafi did not always inspire trust and he was engaged in ‘cheque 
book diplomacy’ in Africa with a view to increasing his influence and achieving his 
passion for global leadership. It seems that ‘leadership’ in whatever way (e.g. of the 
Arab world, or of Africa) was a central pillar (or perhaps the central pillar) informing 
all Gaddafi’s external policies. He seemed to be obsessed with leadership in order to 
gain power and security for his regime's continuation. He sought to achieve regime 
survival, driven by psychological factors that reflected his personal interests in 
seeing himself as pan-Africanist and calling to himself the Father of Africa, through 
establishing strategic depth (Natsios 2012, p. 122). Thus, Gaddafi used the Darfur 
Crisis to put pressure on Khartoum and N'Djamena believing that the more the 
regime had influence on African countries, the more easily it could achieve its 
ambitions for Africa's leadership.  
 
 The Resources Conflict 
 
Darfur is very rich in many types of natural resources (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Its 
soil contains large amounts of copper ore and gum Arabic. More importantly, the 
region is rich in uranium ore, the lifeblood of nuclear programmes. Notably, there 
has been the discovery of a huge amount of uranium in a copper pit (named the 
uranium pit) in South Darfur (see Figure No: 5) bordering the territory of Bahr el 
Ghazal, or Big South Sudan, making this region one of the largest uranium stocks in 
the world (Al-Badri 2004). Above all, oil discoveries have been made in Darfur since 
the 1990s (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 72; Global Witness 3rd June 2010), 
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as well as more recent discoveries of gold mines (ToTheTick 2013) in the area of 
Mount Amer (Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Eldoma 09/01/2013). For more empirical 
information see Sharaky 2005, p. 41–52. 
 
Figure No: 5. Geographic distribution of mineral resources in Darfur (Sharaky 2005, p. 50). 
 
On the other hand, the presence of a huge freshwater aquifer has also been 
discovered in northern Darfur (Robinson, et al. 2006, pp. 229–240, Ghoneim and El‐
Baz 2007, pp. 5001–5018), which is large enough to meet the needs of Darfur and 
Sudan as a whole, and could contribute to the development of Darfur (see Figures No: 
6 and 7 (cited in Ghoneim and El‐Baz 2007). This lake has been monitored by 
satellites of the US space agency and there is likelihood of the availability of large 
quantities of oil in the same area (Kamel 2011, p. 81). 
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Figure No: 6. Geographical distribution of the freshwater aquifer 
Although a lot of specialists have confirmed that this information has been known for 
more than 50 years (Osman 2008), the announcement of this discovery remains an 
important indicator of what is going on in this area of undeclared and hidden 
conflicts internally and externally (American Bedu 2008). The Libyan regime has 
spent billions of dollars on the Great Man-Made River Project to transfer 
groundwater from the southern deserts of Libya to the northern coast.34 However, 
this raises the question of whether Libya was aware of the existence of underground 
freshwater in Darfur. The answer is perhaps yes, and the huge amounts of money 
spent by Libya on this vital project despite its questionable feasibility when based 
solely on Libyan freshwater resources, as well as its being designed by Gaddafi 
personally, could be evidence of this (Rockro 2011). Several international studies 
confirm that many future conflicts will be over fresh water (El-Anis and Smith 2013, 
                                                          
34 For more details: size, cost, time to build etc. see Salem 1992, p. 270. 
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p. 2). This may reflect the desire of the Gaddafi regime for continuing the conflict in 
Darfur and keeping the region unstable in order to prevent the development of 
Darfur’s mineral wealth, especially in the presence of the Islamic regime. Migrant 
workers from Darfur to Libya are estimated at about 500,000 and Sudan benefits 
from its own natural resources, as development and exploitation of these resources 
will, typically, encourage these workers to return to Sudan and thus reduce this figure 
significantly, which could have a negative effect on the Libyan economy (Al-
Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 181). Moreover, this may mean that Gaddafi could 
lose a very important card which can be used in negotiations. The threat of the 
expulsion of Sudanese labour from Libya could be a bargaining factor between Libya 
and Khartoum and the rebels, as well as with the international community. 
 
 The Desire to Play a Role in the International Political 
Arena 
 
Gaddafi tried to exploit the course of the Darfur Crisis to play a pivotal role in the 
international and political arenas. He wanted to make the Darfur Crisis a valuable 
opportunity for the further normalisation of relations with Western countries, 
especially the USA. Also, Gaddafi tried to use the crisis to find more opportunities to 
create a cooperative relationship, which could confirm his desire to create more 
effective political and economic relationships in the long run. This, in turn, imposed 
on his regime the need to avoid the anti-policy interests of the West in the region 
(Beheiri 2010, p. 214). Tripoli was enthusiastic about this trend after the restoration 
of relations with the West. This occurred after Tripoli paid a heavy price for the 
victims of the Lockerbie case and the issue of a French airliner that exploded in 1989 
over the deserts of Niger, known as Aluota, in addition to the announcement of the 
abandonment of Libya’s nuclear programme, and the release of Bulgarian nurses 
accused of infecting children with AIDS in Benghazi. 35  He committed to open 
                                                          
35 The case of AIDS victims in Libya is an issue involving five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian 
doctor who were working in the Children's Hospital in Benghazi, Libya, on charges of infecting 426 
Libyan children with HIV-tainted blood. The case lasted 8 years from the year 1999 to the year 2007, 
and ruled over the settlement of the release of the six defendants after the Libyan judiciary had issued 
a death sentence on them. It is believed that their release was the result of intense pressure and 
interventions by the European Union (Aljazeera net 2006). 
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investment in the field of energy for Western companies to gain economic benefits 
(Mateos 2005, pp. 439-445). 
 
Figure No: 7. Geographical distribution of the Northern Darfur Mega-Palaeolake 
On the other hand, Gaddafi wanted, through this crisis, to ensure the growth of good 
relations with the USA and the EU, in preparation for getting their support and 
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acceptance for him to be succeeded by his son Saif al-Islam, who adopted a liberal 
tendency that was more acceptable to the West (Ronen 2008, p. 135). 
In this context, Libya sought to play an important role in the field of humanitarian 
relief, providing humanitarian supplies to the displaced people of Darfur. Tripoli 
agreed to use its territory as a humanitarian corridor and to allow international aid 
convoys (especially those from the USA) to pass overland, from the Mediterranean 
Sea to the refugee camps in Chad (Thomas and Mizushima 2005). At the same time, 
Tripoli promoted these efforts, providing humanitarian aid relief in July 2004 
through the Gaddafi Foundation, headed by Saif al-Islam (Zine El Abidine 2011). On 
this basis, it was incumbent on Tripoli to remain close to the security zones and to 
areas of unrest on its southern border with either Sudan or Chad because of the 
serious implications of this international involvement for the national security of 
Libya. 
The incident at the Third Africa-EU Summit, held in Libya from 29-30 November 
2010, is further evidence of the Gaddafi regime’s attempt to use the Darfur Crisis to 
repair its relationship with the West and polish the image of Gaddafi globally from 
the first sponsor of terrorism in the world to the first sponsor of the peace process. 
President al-Bashir was formally invited by Gaddafi to participate in the conference. 
After al-Bashir sent confirmation of his participation, Abdullah Sanusi, head of 
Libyan intelligence, surprisingly informed the Sudanese authorities that the 
participation of President al-Bashir had been cancelled as Gaddafi froze permission 
for a plane to be sent to transport him to the conference. 
Mustafa Osman Ismail (2013) confirms that the excuse was that al-Bashir's 
participation in the conference meant the non-attendance of the German Chancellor, 
the British Prime Minister and the French President – this has to be considered 
against the backdrop of the memorandum of the ICC to arrest al-Bashir (Reynolds 
2010, Boateng 2011). President al-Bashir did not attend the conference, although it 
was not a bilateral visit, but was an African conference, and Sudan is a member of 
the AU which rejected the charges against Sudan, including the ICC memorandum. 
Gaddafi cancelled a visit permit and apologised to al-Bashir, keen to secure the 
attendance of the heads of government of Germany, Britain and France. This 
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demonstrates that he was keen to appease the West. Ironically, these European 
leaders did not attend the conference either. 
This position was contrary to the position of the Prime Minister of Malawi, Joyce 
Banda, when she announced on 4 May 2012 that Malawi would not be able to 
receive al-Bashir at an African summit, which was scheduled to sit in Malawi, under 
the pretext of avoiding a deterioration of relations between her poor country and its 
major donors. She announced that the economic implications of hosting President al-
Bashir had to be taken into serious consideration, as Malawi suffers from 
unprecedented economic problems, and it would not be wise to risk allowing 
someone to come and attend the summit despite strong opposition from donor 
partners and collaborators (BBC News Africa 2011). Consequently, the AU 
transferred the summit to Addis Ababa, while Gaddafi insisted on holding the Third 
Africa-EU Summit in Libya after dispensing with the presence of al-Bashir.  
 
Was Gaddafi Able to Influence the Parties to the 
Conflict in Darfur? 
 
There is no doubt that Gaddafi’s Libya played an influential role in the direction of 
the crisis and its duration. Perhaps Gaddafi genuinely wanted to be a mediator for 
peace on the grounds it was a crisis within the space of the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) – at least initially – and his success in solving it would 
enhance his role in the region and the African continent. However, the accelerated 
pace of the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis and the direct intervention of the 
international community formed an early warning to Gaddafi that he would lose the 
most important card he had to play in the region and expose his strategic rear (Al-
Mahdi 10/01/2013; Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). He therefore rushed to be a hidden party 
in the conflict, besides playing an apparent mediator role, providing support to 
various armed groups in the region to ensure his continuity in the game (AlAzreg 
16/10/2012). He sought to own papers which could make him the last word in any 
potential settlement, by controlling the positions of the rebel groups or even 
subdivide them to facilitate control. This had made the task for Gaddafi one in which 
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he had to play a dual role in the Darfur Crisis: the role of mediator between the 
parties as well as the agitator of the conflict at the same time (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). 
Nonetheless, the question that arises is, was he actually able to influence the warring 
parties in Darfur? 
 
 The Extent of Gaddafi's Impact on the Sudanese 
Government 
 
The Gaddafi regime’s relationship with the Inqad regime in Khartoum was bizarre. 
The Khartoum regime was convinced that Gaddafi was supporting Chad in its 
conflict with Sudan, and that he was also supporting armed rebel groups in Darfur. 
However, Khartoum preferred silence and overlooked the bitter reality, not 
disclosing it publicly, though some Sudanese newspapers reporting on the Bashir 
regime sometimes referred to the Libyan role in fuelling the conflict in Darfur. There 
were complex calculations to be made and Khartoum was forced to take precautions 
in dealing with the influential Libyan actor in the Darfur Crisis. The most important 
of these caveats was that Sudan's relations with Chad were tense going as for as 
estrangement and proxy-war by opposition groups in the two countries.  
The GoS was not able to afford the consequences of engaging in a public feud with 
the Gaddafi regime, because that would mean the expansion of its direct war with 
rebel groups, and indirect war with Chad. It would also mean the loss of its two most 
important neighbours in Darfur. So Khartoum opted to prevent "Gaddafi's evil", 
perceiving that he would not hesitate to support the rebels in Darfur publicly if he 
was himself accused by Sudan of supporting them secretly. No one in Khartoum 
could predict the extent of Gaddafi's damage to their regime, in the case of open 
hostility. So Khartoum consented to the lesser of two evils: it turned a blind eye to 
Gaddafi's support for rebel groups in Darfur, and appeared at the same time to be 
relying on his role as a mediator of peace, which might reduce the extent of damage 
he could cause (Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Al-Nour 2011).  
Many Sudanese politicians believe that the continuation of Sudanese-Libyan 
relations, connected for the duration of the Inqad regime, is evidence of the efficacy 
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of their diplomatic style in dealing with Gaddafi and his volatile diplomacy. On the 
other hand, observers do not attribute it only to diplomatic tact, but also to the 
balance of interests between the two countries. Almost all through this era, Libya 
was living under the conditions of Western sanctions, implemented since 1992 
against the backdrop of the Lockerbie disaster. This was at a time when Sudan was 
living under similar conditions against the backdrop of the Western position towards 
the Sudan’s national salvation government, and the circumstances of the war in the 
south and Darfur. Despite the fact that the GoS knew of the hostile actions to it, 
Khartoum worked to harnes Gaddafi's influence, within the corridors of the AU, to 
serve and support the interests of Sudan, both politically and diplomatically 
(Salahuddin 15/01/2013). 
According to observers, Khartoum succeeded in this task, especially in that Gaddafi 
was trying to present himself as the wise man of Africa (Ministry of Defence of 
Republic of Sudan 2013). In contrast, Sudan played an important role in breaking the 
Western sanctions on Libya when the first Sudanese plane landed at the airport in 
Tripoli in 1998, as this interdependence between the two countries was necessary 
(Salem 2004). As soon as Gaddafi realised that the Darfur Crisis was no longer a 
regional game and had quickly turned into an international issue, he wanted to have a 
recognised role in international efforts to resolve the crisis. But he was not able to 
stand by Khartoum when he considered of the UNSC resolutions which accused al-
Bashir of committing war crimes and violations of IHL as referred to the ICC, and its 
implications to issue an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir himself (Al-Nour 
2011). 
 Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) stated that the Gaddafi regime was secular, and 
that Gaddafi himself was historically hostile to the West but he had recently started 
to draw closer to Western powers, which was inconsistent with the orientations of the 
Islamic regime in Khartoum. It looks as though Gaddafi found, in the Darfur Crisis, 
an opportunity to settle accounts with Khartoum's Islamic regime. In this context, it 
was revealed that Salva Kiir, First Vice-President and Prime Minister of the south 
and Chairman of the SPLM, met Gaddafi on 1 July 2009, at which point Gaddafi 
assured him of Libya's support for South Sudan if they decided to secede from the 
north, in the 2011 referendum. Moreover, Gaddafi told Salva Kiir that it was wrong 
to keep the south united with the north: it should be either an independent state or 
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join with another country in East Africa. Furthermore, he promised to send Libyan 
experts to South Sudan to help with the reconstruction of infrastructure and the 
development of agriculture (Asharq Al Awsat 2009).  
This position was not new: Libya was one of the most important sources of support 
for the SPLM in the south, led by John Garang in the mid-1980s, a time when 
Gaddafi was at the height of his nationalist orientations. No doubt it reflects the lack 
of good faith from Gaddafi towards Khartoum, as well as the bad relationship with 
al-Bashir's regime (Al kbashi 2010). It seems that Gaddafi's policy was based on 
maintaining the insurgency in Darfur, since it would oblige Khartoum to comply 
with him. Consistent with to the conflict in Darfur, Gaddafi also wanted the West to 
deal with him by sending humanitarian aid through Libyan ports, making Libya a 
key hub in resolving the Sudan and Darfur problems. Thus, the West, in order to deal 
with the problem, would be forced to mend its relationship with Gaddafi. He wanted 
to put Khartoum and the opposition under his influence, sending a message to the 
West that they were dealing with the Darfur Crisis and a solution would only be 
achieved through Libya (Ismail 13/01/2013).  
Therefore, Khartoum sought to circumvent the role of Gaddafi and pre-empt his 
influence by conducting direct reconciliation with Chad in May 2007 under the 
auspices of Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, which meant a loss for Gaddafi who 
thought of the move as a "ridiculous diplomatic" step (Al kbashi 2010). Khartoum 
also encouraged a platform for Doha and Qatar's role in the Darfur peace 
negotiations. This, of course, did not live up to Gaddafi’s expectations, who found 
his role to be shrinking. He did not publicly oppose the Doha Forum, but he was not 
enthusiastic about it (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Sudan's government officials 
confirmed that Khartoum did not have much trust in Gaddafi and believed that any 
solutions to come from Tripoli might be a discount on the sovereignty of Sudan in 
Darfur, and possibly in Khartoum itself. 
Abdullah AlAzreg (16/10/2012) revealed that Gaddafi was fickle and that his 
positions were not trusted by the Sudanese authorities; he could change them at any 
moment. AlAzreg stated that Khartoum did not want to give him the opportunity to 
be the main sponsor for Darfur peace negotiations, because there were no guarantees 
on Gaddafi’s part. The GoS was convinced that Gaddafi dealt with the conflict in 
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Darfur as a means of putting pressure on them to adopt his contradictory positions 
towards the final settlement of the crisis in Darfur rather than finding a solution (Al 
Mahdi 10/01/2013). Gaddafi was betting on the fact that the GoS knew he could be 
harmful. He exercised his influence through the political role he had made for 
himself in Africa, where he thought of himself as an influential African figure who 
could thus have an effect in Sudan (Nacua 16/05/2012). Another effect was the 
establishment of relationships with tribal and political classes in Sudan, and most 
importantly, establishing relations with the armed movements in Sudan (Salahuddin 
15/01/2013). 
In certain cases, however, Gaddafi was able to exert pressure on the government and 
this was evident in the issue of Khartoum’s acceptance of the principle of 
compensation for those in Darfur. Initially, the GoS refused to talk about 
compensation but Libyan and other international pressure led the government to 
accept this principle (Eldoma 09/01/2013). At first, Khartoum accepted the collective 
compensation and refused compensation of individuals and they signed the Abuja 
Agreement on this basis. Later the GoS approved the compensation of individuals at 
the Doha agreement (Eldoma 09/01/2013). It seems clear that Gaddafi failed to 
subdue the Bashir regime and therefore maintained the crisis as a way of exerting 
pressure on Khartoum. On the other hand, some believe that the regime in Khartoum, 
with its relations with major Islamic organisations (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), 
had the ability to exert pressure on Tripoli. 
Al-Bashir's regime revealed the truth about his relationship with Gaddafi and his 
regime when Khartoum was the first to supply the Libyan rebels with military 
support to topple Gaddafi in 2011. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir stated that his 
country armed the Libyan rebels who overthrew Col. Muammar Gaddafi (AlAzreg 
2012; James 2011). This is evidence that the two regimes were not in sync, each 
having plans against the other without announcing them. The Libyan position during 
an AU summit, held in Addis Ababa in 2007, is another indication of the hidden 
conflict between the two regimes as well as the competition to play an important role 
on the African continent. Sudanese diplomats received a painful defeat for the second 
time in the race for chairmanship of the AU, and the Libyan attitude was not 
supportive of Sudan. Some argue that Gaddafi pitted North African countries at the 
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summit against Sudan's candidacy for the presidency of the African summit in 
Khartoum; along with Western pressure (Saad 2011).  
The regime in Khartoum has the same expansionist vision as Gaddafi had (Al-Turabi 
14/01/2013). It holds an Islamic ideology that was incompatible with the secular 
Gaddafi regime. However, it may be still too early to determine the nature of the new 
political regime that came to power after the February 2011 Revolution in Libya. 
Therefore, the Bashir regime is unwilling to support the continuity of the Gaddafi 
regime because of the clash on ideological and intellectual levels of both regimes 
(Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). On the other hand, perhaps Gaddafi believed that the end of 
the Darfur Crisis might push Khartoum to threaten the security of Tripoli in the 
future, and that case he may have thought that the continuation of the crisis could 
preoccupy Sudan against adopting such a vision. The lack of harmony between 
Khartoum and Tripoli on a common vision for a solution and security has had a 
negative impact on the duration of the Darfur issue. 
 
 The Extent of Gaddafi's Influence on the Armed 
Movements in Darfur 
 
Gaddafi's deal with the parties to the conflict in Darfur has always been characterised 
by contradictions and his positions have always been characterised by duplicity. 
Gaddafi was dealing with the armed movements on the basis that he was an 
internationalist, revolutionary leader and that all revolutionary movements in the 
world had to be within the circle of his influence or under his care in exchange for 
promises of assistance (Bilal 19/10/2013). Sadiq al Mahdi (10/01/2013) pointed out 
that while Gaddafi was cooperating with the Inqad regime, he also deliberately 
cooperated with the rebellion in Darfur in order to gain influence in the Darfur 
movements for two reasons: 1) to apply pressure on the Sudanese regime, and 2) to 
ensure that any settlement was reached under the auspices of the Libyan government. 
However, the question that arises is, to what extent was Gaddafi able to influence the 
positions of the armed movements in Darfur throughout the stages of the crisis while 
he was in power? 
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Azhari Ahmed Tahir (10/01/2013) mentions that Libya did not have significant 
influence on the armed movements particularly the SLM and the JEM, and perhaps 
the main reason for this was the multiplicity of these movements and the differences 
in their agendas. Tripoli dealt with rebel movements in different ways. Some were 
dealt with honesty and some that were dealt with more strategically. Many leaders 
from the armed movements in Darfur believe that they did not benefit from the 
support of Gaddafi to the extent by which they could achieve the goals of the 
rebellion. Gaddafi was unable to put pressure on the leaders of the rebellion. 
However, they did not deny that as Gaddafi was able to put some pressure on the 
GoS, he also could put some pressure on the armed movements at different times, 
forcing them to modify their activities on certain occasions.  
Gaddafi saw the movements as tools to achieve his own agenda and the irony is that 
most of the movements were aware of this (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013; Musa 16/01/2013; 
Minnawi 10/11/2012), but they were also trying to exploit his support to continue 
their rebellion against Khartoum. Gaddafi had significant tools that allowed him to 
influence the armed movements through financial and military support. Furthermore, 
the leaders of the armed movements had a special bias towards Libya more than any 
other country. They considered Libya to be their second home as a result of historic, 
cultural and economic factors. Nevertheless, Gaddafi did not employ these tools in 
the right way to end the crisis according to Sudanese visions, but instead to serve his 
own agenda. Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) says that there were no formal negotiations 
in Libya to end the crisis, but there were attempts to gather all parties to the crisis in 
one place as happened in Tripoli in 2004, the so-called Conference of the People of 
Darfur. This is the greatest diplomatic achievement that Gaddafi was able to 
accomplish within the framework of the Libyan regime seeking to tackle the crisis. 
All Gaddafi's attempts to unite the movements and persuade them to enter into 
serious peace negotiations failed. For example, all the bets that were on the Sirte 
Summit in November 2007 to include the participation of all rebel movements, and 
to unite their delegations to negotiate with the government, failed (Nami 18/01/2012).  
That happened when Gaddafi surprised the world by declaring the failure of the 
summit, which was called for and hosted by himself, arguing that the absence of the 
leaders of the JEM and the SLM made the summit pointless, prompting the African 
mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, to propose to hold another attempt to unite the rebel 
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movements which suffered from splits in Arusha, Tanzania, in 2008. This also did 
not succeed in achieving its desired goal (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 
2013). Hussein Minnawi (10/11/2012) and Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012) contend that the 
lack of seriousness and impartiality of the Libyan mediator helped to prolong the 
crisis. Libyan mediations had no serious proposals or clear plans to end the crisis. 
The Libyan regime could not impose a specific vision on the government and 
revolutionary movements, and the reason for the SLM and the JEM not attending the 
Sirte conference was their realisation of the lack of any genuine interest in resolving 
the crisis on Gaddafi's part. 
Several sources from the rebel movements, including the JEM and the SLM, confirm 
that despite Gaddafi's being able to put pressure on the warring parties, he did not 
have any desire to solve the problem. They even accused him of being behind the 
opposition to the AU and UNSC resolutions regarding the Darfur Crisis due to his 
direct influence on the decision of the Council for Security and Peace of Africa 
(CSPA). This ability to influence the CSPA was driven by both political influence 
and physical effects achieved through its financial contributions to organisations. 
Libya prevented the issuing of any resolution of the CSPA against the GoS due to 
Gaddafi’s impact on all African presidents, without exception. Whether avoiding his 
problems or coveting his money, there was no African regime ready to confront 
Gaddafi (Bilal 22/10/2012). Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013), one of the founders 
of the SLM and the head of the historical leadership movement, confirms that 
Gaddafi supported Abdul Wahid Nour in the early stages of the crisis, and that he 
was dictating the terms in exchange for his support. Mousa reveals that Gaddafi tried 
on several occasions – in the presence of Mousa – to convince Abdul Wahid to adopt 
his vision, which was the secession of Darfur as a separate state and establishment of 
a partnership with Libya, in the sense of becoming a state in Darfur under the 
tutelage and patronage of Libya in the form of a paternalistic relationship. 
Interestingly, Osman Moussa said that Gaddafi offered them a set of incentives to 
embrace this idea in 2005, represented in a railway belt which would run from 
Tripoli to Darfur and South Sudan linked to communication networks. 
Gaddafi used to say that South Sudan would become an independent state. He 
promised them that he was ready to build Darfur in just five years, with all the basic 
facilities, creating economic partnerships, commercially based on trade, as well as in 
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many other fields, such as oil and metals. Gaddafi used to give the SLM aid in the 
form of military vehicles and light weapons, and promised, if they adopted his vision, 
that he would provide them with heavy weapons (Musa 16/01/2013). When Abdul 
Wahid refused to fall in with his ideas, Gaddafi accused the rebellion of not having a 
clear gaol in view, and that the issues were simply "grazing and camels". A number 
of officials in the SLM contended that Abdul Wahid Nour refused to do so because 
they were not separatists and that they, as Darfurians, saw the whole of Sudan as 
their territory. Abdul Wahid believed that control of the centre was the goal by all 
parties in the west, the east and the south, and this was the cause of the dispute 
between him and Gaddafi. 
In this regard, Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013) confirms that the people of Darfur 
expressed their political problems through pressure on the centre and not by 
peripheral pressures alone. Rebels in Darfur did not call for secession, unlike 
Southerners who were always trying to solve their problems by separation. instead, 
Darfurians called for a change in the composition of governance and rule at the 
central level, and the attack of the JEM was evidence of this trend. It seems that 
Gaddafi, after the failure of the Darfur separation project, began to think of toppling 
the regime in Khartoum through support of the JEM, which basically amounted to 
attacking Khartoum with Libyan weapons in the hope of reaching power in Sudan 
through a partnership with the Gaddafi regime. Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) 
also confirms that Gaddafi was seeking to end the Darfur Crisis only by either the 
secession of Darfur or the toppling of the regime in Khartoum. He was trying to 
pressure the rebels through military and financial support, giving a lot of money to 
the leaders as well as providing weapons, vehicles, leadership training and logistical 
support. This support was granted via Abdullah al-Senussi, the intelligence chief 
(Musa 16/01/2013; Tahir 10/01/2013). A number of Libyan military leaders also 
used to come to Darfur to provide military support; this is confirmed by sources from 
both the GoS and the rebels (AlAzreg 2012).  
As explained in chapter four, the Gaddafi regime deliberately prolonged the crisis by 
creating differences and distracting positions between the Darfur movements instead 
of uniting them. This also clearly appears evident in the incident to configure the 
Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) as well as the incident of the detention of 
Ibrahim Khalil in Tripoli. In its reaction, Tripoli sought to bring the Darfurian camp 
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directly under the auspices of Libya. It seems that the Libyan regime deliberately 
supported the formation of a new group, creating a fake revolutionary movement (the 
LJM led by Tijani al-Sisi, who was brought from Darfur as an alternative to Abdul 
Wahid Nour) (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). Some observers, besides officials in the SLA 
and the JEM, accused the Gaddafi regime of inviting various factions that claimed 
resistance in Darfur (Minnawi 10/11/2012; Bilal 19/10/2013). These groups were 
gathered under the auspices of the Libyan intelligence and Libyan funds, and many 
were virtual and default resistance movements which did not really exist on the 
ground and so could not influence the crisis in any way (Bilal 19/10/2013). 
Tijani Sisi was not part of the armed operations in Darfur, but a political figure who 
was governor of the Darfur region on behalf of the UP, before the arrival of the Inqad 
regime; he also was of the UN staff. Sisi became the leader of all Darfurian factions 
that cooperated with Libya and that did not support the factions of Abdul Wahid or 
Khalil. A closer look at the name of the new movement, the "Liberation and Justice 
Movement", shows that it is a quotation from the SLM and the JEM, which may 
show the spirit of political spite used by the Gaddafi regime with Abdul Wahid and 
Khalil Ibrahim configuring the new Darfurian body as a substitute for them. Leaders 
of the SLM and the JEM go further, accusing the Libyan security service of 
cooperation with the Sudanese security apparatus in creating the movement (Bilal 
22/10/2012; Minnawi 10/11/2012). 
However, government sources have rejected this, confirming that Sisi cannot be 
counted as the government (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). When Doha, encouraged by the 
GoS and Arab and international support, called for new negotiations, the Libyan 
regime pressured the Qatari mediator and the rest of the parties to accept the LJM as 
a key partner in the negotiations. The Libyan regime realised that the SLM and the 
JEM would not accept a movement that did not have any military presence on the 
ground, and through this act the peace negotiations were impeded. Thus, it can be 
argued that this action was one of the negative roles played by the Libyan regime in 
prolonging the Darfur Crisis. 
Also, through this act it transpires that Gaddafi's imposition of a fake movement was 
an attempt to delude the world that his political and diplomatic efforts achieved some 
success in the peace process in Darfur. In reality, this intervention created a large 
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split among the Darfurian revolutionary forces. It was clear that this work, in the first 
place, fell within the framework of the general Libyan trend of tackling the crisis – 
that the solution should be Libyan, without taking into account the real interests of 
the Sudanese. Through all this, the Libyan regime failed to maintain its relationship 
with Tijani al-Sisi, who turned his back on Gaddafi and signed the Darfur Peace 
Agreement with the GoS in Doha on 14 July 2011 (Haggar 2012, p. 311). Libya 
realised that all the webs woven in Darfur were lost, so it worked to strengthen its 
relationship with the JEM, without ideological considerations (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013).  
However, the framework agreement signed between the GoS and the JEM in Doha in 
March 2010 was seen by the Libyan regime as a step in the right direction towards a 
final settlement and also as a blow to Libya. But after the JEM delegation went to 
Tripoli on the pretext of displaying the contents of the Framework Agreement and to 
consult with the Libyan leadership, signs emerged of the JEM leader trying to 
wriggle out of the agreement, as well as his convictions of trying to continue fighting. 
For example, the JEM threatened to withdraw from the Doha negotiations in the 
event of the signing of the framework agreement with other armed movements that 
existed in Doha, with reference to the LMJ. Khalil Ibrahim, head of the JEM, pointed 
out that movements that were in Doha were members of civil society, not armed 
movements, and were/would not be in the fighting field in Darfur (Masress 2010). 
This is what actually happened when the JEM boycotted the Doha negotiations, 
accusing Khartoum of violating the cease-fire in May 2010 (Ramadan 2010). 
The JEM froze negotiations with the GoS in Doha on the grounds of governmental 
violation of the Convention and in protest at the involvement of the LJM. 
Subsequently the GoS ordered the arrest of Khalil Ibrahim, on charges of 
involvement in the invasion of Omdurman in May 2008. Sudanese diplomatic moves 
affected the presence of Khalil Ibrahim in Egypt so that he fled to Chad in May 2010, 
but Chad also prevented him from crossing their territory and using it as a base of 
operations against Sudan (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). Khalil 
Ibrahim was compelled to go to Libya, which welcomed him warmly (Alintibaha 
2011). His arrival there after being prevented from entering Chad was a golden 
opportunity for Gaddafi to influence the course of events and the Darfur peace 
negotiations (Al-Nour 2011).  
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Gaddafi sent a private jet to N'Djamena to transfer Khalil to Tripoli and grant him 
political asylum, which caused tension in the relationship between Tripoli and 
Khartoum. This forced the GoS to close the border with Libya and to deploy military 
units. Observers believed that such a move on the part of Gaddafi was an indication 
of a serious escalation in attempts to be influential in the Darfur issue (Rockro 2011). 
He was not satisfied with the intervention of Qatar and the Sudanese acceptance of 
the initiative of the Qatari government and the neglect of the Tripoli initiative. 
Diplomatic mediations sent by President Omar al-Bashir to Libya did not succeed in 
persuading Gaddafi to retreat from hosting Khalil Ibrahim, who also failed to comply 
with al-Bashir’s personal requests over the phone. Mustafa Osman, the former 
Sudanese Foreign Minister, who was appointed Presidential Advisor after stepping 
down as Foreign Minister (he is currently the Sudanese Investments Minister) 
revealed that in the last meeting between Gaddafi and President al-Bashir, al-Bashir 
asked Gaddafi to expel Khalil Ibrahim from Libya, because Libya is Sudan's 
neighbour, and there were many Sudanese in Libya who might be affected by the 
presence of Khalil as well as relations between the two countries. Gaddafi agreed 
that an alternative country should be found to harbour Khalil Ibrahim.  
As a result, Khartoum conducted intensive contacts with some countries, such as 
Benin and Burkina Faso, and all agreed to host Khalil to permit for better relations 
between Khartoum and Tripoli (Ismail 13/01/2013). To start the order required al-
Bashir to send the Sudanese intelligence director to coordinate with Libyan officials 
to complete the transfer, but Khartoum was surprised by Libya’s refusal to eject 
Khalil Ibrahim, the justification being that Khalil had given Libyan hospitality. 
Khalil remained in Libya with his group until the revolution of 17 February 2011 
(Ismail 13/01/2013). Gaddafi's containment of the Darfur rebel movements and the 
presence of the leader of the JEM led to strained relations between the two countries 
and the Sudanese closure of all borders and corridors with Libya in July 2010.  
On the other hand, the JEM demanded many regional and international actors, led by 
the USA, to persuade Gaddafi to allow Khalil to return to Darfur, but all such 
mediations failed (Bilal 22/10/2012). The JEM considered the presence of Khalil 
Ibrahim in Tripoli under house arrest (for approximately 19 months to prevent him 
from attending to his troops in Darfur) as undermining the activity of the movement 
and providing great moral support for the Bashir regime’s agenda (Dosa 2013, p. 
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338). It is clear that Libya did not want Khalil to participate in the Doha peace round, 
but rather to remain in Tripoli, establishing a new alliance with Libya and so serving 
as a new card in the hands of the Libyan leadership to thwart the Doha reconciliation. 
It seems that Tripoli wanted to send a message to all parties that peace had to come 
from Tripoli and not via Doha, emphasising the continued Libyan influence in Darfur, 
in addition to its pressure on the regimes in Khartoum and N'Djamena, considering 
that the JEM had become a hostile party to them in the hands of the Libyan regime 
(Al Mahdi 10/01/2013).  
 
The Future of the Darfur Crisis after the fall of the 
Gaddafi Regime  
 
Although this thesis uses an analytical and interpretative approach for certain events 
and actions rather than a predictive research project, the researcher finds presenting 
an overview about the continuation of the warfare taking place in Darfur beyond the 
collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli gives additional value to the thesis. 
Although it is too early to predict the stability of the situation in post-Gaddafi Libya, 
undoubtedly the fall of the Gaddafi regime will have important implications for 
regional and international paths (El-Anis and Hamed 2013, p. 188). After more than 
four decades of relations between Libya and Sudan, marked with much mistrust and 
instability, the fall of the Gaddafi regime could be a crucial transitional point in 
reshaping the future of relations between them, especially in regard to the future of 
the Darfur Crisis. This was also expressed by Muhamed Sola, the Libyan ambassador 
to Sudan (Sola 06/01/2013).  
Regarding the impact of the Libyan revolution in February 2011 on the future of 
Darfur, there are two expected scenarios that may be seen, pessimistic and optimistic. 
The first track centres on the capability of the new governors controlling the state 
and establishing a state of stability. The failure to completely eliminate the pockets 
of potential resistance of the remnants of the Gaddafi regime, and imposing military 
and security control throughout the country, especially in the desert areas bordering 
Sudan and Chad, would lead to chaos and a wave of disputes and deep divergence 
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harming the components of the Libyan society, and revolution. In particular, the 
tribal factor is still dominant and plays a key role socially in light of the absence of 
the experience of practising the democratic process due to the prevention of 
establishing political parties during the Gaddafi era. The continuation of any 
influence of the elements belonging to the remnants of Gaddafi's regime in the region 
would destabilise the new situation in Libya and could be a resource supply of arms 
to Darfur.  
If some armed movements reject engaging in the peace process, the chances of a 
continuation of the conflict will inevitably be enhanced. Especially in light of many 
existing stories about the smuggling of large quantities of Libyan arms into Darfur 
following the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime with Khalil Ibrahim’s move from 
Libya to South Sudan in September 2011 (Hsabo 2011). Furthermore, there were 
several reports accusing rebel movements in Darfur of supporting Gaddafi forces 
against the revolutionaries in Libya. This also formed a factor of pressure on the 
rebellion movement in Darfur, and a factor of convergence between Tripoli and 
Khartoum as this issue negatively impacted the relationship between many Libyans 
and Darfurians.  
The other main concern is the reaction of the international community towards such 
instability in Libya and the likelihood of its being exploited it to intervene in Libya 
and then in Darfur. Escalating the tension and instability as well as the eruption of 
the civil war, or even the outbreak of armed violence between different components 
of the Libyan people, would negatively affect the stability that has prevailed recently 
in Darfur. Particularly if heavy weapons poured into Darfur, as has happened since 
the 1980s, deteriorating conditions to form a humanitarian crisis, which would 
encourage a NATO and Western intervention in Darfur's affairs. The proliferation of 
weapons in the hands of citizens, regional divisions in Libya, divisions in the elite 
and political class between secularists and the Islamists who have important 
influence on Libyan society politically and socially, besides their role in the military 
operations against Gaddafi's armed militias, are other essential variables.  
Theoretically, and from an ideological view, the West tends to support secularist 
political parties that are established on the Western vision, and to prevent the 
emergence of a party or faction adopting an extreme Islamist or a national orientation. 
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Western countries, such as the USA, France and Britain, effectively participated in 
the operation of ‘Fajer Odessa’ within the framework of implementation of 
Resolution 1973, issued by the UNSC in March 2011, which authorised the use of 
force by NATO to prevent Gaddafi from committing massacres against civilians in 
Libya. Western powers are worried and reluctant to arm the new authorities in 
Tripoli under the pretext that the weapons might fall into the hands of extreme 
Islamists or terrorists.36 These concerns are compounded by several reports which 
talk about the presence of Islamic extremist groups belonging to Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State of (IS) in different parts of Libya, especially in some of the eastern 
cities that threaten Western interests in the region. The attack on the USA consulate 
in Benghazi by unidentified armed men that led to the death of Chris Stevens, the 
USA Ambassador to Libya, along with three of his American staff (BBC News 
Africa 2012; The Washington Times 2013), was an important indicator which cannot 
be ignored.  
In this respect, some Western parties that already have tense relations with Sudan 
may push towards the continuation of instability in Libya. This could provide 
justification for their intervention under the pretext of the protection of civilians, 
which requires the continuation of a NATO presence on Libya and Darfur’s borders. 
Through its existence in the region, NATO may move a step further to attempt to 
establish closer cooperation with UNAMID claiming that the human goal is the same 
and that success in Libya may lead to other successes, especially in Darfur. This will 
be regarded by Khartoum as a threat to the national security in Sudan. 
The other variable relates to the nature of the new political regime in Libya. Yes, it 
seems that Sudan was involved in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and many 
Sudanese officials stated that Khartoum was the largest beneficiary of this event. 
However, this collapse led to the removal of one of the greatest threats against 
national security in Sudan, but not all of them. For instance, the continued tense 
relations between Sudan and some Western countries such as the USA, due to the 
situation in Darfur may influence post-Gaddafi Libyan foreign policy, particularly 
towards Sudan. It is undeniable that the victory of the Libyan rebels was a result of 
the role played by the USA, France, and Britain through NATO, as well as essential 
                                                          
36 For more details about who is the terrorist? What is terrorism?  see Gorry 2004, p. 85. 
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support provided by the international community to the Libyan revolution which led 
to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Due to this influence, Libya may change its 
policy towards the Darfur issue and its rejectionist attitude to the international 
intervention in the Darfur region to become a part of military intervention in order to 
protect civilians. This will all have an impact on the future relations between Sudan 
and Libya (Al-Nour 2011).  
In a similar setting, important Sudanese officials, such as Gazi Salahedden 
(15/01/2013) and Sadiq Al Mahdi (10/01/2013), confirmed that with the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime just one important factor of the continuation of the Darfur Crisis was 
removed from the equation, as the element of Libyan exploitation was removed, but 
the fear of the involvement of other significant external actors still remains. They 
emphasise that the crisis may be exploited by other external parties, such as South 
Sudan and the CAR (Eldoma 09/01/2013), which would be a positive transitional 
point in favour of the armed movements in Darfur. All these factors actually 
represent a serious challenge that beasr out dangerous implications and threatens the 
stability of Sudan, and Darfur in particular, beyond the fall of the Gaddafi regime. 
Thus, with this scenario the possibility of increasing the complexity of the Darfur 
Crisis and prolonging its duration will likely be higher. 
The second expected scenario, in regard to the future of peace building in Darfur 
after the Gaddafi regime's collapse, is centred on the political realism and the shared 
interests of both the Libyan and Sudanese sides. Establishing a democratic regime of 
governance in Tripoli (El-Anis and Hamed 2013, p. 174), as the Libyan revolution 
has aimed for (Ashor 26/12/2011; Nami 18/10/2012), will reassure Khartoum that 
the new Libyan state will adopt peaceful policies in the context of good 
neighbourliness. Likewise, it sends a message that Libya will not support or embrace 
the rebel movements in Darfur.  
Several factors and developments are still interacting and findings can play a crucial 
role in reshaping a new reality for Sudanese-Libyan relations, which would cast a 
positive impact on the Darfur issue. The most important variable is that the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime weakens the armed movements opposed to the government in Darfur, 
especially the JEM and the SLM and some of the movements established by Gaddafi 
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himself, who permanently provided safe havens and principal resources for their 
political, financial and logistical support.  
Despite this, there is a high likelihood of the new political regime in Libya seeking 
closer relations with the West. This is not only because of their support for the 
revolution, but also for the Libyan national interests in its new era given the need for 
the support of Western countries to help Libya through its transition in all aspects 
and facing the nation-building challenge in Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition (Chivvis, 
et al. 2012). It is likely that this factor, at least in the short term, will push Tripoli to 
be less keen to establish close relations with Khartoum, which to a degree may 
adversely affect, or be a reduction of, interests with the West, even if not exposed to 
Western pressure directly. What increases the likelihood of this trend is that the new 
political regime in Libya would not be keen to retain the legacy of Gaddafi and his 
agenda in Africa, including Sudan, due to the complexity and cost of the political and 
economic consequences, which formed a significant burden on Libya (Jibril 
24/12/2011; Dabashi 17/01/2012). The end of Gaddafi is going to be an opportunity 
to break free of the adventures of Gaddafi's Africa in all its forms. However, 
Gaddafi's absence will at least put an end to instability in the Libyan position and 
accounts of its interests towards the relationship with Sudan, which should provide 
an opportunity for a serious dialogue on building a new foundation for future 
relations between the two countries. 
Regardless of the impact of the factors mentioned above as delimiters for the future 
of relations between Libya and Sudan, as well as its implications on the Darfur Crisis, 
Sudan is among the biggest beneficiaries of the fall of the Gaddafi regime, which 
removed one of its biggest direct security threats (AlAzreg 16/10/2012; Ismail 
13/01/2013), even if that did not immediately and dramatically affect the equations 
of the current situation in Darfur or other areas of conflict in Sudan. Nevertheless, it 
accounts for a long-term strategy; the exit of Gaddafi, who was leaving involved in 
fuelling conflict in the region, will contribute to strengthening the process of 
searching for a peaceful political solution to the Darfur Crisis and other regions of 
Sudan. 
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The regional equation has changed in recent times, and reflected positively on the 
Darfur Crisis, due to the fall of Gaddafi's regime, besides the improved Sudanese 
relations with both neighbouring Chad and Southern Sudan (Ismail 13/01/2013; 
Aljazeera.net 2013). In the absence of internal and external support, the rebel 
movements in Darfur will be forced towards peace or they will be significantly 
weakened and undermined due to the support that they took advantage of during the 
Gaddafi era becoming less. Therefore, these new developments in the region provide 
a good opportunity to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (African 
Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 2011). Given the fall of 
Gaddafi, his continuing attempts to pull the rug out from under the Qatari efforts to 
resolve the Darfur Crisis were already stopped. Gaddafi repeatedly attempted to 
make Tripoli or Sirte the headquarters of the talks, under his personal administration, 
to be the main actor in any possible settlement to the Darfur Crisis (Salahuddin 
15/01/2013). 
On other hand, Libya and Sudan particularly in this phase are both desperately 
looking for stability. The necessities of the security of both countries, in the first 
place, require the development and strengthening of bilateral relations based on good 
neighbourliness and regional peace to safeguard common interests. For this reason, 
some important cooperation within the military and security fields between the two 
countries was undertaken, and there is likely to be more in the future. For instance, 
Colonel Abdul Razzaq al-Shihabi, the spokesman for the Department of Libyan 
Defence, stated that the Libyan Defence Ministry agreed with the GoS in November 
2013 to form a joint force to protect the border between the two countries (African 
News 2013). In the same context, the chief of staff of the Libyan Air Defence Forces, 
Brigadier General Juma Hussein Alabani, announced the existence of military 
cooperation between Sudan and Libya to develop a strategic plan. In this regard the 
Brigadier said that Sudan and Libya are coordinating to adopt a solid plan and to 
form strong security and military relations at the operational level. He stated that 
Libya sought to control a large proportion of the spread of weapons and the effective 
control of the borders with Mali, Chad and Sudan for the benefit of regional security.  
This cooperation also included various military fields, such as training and the 
development of the capabilities of the two armies to confront all the challenges 
facing the two countries under the regional and international changes. One of the 
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fruits of this cooperation was the graduation of a new batch of Libyan students in the 
Sudanese Military Academy in October 2013, to be the nucleus of the Libyan army 
(Al Mubarak 2013). This collaboration represents a factor of pressure on the rebel 
movements affecting their capability to continue their rebellion. It seems that the 
implications of this pressure quickly start to appear. The split of Suleiman Sandal, a 
leading figure in the JEM and former official Popular Congress in August 2012, who 
received political asylum and was granted permanent residency in Norway, is an 
important indicator of the weakness and fragmentation of the movement as a result of 
pressure faced internally and externally, especially after the change of the political 
regime changed in Tripoli (Sudansafari 2012).  
Similarly, and in the long term, it is also very likely that a social, cultural, security, 
political and economic cooperation between Tripoli and Khartoum may be seen. This 
would undoubtedly contribute to greater stability for both countries and the whole 
region, especially in Darfur. It is noteworthy that the rise of the political powers 
based on the "Islamic movement", particularly the Brotherhood party, would be a 
significant cause for the establishment of strong Libyan relations with the regime in 
Khartoum with its "Islamic" background and old ties with the Brotherhood party (Al 
Trabi 2013). The existing case of stability would enable the GoS to implement the 
Doha agreement and address a number of political and developmental issues in 
Darfur, which would accelerate the end of the crisis. Regardless of all factors cited 
above, and given the historical, social, cultural, and even economic ties, this thesis 
nominates the second scenario because of the common strategic and security interests 
between Libya and Sudan, especially in the near future.     
 
Conclusion  
 
All the evidence suggests that Gaddafi possessed the tools, capabilities and sufficient 
capacity that enabled him to influence the GoS and all armed movements in Darfur – 
whether by carrot or stick – to end the crisis in the early stages. However, he did not 
employ these tools instead adopting policies to serve his own personal ambitions and 
 231 
 
achieve the goals related to the continuity of his regime, as well as to gain a place for 
himself on the map of international politics. 
Gaddafi’s Libya did not address the crisis through a dedicated team, according to 
basic rules for crisis management, but through a person who makes the decisions 
without studying the goals and policy setting of the expected outcomes. Libyan 
initiatives and decisions were usually issued as random reactions formed by Gaddafi 
himself. There was a lot of gathered information that was relative to the head of state 
dealing with Libya as one state actor and really the centre of that was Gaddafi. The 
evidence showed that in order to understand how Libya behaved as a state the focus 
should be on just one man, Gaddafi. This is because the Gaddafi regime was a 
totalitarian dictatorship entirely based on Gaddafi's autocracy. The decision making 
process in Libya in that era was really dominated by Gaddafi himself. The absence of 
professional diplomacy and institutionalism in Libyan efforts has been the key cause 
of Libya’s position on the Darfur Crisis. Officials of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, such as Abdul Salam Triki, have not played any effective role, and this is 
confirmed by all the parties to the conflict.   
Libyan mediation efforts were run by intelligence officers, led by Abdullah Sanusi, 
and they often focused on the aspects of security and military solutions. The primary 
motive for their dealings with the crisis relates to security, thus they adopted the 
'quick fix' approach. This situation generated influential elements in the Libyan 
leadership that created their own special interests behind their dealings with the 
armed movements. The Darfur Crisis had become a source of money because of the 
presence of these elements as a liaison between Gaddafi and the leaders of the armed 
movements in Darfur (El-Affendi 24/02/2012; Dosa 2013, p. 381). Tripoli has not 
yet provided a clear plan to address the root issues in order to bring together the 
views of the belligerents and so avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.  
The lack of a clear vision by the Libyan leadership is another negative factor that has 
impeded any achievement in Libya, and thus the continuation of the crisis. Libya was 
not eligible, in terms of its institutions and its ability to develop a strategy that would 
enable it to play a leading role in Africa, because this role needs policy-making 
institutions that can both plan and follow-up on decisions. Gaddafi’s Libya did not 
have a clear strategy for its foreign policy in accordance with necessary political 
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criteria, due to the absence of the real meaning of the state as well as exporting the 
policy of one man from inside Libya to outside Libya, according to the dictates of 
that leader. Thus, the conclusions of this chapter demonstrate that the Libyan 
involvement in the Darfur Crisis was in pursuing an agenda which was different from 
the internal parties’ agenda and this in turn significantly prolonged the expected 
duration of the crisis. This strongly underpin the applicability and the validity of the 
theoretical model used for this thesis.  
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Conclusions 
___________________________________________________ 
Contributions to Knowledge, Limitations and 
Further Research 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
In general, the main task undertaken in this thesis lies in the field of knowledge that 
is concerned with understanding factors that influence the expected duration of 
intrastate conflicts. This study contributes to the answer the broader question: why do 
some intrastate conflicts last so much longer than others? More specifically, do 
external third-party interventions tend to shorten or lengthen the duration of civil 
wars, and do particular strategies for intervening have different effects on the 
expected duration of such types of wars? Chapters five and six examine the impact of 
the Libyan involvement under the Gaddafi regime as a key external/regional state 
actor on the duration of the Darfur Crisis as a method of crisis management and 
conflict resolution in Africa and elsewhere. Libyan intervention in the Darfur Crisis 
was used as a case study for this research project to determine the relationship 
between the regional state intervention and the duration of civil wars, if any.  
 
We started our research project with the aim to meet the following objectives:  
First, to examine the key causes of the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. Second, 
to explore the improvement in the governmental crisis management techniques 
used by Libya to address this crisis. Third, to determine the internal and external 
factors affecting the paths and courses of governmental crisis management in 
Darfur. Finally, to ascertain the optimal alternative for handling the crisis, as an 
analytical framework for management of other political crises. 
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and with the aim of addressing the following four central analytical questions. 
The first question asked what the causes of the Darfur Crisis are and who do they 
impact through its duration? The second question has sought to answer the query 
of what are the key Libyan interests and motivations that have led to Tripoli 
being one of the major actors? A third central question asked how has the Libyan 
involvement influenced the duration of the Darfur Crisis? The final question 
considered how the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya might affect the 
termination of the Darfur Crisis. 
We could neither find an answer to these questions nor meet our objectives from the 
literature review as no comprehensive research had been done to establish the link 
between the Libyan intervention as a regional player and the length of the duration of 
the conflict in Darfur. These research questions were followed with theoretical 
assumptions. 
The central hypothesis of this thesis holds that Gaddafi’s Libya was (in)directly 
involved in the Darfur Crisis in pursuit of its own agenda that is separate from the 
agendas of the domestic combatants, which therefore lengthened the duration of the 
conflict. The intervention of Gaddafi’s Libya was associated with prolonging rather 
than reducing the duration of the conflict in Darfur. In order to answer the research 
questions and to test the hypotheses, a theoretical model was developed and tested in 
this investigation. The theme running throughout the study is that crisis management 
and conflict resolution must take into account the impact of the regional third-party 
intervener when it becomes (in)directly involved, in a certain fashion, in adopting 
specific mechanisms to achieve its goals behind such intervention. The research 
outcomes provide the evidence necessary to answer the four key research questions. 
Nevertheless, there are three types of conclusions for this thesis. The first type relates 
to the nature of the Darfur Crisis itself and the internal and external factors that have 
had a significant contribution to its eruption and termination. The second type relates 
to the theoretical model developed and the evaluation of the central hypotheses of 
this thesis. The third type of conclusions are reflections on the work in this thesis and 
the strategy adopted for the research process and writing. 
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The answer of the first core research question lies within the framework of the first 
type of conclusions. It has asked what are the causes of the Darfur Crisis and how do 
these influence the duration of this crisis? In order to answer this question, chapter 
three has analysed the internal and external causes and essential factors feeding into 
the crisis. It also evaluated how these elements have influenced the course of the 
conflict alongside considering the domestic and the foreign implications of the crisis.    
The evidence in chapter three suggests that there are multiple factors with domestic 
and forging dimensions that have significantly contributed to the eruption of the 
armed conflict in Darfur. These are political, economic, social, environmental, and 
entirely interdependent, and their impact on each other cannot be separated. The 
evidence in this thesis shows that the Darfur Crisis erupted as a tribal dispute over 
the natural resources between the pastoralists (who are mostly from Arab) and 
farmers (who are mostly non-Arab), and these conflicts were passed on tribal 
alliances linked to the access to resources, especially after the drought and 
desertification witnessed by the region during the last two decades as a result of 
changing climatic conditions. However, the emergence of a class of highly educated 
and knowledgeable individuals in Darfur is a vital factor. This elite has realised that 
the conflict over the resources is a consequence of the absence of development 
policies in Darfur, as well as the marginalisation and the carelessness of Khartoum 
towards the peripheral areas of Sudan. Therefore, they transferred the conflict to the 
next phase of confrontation with the Khartoum government.  
In response, the central government resorted to the armed option for addressing the 
rebellion in Darfur instead of responding to the rebels’ demands. Khartoum was not 
only unable to benefit from the early warning to handle the problem via improving 
the economic conditions in the region, but it largely contributed to creating a state of 
polarisation by recruiting tribal and political loyalties for supporting its policies 
against its opponents, and arming them in order to crush the rebellion. This pushed 
the other rebel social components to seek arms to protect themselves from the brutal 
reaction by Khartoum, as well as resorting to the neighbouring countries, such as 
Chad and Libya to gain bases to launch their military operations against the 
governmental forces from. This was followed by these opposition groups resorting to 
Western countries to obtain political, media and financial support, which was the 
transitional point from the local to the global circle for the crisis. 
 236 
 
Chapter three also demonstrated that some external factors have played a significant 
role in the deterioration of the security and stability in Darfur and militarising the 
conflict. This thesis does not suggest that regional factors like the social interactions 
between Sudan and the neighbouring countries, the political instability in these 
countries, the Libyan-Chadian relationship and the dilemma of weapons proliferation 
were the key causes to the conflict. Instead, they were factors that have 
fundamentally increased the complexity of the crisis by exacerbating and militarising 
the conflict.  
With regard to the ethnic dimension of the conflict, the element of tribal and racial 
tensions cannot be overlooked throughout the course of the Darfur conflict. However, 
this thesis did not demonstrate that the eruption of the crisis caused by the issue of 
racism and discrimination between Arab and non-Arab. This study found that this 
matter was raised due to the failed policies and strategies undertaken by Khartoum to 
respond to, and manage the problem, which led to the growth of the feeling among 
the African components that the central government was supporting the Arabs to 
exterminate them. The failure of the GoS to prevent the outbreak of conflict and to 
manage the local disputes decisively and professionally in the early stage provided 
the opportunity for this problem to be transferred from the local to the outside level.  
Chapter four was also acting to answer the first research question. This chapter 
identified the key domestic parties of the Darfur Crisis and then examined their key 
perceptions, agendas, mechanisms, and techniques employed to manage and end the 
crisis. How these elements have impacted the method of third-party intervention and 
the duration of the conflict, was also addressed. Chapter four sought to understand 
the impact of the mutability in the rebel factions, as well as intra-rebel divergence in 
Darfur on the opportunities of peace-making. To achieve this task, a theoretical 
model has been developed to guide the analysis during this chapter. This theoretical 
model argues that:  
when external states intervene with a separate agenda in intrastate conflicts that 
involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition 
armed groups with independent preferences, tend to exacerbate an insurgency 
and extend expected duration of civil warfare rather than shorten it.  
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One of the central findings of this study is that the conflict ongoing in Darfur is a 
clear reflection of a trust crisis among the political and elite classes in Sudan. The 
perceptions of the key internal combatants about the form of the final resolution are 
completely disparate. The evidence indicates that the GoS is keen to handle the 
problem within the local framework, by GoS mechanisms, while the two key intra-
rebel groups, the JEM and the SLM, believe that involving the international 
community and simultaneously adopting the armed option are the best ways to 
achieve their demands. It also found that the negotiating positions of the two main 
factions suffer from a significant weakness due to the lack of uniformity in their 
political visions and military agendas.  
Another interesting outcome is that the inability in resolving the crisis in its early 
phase and the continuation of the conflict has vitally contributed to the widespread 
phenomenon of differences inside the rebel groups in Darfur. With the passage of 
time, and the absence of a solution, the possibility of further rebel groups with 
different agendas emerging has been growing. The ethnic and tribal variety in 
Darfurian society, the multiplicity in the rebel armed groups, and the absence of a 
united leadership for the rebellion have all led to an emergence of various strategies 
and a separation in the goals of the internal combatants in the Darfur conflict. As 
result, an ideological and intellectual collision between the armed groups themselves 
was undertaken. This in turn has deepened the gap between the insights of the 
domestic conflicting parties regarding the best form of settlement and to halt the 
catastrophic situation in the region. As a consequence, further splits inside the rebel 
movement have occurred. This led to an emergence of additional armed groups with 
varying credibility in Darfur and other Sudanese regions.  
This study also reflects that the fundamental motivation behind the splits among the 
rebel groups is the individual opportunism of some rebel leaders, driven by personal 
ambitions and the enthusiasm for obtaining financial gains and political posts. Some 
of the rebel leaders in Darfur are keen to prolong the crisis. This is because they are 
beneficiaries in terms of the gained spoils of financial funding from the continuity of 
the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. The conflicts over privileges and searching 
for political and financial gains between the rebel factions, which are basically 
founded on ethnic and tribal fundamentals, have caused, at different times, the 
outbreak of violent armed clashes between the rebel groups themselves. This caused 
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further splits which were usually influenced by the ethnic and tribal motives and 
priorities. 
In light of these fragmented and conflicting interests within the rebel factions, the 
initial legitimate claims and demands that were adopted by the rebel groups and were 
behind the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur, were lost. This thesis proves that the 
political privileges and posts demanded by some rebel leaders were the decisive 
factors that led to the failure in reaching a comprehensive agreement for making 
peace, which in turn greatly prolonged the Darfur Crisis. The Abuja negotiations in 
2006 are a clear example. All internal and external efforts made to find a common 
ground combining the government and the opposition to reach a swift and 
meaningful outcome and resolve the crisis in a short period were undermined. Efforts 
were then doubled to unify the rebel factions and their demands.  
Moreover, this study proves that the frequent splits in rebel groups, as well as the 
phenomenon of the diversity in the insurgents’ agendas, led the internationalisation 
of the crisis and lengthened its duration. The tribal composition of the Darfur 
community, the narrow sectarianism agendas, the power conflict and the political 
maliciousness practised by some Sudanese political actors – who do not give priority 
to supreme national interests – provided an opportunity for outside actors to become 
involved in different forms, adopting the appropriate mechanisms for managing 
and/or exploiting the crisis by creating a climate that allowed external players to use 
excuses to pursue their own interests. In this respect, the study concludes that these 
outcomes strongly confirm the theoretical hypothesis tested in chapter four.  
The overall answer to the first research question must, therefore, be that the causes of 
the insurgency in Darfur are multiple and complicated, internal and external, political 
and economic, and social and environmental. That being the case, it is not at all 
simple to identify one or two factors that have had a major effect on the outbreak of 
the Darfur Crisis. Thus, any attempts to manage this crisis without taking all these 
dimensions into consideration would be quite meaningless and ineffective. Each 
regional and extra-regional actor significantly sought to guide the violence in the 
direction which would allow them to gain certain outcomes. In order to demonstrate 
these results, chapters five and six investigate the effectiveness of external 
intervention on the duration of intrastate conflict as a form of crisis management.  
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The second research question addressed by this thesis considered what are the key 
Libyan interests and motivations that have led it to being one of the major external 
players? To answer this question, chapter five examined the internationalisation of 
the Darfur Crisis by addressing the internal and external motives were behind calls 
for the internationalisation the Crisis. The key mechanisms that have been used for 
exaggerating the description to the conflict in Darfur and to impose it on the 
international agenda have been highlighted. 
 Additionally, to test the applicability of the theoretical model developed for this 
thesis, Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis as external actor has been deeply 
investigated. The variables of the incentives and interests of Libyan involvement, and 
how the mechanisms adopted by Gaddafi’s regime have impacted the continuation of 
the crisis, were discussed. This thesis demonstrates that external players do not create 
internal crises, but instead they take advantage of the opportunities of their existence 
and the failures of local attempts at resolution. They intervene under various claims 
and offer solutions. Usually these solutions are consistent with the orientations of 
some local forces and vary with the orientations of others, which deepen the dispute. 
An ongoing conflict between the internal and the external remains until one of the 
parties wins. It is found that the existence of the strategic interests of the great 
powers in the targeted areas for intervention is a crucial condition for completing the 
international scenario for that intervention. The Darfur Crisis does not depart from 
this general scenario: the national interests of the major powers and other regional 
powers such as Libya have been the main motivation for their enthusiasm for 
intervention in the course of the conflict.  
The study concludes that the national interests of these involved states were the 
central incentives to intervene throughout the course of the conflict. For instance, the 
competitive state between the USA and China over the natural resources, especially 
oil in Sudan, from one side, and caveats and security considerations of the Libyan 
regime along with the Gaddafi aspiration in Sudan and Africa from the other side, 
have been the major reasons for the internationalisation of the Darfur issue. This 
competitive situation generates a state of multiple and conflicting regional and 
international agendas which aim to achieve the objectives of divergent interests, not 
necessarily consistent with one another. This in turn contributes to the complexity of 
the crisis and its possible solution (for both foreign and internal actors). This 
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investigation reflects that the rivalry has extended the duration of the conflict. The 
longer it takes, the more opportunity the crisis has to move up from one stage to the 
other. This is because the conflicting regional and international agendas seek to 
achieve divergent interests, which are not necessarily consistent with those of the 
domestic combatants. These external actors are all keen to manage the Darfur Crisis 
in peaceful ways. They not aiming to protect civilians and end the humanitarian 
catastrophe in Darfur, but to preserve their national interests through maintaining 
influence in Sudan.  
The conclusions to the second research question also demonstrate that the Libyan 
role played under the Gaddafi regime had a critical influence throughout the course 
of the Darfur Crisis and its duration. This thesis was able to identify and then classify 
the key Libyan national interests behind the involvement into national, regional, and 
international levels. Generally, this thesis reflects that these incentives were mostly 
driven by the Libyan national security interests. These were primarily embodied in 
the Gaddafi regime’s wish to survive and achieve Gaddafi’s personal ambitions 
which were saturated by the desire to lead the Sub-Saharan area and Africa in 
general, as well as gaining an important position globally.  
On the local level, the political leadership in Tripoli was worried about the 
seriousness of the armed conflict in the neighbouring region of Darfur, and the 
likelihood of the transition of this tribal conflict into Libya turning Libyan territory 
into refugee camps, which could increase the possibility of the conflict’s leakage into 
Libya. This scenario would affect the security and economic stability in Libya and 
might threaten the Gaddafi's regime survival.  
Regionally, the Gaddafi regime also had concerns relating to both the region and the 
entire African continent. The key Libyan motivation to intervene stemmed from the 
fear that escalating the security deterioration in Darfur would provide a large 
opportunity for direct external military intervention, which would limit the active 
Libyan movements in the Sub-Sahara area. Libyan attitudes were always reflecting 
the rejection of any form of international forces existing on the southern border of 
Libya. This was regarded by the Libyan authorities as a direct threat to the Libyan 
national security. This thesis demonstrates that Darfur represents a strategic depth for 
Libyan national security due to the overlapping borders, and the historical, tribal, and 
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economic relationships between Libya and Darfur. Therefore, Gaddafi’s involvement 
may have been due to tribal pressures practised by some tribal figures belonging to 
ally tribes that extended over the borders, such as the Tubu and Zaghawa. The 
evidence seems to be strong that Gaddafi sought to use the insurgence in Darfur to 
strengthen his political influence there not to stop the humanitarian catastrophe but to 
exploit the region as a base for the legal and illegal activities required for achieving 
his goals in Sudan and the African region in general.  
Internationally, this thesis concludes that Gaddafi had sought to use the bloody 
conflict in Darfur to change the mental image that formed around him in the 
international community. He wanted to change from being a sponsor of political 
instability in Africa and other parts of the world and a financier to many liberal 
groups, as well as a supplier for terrorism, to being the sponsor of global peace and 
stability. He wished to demonstrate that Libya was not a rogue state. After Libya’s 
return to the international scene when Gaddafi gave up his weapons of mass 
destruction programme in 2003, his policies proved to be pragmatic and 
opportunistic with the aim of achieving maximum credit abroad.   
The third core research question considered how did Libyan involvement influence 
the duration of the crisis? Conclusions of chapter five reflect that the overall strategy 
adopted by the Libyan regime in dealing with the Darfur Crisis was founded in 
conformity with the policy of double standards and playing a double game in order to 
pursue these national interests. This investigation explored that Gaddafi used various 
both apparent and unseen approaches and mechanisms. 
While Tripoli’s apparent diplomatic role since the eruption of the conflict seemed to 
aim to end the crisis, it was clear that Gaddafi’s policies towards that crisis 
deliberately sought to prolong its duration. Gaddafi provided some diplomatic and 
political support to the regime in Khartoum in order to preserve stability in the region. 
At the same time, however, he supported the opposition’s attempts to change the 
Islamic regime in Khartoum, clearly reflecting the hidden ideological conflict 
between the two regimes in Tripoli and Khartoum.  
This thesis demonstrates that Gaddafi had used a number of unexpressed 
mechanisms to resolve the Darfur Crisis. These were primarily embodied in 
providing weapons, money and other logistical support to different rebel groups 
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active against the GoS. Each rebel group was treated differently according to its 
importance and strength as required by the Libyan interests at each stage of the crisis. 
In this sense, it could be observed that Gaddafi was exploiting the various 
fragmentations among the rebel groups whether based on ethnic, tribal or ideological 
polarisation. These intra-rebel divergences, the differences in the rebels’ agenda, and 
the personal aspirations and ambitions of some rebel leaders allowed Gaddafi to play 
with, and change, alliances in accordance with the requirements of his interests, 
using the carrot and stick policy. The major tools he used to pursue his purpose were 
to leverage individuals who were social activists in Darfur and belonged to different 
tribes, at the same time belonging to the ‘Allegan Al Thawria’ in Libya, or in other 
words; groups with dual loyalty. 
The other important result is that the Gaddafi regime’s policies towards the crisis 
were not made within the corridors of the Libyan Foreign Ministry in accordance 
with the rules of real diplomacy and transparency, or by the assets of crisis 
management and armed conflict. But, the Libyan actions and reactions were taken 
purely according to security considerations under the direct supervision of Gaddafi 
himself, with the implementation by elements from Libyan intelligence headed by 
Abdullah Al-Senussi. The absence of the institutional diplomatic work on the Libyan 
side was one of the vital reasons behind the complexity of the Libyan role and the 
lack of clarity of its objectives. Hence, this in turn caused a crisis of confidence, not 
only between Tripoli and the Sudanese parties, but also between Libya and other 
intervening external state actors, which contributed substantially to obstructing 
efforts to accelerate a settlement and an end to the crisis. 
In the same context of answering the third core research question, chapter six 
assessed the influence of the Libyan intervention of the duration of the Darfur 
conflict. It probed the hidden role of Gaddafi and the agendas he was seeking to 
achieve through his involvement in the management of the Darfur Crisis. Whether 
these goals were separate from the goals of the internal combatants’ agendas was 
examined. Moreover, the scope of the Gaddafi’s influence on the domestic parties to 
the conflict in Darfur and the effectiveness of Gaddafi’s Libya, as an important 
involved regional actor, on the duration of the Darfur Crisis, also have been 
addressed. 
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This thesis found that Gaddafi was a fundamental factor that undermined a quick end 
to the brutal conflict. He was keen to maintain influence throughout the course of the 
crisis over its parties and outcomes by employing the bloody conflict in Darfur in a 
way which served his own agenda, and to liquidate the political calculations and 
personal aspirations even at the expense of the efforts of peace and the continuity of 
the conflict. Despite the fact that Gaddafi had the capability to influence the internal 
parties of the conflict and to push them towards a just solution, he was not keen to 
employ this ability to end the crisis. This study found that there was a crisis of 
mistrust between Gaddafi and the Sudanese parties in Darfur (both government and 
rebels) as they were well aware of the lack of sincerity of Gaddafi's intention to 
resolve the crisis in accordance with the vision of the Sudanese parties. Furthermore, 
they were convinced that Gaddafi was exploiting the crisis to achieve his personal 
objectives. For these reasons Gaddafi’s influence over the GoS and the key rebel 
groups was limited. Therefore, this vitally contributed to the longevity of the crisis 
duration in Darfur instead of ending it quickly.  
The next interesting route explored was that despite Gaddafi’s apparent and frequent 
attempts to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis, he had essentially and 
intentionally contributed to internationalising in order to maximise the possible 
international political gains. This was because of Gaddafi's unbalanced policies and 
conflicting attitudes about the crisis and its different parties. Also, the discrepancy 
between his agenda and vision for the final solution and those of the rest of the 
parties involved, whether internal or external, disrupted the peace efforts. Gaddafi 
used the conflict in Darfur to settle his political scores with his opponents, bpth with 
the Inqad regime ruling Sudan and with his other regional and international 
opponents. The conclusions of the thesis demonstrate that the core motivation behind 
the Libyan interference in the Darfur Crisis was founded on the basis of Gaddafi’s 
desire to “gain from the conflict, not to resolve the conflict”.  
The fourth research question examined here considered how the collapse of Gaddafi 
regime in Libya would impact the resolution of the crisis? The overall answer to this 
question is that the fall of the Gaddafi regime will definitely have important 
implications for the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. Chapter six provides two 
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predictable scenarios to the future of the armed conflict in Darfur beyond the 
collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. The first scenario is pessimistic. With this 
scenario the potential of the density of the crisis growing and OF prolonging its 
duration beyond the fall of the Gaddafi regime is higher. This is because several 
factors can be major barriers to resolving this conflict and threatening stability in 
Sudan and Darfur in particular. The second scenario is optimistic. With this scenario 
there are several factors that could significantly raise the likelihood of resolving this 
conflict in a short time. In this regard, the major factor is that the absence of Gaddafi 
as a key player from the equation of the management of the Darfur Crisis would 
weaken the two main armed groups, the JEM and the SLM, and other movements 
established by Gaddafi himself.  
These groups will lose the major source of support that was permanently provided by 
Gaddafi, such as safe havens and principal resources for political, financial and 
logistical support. Furthermore, the new relationship between Tripoli and Khartoum, 
as well as the important political and military cooperation established during the 
course of the Libyan revolution in 2011 and after the Gaddafi regime collapsed, 
could be another decisive limitation for the continuation of the rebellion in Darfur. 
Given the factors discussed here, and taking into account all the developments and 
events that followed the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, whether on the level of the 
relationship between the new rulers in Libya and the ruling regime in Sudan, and/or 
the level of decline in the insurgents’ activity in Darfur after Gaddafi’s death, this 
thesis nominates the optimistic scenario as more likely than the pessimistic.  
Thus, the original hypothesis tested in this thesis has been proven to be strongly 
correct in the form outlined in the introduction. The conclusions of this thesis 
demonstrated that Gaddafi’s Libya was (in)directly involved in different forms of 
diplomatic, economic and military activity in the Darfur crisis to pursue its own 
agenda that is separate from the agendas of the internal combatants. As result of that, 
the Libyan involvement made the duration of the Darfur Crisis substantially longer. 
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Theoretical approaches 
 
A further set of conclusions must be made regarding the original theoretical model 
developed and employed in this thesis. By examining the key motivations behind the 
Libyan interference in the Darfur Crisis and the Gaddafi’s policies and attitudes 
towards the crisis, as well as his major used strategic mechanisms, the preceding 
analysis demonstrates the validity of the original theoretical model of this thesis. This 
study confirms that the model developed to guide the theoretical analysis throughout 
this thesis shows that:  
when external/regional actors become (in)directly involved with military, 
economic or diplomatic manoeuvres in an intrastate armed conflict to pursue 
their own agendas, which is independent of the motivations of the domestic 
fighters, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of conflict, is very strong 
model.  
Moreover, the evidence seems to indicate that the theoretical model used here is a 
reliable and valid instrument to be used for predicting relationships between the 
long-duration of intrastate conflict and the external state diplomatic, economic, and 
military interventions with the availability of the factor that external states become 
involved in intrastate wars to pursue their own agenda, which is independent to the 
domestic combatants’ agenda.  
This thesis also proves that the insurgents' external support is a key factor that 
determines the outcomes of intrastate conflict. Three types of external assistance – 
diplomatic cover, safe havens in neighbouring states and the provision of military or 
economic aid – have been deemed especially crucial for insurgent success. In turn, 
the increasing number of countries intervening over time may well have increased 
the incentives for neighbours or patron states to fight proxy wars through the 
provision of cheap arms to insurgents in the hopes of destabilising an enemy from 
within.  
The other interesting theoretical finding presented in this thesis is that conflict 
duration is strongly associated with the type of local society (as an additional 
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variable to the existing model) where the armed conflict occurs. It is clear from this 
thesis that longer conflicts generate more rebel groups with more varied agendas. 
This is very likely to happen when the type of society where armed conflicts take 
place is tribal and multi-ethnic, with multiple ideologies. Therefore, the mechanisms 
and methods adopted by such multiple rebel groups for managing the conflict tends 
to be different due to the inevitability of conflict between perceptions of the final 
solution and then delayed peace.  
These outcomes were demonstrated by the additional theoretical model generated in 
chapter four during the research process to act as guide for analysing the information 
gathered during the research phases of this project. This theoretical model shows that:  
when external states intervene with a separate agenda in intrastate conflicts that 
involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition 
armed groups with independent preferences, it makes the likelihood of 
prolonging the duration of the conflict higher.  
This study also demonstrated the validity of this model and confirmed that it is a very 
strong instrument to explain what happens to the length of the conflict duration when 
external states intervene in intrastate conflicts that occur in such types of societies 
and where these circumstances exist. The results of this thesis have been interpreted 
to mean that:  
the more agendas there are, the longer duration will be, and vice versa. The long 
duration of conflict, the more varied and increased agendas are. 
 
Suggestions 
 
The findings of this study have some important implications for policy-makers 
interested in resolving intrastate conflicts and crises. First, failing to address the 
dimension of diplomatic, military and economic forms of external intervention in the 
pursuit of their narrow national agendas would considerably lower the probability of 
resolving these conflicts, leading to substantially longer intrastate conflict. In this 
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respect, conflicts appear not to be ineffectively managed as the interventions 
themselves will be a major barrier to the resolution. 
This is very likely to happen if the external intervener is a neighbouring country that 
shares borders and historical, economic, social and culture ties with the country 
where the civil war takes place. As a consequence, the policy-makers and parties 
participating in negotiations, and the international community, should verify the real 
motivations and goals behind any external state intervention. The international 
community should work hard to isolate external states that intervene in this way. 
This can be done by practising a series of political pressures to force them to 
withdraw from the process of managing the conflict, as it is not easy to induce these 
states to leave prior to achieving their full goals. Intrastate conflicts with high 
degrees of outside involvement cannot be resolved until the external dimensions are 
addressed. This was very clear in the case of Libyan involvement in Darfur.  
When the internal conflicting parties realised the risks of Libyan intervention, they 
accepted the transfer of the peace negotiations from Tripoli to Doha, preferring the 
Qatari peace initiative for Darfur and neglecting that of Tripoli. This was because 
they did not trust Gaddafi and believed that solutions that might result from the 
Tripoli process would weaken the Sudanese authorities’ sovereignty in Darfur and 
maybe in Khartoum itself. As a result, an important breakthrough happened in the 
path of negotiation when an important number of rebel movements signed a 
framework agreement with the GoS in March 2010, which took direction of the final 
settlement of the crisis. In addition, this détente was reinforced by the absence of 
Gaddafi in 2011.  
Second, if the international community failed to isolate the external veto players by 
practising political pressure, a serious negotiation with these external third parties to 
address the independent dimensions of these civil wars must be undertaken. The case 
of the Syrian conflict which began in 2011 and the impact of the external veto 
players involvement, such as the USA, Russia and Iran, on the continuation of the 
civil war there is also a very good example.  
Third, this study suggests that if external third-party states are indeed seeking to 
resolve the political crisis or intrastate conflict, where armed opposition movements 
are multiple and different in their ethnic, tribal and/or ideological composition, in the 
 248 
 
short term they should deal firmly with the rebel movements and not provide them 
with a large margin to manoeuvre. This thesis suggests that external actors should 
apply pressure on the leaders of the movements to urge them to negotiate earnestly 
and responsibly in order to reach a unified and consensual agenda which can bring 
them together to face the government's agenda. This can be done, for example, 
through discontinuing political support for them, discontinuing the provision of a 
safe haven for logistical aid, and undermining their movements and activities in 
neighbouring countries. Foreign parties should do this before announcing their 
attitudes towards the crisis and the rebellion. 
 
The Originality   
 
The originality of this thesis lies in both what is studied and how it is studied. First, 
this research project contributes to different bodies of literature. This study uniquely 
makes contributions to the field of both the study of conflict resolution and external 
intervention and the history of the conflict in Darfur more specifically. Existing 
literature on the Darfur Crisis appears to focus mainly on one or two aspects of the 
crisis, and mainly looking at one or perhaps two angles of the scene in Darfur. The 
prior studies on the topic being addressed here in general deal with the causes of the 
crisis, whether political, economic, ethnic or environmental, or exclusively with the 
international intervention within the framework of civilian protection. This gap in 
knowledge has been dealt with by engaging with discussion and analysis all these 
factors together as well as to the international involvement to establish compound 
outcomes and also exploring and build a coherent picture of crisis management in 
Darfur.   
Unlike previous studies (addressed in the literature review chapter) that investigated  
the conflict in Darfur by focusing separately on certain aspects whether with political 
such as Kalu 2010; Omar 2008; Abiodun 2011; Waal 2007a; Fuchs 2011, or 
economic such as Hakim 2011; Brown 2010; 0lsson 2010b; Behrends 2008; Young 
et al 2007, or social and ethnic such as El-Tigani 2004; Olsson and Siba 2009; Hgan 
and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Olsson and Valsecchi 2010, or international and 
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humanitarian law dimensions within the international organisations such as Babiker 
2010; Waal 2008; Mickler 2009; Reynolds 2010; Boateng 2011, this thesis addressed 
all these aspects together at the same time as well as how these interact with each 
other, which fill in the gap and extend prior studies. This research project 
demonstrates that the crisis in Darfur is an internal issue that should be addressed 
domestically among the Sudanese themselves, not globally. This study emphasises 
the point that to decisively and effectively resolve this crisis we should take into 
account all these mentioned factors together within the national Sudanese framework.    
On the other hand, the great complexity of the problem in Darfur has led to limited 
accurate and reliable information. The diversity in its dimensions has resulted in a lot 
of differences among many analysts and researchers about the underlying causes of 
the crisis, its description, and the manner of its management. Therefore, getting 
access to calibre of interviewees sourced and the information that was gathered for 
this study (as discussed in the chapter two; the Collection and Analysis of Data 
section) in total offers further value to the thesis which in itself makes a considerable 
contribution to our understanding of the political phenomena being investigated. A 
further important contribution is that this study is perhaps the first PhD research 
project that has been conducted on the Darfur issue and the Libyan involvement after 
the death of Gaddafi and the collapse of his regime in 2011. 
A further contribution relates to the strategy of collecting and analysing primary and 
secondary data during this study. This study simultaneously combines and employs 
two different types of literature; material focuses on the Darfur Crisis’ historical 
roots, its domestic, regional, and international implications, and literature related to 
the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis which addresses the impact of 
external intervention on the internal crises and conflicts and their durations. This 
comprehensive technique, to the best of our knowledge, it is new and there is no 
other study in the literature that has used it. 
Second, this study provides further contribution to the literature of the management 
of political crises and the intrastate conflicts subject as well as armed conflict dataset. 
Understanding the relationship between external (the regional in particular) state 
intervention and the expected duration of the intrastate conflicts in general and in the 
Darfur Crisis in particular, as a way of crisis management, has been a topic that is 
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largely overlooked. This topic is one of the most important for the development of 
these fields in the next decade. This study covers this essential gap in knowledge by 
evaluating the case of the impact of Libyan involvement under the Gaddafi regime 
on the duration of the Darfur Crisis. 
This study contributes towards the objective of addressing the lack of studies 
focusing on civil war duration that might be effected by the role played by regional 
third-party intervener in internal armed conflicts which take place in neighbouring 
countries as most of the studies identified in this field are broader studies which lie 
within the framework of the wider concept of the external intervention whether 
politically or economically and/or military in civil war.  
This study provides new insights on how to manage an intrastate conflict event 
effectively based on the necessity “as pro-active measures” of understanding the real 
intents and motivations of the third-party interveners when they involve in intrastate 
conflicts as well as ensuring whether they seek to end the crisis or employ the crisis 
to achieve some gains that cannot be gained in normal time.   
This thesis is an important contribution to the academic interests in the field of the 
management of the political crisis and intrastate conflicts. The study contributes to 
the literature by identifying key practices that could result in better crisis outcomes. 
This study is a further investigation to the work written by David Cunningham (2010. 
2006), Patrick Regan (2002), and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) where each one of 
their studies has investigated the expected duration of the intrastate conflicts by 
exploring the impact of one or two certain form of external intervention on the 
course and the longevity of civil war. For example, Cunningham (2010) inspected 
the duration of civil war through addressing the variable of third-party intervener’s 
independent agenda which is different to the goals of the internal fighters. Work by 
Regan (2002) focuses on how external military and economic interventions 
contribute to intrastate conflict management.  
This thesis is an extension to these prior studies where the main contributions made 
by this study to the crisis management and civil war fields in general and the studies 
by Cunningham and Regan in particular are; first, in propose of achieving the aims 
and answering the core questions of the research project, this thesis combines and 
uses both the Cunningham and Regan’s theoretical models amalgamated with one 
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another and the diplomatic and the type of society, where the intrastate conflict take 
place, approach, as well as the indirect forms of intervention rather than focusing 
merely on direct ways.  
Moreover, this study is a new contribution in the sense that it differentiates between 
the types of third-party state interveners, regional and extra-regional actors, and 
focuses directly on the role that can be played by a certain regional player in an 
armed conflict into another country rather than generalising by referring to the 
characteristics of extra-regional state actors.  
All these factors were adopted as further variables to form the theoretical model 
developed and used in this study, and which was the theoretic framework that guided 
the researcher to address the question of what happens to the termination of intrastate 
conflict when regional third parties are involved in certain positions and particular 
statute. And this was done by testing the validity of this model through applying it to 
the case of the Libyan intervention under the Gaddafi regime in Darfur in order to 
understand the relationship between regional intervention and the expected duration 
of the intrastate conflicts. 
The study contributes to the conflict management’s understanding of the importance 
of reducing the negative impact generated by regional third-party intervention in 
intrastate conflict (in certain forms and particular ways) and the dimensions and 
variables involved in advancing towards the solution for this conflict. This study is 
original in the sense that three theoretical models were developed from the literature 
and gathered information that is a valid instrument for managing intrastate conflicts 
and predicting their durations, during the research process.  
 
The first theoretical model defined in chapter two and illustrated in Figure 2 shows 
that: 
when external/regional actors become (in)directly involved with military, 
economic or diplomatic manoeuvres in an intrastate armed conflict to pursue 
their own agendas, which is independent of the motivations of the domestic 
fighters, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of conflict. 
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The second was defined in chapter four and clarified in Figure 4, which shows that: 
when external states intervene with a separate agenda in intrastate conflicts that 
involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition 
armed groups with independent preferences, make the likelihood of prolonging 
the duration of the conflict higher. 
The third emerged here by combining the two above theoretical models and is 
illustrated in Figure No: 8, which shows that: 
when an external state become (in)directly involved with military, economic or 
diplomatic manoeuvres with a separate agenda, which is independent of the 
motivations of the domestic fighters parties, in an intrastate conflict that involve 
ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition armed 
groups with independent preferences, the likelihood of prolonging the duration of 
the conflict is higher.  
However, this study does not aim to generalise its findings across other cases. Rather, 
it provides a theoretic framework and information that has been collected in a 
specific way, in order to explore the case of Libyan intervention in the Darfur Crisis, 
for the purpose of reaching a useful explanation and better understanding of other 
similar cases instead of being applicable to all cases studies. This study contributes to 
existing literature by an offering analytical framework that can be tested and applied 
to other cases. This study does not argue that this is the conclusion to any other case 
studies, but it claims that third-party intervention will always result in prolonging the 
duration of intrastate conflict when they intervene in the same fashion of the Libyan 
involvement in Darfur. The developed theoretical framework can be employed by 
other researchers to study other cases’ similarities and differences, examining the 
same theoretical variables and approaches that formed the theoretical framework 
designed for this study, either to confirm the findings gained as a result of this study 
or to extend them through exploring further implications and crucial variables - or 
even to disprove these outcomes. 
This study examined the role of regional third-party intervention in intrastate 
conflicts by way of management processes of internal conflict via exploring the case 
of Libyan intervention in the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan as this has not 
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deservedly received significant attention in mainstream discourse. In doing so, it has 
adopted an analytical framework that takes into account the diverse contexts within 
which such conflicts are manifested, and in which they should be analysed and 
managed. 
In terms of IR, this study contributes to the current literature by drawing the attention 
of all policy makers and research centres that are involved and/or interested in 
managing political crises and intrastate conflicts to the importance of exploring and 
identifying the roles of regional interveners or “regional powers” in escalating, 
ending or prolonging the intrastate conflicts rather than focusing mainly on the major 
power states (such as the US, China, and Russia) and/or the main international 
organisations (such as the UN, AU, EU and their agencies as well as other 
international players). In other words, exploring whether the involvement of the 
neighbouring countries in managing armed conflicts take place into other countries 
that share boarders would lead to increasing the complexity of the intrastate conflict 
course or acceleration of the ending of the conflict and building peace, which is 
essential in managing intrastate conflicts effectively.  
Internationally, many scholars have limited their investigations, focusing merely on 
the role played by the primary state actors (which have been referred in chapter two 
as extra regional actors) in the field of international relations and seeking global 
peace, especially their effects on the intrastate conflicts. They mostly argue that the 
key motivation of these international (state) actors to intervene in intrastate conflict 
is to preserve their own national interests. 
 For example, work written by Fake and Funk (2009), Peter K. Bechtold (2009a, p. 
10), and Mahmood Mamdani (2009) studied the role played by the US in the Darfur 
Crisis. Authors argue that the US intervention in the Darfur Crisis is a part of the 
Bush administration’s “grand strategy” which aims to maintain the American 
dominance of the ‘global chessboard’ by diminishing the influence of the only other 
significant players, China and Russia. Fake and Funk comment that the key motive, 
which determines the form and the way - choosing the direct humanitarian not a 
decisive military intervention - of the Washington involvement in Africa in general 
and to resolve the Darfur Crisis in particular and end the suffering, is to consolidate 
its global control over a key natural resource (oil in particular) – fundamental to 
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deferring independent development in China and other rising economies (Fake and 
Funk 2009). Authors argue that the US policies undertaken to respond to the crisis 
were stuck with the US agenda in Africa more broadly and in Sudan specifically 
which is independent to the goals of domestic fighters. Therefore, these policies have 
deteriorated the situation in Darfur by fermenting the war in Darfur, exacerbating a 
long-running conflict for survival in the region.  
According to Bechtold, America's interests are above democracy, and the world 
press in dealing with the Darfur issue always fails to mention the fact that oil is the 
root cause of US intervention in Darfur. Mahmood Mamadani (2009) the US has 
failed, consistently, to employ its capacity to lead international and regional efforts to 
attain peace and security missions in Darfur either because Russia and China have 
material interests in Sudan and/or the US has a verifiable national interest in working 
with the al-Bashir government whose support for rooting out terrorists compels the 
US to be diplomatically lenient with its allies.  
Other scholars Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-ha Chan (2012) and Rose 
Macfarlane (2013) focus on China and its policy on the Darfur crisis. Rose 
Macfarlane (2013) explored how Sino-Sudanese relations have become synonymous 
with the Darfur conflict. He also examined how and why China, as a permanent 
member of the Security Council, has been accused by Western countries of impeding 
peace in Darfur. According to Rose Macfarlane “the western vilification of China 
occurred because of the perception of Beijing as both the solution and the problem to 
the crisis, caused by its close links with Sudan through economic (primarily oil), 
military and diplomatic relations.” Rose Macfarlane interpreted China’s strategy in 
Darfur as being motivated by China’s national economic interests, specifically oil, oil 
being important for energy security and associated with geostrategic competition 
with America. Therefore, China’s original position on Darfur reflects the Chinese 
national agenda of protecting its economic interests above all. While Rose 
Macfarlane did not exonerate China’s actions, this work further highlighted the 
importance of roles played by other extra regional actors (Russia, Malaysia, India 
and South Africa). Rose Macfarlane argued that the roles of these extra regional 
actors significantly hindered solutions to the Darfur Crisis as well as contributing to 
prolonging its duration, but they have largely been overlooked. Macfarlane added 
that China’s actions in Sudan are not unique, either compared to China’s actions 
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elsewhere in the Africa continent or compared to other actor’s involvements in 
Sudan. In contract, Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-ha Chan (2012) examined 
Chinese perspectives on humanitarian intervention and national sovereignty. They 
argued that Beijing’s interests are so multiple and complex that concern about the 
implications of humanitarian intervention for national integration is more crucial 
than oil in determining its policy towards Sudan. 
In light of growing competition amongst various countries (especially superpower 
states) for political and economic influence in the region has led these state actors to 
adopt different agendas and mechanisms to manage the Darfur Crisis that added 
further factors to the complexity of the conflict rather than the acceleration of ending 
it. The thorny questions arose regarding how best to seek an end to the violence in 
Darfur without furthering the hegemony of wealthier nations, particularly the world's 
superpower. Outside intervention would surely be undertaken for less than saintly 
motives – generally in order to take control of Sudan’s significant oil resources and 
establish another outpost for Western interests in the region.   
On the other hand, several studies have focused on the failure of the UN Security 
Council’s non-intervention in Darfur, Sudan to protect civilians. For instance, studies 
by Bedal Aral (2010) and David Mickler (2009) explained how the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), the key international organisation established for 
preserving peace for all the world’s nations, has become an instrument at the hands 
of a handful of states seeking hegemony, inter alia; through implementing their own 
national agenda via this global body especially in the Darfur case. 
 Bedal Aral’s work looked at the Darfur Crisis as case study to explore to what extent 
the response and the intervention of the UNSC as an international (non-state) third-
party intervener was a motivating factor in ending the conflict in Darfur. Aral 
concluded that the international crisis management of the Darfur case was a model 
instance which shows that the UNSC has been employed by powerful states (such as 
the US, Russia, and China) in order to exercise their hegemony and to control energy 
resources in the non-Western world. In this regard, David Mickler (2009) conducted 
a similar study and demonstrated that effective and successful intervention by the 
UNSC has been precluded by the national agenda of its permanent members, 
including a lucrative economic relationship between China and Sudan, and because 
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of valuable Sudanese intelligence cooperation in Western counter-terrorism 
operations in the region. According to the findings of David Mickler’s work, the 
Council's members chose to preserve these national interests at the expense of 
protecting civilians in Darfur. 
 Also in the context of the international crisis management in the Darfur Crisis, A 
study by Al-Said Omar (2008) studied certain actors’ responses to the crisis in Darfur 
and how their involvement impacted the determination of the war. He has divided 
selected actors into two different categories, according to the mechanisms and 
strategies each actor has adopted and used to handle the crisis. First, Omar argued 
that three actors; rebels, Western civil society actors, and international mass media 
manage the Darfur Crisis through manipulating crises. Omar demonstrated that these 
actors have significantly inflated the problem by their policies towards the conflict, 
including deliberately resorting to the use of power, diplomatic coercion, and have 
applied pressure on international public opinion with a view to shaping the 
orientation of international circles of decision-making, which led to the escalation 
and growing complexity of the situation as well as leading to the internationalisation 
of the issue. Second, another four players; the GoS, the UN, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), and the African Union (AU) have been 
classified (in accordance with their efforts to deal with the problem) as those who 
attempt to manage the crisis effectively, and to find an appropriate determination to 
the crisis shortly. Despite agreement with the author, Omar's argument has limited 
his investigation to the involvement of non-state actors (if we exclude the state of 
Sudan). Perhaps the most significant is that he has referred to the causes of the 
internationalisation of the crisis, instead of investigating and analysing the impact of 
regional involvement (neighbouring states) as external players on courses of the 
crisis, as a form of the crisis management. 
Hence, this project contributes to the body literature of civil wars and international 
relations. This literature, as a whole, is rather western-centric in nature focusing 
mainly on the influential role that can be played by western major power states in 
intrastate conflicts taking place in the MENA region. Hence, this study brings Libya, 
as a model of the regional intervener in the intrastate conflict in Darfur, to civil wars 
and international relations literature as a form of international crisis management. 
Therefore, the locale in which this study is anchored is the MENA region and its 
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internal conflicts which, like those elsewhere, are becoming internationalised at an 
increasingly early stage. The locality does not however suggest peculiarity, or 
endorse an idiosyncratic view of the conflicts of a particular region. But it suggests 
the vastness of the conflict management field, and the commonality of problems of 
the tempest-tossed human beings whose lives are lost or thrown adrift. 
This thesis contributes to the scarce studies that have been written about the Libyan-
Sudanese relationship during the era of the Gaddafi regime (discussed in chapter one, 
the literature review). For instance, this thesis represents a new addition to works by 
William D. Brewer 1982; Helen Young et al 2007; and Yehudet Rone 2011. Brewer 
(1982) examines the Libyan-Sudanese Crisis of 1981 and implication of Gaddafi's 
arrival to power in Libya on Darfur’s strategic significance for both countries, Libya 
and Sudan. Moreover, Brewer investigates some historic, regional, and religious 
factors bearing on the prickly Libyan-Sudanese relationship – but long before the 
Darfur Crisis emerged. Brewer found that the relationship between the two countries 
was characterised as volatile. Brewer argued that the Sudanese problem with Libya’s 
Gaddafi was political and long-term, not military and immediate. Brewer argues that 
Darfur's strategic importance stems from its size and remoteness from Khartoum, as 
well as its independent past in addition to its conservative religious population, 
which would render the province an inviting target for Libyan ambitions and 
machinations. Brewer demonstrates that these properties would significantly increase 
tension in relations between Tripoli and Khartoum, especially since they share an 
adjacent corner of the same desert. He believes that the fundamental threat to 
Sudanese stability originates from, or via, the sensitive Darfur region. This thesis 
then contributes to the Brewer’s work by examining the Libyan-Sudanese 
relationships, focusing on Libyan ambitions and machinations in the Darfur region 
after twenty years’ time.  
Helen Young et al (2007) studied the impact of the eruption of the Darfur Crisis in 
2003 on the patterns of Darfurian migrant workers to Libya and their remittance 
flows. How the intrastate conflict in Darfur impacted the livelihoods of Darfurians in 
Libya was also examined. Additionally, the authors focused on the ways in which 
continued changes in Libyan political and economic policies affect migration for 
Sudanese workers from Darfur to Libya in the opposite direction. From an economic 
perspective, Helen Young et al (2007) suggested that understanding of the patterns 
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and mechanisms of migration of the affected Darfurians who work in Libya and their 
remittance flows is vital for any affective international response to resolve the crisis. 
In both the short and long terms, a number of policies that could lead to an 
improvement in conditions for the Darfurian migrant workforce in Libya were 
recommended. Until a resolution to the crisis and peace is achieved, Libya will 
remain an attractive destination for Darfurians. The authors focused on the 
implications of the volatile Libyan economic policies on the stability of the Darfur 
region. This thesis, however, contributes to the Young, Osman and Dale study by 
looking at another aspect of the picture, answering the question of how the Gaddafi 
regime in Tripoli employed this economic approach in its strategy to manage the 
Darfur Crisis, which has not been done by Young, Osman and Dale (2007).  
Study by Yehudet Rone (2011) explores Gaddafi regime’s essential interests and 
involvement in its broader geo-strategic neighbouring region. It also traces the 
chronology of Libya’s relations with Sudan during the period of 1969–2010, 
focusing on Libya’s interests in Sudan in the post-cold war era. Moreover, Rone 
highlights the dramatic shift that had occurred in Tripoli’s regional policies, 
abandoning the Arab world in favour of Africa.  Therefore, this thesis is different to 
Rone’s work. While Rone addressed how Gaddafi viewed the regime in Khartoum as 
well as how Gaddafi was trying to employ Sudan as a neighbouring state, in general, 
to boost his diplomatic and political position in Africa and in Libya’s international 
arenas. This thesis more deeply explores how Gaddafi has used the instability and the 
war in the Darfur region in particular, which first erupted in 2003, as card to achieve 
his strategic ambitions in Sudan and then in Africa and in Libya’s international 
arenas. This thesis highlights the aspect of how Gaddafi was presenting himself as a 
neutral third-party mediator between Sudan’s government and Darfur’s strongest 
armed rebel groups. While he was playing “a dirty game” by adopting the strategy of 
a double standards policy in his dealings with the two fighting parties in Darfur. This 
aspect of knowledge, therefore, has not received sufficient attention by Rone’s 
investigation.   
From the IR theory perspective, this study then adds weight to the international 
argument regarding what effect a third-party state might have on the evolution of 
civil wars? This thesis contends that intervention by regional third parties is central 
to the civil war process. This study demonstrates that regional third-party 
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interventions could be decisive in the evolution of civil war and its duration. 
Furthermore, third-party interventions have a different effect on civil war duration 
and then different outcomes. The results show that regional third-party players, 
especially those who have a common border with the home state of the crisis, could 
prolong the intrastate conflict duration until the supported group achieves military 
victory. Likewise, third-party interventions, on both the government and opposition 
sides, decrease the likelihood of a negotiated settlement shortly.  
One of the interesting findings of this thesis is that the Libyan intervention as a 
regional player under the Gaddafi regime was the most important factor that 
prolonged the duration of the crisis in Darfur and the key obstacle for ending the 
bloodshed and the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, and building peace in Sudan. 
The international community’s duties towards Darfur is not only one of arranging 
peace talks, but it is one of ensuring that the key motivation of involved third-party 
regional interveners in the crisis is to help the conflicted domestic parties to end the 
conflict and reach a permanent peaceful settlement, not to gain advantages from the 
conflict and achieve their own interests.  
This study contributes, therefore, not only to the crisis management and conflict 
resolution field and/or the history of Darfur Crisis literature, but to a range of 
different bodies of areas of study, as this project has engaged with lots of different 
literature and information from other disciplines adopting an interdisciplinary 
approach. In general, the researcher engaged with different fields from international 
relations, conflict resolution, crisis and conflict management, and international 
political economy. Those bodies of literature were categorised and put together 
according to their theme, analytical focus, and conclusions. This research project was 
conducted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for gaining a PhD degree in IR, 
but IR in the researcher’s view is seen as an interdisciplinary field of study to an 
extent, and as such it does not focus on one body of literature and ignore others, but 
can in fact draw on a wide range of literature. The researcher used literature and 
sources of information, where relevant, from a range of fields of study according to 
their utility. What has been conducted, therefore, is an interdisciplinary project. This 
researcher has looked at this particular case study and tried to analysis it in a broad 
way by employing information, methods, theoretical ideas, and literature from 
different disciplines. Hence, the outcomes of this study could provide a solid 
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foundation to improve many of the claims and assumptions or even refute them. This 
research project is incredibly valuable because it has what might be termed “policy 
impact”. The perception it offers may help decision-makers in reducing the negative 
impact generated by the involvement of external states, solving the crisis and 
maintaining peace in a shorter time-frame. 
 
Limitations and Future research 
 
There are a number of limitations which could be addressed in future study. While 
this research will provide greater understanding of how the duration of the internal 
armed conflicts can be influenced by the type and the method of the external state 
involvement, further research is encouraged. The theoretical model developed in this 
study, should be tested further and continuous improvements made for the best 
outcome possible for resolving the political crises and intrastate conflicts in a shorter 
time. Although the validity of the theoretical model here in this thesis is strong and 
seems to be applicable to other cases elsewhere in the world, there is room for 
improvement. Further research could focus on other factors which could be more 
accurately reflect the influence of the external state intervention on the expectation of 
the duration of the intrastate conflicts, and which would hopefully achieve higher 
validity scores.  
Further independent variables, such as the type of political regime ruling the 
intervening state, are warranted to be considered for developing the construct of our 
model. A new version of the original model of this thesis could be completed by 
adding the type of the political regime as another dimension. To do so, we classified 
the type of political regime as being totalitarian. The following propositions are 
recommended for future research:  
 The external interventions by states governed by a democratic political 
regime have a limited influence on prolonging the intrastate conflicts for a 
longer-duration. 
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 The external interventions by states governed by a totalitarian and dictatorial 
political regime have a strong influence on prolonging the crisis for a longer-
duration. 
The type of the external state player also warrants future research. Investigating the 
influence of the extra regional state intervener on the expected duration of the 
intrastate conflicts is encouraged, as this investigation might reflect different 
significant outcomes. Remote countries could have agendas that do not encourage 
them to be heavily involved like neighbouring countries, and therefore their adopted 
mechanisms and the impact on the continuity of the war for a longer period would 
also be different.  
Investigating media coverage as a mechanism of conflict management also warrants 
future research. This study will cast light onto the debate on how the media coverage 
used by the external state interveners (the hostile media effect) can impact the 
termination of civil conflicts and their expected duration.  
Further international research on the impact of external state intervention on the 
expected duration to the intrastate conflicts is needed under the same methodological 
framework used by this research. This research should include other case studies, 
such as addressing the impact of external states’ involvement (such as the USA, 
Russia, Sudan, Iran) in the Libyan 2011 and Syrian 2011 intrastate conflicts to 
compare results internationally and to test the findings of this study beyond its 
geographical scope. Moreover, to establish a truly international practices 
benchmarking index in relation to the impact of external intervention on the duration 
of intrastate conflicts. 
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